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Many academic works have focused on the German occupation of France in the Second 
World War, both from the perspective of the occupiers and the occupied. Only a few monographs 
however had dealt so far with the Italian military occupation of southeastern France between 1940 
and 1943. My dissertation strives to fill this historiographical gap, by analyzing the Italian occupation 
policy established by both Italian civilian and military authorities. Compared to the German 
occupation policy, the Italian occupation was considerably more lenient, as no massacres were 
perpetrated and wanton violence was rare. In fact, the Italian occupation of France contrasts sharply 
with the occupation in the Balkans, where Italians resorted to brutal retaliation in response to guerilla 
activities. Indeed, softer measures in France stemmed from pragmatic reasons, as the Italian army had 
not the manpower to implement a draconian occupation, but also due to an humanitarian mindset, 
especially with regards to the Jewish population in southeastern France. This work endeavors to 
examine the occupation and its impact on southeastern France, especially at a grassroots level, with a 
particular emphasis on the relations between the Italian soldiers and the Italian immigrants in the area. 
Furthermore, much light will be shed on the conflict opposing French officials to Italian ones, and on 
the differences in policy between Italian civilian authorities and Italian military officials. 
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In 1965, a movie opened in Italian theaters called "Italiani Brava Gente" (Italian 
goodfellows). Directed by Giuseppe De Santis, the movie narrated the adventures of an 
Italian unit of the Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Russia (Italian Expeditionary Corps in 
Russia or CSIR) who became firsthand witnesses of German atrocities against the Russian 
civilian population on the Eastern Front in the Second World War. The shocked Italians were 
so horrified by the German actions that the Italians befriended the local Russian population  
and protected it from the Germans' savagery, offering them food and benevolent care. This 
attitude was encapsulated in an iconic moment in the film when a good-natured Italian young 
soldier was killed in a field of sunflowers while shielding an innocent Russian girl from 
crossfire with his body.  
De Santis' movie immortalized one of the central paradigms of postwar Italian 
historiography, that of the Italiani Brava Gente. This self-exonerating myth rested on the 
foundational idea that "the Italian soldier is essentially good-natured, firmly attached to 
family values, even a bit of a "mummy's boy" (mammone); as such, he is incapable of 
performing violence against the defenseless ones, he eschews reprisals, he does not yield to 
the overwhelming brutalities of war."
1
 The movie fuelled the broadly accepted assumption of 
the existence of a moral chasm that separated the supposedly heartless Wehrmacht soldiers, 
always prone to wanton violence, from the supposedly kind soldiers of the Regio Esercito, 
                                                     
1








The paradigm of Italiani Brava Gente was already deeply ingrained into the Italian 
public opinion when De Santis shot his movie. Beginning with the signature of the Armistice 
in September 1943, Italian national unity governments, formed by a coalition of former 
antifascist parties both on the right and left of the political spectrum, sought to underscore the 
moderation of Italian behavior towards the civilians of the countries occupied by the Italian 
army, in marked contrast with the scorched earth policy of the Germans and their brutal 
history of massacres and reprisals. The goal was to demarcate, as much as possible, the new 
Italian state from the Fascist regime and its partner in crime, Nazi Germany. Thus, all the 
atrocities perpetrated by soldiers of the Regio Esercito in the name of Fascist imperialist 
policy became a crime of solely the Fascist regime, and ultimately of its leader, Benito 
Mussolini. The myth was especially effective in solely whitewashing Italian military leaders 
such as Marshall Badoglio and General Mario Roatta, who openly supported the new Italian 
pro-Allies state, the Kingdom of the South. In reality, their occupation policies respectively 
in both Ethiopia (1935-1936)
3
 and the Balkans (1942-1943)
4
 violated the international laws 
                                                     
2 More recently, this myth was reinforced by two films, Gabriele Salvatores' Mediterraneo (1991) and John 
Madden's Captain’s Corelli Mandolin (2001). Both are stories of Italian officers falling in love with Greek 
women on the Aegean islands.  
3 In October 1935, Mussolini, as the first step towards the expansion of an Italian empire in Africa, ordered the 
Italian army to invade Ethiopia from Italian Somaliland and Eritrea. The campaign against a poor-equipped and 
badly trained army lasted only six months. In order to crush the resistance of the Ethiopian army, Italian 
generals Badoglio and Graziani used chemical warfare and indiscriminate bombing against civilians. For more 
on the Italian war crimes in Ethiopia, see Angelo Del Boca, I gas di Mussolini: il fascismo e la guerra d'Etiopia, 
Roma: Riuniti, 1996. The best monograph on the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia is probably H. James 
Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic, Mussolini's conquest of Yugoslavia, 1941-1943, New York: Enigma, 2005.  
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of war. However, the post-Armistice national governments, even those members from leftist 
parties who in the past had severely criticized the Italian army as the docile strongarm of the 
Fascist regime, understood that the support of Italian army upper cadres in the short term was 
crucial to bolster the legitimacy of the new state. New governments needed the support of the 
monarchy and questioning the army policy up to 1943 would have inferred criticizing the 
decisions of the king, as nominally Vittorio Emanuele II was still head of the Regio Esercito. 
Even Leftist parties, such as the Italian Communist Party, the Italian Socialist Party and the 
Partito D'Azione, while sometimes accusing Italian military leaders of war crimes, staunchly 
defended the rank-and-file, portraying them as innocent victims who had been thrown against 
their will into an imperialist war which brought them only misery and death.
5
 
In addition to garnering the approval of the Italian populace, other foreign policy 
factors pushed Italian politicians to put as much distance between the new Italian state and 
the former regime as possible. Italian national governments hoped the peace treaty at the end 
of the war would not be as punitive as expected.
6
 Indeed, at the beginning of 1945, Italy was 
beginning to feel increasingly isolated internationally. In February 1945, the newborn 
Yugoslavian state, headed by the Communist leader Josef Broz Tito, handed a list of forty 
Italian military leaders wanted for crimes committed in the Balkans during the Second World 
                                                                                                                                                                  
4 The Italians invaded Greece in October 1940 and Yugoslavia in April 1941 in an effort to start a Guerra 
Parallela (Parallel War) concurrent to the German expansion in eastern and western Europe. In both 
campaigns though, German intervention was instrumental in bludgeoning local armies into submission. The 
Italians subsequently occupied part of Greece and part of former Yugoslavia, namely the Slovenian and 
Dalmatian coastline, Montenegro and Kosovo. The Germans and the Italians carved out two zones of 
influences in the Balkans, the Germans eager to milk their parts of its resources as quickly as possible, while 
the Italians were also interested in colonizing the zones in preparation for a future annexation.  
5 See Focardi, Filippo and Lutz Klinkhammer, "The question of Fascist Italy's war crimes: the construction of a 
self-acquitting myth (1943-1948)," Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (2004): p.342. 
6 Claudio Pavone, "Introduction" Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (2004): p.272. 
 
 4 
War to the United Nations War Crimes Commission. This unsettling move was worsened not 
only by the news that officers of the Regio Esercito had been executed in August 1944 by the 
Yugoslavs allegedly for their wartime crimes, but also because of the temporary occupation 
from May to June 1945 of Trieste and the Italian region bordering Slovenia by Yugoslavian 
troops.
7
 The Yugoslavian request produced a snowball effect, as other countries such as 
Greece, Albania and France demanded the extradition of Italian war criminals.
8
 The Italian 
political leaders understood that there was more than the fate of a few military officers at 
stake here. By handing over Italian citizens, no matter the gravity of their crimes, the Italian 
state risked losing its precarious legitimacy, as extradition would infer that Italian courts 
were not be able to pass impartial judgments. It is not surprising, then, that all Italian political 
forces, as well as the army and the monarchy, united against the extradition of Italian 
soldiers. The British and the American governments were sympathetic, if just for the 
pragmatic reason that the Italian government and army was becoming an important bulwark 
against the Communist wave threatening to sweep over Europe. The Italian Foreign Ministry 
(the Farnesina) made wide use of the Italiani Brave Gente paradigm, insisting on the "good" 
Italian soldier versus the "bad" German one, putting the blame squarely on the Nazis for any 
atrocities. This myth was also reinforced by the publication of postwar memoirs of several 
Italian military leaders trying to clear their names.
9
 In the words of General Roatta, head of 
                                                     
7 Focardi, Filippo and Lutz Klinkhammer, "The question of Fascist Italy's war crimes: the construction of a self-
acquitting myth (1943-1948)," Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 9, no. 3 (2004): pp.333-335. 
8 Gianni Oliva, "Si ammazza troppo poco," i crimini di guerra italiani 1940-1943, Milano: Mondadori, 2006, 
pp.34-35. The new French Republic requested thirty Italian officials. 
9 For an example of memoirs advancing the idea of a good-natured Italian soldier, see Mario Roatta, Otto 
milioni di baionette, Milano: Mondadori, 1946; Salvatore Loi, Jugoslavia 1941, Torino: Il Nastro Azzurro, 1953; 
Giuseppe Angelini, Fuochi di Bivacco in Croazia, Roma: Tipografia Regionale, 1946 and Giacomo Zanussi, 
Guerra e catastrofe d'Italia, Rome: Corso, 1945, vol.1. 
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the Italian Army in the former Yugoslavian territories, Italian soldiers were at most capable 




Thus, it is unsurprising that, apart from these memoirs, which failed to mention any 
Italian reprisals or massacres, Italian postwar historiography largely ignored the imperialist 
campaigns from of Fascist Italy. More than that, Italian society as a whole chose to ignore the 
1940-1943 years of conflict. This drive to cleanse Italian history of its Fascist period was 
epitomized by the trial in 1953 of a cinema screenwriter, Renzo Renzi, who had sparked a 
debate on the occupation policy in Greece in the cinema magazine, Cinema Nuovo. Renzi, 
himself a veteran of the Greek front, boldly asserted that Italian soldiers had sometimes 
exercised ruthless repression, shooting hostages and civilians in retaliation against partisans' 
attacks. Moreover, the rank-and-file, as much as their officers, had a propensity for dating 
local girls, out of frustration with the Italy's lack of success in its military campaign in 
Greece. Renzi provocatively claimed to be writing the screenplay for a new movie called 
L'armata s'agapò, literally the "Army I Love."
11
 The result was a heated debate in the 
magazine, in which former soldiers of the Greek campaign agreed with Renzi's judgment of 
the Regio Esercito's shortcomings. Not surprisingly, the Army reacted strongly and, in 
September 1953, both Renzi and the magazine's editor, Guido Aristarco, were arrested and 
sentenced to a few months in prison for vilipendio alle Forze Armate (public defamation of 
                                                     
10 Roatta, Otto milioni di baionette, pp.178-179. 
11
 "S'agapò" means "I Love" in Greek and was this nickname was derogatively used by the British to call the 





  In the 1950s, neither the Italian republican state nor its army was 
prepared to reopen this particular "can of worms." 
Up to 1943, The Second World War became simply put, the "forgotten war" in the 
Italian popular subconscious.
13
 Only the most heroic battles or campaigns such as the Battle 
of El Alamein or the retreat of Russia were remembered, thanks to several memoirs.
14
 Few 
history textbooks and no memoirs mentioned the disastrous Battle of the Alps or the failed 
invasion of Greece, let alone the occupation of the Balkans. These dark parts of the story 
were simply forgotten, and attention was directed instead the Italian Resistance and its fights 
against the Nazi and republican fascist forces from 1943 to 1945.  Even the most 
authoritative historian of Fascism, Renzo De Felice, in his monumental biography of the 




The historiography on the Italian military occupations and on the Italian army thus 
dates only from the 1960s. Monographs by Nuto Revelli and Bianca Ceva highlighted the 
war experience as seen from the perspective of the soldiers.
16
 Giorgio Rochat, one of the 
éminences grises of Italian military history, published a book on the Italian army from the 
                                                     
12 For more on the trial, Oliva, "Si ammazza troppo poco," pp.163-169. 
13 The formula is used by Giorgio Rochat in his essay on the shortcomings of Italian military history, Giorgio 
Rochat, "La Guerra di Mussolini, 1940-1943," in Angelo Del Boca, La Storia negata, il revisionismo e il suo uso 
politico, Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2009, pp.151-172. 
14 For more on bibliography on memoirs, Rochat, "La Guerra di Mussolini, 1940-1943," in Del Boca, La Storia 
negata, il revisionismo e il suo uso politico, footnote 3. 
15 Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il Duce, Gli anni del consenso, Torino: Einaudi, 1974; Mussolini l'Alleato: L'Italia in 
guerra, Torino: Einaudi, 1990. 
16
 Nuto Revelli, La strada del davai, Torino: Einaudi, 1966; L'ultimo fronte, Torino: Einaudi, 1971; Bianca Ceva, 
Cinque anni di storia italiana 1940-1945 : da lettere e diari di caduti, Milano: Comunità, 1964.  
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Risorgimento to the fall of Fascism with Giulio Massobrio.
17
 The memoirs of a military 
chaplain of a unit quartered in Croatia, dramatically entitled Santa Messa per i miei fucilati 
(Holy Mass for my Executed), described (without passing judgment) the ruthless war 
between Italian soldiers and Yugoslavian partisans.
18
  
However, the self-exonerating myth of the "good" Italian soldier remained in vogue 
until relatively recently. The first two official monographs by the Historical Office of the 
Italian Army (Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito or USSME) on the military 
occupations in the Balkans, while exhaustively complete in their operational details, glossed 
over the harsher aspects of the policy occupation.
19
 Thus, even decades after the end of the 
war, the darker side of the Italian occupation policy were still a taboo topic. Paralleling 
Italian imperialistic policy with the German one was still problematic, as was demonstrated 
by the reaction of the Italian state to the 1989 BBC documentary called Fascist Legacy.  
Enriched with interviews with famous Italian scholars such as Giorgio Rochat and Angelo 
Del Boca, the documentary stressed the criminal character of the Italian way of war in the 
conflict with Ethiopia in 1935-1936.
20
  
Moreover, it also focused on another controversial campaign of the Regio Esercito: 
the occupation of the Balkans in the Second World War. After the successful invasion of 
                                                     
17 Rochat, Giorgio and Giulio Massobrio, Breve storia dell'esercito italiano, 1861-1943, Torino: Einaudi, 1970.  
18 Pietro Brignoli, Santa Messa per i miei fucilati, Milano: Longanesi, 1973. In truth, Don Brignoli underlined 
that most perpetrators of retaliations and atrocities were members of Blackshirts' units.  
19 For the Greece, see Mario Montanari, L'esercito italiano nella campagna di Grecia, Roma: Ufficio storico, 
Stato maggiore dell'Esercito, 1991. In fact, this book stops at the time where the Greek army capitulates and 
thus does not provide an account of the occupation. For Yugoslavia, Salvatore Loi, Le operazioni  elle  nit  
italiane in Jugoslavia (1941-1943), Roma: Ufficio storico, Stato maggiore dell'Esercito, 1978. This book barely 
made any mention of Italian reprisals, as rightly asserted by Teodoro Sala in his book review, Italia 
Contemporanea, no. 138 (January- March 1980): pp.90-105 
20 Ken Kirby, The Fascist Legacy, BBC, Great Britain, 1989. 
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former Yugoslavia April 1941, the Axis powers carved out their own sphere of influence: the 
Italian took part of Dalmatia (Split, Kotor and the province of Zadar) as the Governorate of 
Dalmatia and part of Slovenia as the Italian Province of Ljubljana. Moreover, over the 
summer of 1941, they military occupied Montenegro and Herzegovina along with part of 
Bosnia. Germany annexed northern and eastern Slovenia, occupied the Serb Banat, as this 
territory had an important ethnic German minority, and established a military protectorate in 
Serbia, based in Belgrade, where it created a puppet state headed by Milan Nedić.  
Arguably, former Yugoslavia quickly became a minefield for the Axis powers. The 
military occupation was made complicated by ancestral enmities between the various 
indigenous nationalities inhabiting the regions. The hatred between Serbians and Croatians 
boiled over. Both sides annihilated each other in a ruthless escalation of violence that spared 
no one, not even women or children. These ethnic wars were exacerbated by political 
conflicts between nationalist and Communist organizations. Serbia in particular was the 
battleground of a merciless fight between the monarchist Chetnik faction and Communist 
partisans led by Josef Tito, the future ruler of postwar Yugoslavia.  
However, Fascist Legacy underlined that the Italians were hardly less ruthless in their 
attitude in the Balkans. Italian units, while combing up remote areas in search of partisans, 
burned down villages and executed hostages in retaliation for partisan attacks, such as the 
razing of the village of Podhum on 12 July 1942. Moreover, they also deported civilians in 
concentration camps, where the internees were packed in insalubrious conditions. The 
powerful indictment of the documentary however never reached the Italian audience. The 
Italian embassy in London filed a formal protest when the movie was broadcasted on British 
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television. More importantly, the RAI, the Italian state television, bought the rights of Fascist 
Legacy, but never showed it in what appeared to be a state censorship.
21
  
However, important steps towards dissipating the fog shrouding the Italian 
occupation policy in the Second World War have been accomplished. Tone Ferenc has shed 
some light on the repression in Slovenia, where the Italian interned more than 20,000 persons 
out of a population of 360,000.
22
 In Italy, Enzo Collotti and Teodoro Sala have emphasized 
the racist and imperialist character of the Italian occupation in former Yugoslavia.
23
 
Historians have increasingly pointed to the infamous Circolare 3C, a directive issued on 1 
March 1942 by General Mario Roatta, head of the Italian Army in the former Yugoslavian 
territories, which decreed a vicious occupation policy of reprisal, summed up in the rallying 
cry "not tooth for a tooth, but a head for a tooth," to crush the partisans' actions.
24
  
In the last decade, important works have been published definitely debunking the 
myth of the Italian buon soldato. Monographs have considerably revised the assumption that 
the Italian male, born to a superior civilization, was by nature incapable of acts of cruelty, 
pointing to the racist undertone of the Italian society which led to the anti-Semitic laws of 
                                                     
21 In fact, the documentary was shown on Italian television only in 2003, and not on the RAI channel, but on a 
minor private one, La7. 
22 Tone Ferenc, There is Not Enough Killing: Condemned to Death, Hostages, Shot in the Ljubljana Province, 
1941- 1943, Ljubljana: Institute for Contemporary History, Society of the Writers of the History of the 
Liberation War, 1999. 
23 Enzo Collotti, "Sulla politica di repressione nei Balcani," in Leonardo Paggi (ed.), La memoria del nazismo 
nell'Europa di oggi, Firenze: Nuova Italia, 1997, pp.181-211; Teodoro Sala wrote several articles on the 
occupation of the Balkans, which have been collected in Teodoro Sala, Il fascismo italiano e gli Slavi del sud, 
Trieste: Irsml Friuli Venezia Giulia, 2008. 
24 A summarized version of the circular is available in Oliva, "Si ammazza troppo poco," pp.173-201. In truth, 
the directive expressly stated that blind retaliations were counterproductive and would force the population 
to side with the partisans. To that effect, for instance, churches, schools, hospitals and public works were not 
to be destroyed in any circumstances. However, its effects should not be underestimated, as the circular 





 or by recounting several massacres perpetrated by the modern Italian army in 
Africa.
26
 The opening of the Yugoslavian archives confirmed the ineffectiveness of the 
Italian army, whose units found themselves embroiled in a fratricidal war between local 
ethnic groups they were unable to control.
27
 Military historians fully acknowledge the 
massacres committed by Italian troops.
28
 Even the USSME published a book on the 
occupation of Slovenia in which he fully acknowledged reprisals by Italian army units.
29
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive work on Italian policy during the Second World 
War is that of an Italian historian, Davide Rodogno, Il Nuovo ordine mediterraneo, which 
lays out in a comprehensive manner the imperialistic ambitions of the Fascist regime and its 
inchoate implementation in the European territories occupied by the Italian army.
30
 Rodogno 
endeavors to describe the characteristics of the idealized Fascist Empire, bearing in mind 
(and the author repeatedly underscores this) that Mussolini and his minions were in no way at 
any moment during the war close to attaining their goal. However, Rodogno insists that an 
examination of the expansionist project, which was the ultimate goal of all Fascist militants, 
would shed important light on the true nature of Italian Fascism and of its leader. 
                                                     
25 David Bidussa, Il mito del bravo italiano, Milano: Il Saggiatore, 1994. 
26 Angelo Del Boca, Italiani, Brava Gente? Vicenza: Neri Pozza, 2005. 
27 Eric Gobetti, L'occupazione allegra. Gli Italiani in Jugoslavia (1941-1943), Roma: Carocci, 2007. The title is 
rather odd, as it stems from the expression "Vesela Okupacija" ("Easy Occupation") used by Communist 
partisans in their stereotypical view of the Italians as mediocre soldiers who should not be taken seriously. In 
fact, his book contradicts this view akin to the Italiani Brava Gente in every aspect.  
28 Giorgio Rochat, Le guerre 1935-1943, Torino: Einaudi, 2005.  
29 Mario Cuzzi, L'occupazione italiana della Slovenia 1941-1943, Roma: Ufficio storico, Stato maggiore 
dell'Esercito, 1998. 
30 Davide Rodogno, Il nuovo ordine mediterraneo, le politiche di occupazione dell'Italia fascista in Europa 
(1940-1943), Torino: Bollati Boringhieri, 2003. For the English translation, Fascism's European Empire, Italian 
occupation during the Second World War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
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The Fascist regime endeavored to create an empire in the Mediterranean area by the 
means of territorial conquests carried out by the Italian army, just as the columns of Roman 
legionaries had done a few centuries earlier. The reach of this new empire would be limited 
to the Mare Nostrum, for the Italians longed to extend their dominion over territories 
bordering the Mediterranean Sea such as Tunisia, Corsica, Dalmatia, the County of Nice and 
Greece. These territories were important for two reasons. both They were of strategic 
significance, having ports which would allow the Italian navy to control the trade routes and 
because many of these regions such as the County of Nice and Dalmatia were the objects of 
older irredentist claims which preceded the Fascist regime. In fact, the New Mediterranean 
Order would be organized much like as the Roman Empire.  
Governors chosen from the hardline Fascist civil servants would rule the newly-
conquered lands as Roman proconsuls. Local populations would be subjected to Fascist laws, 
but in theory they would retain a certain degree of autonomy. In reality, the Italians intended 
to control all aspects of governance. Fascist panegyrists repeatedly asserted that no mixing of 
the New Italian Man with individuals of lesser races would be permitted. Rodogno is 
adamant that Italian Fascist ideology was racial determinist, whereby some races were 
deemed inherently superior to others. The racial scale, which placed the Italic race at the top 
and the Slavs and the Africans at the bottom, explains why, unlike the Ancient Romans, the 
Fascists failed to assimilate local natives into the Italian social fabric. Rodogno rightly asserts 
that the Fascist regime looked upon this expansionist push as a campaign to bring a superior 
civilization to lands which they considered on the fringe of the Western World. This 
patronizing attitude was, in fact, part of the racist mindset of Fascist bureaucrats, who, like 
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twentieth-century conquistadores, sincerely believed that they were fighting a "war of 
liberation" and that it was their moral duty to free the barbaric races from the shackles of 
ignorance. Thus incorporating these people into the Fascist empire, notwithstanding their 
ultimate segregation in the future New Order, was merely doing them the favor of being part, 
as the Italian army would bring a new Pax Romana.   
At the top of the Fascist Empire stood its leader, Benito Mussolini. Rodogno here 
clearly adopts an "intentionalist" approach to define the Fascist regime whereby the major 
foreign policy decisions were first and foremost the product of the aspirations of the Duce. 
Indeed, the new empire gravitated around the figure of Mussolini, the charismatic leader, 
who acted as a condottiere issuing directives and laying out the master plan for the grand 
strategy, occasionally helped in this task by a few military advisors. However, Rodogno 
asserts that this policy formulation did not go only from the center to the periphery, but also 
the other way. Every Italian local ruler and military officer "worked towards the Duce," in 
that they attempted as best as they could to implement the imperialist policy stemming from 
Rome, or significantly, to anticipate the Duce's wishes. This obsession to please their master 
explains, according to the author, the power conflicts within the Fascist regime, as civil 
servants and military leaders in the periphery often pursued their own personal agenda while 
trying to belittle other Italian personnel, all with the intention of anticipating Mussolini's 
wishes and, in doing so, advance themselves. Conflicts erupted especially between civilian 
and military officials, such as the dispute opposing Mussolini's plenipotentiary in Yugoslavia 
Giuseppe Bastianini and the commander of the Second Army Mario Roatta. Bastianini did 
not hide his contempt for the Italian soldiers in the Balkans who he deemed cowards and for 
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their leaders who he lambasted as "mediocre generals."
31
  Rodogno is quick to acknowledge 
that these frictions existed in every dictatorship, even in the Nazi and Soviet regimes. 
However, the system of governance worked in the context of these totalitarian regimes, 
because all the contenders bowed to the charisma of their supreme leader. Indeed the same 
happened in Italy as Mussolini confidently managed and encouraged these quarrels in a 
divide et impera strategy.  
More importantly, according to Rodogno, both the civilian and military cadres in the 
occupied territories, regardless of their personal antipathies and their differences in 
evaluating local situations, worked towards laying the foundations of the new Italian Empire 
without reservation. In light of the increasing opposition in the Balkans on the part of local 
partisans, Italian commanders and governors both issued harsh counterinsurgency directives 
to crush any rebellion. The Circular 3 C issued by Roatta in March 1942 left little ambiguity 
as to the intention of Italian commanders. Unit leaders were given permission to raze villages 
whose population was suspected of helping partisans. Male inhabitants of these villages were 
to be consideredFavoreggiatori (a term that can loosely be translated as accomplices) and as 
such be executed while the remaining population, women, old people and children, were to 
be deported to concentration camps. Italians never implemented a system of extermination 
camps like the Germans did, because their goals were not to annihilate local populations as 
much as to subjugate them, but living conditions in their concentration camps were no less 
atrocious than in the Nazi ones. The concentration camp on the Rab Island in Croatia in 
particular accounted for at least 3,000 dead out of 15,000 inmates. 
                                                     
31 Rodogno, Fascism European's Empire, p.139. 
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But Rodogno's book is especially revisionist on the topic of the saving of Jews by the 
Italian army. Until his book was released, many historians such as Léon Poliakov, Daniel 
Carpi and Jonathan Steinberg asserted that the Italians had voluntarily, and, in some 
instances with considerable success, shielded the Jews both in the Balkans and in France 
from deportation. Italian officials and military officers alike, knowing the fate that would 
await the Jews in German extermination camps, out of compassion and piety actively 
protected them from anti-Semitic round-ups by both Nazis and local population.
32
 Rodogno 
refuses to recognize any humanitarianism in these surprising actions, arguing that the Italians' 
motivations were purely opportunistic and meant as an act of defiance directed against the 
Germans. It was a way to demonstrate Italy's independence vis-a-vis its senior partner and 
the other Axis countries. Moreover, with the coming reversal of alliance, certain elements in 
Italy wished to position itself favorably vis-a-vis  their future allies, hoping that by acting as 
saviors of the Jews in strident opposition to the other Axis powers, it would improve Italy's 
chances.  
In the conclusion of this brilliant work, Rodogno, by underlining the utter failure of 
the Fascist regime to build its own empire, reminds the reader that the Italians could have not 
achieved its expansionist goals without German help and thus their margins of maneuver 
were thin from the start. The Italian regime tried desperately to build its spazio vitale (vital 
space), but it became clear quickly that the Italians lacked the material means, if not the will, 
to achieve the vainglorious ambitions of its leader. Nevertheless, Rodogno believes that 
exploring the ideal empire of the Fascists and in particular their leader Mussolini shed 
                                                     
32 For more see pp.356-359. 
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important light the truly totalitarian nature of the regime, an highlights the many similarities 
between the Italian and Nazi expansionist policy. Indeed, the Fascist regime followed in the 
steps of its senior partner with the economic plundering of the newly-conquered territories, 
the implementation of severe repressive measures, including deportation, and indiscriminate 
reprisals. The blueprint was the same, as German and Italian occupation policies differed 
only on their efficacy, not their overarching goal: the creation of an Empire by means of 
violence which would lead to colonization and the subjugation of other ethnic groups.        
 Rodogno's book was shortly followed by another controversial book on the Italian 
occupation of former Yugoslavia, H. James Burgwyn's monograph, Empire on the Adriatic.
33
 
Arguably one of the most comprehensive studies of the Italian occupation of Yugoslavia, the 
author strives to depict the occupation in its full brutality, with retaliations and reprisals 
carried out in a manner similar to the Germans. Nonetheless, he maintains that the two 
armies differed in at least one important aspect. While the German policy reflected the Nazis' 
ideological and racial belief in their inherent superiority over the conquered population, 
Italian reprisals were borne out of a sense of pragmatism, a dread of a war who turning into a 
logistical and strategic nightmare. For instance, Burgwyn points out the Italian alliance with 
the Četniks, the Serb nationalist fighters, struck in response to their mutual and pressing need 
to unite against the Croatian Ustaša and the Communist partisans. Needless to say, neither 
parties never fully trusted the other and the Italians continued to maintain a patronizing 
attitude toward the Serbs, whom they believed to be a barbaric ethnic group. This symbiotic 
                                                     
33 H. James Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic, Mussolini's conquest of Yugoslavia, 1941-1943, New York: 
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relationship never evolved into a true friendship then and, thus, the Fascist regime had few 
qualms about ordering its army commanders to abandon the Serbs in 1943 as soon as the 
Germans insisted the alliance was going against the Axis interests.
34
  
However half-hearted and shaped by circumstances, this alliance between the Italians 
and the Četniks demonstrates that, contrary to Rodogno's claims, the regime was not as 
monolithic as it appears. Roatta and his commanders pursued a policy of collaboration with 
the Serbian minority in Croatia and Dalmatia, contradicting the grand strategy stemming 
from Rome which instructed them to view the new Croatian state headed by Mussolini's 
protégé Ante Pavelić and the Germans as their only possible allies in the area. Italian 
commanders in the Balkans however disobeyed out of pragmatism, not for ideological 
reasons. The Croatian state, resentful of the Italian protectorate in Dalmatia, which was 
viewed by Croat nationalists as part of a Greater Croatia, had been only paying lip service to 
Italian sovereignty while slowly but steadily trying to usurp their authority over the region. 
At the same time, Communist partisan incursions were wreaking havoc in Italian lines. Thus, 
local Italian commanders struck the alliance with the Serbs as a last attempt to deal with their 
common enemies. This down-to-earth policy was firmly rejected by the Italian governor in 
Dalmatia, Luca Pietromarchi, and by other rabid Fascist officials, who, imbued with anti-
Slav chauvinism, complained that the "unholy" alliance with the Serbs was in flagrant 
disobedience to the Duce's will and risked jeopardizing the Axis balance in the Balkans.     
 These rivalries within the Italian state should not be seen, however, as any form of 
humanitarianism or generosity. Burgwyn posits that Italian commanders quartered in the 
                                                     
34 Marina Cattaruzza, L'Italia ed il confine orientale, 1866-2006, Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006;  
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former Yugoslavia shared a contempt for human life with their German counterparts. If the 
numbers of casualties directly tied to the Italian occupation were not staggering, it was 
because the Regio Esercito, lacked the means, not the will.  Indeed, Burgwyn bluntly argued 
that "the behavior of the regio esercito (sic) in Yugoslavia was at times as beastly as the 
Wehrmacht toward the occupied peoples in that country."
35
 Thus, in his overarching 
argument, Burgwyn fully agrees with Rodogno that the myth of the "good" Italian soldier is a 
fallacy which has not stood the test of time.  
If nothing else, Rodogno's book has the merit of analyzing two occupations often 
neglected until recently: the Italian military occupation of Greece and southeastern France. In 
Greece, German forces occupied the most important cities such as Athens and Thessaloniki, 
along with other crucial strategic areas such as part of Macedonia and Crete Island, the 
Bulgarians took control of Macedonia and Thrace, both long-time territorial claims, and Italy 
occupied the rest, with the Ionian islands which were directly annexed to the Reign of Italy. 
Unfortunately, no monograph exists which focuses solely on the Italian occupation of 
Greece. Mark Mazower's book Inside Hitler's Greece is very limited on the Italian policy and 
deals primarily with the German occupation and little had been written by Italian scholars, 
with the significant exception of Lidia Santarelli.
36
      
The Italian military occupation of France is another topic that has been poorly studied 
until recently. The German occupation from 1940 to 1944 and the establishment of the 
                                                     
35 Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic, p.301. 
36 Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler's Greece: the experience of occupation, 1941-44, New Haven: Yale University 
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collaborationist Vichy regime have been thoroughly dissected by modern historiography. A 
huge body of literature has evolved given us a clear picture of the Années Noires, from a 
political, social and cultural perspective. They are however largely confined to an 
examination of Vichy and of the German occupation.
37
 Only a handful mention the Italian 
military occupation of southeastern France. Even the most comprehensive syntheses on the 
period devote little more than a few pages to the Italian zone.
38
 This absence can be 
explained by the scarcity of monographs on the Italian occupation zone in every language. In 
the Anglo-Saxon academic world, no book has tackled the topic from a holistic perspective, 
as the main aspect which has grabbed the attention of the academic community was the 
extraordinary protection accorded to the Jews by the Italian military and civilian 
authorities.
39
 Even the French and Italian literature have produced little until recently. The 
Italian occupation came under scrutiny in a conference organized by the Istituto Storico della 
Resistenza in Cuneo e provincia (Historical Institute of the Resistance in Cuneo and the 
Cuneo province) in 1976.
40
 The first book specifically on the CIAF (Italian Armistice 
Commission with France), Romain H. Rainero's Mussolini e Pétain, Storia dei rapporti tra 
l'Italia e la Francia di Vichy, was only published in 1990.
41
 Moreover, the impact of Italian 
                                                     
37 For a comprehensive bibliography on Vichy France and the German occupation period, see Julian Jackson, 
France, the Dark Years, 1940-1944, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp.637-646. 
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occupation policy at the grassroots level has been examined at a French departmental level 
only by local French historians.
42
 Nonetheless, in the last years, the historiography on the 
Italian occupation of southeastern France has progressed significantly. The Italian army 
published a voluminous monograph by General Domenico Schipsi, entitled L'occupazione 
italiana dei territori metropolitani francesi (1940-1943), which has bridged a gap in Italian 
military historiography, even though the sheer volume of logistic details makes it difficult to 
read for all but the most expert.
43
 On the French side, Panicacci's book, L'Occupation 
Italienne, Sud-Est de la France, Juin 1940-Septembre 1943, is the first work to provide a 
comprehensive examination of the Italian occupation zone, looking at it from both an Italian 
and a French perspective.
44
  
Thus, my dissertation endeavors to counter the strongly German focus of the 
historiography of the Second World War, and in particular of the occupation of France. The 
Italian perspective, which has been missing from the picture of the Années Noires for a long 
time, deserves the attention of the academic community, for it forces a recognition of the 
different approaches of the Axis partners with regards to the occupation policy. Moreover, I 
strive to examine the Italian military occupation of southeastern France from June 1940 to 
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43 Domenico Schipsi, L’occ pazione italiana  ei territori metropolitani francesi (1940-1943), Roma: Stato 
Magg  re  ell’Eser    , Uff        r   ,   a   Magg  re  ell'Eser    , 2007. 
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September 1943 at different levels. My dissertation looks not just at state-to-state relations 
between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and the Vichy regime, but also at the impact of the 
Italian occupation policy at a grassroots level. Much attention will be focused on the complex 
relations between Italian soldiers and the local population; complex because in some border 
regions, up to one-fourth of the population was Italian or of an Italian heritage.  
Finally, my work engages with the debate about the "Italiani Brava Gente," showing, 
that in striking contrast to Italian policy in the Balkans and Africa and to the German 
occupation of the rest of France, the Italian policy in France was relatively benign in its use 
of repression and instead sought to win over the local population through accommodations 
which lessened the impact of the occupation. Arguably, this softer touch was so not much the 
product of the nature of the Italian soldier than the consequence of a pragmatic approach 
intended to avoid the radicalization of the internal situation in France at a time when the 
inherent weaknesses of the Italian army would not permit it to successfully deal with both an 
Allied invasion and a French uprising. It is also crucial to point out that Italian civilian and 
military authorities strongly disagreed on the policy to be carried out in the French territories. 
Officials from the Italian Armistice Commission with France (CIAF), most of them Foreign 
Ministry functionaries or Fascist representatives, were interested in preparing the ground for 
the future annexation of the contested territories and advocated taking a harsher stance 
generally, but also allowing considerable latitude for native Italian separatist groups. The 
Army, on the other hand, advocated a softer policy in light of the contingencies of the war. 
These divergent policies inevitably clashed and led to inconsistencies in occupation policies. 
In the end, the Army commanders succeeded in enforcing their views and the Italian army 
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followed a more pragmatic policy intended to avoid escalating tension in the Italian 
occupation zone. That is not to say that the Italians did not implement harsh measures to 
curtail any political or military opposition to their rule. In fact, curfews and waves of arrests 
were recurrent throughout the occupation, but the situation never downgraded into open 
confrontation with the local population, except partially in Corsica, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Fascist propaganda had always insisted on its Italian character. 
 It is important to note that on one key matter both Italian civilian officials and 
military commanders converged: the rescue of the Jewish community in the Italian 
occupation zone. Measures were taken to deliberately shield Jews both from both German 
and Vichy's clutches. Fascist officials and military commanders coalesced perhaps moved by 
the plea of the Jewish community, and sent the Jews, most of whom were foreign Jews 
without papers who had flocked in the Italian occupation zone, in Alpine hamlets, protected 
by Italian army soldiers, starting from January 1943. More surprisingly, the entire operation 
was financed by a Jewish banker, Angelo Donati, with the approval of the higher echelons of 
the Fourth Army. This surprising policy, a unique case of an Axis country protecting Jews 
regardless of their nationality, was not dictated merely by a vested interest in demarcating 
Italian policy from the German one, but also by a lack of anti-Semitism within both Italian 
military and civilian circles. 
Ultimately, my thesis suggests that the paradigm enshrined in the Italiani Brava Gente 
shibboleth, is certainly exaggerated even if we evaluate the Italian occupation of France. It is 
true that the military’s policy in France from 1940 to 1943 was particularly lenient, 
especially compared to the subsequent German occupation of the same region, which was 
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replete with atrocities and executions. However, it is crucial to stress that the Italians acted in 
a benevolent way not only out of humanitarian concern, but for pragmatic reasons owing to 
the inherent weaknesses of their occupation army in France. Nevertheless, the humanitarian 
nature of Italian state officials and military officers should not be downplayed. It appears, 
then, that the story of the Italian occupation was more nuanced than the historiography to 
date has posited. The occupation cannot be dismissed as a bland and more ineffective version 
of the German one, but must be recognized as one with its own independent, if at times 
convoluted, goals. This dissertation will shed light on the complexity of the Italian 
occupation of southeastern France, which was of such a different nature than the Italian 
military occupation of the Balkans. 
 
 
For my dissertation, my primary sources are drawn chiefly from in two French 
archives, the Archives Départementales des Alpes-Maritimes (or ADAM) and the Archives 
Départementales des Alpes-de-Haute-Provence (ADAHP). The choice of ADAM is obvious: 
the County of Nice was not only the main irredentist objective in the Italian imperialist 
propaganda, but also a strategic region in terms of the prospective Allied landing. 
Furthermore, it was an interesting test case for a study of the relationships between the Italian 
soldiers and the local population, in light of the fact that one-fourth of its population was 
Italian or of Italian heritage. The rationale behind the ADAHP was to provide contrast: a 
more inland region, a non-strategic area with a smaller Italian minority, but where Italian 
units came to close contact with the French population living in small villages. In fact the 
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Basses-Alpes are an interesting example of how the Italians and the French could cohabit 
peacefully if their mutual suspicions were not fuelled by irredentist propaganda. 
Of course, I also made wide use of Italian archives. The most important for my 
research was the Archivio, Ufficio Storico Stato Maggiore dell' Esercito (AUSSME), 
supplemented by the Microfilm series T-821, found in the Washington National Archives, 
(ARC) where I found not only the directives trickling down from the Fourth Army 
headquarters to the divisions, but also important documents stemming from division and 
regiment commands highlighting endemic issues of the Fourth Army such as low morale and 
slackness. The Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE) provided the 
perspective of the members of the Farnesina, the Foreign Ministry, whose ideological biases 
often clouded their own judgment in evaluating the strategic and political implications of the 
occupation. Their conflict with the Italian military personnel should not be underestimated 
and is well documented in the ASMAE. Finally, I supplemented the AUSSME and ASMAE 
records with some research in the Archivio Centrale dello Stato (ACS), the Italian state 
archives, which were mostly useful for their documents on the Italian Commissariat of 
Menton, providing a close look at the only example of Italianization in France, and for the 
records of the Italian military justice courts in the Second World War. Unfortunately, as 
asserted by Giorgio Rochat, all three archives are severely understaffed and underfunded, 
which made my research sometimes a daunting task, notwithstanding the abnegation of their 
personnel.45  
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We used to be good friends: Italian immigration to Southern France 
and the deterioration of international relations, from the 1930s until 
June 1940 
The territories where the 1940-1943 Italian military occupation would take place, the 
Côte d'Azur and the County of Nice, had always been a cross-border region, in that it had 
shifted between French and Italian hands repeatedly over the centuries. Indeed, since the end 
of the fourteenth century, the southeastern part of France has been traded repeatedly between 
the French kings and the Savoy dynasty which, starting in 1861, would head the modern 
Italian state. More particularly, the County of Nice, which would later form the bulk of the 
Alpes-Maritimes department of France, was firmly a part of the House of Savoy’s territories 
for nearly four centuries (1397-1792).
46
 With the advent of the French Revolution, the Savoy 
region and Nice became part of the French state in 1792. However, in 1815, after the turmoil 
of the Revolutionary Wars, the County of Nice was united with the Kingdom of Piedmont-
Sardinia, thus coming again under the rule of the Savoy monarchy.   
Discontent among the population in Nice flared up in 1851 as the merchant class was 
angered by the Savoy monarch's decision to withdraw the city’s free port status.
47
 The 
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County of Nice ultimately joined the French Empire, not because of an internal revolt, but 
rather as the result of international politics. The King of Piedmont-Sardinia decided to hand 
over Nice and the Savoy territory to the French as a token of gratitude for their help against 
the Austrians in the Second Italian War of Independence (April-July 1859). This decision 
was officially ratified through a plebiscite on 15-16 April 1860, although some Italians, such 
as the national hero Giuseppe Garibaldi, himself born in Nice in 1807, never accepted the 
surrender of Nice and the Savoy.
48
  
The continual shifting of these territories between Italian and French states was 
paralleled by an ebb and flow of Italian migrants in and out of southern France for centuries, 
making this region a peculiar blend of Italian and French culture. In fact, French, Provencal 
and Italian traditions did not evolve separately but intermeshed together in a variety of ways, 
including the dialect, the way of dressing and the way of cooking. Italians had been crossing 
the porous borders into France since the fourteenth century. The majority of Italians coming 
to France were originally mostly skilled people, such as wealthy merchants or talented 
artists.
49
 The creation of the Italian state in 1870 paradoxically amplified this migration. 
Italian Prime Ministers had few resources to address the economic recession that plagued the 
peninsula in the 1870s and 1880s, which, coupled with a rapidly growing population, 
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threatened to disrupt the fragile social fabric of the newborn state.  The Jacini Commission
50
 
attested to the appalling conditions of the Italian agricultural world, where poverty and severe 
malnutrition was endemic, mostly owing to falling agricultural prices. Peasants’ diets 
consisted of “rye bread or bread made out of a mixture of flour, Saracen corn, potatoes or 
walnuts, a bit of polenta (corn meal mush), fermented dairy products, plenty of vegetables, 
almost never any meat or wine, everything badly prepared and even worse cooked.”
51
 Each 
household had its own goats, ewes, sometimes even a few pigs, although almost never a cow, 
due to a lack of fodder.  These cattle were never eaten, as the money made from their sale in 
town markets was a crucial source of income needed to buy basic necessities such as clothes 
and shoes, or to pay taxes.
52
 Rural homes were nothing like the bucolic houses portrayed in 
Renaissance paintings, but were rundown shacks infested with lice, where little light entered, 
and with no sanitation or running water. Small wonder a wave of cholera swept over the 
Cuneo province in 1884. In fact, the problem of public sanitation and hygiene was 
aggravated by the fact that isolated villages were even devoid of fountains. Water had to be 
fetched from mountain streams and brought to the village in buckets. Despite a high infant 
mortality rate, the population was growing at alarming rate owing to an even higher birth 
rate. Since the mountainous Piedmontese regions had experienced few of the transformations 
wrought by the Industrial Revolution, the peasants were still caught by the Malthusian Law 
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 To free themselves from the vicious loop, the Piedmontese peasants looked 
on France as the promised land.  
Beginning in the 1870s, thousands of Italians, most of them from Piedmont, bundles 
on their backs, crossed the French-Italian border, which at that time was no more than a line 
on a map, in search of a better life. The emigrants settled mostly in the departments bordering 
Italy, especially in the Provence region and along the Mediterranean shore. In fact, according 
to the Direction Génerale de la Statistique, the French governmental bureau which 
conducted surveys on Italian immigration from 1876 to 1920, 51,867 and 83,320 Italians 
already resided, respectively, in the Alpes-Maritimes and in the Bouches-Du-Rhône by 1891 
one-fifth and one-ninth of the total population of these departments. The 292,000 Italians 
officially living in France constituted by far the largest group of immigrants, as they 
represented one-fourth of the non-French population.
54
 What is more, these numbers 
probably do not tell the whole truth. In fact, census data was based on the results of the 2 
October 1888 decree which required foreigners wishing to work in France to declare their 
actual residence to French municipalities within fifteen days of their arrival. Thus the data 
greatly underestimated the number of Italian immigrants by not taking into account the 
widespread phenomenon of seasonal immigration.
55
 Especially at the outset of the Italian 
                                                     
53 This theory suggested that the more a population grew, the more its standard of living decreased due to a 
depletion of resources and lower wages. 
54 A primacy they stole from the Belgians at the turn of the century. From 1896 to 1901, the number of Belgian 
immigrants fell from 395,000 to 323,000, while Italians swelled from 292,000 to 330,000. Janine Ponty, 
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migratory wave, immigrants from regions bordering France, fearful of severing all ties to 
their families and compatriots, emigrated for only a few months at most and then returned to 
their respective villages. This migratory trend was the norm in the Mediterranean coastal 
French towns where work in winter abounded in the fast-developing tourism sector. This 
meshed well with the yearly schedule of the highland Piedmont peasantry, whose agricultural 
activities always came to a halt at the outset of the cold season.  
The matching schedule was not the only enticing reason for impoverished rural 
people to come to the southern part of France. The geographical distance separating 
Piedmont from Provence was minimal and this proximity was reinforced by the construction 
in 1860 of a railway line between Marseille and Ventimiglia. What is more, this geographic 
closeness was also reflected in a joint cultural heritage reflected in the similarity between the 
Provencal and Piedmont dialects and in the cooking. This closeness was underpinned by 
common religious practices, as Catholicism was steadfastly strong in both regions.
56
 Most 
importantly, however, the immigrants found in France a place to earn a decent salary, 
sometimes even at the same occupation they had in Italy. In fact, France was in dire need of 
unskilled labor in the 1870s and in the first half of the 1880s, as its economic expansion was 
not matched by demographic growth. The demand was especially strong in the construction 
industry at a time when the Third Republic was improving its road and railway networks. It 
is therefore not surprising that more and more immigrants chose to stay in the Cote d’Azur 
                                                     
56 Rainero, Les Piémontais en Provence, p.71. It should be noted that common religious background alone did 
not guarantee an automatic integration into the French social fabric inasmuch as differences in languages and 
religious traditions were still difficult barriers. See Lu g  Taravella, “La pra  que rel g euse   mme fa  eur 
 ’ n  gra   n,” in Antonio Bechelloni, Michel Dreyfus and Pierre Milza (eds.), L’intégration italienne en France, 
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and in Savoy, thus passing from temporary to permanent workers’ status. Jobs included a 
wide variety of occupations, mostly less skilled occupations where muscle power was 
needed, such as miner, mason and construction worker, or in the leisure industry where 
opportunities for butlers and chambermaids were countless. Moreover Italians, especially 
children, excelled in itinerant employment as chimneysweeps, bear tamers, puppeteers and 
street musicians, even at the end of the nineteenth century.
 57
 
Integration of these Italian immigrants in the last quarter of the nineteenth century 
was not a smooth process. Most of the immigrants were unmarried males, still in their youth, 
in an alien milieu without familial support.
58
 A number of these rootless, young and, for the 
most part, illiterate people fell prey to vices such as prostitution, gambling and heavy 
drinking, sometimes even finding employment in a criminal underworld already thriving in 
that part of France.
59
 Moreover children, most of them from southern Italy, were 
clandestinely transported to France to be exploited in exhausting and dangerous jobs such 
mining and glass manufacturing. The latter industry was one with especially appalling 
conditions: children inhaled toxic fumes daily which resulted in, over the years, almost 
                                                     
57 The tradition of Italian itinerant child performers dated back at least to the sixteenth century. For more on 
their adventurous and often precarious life, see John E. Zucchi, The Little Slaves of the Harp, Italian Street 
Musicians in Nineteenth-Century Paris, London and New York, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Un versity 
Press, 1992. A shining account of the life of Italian wandering immigrants is found in the novel of Hector 
Malot, Sans Famille (1878). 
58 One-third of them were twenty years old or less at the end of the century. It is interesting to note that the 
emigration experience was often seen as an obligatory rite of passage, as much as the military draft. Gabaccia, 
Italy’s Many Diasporas, pp.83-84. 
59 From 1860 to 1939, the Italian population in the department of the Alpes-Maritimes averaged 21 percent of 
the total population and 41 percent of the criminal population. See Virginie Cecchetti, "La criminalité italienne 
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 Young women generally fared little better as they worked for poor 
wages in the textile industries or as prostitutes. One of the only exceptions in the otherwise 
bleak picture of the Italian emigration to France was represented by wet-nurses. Wet-nurses 
were in high demand among the Cote d’Azur upper bourgeoisie as it was considered 
inappropriate for an upper-class woman to breast-feed her children. Therefore, young and 
healthy Piedmontese mothers were brought to France to nourish French toddlers. If, on one 
hand, this experience could be psychologically difficult as the young mother had to leave her 
own toddler to another wet-nurse in her native village, on the other hand, wet-nurses in 
France were paid three times the amount they earned in Italy while enjoying a life well above 
their previous standard of living. After all, a well-fed nurse was the best guarantee of the 
growth of a healthy child.
61
   
Then, beginning in the second half of the 1870s, the western world was hit with an 
economic recession. All the European countries, including France and Italy, reacted by 
raising tariffs. This economic strife fuelled the tension brewing between the French and the 
immigrant workers. As unemployment mounted, the former accused the latter of accepting 
considerably lower wages and poor working conditions, thus robbing them of jobs. The 
Italian workers, few of whom belonged to a union, were labeled briseurs de travail (rate-
breakers) by their French counterparts. The French government did not come to grips with 
the unemployment in a consistent way and instead tried to check the immigrant tide by 
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Baptiste Duroselle and Enrico Serra (eds.), L’emigrazione italiana in Francia prima  el 1914, Milano: Franco 
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enforcing the 8 August 1893 law which required any foreigner who wished to work or start a 
business in France to inform the municipality of the city where he planned to reside and 
forbade employers from hiring immigrant workers not complying with labor regulations.
62
 
This law, ostensibly meant to regulate immigration, was in reality a response to a growing 
French xenophobia at a time of deep economic recession. However, this new law proved 
insufficient to eliminate the tension between the French and Italian communities. Its 
enforcement by French authorities was also at best lukewarm as both building contractors 
and employers lobbied against its implementation for fear that it would considerably lower 
the availability of cheap labor.  
For the vast majority of the French population, these immigrants remained scapegoats 
for all their problems. Italians were framed as boorish, filthy and mischievous. Although the 
Neapolitans only accounted for 20 percent of the population, their particularly unflattering 
reputation tarred all the Italians in the eyes of the French.
63
 This was a minority who had 
integrated less quickly than the Piedmontese or the Tuscans because their way of life and 
culture differed considerably from the Provencal one.
64
 The French population scoffed at 
                                                     
62 All the French immigration laws are carefully scrutinized in Ponty, L’Immigration  ans les Textes, France 
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The friction between the two communities boiled over in the last two decades of the 
century.  The main cause of the worsening ostracism in France was the problematic relations 
between the two countries. Colonial rivalry in Tunisia, the Italian entry into the Triple 
Alliance and the successive economic war waged between Italy and France fuelled 
nationalist anger on both sides of the Alps. Open strife erupted in Marseille in 1881 with the 
so-called “Marseille Vespers,” when spectators cheering a parade of French troops who had 
previously occupied Tunisia turned into a lynch mob, leaving three Italians dead and injuring 
several others. Many other minor episodes of violence against Italians marred the ensuing 
decade.
68
  However, the apex of xenophobic riots came with the infamous incidents of the 
city of Aigues Mortes. The annual salt harvest in August always attracted a large number of 
Italian workers to the small medieval town in the Gard department, despite signs of growing 
hostility from French workers. The French authorities largely ignored the mounting friction. 
This tension suddenly burst into full-scale riot on 16 August 1893 when French and Italian 
salt miners turned on each other.  For two full days, Italian workers were hunted down by 
gangs of Frenchmen, leaving nine dead and several dozens injured, according to official 
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 The massacre caught the attention of the general public; newspapers and French 
politicians openly condemned the senseless massacre. The public's sympathy towards the 
Italians ended abruptly, however, with the assassination of French Republic president Sadi 
Carnot by Italian anarchist Sante Caserio in June 1894. Several “hunts of Italians” were 
organized across France and rioters went so far as to attack Italian consulates and shops.
70
 
Yet these incidents did not seem to discourage the Italian immigrants as their 
numbers swelled in twenty years (1891-1911) from 289,000 to 419,000, thus making the 
Italians the most important immigrant community in France. These numbers, moreover, did 
not reflect the full extent of the Italian tide, as they did not take into account the growing 
number of naturalizations. Two successive laws, passed in 1893 and in 1899, had opened up 
the naturalization process to second- and third-generation immigrants. This renewed exodus 
was owing to a multiplicity of factors. First, the global economy was emerging from 
recession, as was the French one, significantly improving the job market again. Secondly, the 
relationship between the Italians and French dramatically improved at this time. As 
mentioned earlier, Italy had become part of the Triple Alliance in a response to the French 
annexation of Tunisia. However, this alliance could not resolve the tensions between Italy 
and the Austro-Hungarian Empire over the “unredeemed Italian lands,” of Trentino, Venezia 
Giulia and Istria. Italian public opinion unremittingly protested the Dual Monarchy’s 
                                                     
69 French state authorities tended to minimize the incidents in order to play down intercultural tensions. 
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sovereignty over lands which Italian nationalists considered part of the Italian nation.  The 
grudge against the Austrians was not the only reason for a Franco-Italian rapprochement. 
Italy also sought a degree of stability in the Mediterranean area that no country but France 
could guarantee. In January 1902, The French and Italian governments signed an accord 
settling their disagreements over several African territories, outlining their respective spheres 
of influence. This newly cordial relationship between the Latin Sisters was sealed by a 
triumphal Parisian tournée of the King of Italy Vittorio Emanuele III in October 1903. 
Nonetheless we must be careful not to push this argument too far. This more relaxed period 
may have meant that major confrontations between the two communities in France ceased, 
but rooted prejudices and ancestral enmities survived until the end of the Second World War. 
Italian migratory waves were still described as “locust swarms” or “barbaric invasions,” 
while Italian workers were often dismissed as brutish subhumans, not to be trusted and 
naturally inclined to any imaginable vice.
71
 Moreover, in the French collective imagination, 
the Italian peninsula was still belittled as a land of museums and hotels, with a population 
lazily exploiting its history for commercial reasons, but which was in no way capable of 
renewing its past glory.
72
 
The First World War and the postwar years was the zenith of the entente between the 
French population and the Italian migrants. The reversal of Italian policy and the subsequent 
siding with the Triple Entente considerably alleviated French xenophobia. Newspapers and 
journals from both sides of the Alps stressed the Latin character of the two countries, as the 
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72 This myth still thrived in the 1930s. See P erre M lza, “L’ mage  e l’I al e Fasciste dans la France des années 
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cradle of modern civilization cast against the Teutonic barbaric hordes.
73
  Moreover, from the 
outset of the hostilities, thousands of Italian migrants flowed into recruitment offices to join 
the French army. The resulting Légion Garibaldienne, led by a grandson of Garibaldi,
 
fought 
valiantly on the Argonne front in the winter of 1914, losing more than one-fourth of its 
forces.
74
 Although only numbering 3000, an insignificant part of the French forces, their 
bravery provided considerable fuel for the interventionist propaganda in Italy.
75
   In July 
1918, 40,000 Italian soldiers forming the Alpi Brigade were sent to the Marne front, in 
reciprocation for the French and British divisions sent to reinforce the Austro-Italian front 
after the rout of Caporetto. This unit bitterly resisted nineteen German assaults at the 
appalling cost of 5,000 lives and twice as many wounded and missing and was officially 
praised by the French Commander-in-Chief Marshal Pétain. Pétain’s acknowledgment of the 
Italian sacrifice did much to advance friendly relations between the two communities in 
postwar France.  
Besides tearing down the barriers separating the two communities in France through 
the contribution of the Italian units on the French front, the Great War, at least in the short 
term, brought another positive consequence which favored Italian integration in France. The 
French hecatomb in the First World War brought a severe shortage of manpower.
76
 These 
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 1.4 million dead, 1.1 million wounded, with 130,000 of the latter severely maimed. This represented 10.5 
percent of the active population. Pierre George, “L’ mm gra   n   al enne en Fran e  e 1920 à 1939: aspe  s 
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demographic losses and the consequently plummeting birth rate forced French governments 
in the 1920s to explicitly entice new immigrants from countries like Italy and the East 
European nations which were experiencing a demographic explosion.
77
 This pro-immigration 
policy was sealed by a series of bilateral immigration and work agreements with different 
European countries between 1919 and 1920, which gave the Third Republic the cheap labor 
it so dearly needed at a time of heavy infrastructure reconstruction.
78
 Italians spread into 
northeastern France such as Alsace and Lorraine and into southwestern rural France (an 
important source of relief for a region that was experiencing its own rural migration) and of 
course into departments bordering the Alps.
79
 
 What is more, the reputation of the Italian immigrant in the 1920s and 1930s 
improved considerably in the French collective imagination. Italians were deemed faster to 
adapt than, for instance Polish workers, because of the similarity of lifestyle and habits. 
Shared cultural traits favored the assimilation of Italian immigrants into the French social 
fabric. Second and third generations of Italian immigrants were found to excel in the French 
primary school system.
80
 Indeed, Italian migrants were slowly, but gradually, coming to 
consider France as truly their new home, like the Italian worker in Jean Renoir’s movie Toni 
                                                                                                                                                                  
démographiques et sociaux,”  n P erre M lza (e .), Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940, Rome: École française 
de Rome, 1986, p.45. What is more, psychological trauma dramatically curtailed the efficiency of French 
veterans.  
77 For a detailed account of the labor market trend in postwar France, see Mauco, Les Étrangers en France, 
le r rôle  ans l’activité économiq e, chap er V “La s  ua   n  es mar hés du travail en France et en Europe 
après la guerre.“ 
78 A work treaty was signed in Rome, 30 September 1919. France and Italy agreed to give immigrant and local 
workers equal rights and salaries. See Ponty, L’Immigration  ans les Textes, p.126. 
79 An enlightening and succinct account of the immigration process in the interwar years from Italy to 
southwestern France based on the interview of an Italian farmer can be found in Jean Anglade, La vie 
quotidienne des immigrés en France de 1919 à nos jours, Paris: Hachette, 1976, pp.48-63. 
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 Ralph   h r, “L’image  e l’I al en en Fran e en re les  eux guerres," in in Pierre Milza (ed.), Les Italiens en 
France de 1914 à 1940, Rome: École française de Rome, 1986, p.91.  
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(1936) who flatly stated: “Mon pays, c’est le pays qui me donne à bouffer!”(“My country is 
the country that gives me something to eat”).
81
 On the other hand, French employers lauded 
the Italian sense of discipline and handiness at work. They also appreciated the fact that 
Italian workers did not shy away from hard and tiring occupations and would work in 
virtually any conditions.
82
 It is therefore not surprising that the Italian population in France 
nearly doubled in a decade, starting from 450,960 in 1921 and peaking at 808,000 in 1931. 
This massive migration was also encouraged by the progressive restriction of immigration 
policies in the rest of the occidental world, reflecting a rise in nationalism and xenophobia 
after the First World War. Thus, for example, Italian immigration in the United States was 
reduced to a minimal quota of 3,500 workers per year.
83
 
Nevertheless, old prejudices regarding the Italians resurfaced from time to time, 
following the ebb and flow of international politics and economics. The Roaring Twenties 
consolidated Italian-French ties, as much as the Great Depression threatened the two 
communities’ peaceful coexistence in the 1930s. As was the case in the 1880s, in the 1930s, 
Italian workers were no longer seen as peers but as dangerous rivals vying for the few 
available jobs. This xenophobic view was not only shared in working class circles, but 
extended to the upper political echelons, which were quick to ride the demagogic tide. Two 
senators, Prosper Josse and Pierre Rossillion, complained: “If we had not accepted so many 
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foreigners, we wouldn’t have so many unemployed workers […] Foreigners snatch the bread 
out of our mouths.”
84
 Nationalist rhetoric insisted on the staunch principle that French people 
should be given priority in employment.
85
 Those in the liberal professions, such as doctors 
and lawyers, dismissed the Italian professionals as second-rate because they did not 
understand French culture and values and would therefore provide less effective assistance to 
their clients.   This fierce competition fuelled chauvinistic views of the Italians as uneducated 
persons, with little sense of personal hygiene
86
 and little intelligence, not deserving to remain 
on French soil. As well, Italians were viewed as volatile and dangerous, with an excessive 
sense of honor which sparked knife fights over even the most trivial reasons.
87
  
Notwithstanding this old atavistic image of the Italian rooted in the French 
subconscious, the 1920s and the 1930s saw an evolution in Italian immigration to France 
with the arrival of political emigrants fleeing the rise of Mussolini’s regime. Italian political 
immigration in France was not a new phenomenon. Since the 1870s, hundreds of Italian 
anarchists and socialists had fled to France to avoid repression in the Italian kingdom. 
However, the coming to power in 1922 of Benito Mussolini, the Duce, fuelled a marked 
growth in the Italian political diaspora. The new authoritarian Fascist regime admitted no 
political dissent on the peninsula, and had outlawed all political parties but the Partito 
Nazionale Fascista (National Fascist Party or PNF). Political opponents were relentlessly 
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hunted down by the Fascist secret police, the OVRA.
88
 Thousands of anti-Fascists fled to 
France, as the birthplace of the “Rights of Man and Citizen” was deemed the safest haven for 
political refugees. These fuoriusciti (literally "the ones who went outside") created a wide 
network of workers’ cooperatives, friendly societies and Italian unions, often affiliated with 
parallel French organizations. These political exiles found a warm welcome with the Cartel 
des Gauches government of the moment.  
Mussolini was quick to react to the work of the socialist and communist Italian 
refugees by encouraging the creation of Fasci all’Estero (“Fascist Organisations Abroad”).
89
 
The idea behind this project was to channel the sense of national pride created by the Great 
War among Italian emigrants into Fascist organizations, thus advancing Fascist interests 
abroad.  Through its consulates, especially those in Nice and Marseille, the Italian state 
funded a plethora of organizations on French soil, from children’s Balilla and Avanguardisti 
to recreational and leisure activities for adults such as the Opera Nazionale Dopolavoro.
90
 In 
fact, the Italian authorities wanted to recreate in France the same network of associations 
found in Fascist Italy and which ideally would organize the Italian migrants from “cradle to 
grave”. In order to instill a sense of belonging to the Italian patria into the younger 
generations, Italian schools were created in the bigger cities where children were taught the 
economic, cultural and religious history of the Italian peninsula from a Fascist perspective. 
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To further their cause, Italian authorities in France were quick to assist any immigrant family 
in dire straits with food and clothes, a policy which had become common practice during the 
Great Depression and which would be renewed during the Second World War. Moreover, 
Italian officials helped jobless workers to find employment. 
The Italian state even went so far as to offer economic aid and moral support to the 
families of militants wounded or killed by political enemies, as in the case of the leader of the 
Fascio in Paris, Nicola Bonservizi, who was gunned down on 20 February 1924 by a 
fuoriusciti commando. Indeed more than thirty Fascist militants and leaders in France were 
killed between 1924 and 1934,
91
 with the Fascist militants retaliating accordingly. The Italian 
secret police, the OVRA, along with the military secret police, the SIM,
92
 infiltrated agents 
provocateurs into the Communist and Socialist organizations, and the SIM was instrumental 
in the murder of two well-known Socialist figures, the Rosselli brothers, Carlo and Nello, in 
Bagnoles-de-l’Orne on 9 June 1937.
93
 
The significance of this political feud should not be exaggerated. At most, anti-Fascist 
forces in France peaked at 17,000 militants.
94
 It is true that the Italian community was by far 
the most politicized of all the foreign communities in France. Nonetheless, Leftist political 
                                                     
91 Milza, Voyage en Ritalie, pp.288-289. 
92 SIM stands for Servizio Informazioni Militare. 
93 The murder was carried out by hired killers of an extreme right-wing group, the CSAR (Comité Secret 
 ’Action Révol tionnaire), which was partially funded by the Fascist regime. Milza, Voyage en Ritalie, p.314. 
94 Italian postwar scholars, such as Lu g   alva  rell , wr  e  f an “ex  us”  f I al an p l    al expa r a es.   me 
authors maintain that the Italian political diaspora peaked at 200,000 militants. Their judgment seems, 
however, to be clouded by the need in the postwar years to picture the Italian population as profoundly anti-
Fascist. See Pierre Milza, “L’ mm gra   n   al enne en Fran e  ’une guerre à l’au re;  n err ga   ns,   re    ns 
 e re her he e  prem er b lan,”  n Pierre Milza (ed.), Les Italiens en France de 1914 à 1940, pp.29-30. A good 
summary of the evolution of postwar memory in Italy can be found in Claudio Fogu, “I al an  brava gen e,  he 
lega y  f Fas  s  h s  r  al  ul ure  n I al an p l    s  f mem ry,”  n R  har  Ne  Bel w, Wulf Kans e ner an  




militants accounted for only two percent of the active Italian population in France and were 
highly dispersed among different groups ranging from the moderate Giustizia e Libertà to the 
revolutionary Communists. For instance, in the Alpes-Maritimes, out of an Italian population 
of 90,000, only roughly 1,200 belonged to Leftist organizations.
95
 Fascist organizations 
probably did not fare better:  one Fascist official ruefully noted in 1941 that only four percent 
of the total Italian population in the region of Paris belonged to a Fascist organization and 
even less were truly active.
96
 Even in the interwar years, they only numbered approximately 
12,000 active members.  
Until to the late 1920s, the spread of the Fasci was far from successful for several 
reasons: a lack of coordination between the Fasci; the hostility of the Italian diplomatic 
service, still tied to the old Liberal class; the ineffectiveness of the threat of physical 
coercion, a strategy normally applied in Italy; internecine fighting among the Fasci members; 
and very low moral standards. After Mussolini’s seizure of power, many opportunists, and in 
some cases, also criminals swarmed the offices of the Fasci in a typical Italian corsa alla 
tessera (“the rush to the membership card”).
97
 In order to reorganize what had quickly 
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become a dysfunctional organization, the Duce appointed Piero Parini and Dino Grandi to 
head respectively the Fasci (1928) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1929). They 
strengthened the ties between local Fascio branches and Italian diplomatic authorities in 
France, both of which were purged of felons and anti-Fascist officials.
98
  
Fascist organizations (as well as anti-Fascist, for that matter) remained marginal 
compared to a total population of Italians in France, which was nearly one million people, 
plus another million second- and third-generation Italians. Most of the immigrants, fearful of 
possible consequences for their jobs, shied away from any form of political activism. To 
embrace socialist or communist ideas was, at best, frowned upon by French employers and, 
at worst, openly condemned by Italian officials in France. On the other hand, to support 
Fascist organizations was a sure way to be held in contempt by Frenchmen, especially in the 
French border regions such as the Alpes Maritimes which was openly claimed to be Italian 
by Fascist irredentist propaganda. Thus, and this would become even more blatant in the war 
years, most of the immigrants were content to remain apolitical, not an easy feat at a time 
when the surge of ideologies dramatically radicalized politics. To quote an Italian emigrant 
who arrived in France in the interwar years: “Political activism was for those who had 
nothing to do.”
99
  It is highly doubtful, therefore, especially in the case of Fascist 
associations, that all the immigrants who proclaimed themselves active militants did so out of 
ideological zealotry. What might have seemed to be excessive zeal to a casual observer might 
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have been in reality mere deference to local notables or even an easy way to further one’s 
own interests, be it obtaining a passport, a job or goods.
100
 What is more, boundaries between 
economic and political emigration could be very hazy. Some Italians crossed the border to 
flee both poverty and political repression at the same time.
101
  It was not unusual for a worker 
who initially emigrated for political reasons to choose to withdraw from activism, or for an 
emigrant coming to France for purely economic reasons to find himself involved in unions or 
political associations. Finally, it was not unheard of for workers to switch from one political 
side to the other, especially going from Leftist groups to Fascist organizations.
102
  
This opportunistic switching of sides, more commonly and derogatively known in 
Italy as voltagabbana (turncoat), was partly caused by the propaganda of Fascist-endorsed 
organizations. This propaganda campaign had three purposes: to build up a following in the 
Italian diaspora in France which could eventually act as a pressure group lobbying for Fascist 
interests; to counter the fuoriusciti’s propaganda against the Fascist regime; and finally to 
curtail the wave of naturalizations following the 10 August 1927 law
103
 which facilitated the 
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possible assimilation of the second-and third-generation of Italian immigrants.
104
 Italian 
authorities however sometimes had to resort to providing funds for Italian emigrants who 
wished to return to Italy, in an effort to deny these workers to France, a latter policy 
somewhat in contradiction with Mussolini’s desire to create Fascist enclaves abroad. After 
all, the Fascists could not possibly hope to create Fascist hubs outside Italy if, in the 
meantime, they fostered a repatriation campaign.  
In truth, it was also a reflection of the paradox of the Italian expansionist policy. It is 
a truism that since the inception of his regime, Mussolini had aspirations for territorial 
expansion as he sought to annex French or Slavic provinces considered culturally part of 
Italy such as Corsica, Dalmatia and the County of Nice. In fact, the Duce deftly exploited, as 
part of his aggressive foreign policy, a movement rooted in Italian society, the Irredentismo. 
The word stems from irredento, literally "unredeemed," called such because its supporters 
advocated the annexation of territories outside the Italian state, on historical or ethnical 
grounds. The movement became stronger after the First World War, as the Italians were 
frustrated by the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Italy had been handed the Trentino Alto-
Adige and Trieste but had failed to secure Istria and Dalmatia, therefore, Mussolini had only 
to add fuel to the already blazing resentment following the "Mutilated Victory" ("Vittoria 
Mutilata"). 
Moreover, old colonial claims in North Africa re-emerged, such as that on Tunisia. 
This sudden interest in the African continent was motivated by strategic reasons as much as 
by external and internal policy. The Fascist bid for colonies was part of an effort to win over 
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the old Liberal class, by stressing the continuity between Italian Liberal and Fascist 
imperialist policy, as both argued Tunisia in particular held a pivotal strategic role. The 
French colony was deemed paramount to Italian expansion in the Mediterranean area as 
Italian control of Tunisian and Sicilian coasts would strategically cut the Mediterranean Sea 
in half. The push to North Africa was also an important part of the affirmation on the 
international stage that Italy was willing to fight to get what the Fascists thought was a "place 
in the sun."
105
 In other words, Mussolini wanted to bolster Italian international prestige 
through the colonization of African territories. The Fascists encouraged the Italians in France 
to relocate to North African lands, especially their emigrants who were in dire economical 
straits at the time. In fact, the image of poor Italians struggling to make a living abroad 
starkly contrasted with the image of "Great Power" cast worldwide by the Fascist regime. As 
a matter of fact, it appears that the Fascist state never solved the dilemma between bolstering 
the Italian communities in France and repatriating the Italian emigrants as a way to 
demonstrate the new prosperity of the Italian state.
106
  
In any case, the French were certainly not pleased by either policy, seen as 
interference in French internal affairs. The Duce’s boastful annexationist propaganda did 
little to appease French distrust of the new Italian regime, especially at a time when the Front 
Populaire’s politicians openly sympathized with Italian Leftist leaders in France. The Rome 
Accords of January 1935 were themselves emblematic of the different visions embraced by 
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the political authorities in both countries. Mussolini, captivated by the dream of conquest 
since the inception of his regime, strived to revive the myth of the Roman Empire by getting 
a jumpstart via the conquest of the arid Ethiopian lands.
107
 On the other hand, the French 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pierre Laval, sought to appease domestic worries following 
German rearmament by recruiting Italy as a newfound ally, even at the cost of giving 
Mussolini a free hand in Ethiopia.
108
 Such was the desperation of the French government to 
find new international partners in the wake of Hitler’s unilateral decision to rearm that France 
promoted the Stresa Conference in April 1935, where, together with Italy and Britain, it 
reaffirmed its staunch anti-Germanism. Furthermore, France was so upset by the 
reawakening of its old nemesis that Laval was ready to accept the de facto Italian annexation 
of Ethiopia with the Hoare-Laval Pact in December 1935. Only public uproar in France and 
Great Britain over the prospective “sell-out” compelled the two governments to disavow their 
respective Foreign Ministers. 
Mussolini swiftly exploited the Anglo-French wavering over the fate of Ethiopia to 
steer his policy in the direction of undermining the new order created by the Treaty of 
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Versailles. The Duce, as much as his Nazi counterpart, fostered a revisionist foreign policy 
aimed at breaking the status quo stemming from the 1919 Paris Peace conference. Smoothed 
by the nomination of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s son-in-law, as Foreign Minister and 
the simultaneous sacking of the fiercely anti-German undersecretary Fulvio Suvich, this goal 
ultimately led to the signing of the Italian-German friendship treaty in October 1936, 
establishing the nefarious Rome-Berlin Axis. The rapprochement between the two 
dictatorships was sealed by their joint assistance of the Spanish Nationalists in the Spanish 
Civil War, both in terms of men, as 75,000 Italians joined the fray, including a division of 




Current historiography seems to agree that Mussolini’s imperialistic policy played a 
crucial role in heightening the tensions that would eventually lead to the second major 
conflict of the twentieth century.
110
 It also contributed to the growing unrest brooding inside 
the Italian community in France and to a growing tension in Italian-French state relations of 
the 1930s. In the second half of the 1930s, Franco-Italian relations deteriorated markedly 
over the Ethiopian crisis and the Spanish Civil war. France’s hardline stance on the 
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enlargement of the Italian colonial possessions in Africa had severe repercussions in the 
French-Italian border regions. Italian military authorities, backed up by the Fascist 
establishment, began a forced expropriation campaign in the Alps in 1936, officially aimed at 
strengthening the Italian line of Alpine fortifications.
111
 All of the sudden, French shepherds, 
as in the case of the hamlets of Isola and Belvedere in the Alpes-Maritimes, and of 
Lanslebourg, Bramans and Sollières in the Savoy department, ran into painstakingly long 
document checks at the borders and, in the most extreme cases, were sic et simpliciter 
dispossessed of their own pasture land in Italy with little compensation.
112
 These property 
infringements were an effective barometer of the stormy relationship between the “Latin 
Sisters.” Whenever the two countries quarreled on the international stage, Italian military 
authorities tightened their grip, among other things, forbidding the cattle farmers access to 
alpine pastures for example.
113
 On the other hand, on the rare occasions when the 
international tension receded, local Italian commanders relaxed their control, once again 
allowing cattle to be moved up the mountains to graze.
114
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At the same time, Mussolini observed with growing interest the international isolation 
of the French Republic. If nothing else, the Munich Conference laid bare the irresoluteness of 
France and Great Britain in the face of Hitler’s expansionistic demands. There, the French 
and British Prime Ministers, Edouard Daladier and Neville Chamberlain, were so eager to 
avoid war that they sacrificed Czechoslovakia on the altar of peace in September 1938. In 
light of this, the Fascist elites decided to step up their irredentist campaign at once. The 
occasion chosen for the launch of the offensive was a speech delivered by Galeazzo Ciano to 
the Italian parliament on 30 November 1938.  Broadly outlining the Italian strategy, the 
Italian Foreign Minister boomed: “We will defend, with inflexible steadfastness, the interests 
and natural aspirations of the Italian nation.” This menacing statement was clearly aimed at 
Italy’s western neighbor, as the deputies roared in response: “Tunisia, Djibouti, Corsica, 
Nizza.” This event was especially humiliating for France as her new ambassador to Italy, 
André François-Poncet, who was targeted by Fascist militants upon leaving the Parliament 
after Ciano’s speech, had just been accredited the day before.
115
 It quickly became clear that 
the Fascist regime was heading towards a collision with the French Republic with the 
creation of a permanent commission for the repatriation of Italians living abroad (CORI) in 
mid-November 1938. The official goal of the Ciano Commission was clear: bringing back to 
the peninsula all the Italians who wished it, or at least as many as could be accommodated 
given domestic economic needs.  As with most of the decisions made by Mussolini’s regime, 
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prestige was key to understanding the real Fascist motivations behind this change of policy. 
First of all, the return of the emigrants was used as an overt symbol of the relative prosperity 
Mussolini had brought to Italy. Secondly, the Italian regime had to repatriate their most 
militant nationals anyway as they were being expelled by the French prefects. Finally and 
most importantly, Italy hoped to use these people to increase the ranks of its army, while 
simultaneously denying them to a potential enemy army.
116
  
The issue of potential recruits for a future war was also a concern in France. As early 
as 1937, Marc Rucart, the Minister of Justice of the Front Populaire government, argued this 
same point: “I wanted naturalization policy to take into account, primarily, the necessities of 
national defense…”
117
 Thus French authorities responded to the Fascist strategy by 
increasing the number of naturalizations of Italians, with 24,000 naturalized in 1939 and 
18,000 in 1940.
118
 The Italian Ambassador in Paris, Raffaele Guariglia, worriedly noted that 
naturalizations of Italians in 1939 had doubled or even tripled if compared to previous 
years.
119
 Not all the naturalization applications were apparently genuine, however. The 
Italian diplomatic officials complained that some Italian emigrants, who read little French, 
were coerced or tricked into signing papers which tagged them as political refugees, while 
others were lured into enlisting to the French army as a way to fast-track the naturalization 
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 To further disrupt the network based in the Italian consulates, the French 
prefects launched a wave of refoulements, aimed particularly at notorious Fascists or 
consulate collaborators. Significantly, more than half of the expulsions were carried out in 




No wonder then that the Ciano policy of repatriation had only a limited success. 
Between February 1939 and June 1940 only 80,000 Italians living in France and in French 
colonies took advantage of the program, most of them unemployed and single, or ardent 
militants.
122
 Most of the Italians in France had worked hard to build their own capital, be it a 
small company or a house, or had married a French woman. Thus they were reluctant to 
leave. Meanwhile, Daladier responded to the Italian propaganda by touring Corsica and 
Tunisia. On January 1939, Paul Marchandeau, the Minister of Justice, along with the Mayor 
of Nice Paul Médecin, reaffirmed the unequivocally French nature of the County of Nice.
123
 
Manifestations of francité were not the prerogative solely of the French political elite. French 
intellectual circles of Provence voiced their anger in books and academic journals, vilifying 
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the irredentist claim of the supposed Italian character of Nice and highlighting the Provence 
traits of Nice culture and background.
124
  
The mounting international tension inevitably erupted into clashes between the Italian 
and French communities in the Alpes-Maritimes. On 13 April 1939, the arrival of a Fascist 
notable in the Casa Italiana of Saint-Laurent-du-Var brought two hundred people into the 
streets to interrupt the Fascist gathering. Local politicians fuelled this mounting xenophobia 
by requesting the closing of all the Case d’Italia and the abrogation of the 30 September 
1919 treaty which granted immigrants the same social rights of the French workers. The 
spiral of violence was not exclusive to the Alpes-Maritimes department. Incidents ranging 
from the sacking of shops to beatings took place in the Var, the Savoie and the Haute-Savoie 
departments and were spreading at such an alarming rate that Italy's Ambassador Guariglia 
wrote a formal note of protest to the Quai D’Orsay.
125
 
In the 1930s, the shifting system of alliances in the European concert soured the 
relations between Italy and France. The rapprochement of Mussolini's regime with Germany 
deepened the French distrust of Italy. Indeed, the Italians were instrumental in getting the 
French historical nemesis out of the cordon sanitaire built by the Treaty of Versailles. No 
wonder then that this state of tension had severe repercussions on the relations between the 
French and Italian communities in France. To be sure, the decision of the Fascist authorities 
to establish a network of Fascist organizations and agencies aggravated the tension. Yet, all 
these tensions did not erupt in widespread incidents in a region where one-fourth of the 
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population was Italian or had an Italian heritage. The inchoate development in the interwar 
years of the Fasci all'Estero tells much about the nature of the Italian community in France. 
Apart from the already mentioned inherent weaknesses in the Fascist network, the Fascist 
ideology's failure to make inroads among the emigrants demonstrates the degree of 
integration of the Italian minority into the French social fabric. Most emigrants failed to 
radicalize, as they were genuinely grateful to their host nation. This absence of polarization 
within the Italian community, as the fuoriusciti movement weakened due to growing internal 
tensions and the Fascist grassroots movement became increasingly discredited by the dubious 






The Coming of the Second World War and the Battle of the Alps 
 
The Pact of Steel, signed on 22 May 1939, virtually tied the destiny of Italy to that of 
the Nazi dictator, and the Secret Supplementary Protocols undeniably forecasted an alliance 
in the eventuality of a war. Scholars have been puzzled by the fact that the Duce and his 
Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano committed the Fascist regime so deeply to an inherently 
offensive alliance at a time when Italy and its armed forces were anything but prepared for 
war. Mussolini himself understood the state of disarray pervading the Regio Esercito as 
demonstrated by a memorandum handed to Ciano before the May meeting with von 
Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. In it, the Italian dictator insisted on the necessity 
of postponing an eventual confrontation until 1943 for a plethora of economical, military and 
political reasons.
126
 Mussolini, even if sometimes prone to irrational behavior, was no fool.  
Italy lacked the raw materials, such as coal and oil, urgently needed for the operation 
of the Italian Navy which, ironically, was the only armed service capable of securing the 
routes to fuel extraction sites. In fact, Italy’s economy had lagged behind the other Great 
Powers since the nineteenth century. As recently as 1913, the Italian level of industrialization 
per capita was half that of France and one-third of Germany's, and the ratio remained the 
same until the Second World War.
127
  Industrial development was further hindered by the 
government’s resort to autarchic plans. The Fascist Regime was determined to demonstrate 
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that Italy could be self-sufficient in food and industrial production. Owing to the lack of the 
necessary resources, however, the result was disastrous. Severe protectionism undermined 
Italy’s preparation for war, as Italian war industries were not compelled to innovate owing to 
the lack of competition from foreign companies. Italian heavy industries’ production was 
propped up artificially by state-induced demand.
128
 Small wonder that Italy had an industrial 
productivity index far below that of the other Great Powers.  Italy’s financial assets were also 
depleted as the regime had squandered hard currency reserves to fund the war in Ethiopia and 
the intervention in the Spanish conflict. As a result, the Fascist regime was caught in a 
vicious circle: Italy lacked raw materials and needed foreign currency to buy them. In order 
to obtain the currency, the regime was forced to export part of its war production, especially 
from the aviation industry, thereby depleting its already meager armament stocks. These 
structural weaknesses explain Italy’s economic dependence on Germany. The Fascist regime 
had to rely on its senior partner for essential goods in order to upgrade its outdated 
armament.  
Just as Italy was trailing Germany in terms of industrialization, the same could be 
said for the combat power of its armed forces. The qualitative gap separating the armies of 
the two Axis powers stemmed in part from their national histories. The most important 
military theorist of the modern era, Carl Von Clausewitz, wrote in his monumental work On 
War that “the quality of military genius […] depends on the general intellectual development 
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(italics in the original) of a given society.”
129
 In other words, the armed forces of a nation are 
shaped by the characteristics of the society and by the evolution of its political institutions.
130
 
Imperial Germany was built on Prussian victories at arms, which elevated the prestige of its 
army to soaring heights. The unchecked power of the Reichsheer would destabilize the civil-
military relations in the German state in the long run, but in the short term proved to be one 
of the pillars on which the new German state built its international grandeur.
131
 Adolescents 
from impoverished Junker families flocked to military academies as the army became a sure 
means for climbing the social ladder. This praetorian state, where the whole prestige of a 
nation was embodied in its armed forces, bore a striking resemblance to the Roman Empire. 
Unfortunately, the Piedmontese army and its Italian counterpart could not stand up to the 
comparison. The late-nineteenth century Italian army was severely understaffed, despite the 
fact that, in 1860, two-thirds of the officer corps living in Nice and Savoy chose to remain 
faithful to the House of Savoy.
132
 The Piedmont War Minister, General Manfredo Fanti, 
refused to incorporate in toto units of the Garibaldi army or to acknowledge the Bourbon 
army ranks.
133
 Furthermore, the use of the newborn Regio Esercito to quell the brigandage in 
southern Italy affected the Italian army’s prestige; officers and soldiers felt demoted to the 
role of policemen.   
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No monarch on the Italian peninsula could match the military and political expertise 
of Frederick the Great (1712-1786). No Piedmontese general ever equaled the strategic 
shrewdness of Generalfeldmarschall Helmut Von Moltke (1800-1891) who fundamentally 
reformed the General Staff.
134
 In fact, Italy’s chief of general staff from 1927 to 1940, 
Marshall Pietro Badoglio, was nothing more than a ceremonial figure who had no role 
whatsoever in the making of strategy. Until the advent of Field Marshall Ugo Cavallero in 
December 1940 and his reforms of 1941, the Chief of the General Staff did not even have 
staff of his own.
135
 The Duce encouraged this divided and ineffective command structure. He 
refused to implement any inter-service joint command as he feared that the possible accretion 
of power it might entail ultimately could challenge his rule.
136
 Mussolini’s "divide and 
conquer" strategy was helped by longstanding rivalries between the different services. No 
service would have ever wanted to submit to the decisions of an integrated command.
137
 
Thus, every service carried out its own reforms independently, with disastrous results. 
The head of the General Staff of the Army, General Alberto Pariani, for instance, failed to 
foresee the importance of mobile armored warfare. Modern scholars consider his binary 
division scheme in 1938 that reduced the number of infantry regiments in each division from 
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three to two as one of the major reasons for the woeful unpreparedness of the Italian army. It 
was intended to enhance a division’s mobility. The guerra of rapido corso (“war of rapid 
decision”), remained, however, wishful thinking. The reduction in the size of divisions left 
unresolved the chronic shortage of armored vehicles and motorized transport. The actual 
outcomes were to weaken divisional firepower, cause confusion at the tactical level of 
command, and favor rampant careerism as each of the new smaller divisions required a full 
slate of officers and thereby opened opportunities for promotion.
138
 In a nutshell, the “war of 
rapid decision” was only an empty shibboleth which masked the Italian inability to upgrade 
its armaments and to wage anything but a short war due to its extremely limited stocks of 
materiel.
139
   
  If even the most senior political and military leaders would not abandon their 
outdated theories, it should not come as a surprise that only a few junior officers dared to 
criticize such conservative approaches to war. A high level of deference permeated the Regio 
Esercito; the upper echelons discouraged open dissent to the point that, during the war, junior 
officers were loath to take any kind of initiative.
140
  Debates in military journals were 
severely curtailed by censorship. Officers’ submissions had to be approved by the army corps 
commanders in order to be published. Small wonder then that, in the interwar years, there 
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was little debate over tactics and strategy, unlike in the United Kingdom, France or in 
Germany.
141
 Pleas of Italian reformers such as Emilio Canevari (Lo spirito della guerra 
moderna and La lotta delle fanterie, 1935) and Sebastiano Visconti Prasca (La guerra 
decisiva, 1934), which attacked the doctrinal stagnancy of the Italian “army barracks” 
remained largely unheeded.
142
 Italian military theory remained tied to anachronistic trench 
warfare and to Jomini’s paradigm of concentrating the attack on a particular spot in the 
enemy’s presumably static defensive positions.
143
 Reforms to improve mechanization began 
only at the start of 1939. Cadets received poor training in military academies and 
professional development was further marred by practices such as promotions based on 
recommendation, or in the most blatant cases, on outright nepotism.
144
 Ideologically 
motivated efforts to militarize the Fascist society and the need for mass recruitment at the 
time of the Ethiopian campaign rushed the training of future officers, further undermining the 
caliber of the officer corps. Officers of the Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (the 
“Blackshirts”) got transferred to officers’ positions in the army with a mere fifteen days’ 
training. This absurd policy went so far in 1936 as to grant upper bureaucrats such as 
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 Just as the professionalism of the army was deteriorating rapidly, corruption was 
thriving among the most important industries. The conflation of these factors compromised 
the development of the Italian military-industrial complex in the Fascist era. The notion of a 
military-industrial complex was not a new one. Since the 1890s, the Western world had seen 
the rise of command technology, whereby the states funded technological innovation through 
military procurement.
146
 This active collusion of government officials, military elites, and 
arms and heavy industry executives, considered by many scholars as one of the main causes 
of the First World War, was also one of the predominant traits of the Fascist regime.
147
 No 
one embodied these connections more than Ugo Cavallero. Born in 1880 to a noble 
Piedmontese family, Cavallero was assigned to the Army General Staff in the First World 
War. After the conflict, he became general manager of one of the most important industrial 
companies, Pirelli. In 1925, he was appointed Undersecretary of the Ministry of War but, due 
to frictions with General Badoglio, he moved back to the industrial sector, heading the 
metallurgic trust, Ansaldo, from 1929 until his resignation in 1933 when he was accused of 
corruption, following a scandal about poorly made armor ordered by the Regio Esercito.
148
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Cavallero was acquitted and returned to the army in 1937 later to be promoted Chief of the 
Italian Supreme Command from 1940 to 1943.
149
 The 1933 affair was only one of the several 
cases of the unhealthy alliance between Italy’s monopolistic heavy industry conglomerates, 
the upper echelons of the Regio Esercito and the state’s higher bureaucrats. These shadowy 
ties severely compromised the quality of armaments production. The L3 tank and its 
successors remained below par for the entire conflict and the airplanes proved unreliable.
150
 
The inadequacy of Italy’s preparation for war was effectively summarized in a report 
submitted by Badoglio, the Chief of the General Staff, to Mussolini on 1 November 1939. In 
an effort to belittle Pariani’s planning, General Badoglio informed Mussolini that of the 
sixty-three binary divisions formally in existence, only ten were fit to go to war, twenty-two 
were no more than pawns on a battlemap and the remaining divisions were either lacking 
crucial military equipment such as uniforms or ammunition, or were far below strength.
151
 
Given this and the dearth of raw materials plaguing the Italian economy, the Italian army of 
1939 was incapable of sustaining even a limited war. Fascist dignitaries such as Minister of 
Justice Dino Grandi and Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano were well aware that their country 
needed at least two or three more years to fully develop its military potential.
152
 Mussolini 
himself, notwithstanding his hope that the Italian army would eventually be the standard-
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bearer for the new Fascist Italian race, knew that his bellicose rhetoric could only 
momentarily sweep under the rug the inherent weaknesses of the Italian army.
153
  
Small wonder then that Mussolini, after his perusal of the Badoglio report and in light 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939 and the following invasion of Poland, opted 
for a third way, a policy of “non-belligerence.” In truth, “non-belligerence” was more about 
procrastination than any effort to maintain an equal distance from both the Allies and the 
Axis, as was purported. The unequivocal stance of the Fascist regime regarding its German 
counterpart was encapsulated in a letter Mussolini sent Hitler on 5
 
January 1940.  The Duce 
tried again to dissuade the Führer from launching any major campaigns until 1942, but at the 
same time he reiterated Italy’s willingness to remain loyal to its ideological partner. 
Mussolini’s plea to delay a prospective major Axis offensive should not be viewed as part of 
a mediating strategy. Quite obviously, the Duce desired to delay Italy’s entry to war to the 
very end in order to allow the navy, the air force and the army time to modernize. This 
strategy would have maximized Italy’s chances to have a significant impact in the 
forthcoming war.
154
 The surprising alliance in August 1939 of Germany with the USSR 
could have represented the opportunity for which Italy was waiting in order to distance itself 
from German expansionist policy and side with France and Great Britain, a strategy endorsed 
by the Foreign Minister Ciano, who always had been wary of the Führer’s ambitions. On the 
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other hand, the devastating blow the Panzer divisions inflicted on Poland in September 1939 
could not have failed to impress the Duce, at a time when his own army was anything but 
efficient. It is understandable then that Mussolini chose to tolerate the sudden German 
reversal of policy, a decision also confirmed in his memorandum of 31 March 1940. In it, the 
Duce openly advocated Italy’s entry into the conflict, with the goal of breaking the politico-
military encirclement in the Mediterranean. This “March to the Ocean” would be achieved 
through the annexations of the County of Nice, Corsica and some French colonies (Algeria, 
Tunisia, and Djibouti).
155
 Shortly thereafter, the stunning German victories in Scandinavia 
and on the Western front definitely persuaded the Duce that, by siding with the Nazi regime, 
he had bet on the winning horse. Indeed, the Scandinavian campaign of April 1940, which 
flowed smoothly, underlined the capability of the German army to score quick successes 
without any external help. Yet, until May 1940, the Wehrmacht had only vanquished armed 
forces of small countries, not in any way comparable in armaments or number of soldiers to 
their German counterpart. Starting in 10 May 1940, the astounding victory of the Panzer 
divisions in France, however, demonstrated to the whole world that the Blitzkrieg strategy 
could smash into pieces the defensive line of one of the most prepared armies in Europe. 
Instead of focusing on the Maginot Line, the Germans chose to strike through the Ardennes 
with six Panzer divisions. French units in the sector, the 2
nd
 Army of General André Corap 
and the 9
th
 Army of General Charles Huntziger, lacked sufficient men to stop them, as the 
French General Staff had deemed the Ardennes sector, with its steep hills and heavily 
forested areas, utterly impenetrable. The pincer move, therefore, caught the French troops 
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completely unaware and cut through the French defenses like a hot knife through butter.
156
 
Thereafter, the German thrust towards the sea isolated the main ally of the French army, the 
British Expeditionary Force, along with 170,000 French soldiers, in the Dunkerque pocket.  
With the successful unfolding of “Operation Dynamo,” (26 May – 4 June), the Allied forces 
were evacuated across the Channel, thus sealing the fate of France.
157
     
 The astounding victory of the Panzer divisions drove Mussolini to order preparation 
for an immediate invasion of France across the Alps for fear of being denied a share of the 
spoils from the lightning success of the Wehrmacht’s campaign. Participation in the conflict 
was crucial both for domestic reasons (Mussolini’s speeches extensively glorified the vis 
pugnandi or the fighting spirit of the Italian race, which was one of the main characteristics 
of the new Fascist man) and external interests (Mussolini wanted Italy to be fully recognized 
as a first-class power).
158
 Accordingly, the Duce turned a deaf ear to British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill and the American President Franklin Roosevelt who urged that Italy 
remain neutral.
159
 Instead, he persuaded his skeptical generals to wage war by predicting that 
the forthcoming conflict would last a few months at most, and so be over before the strains 
on the Italian military machine overwhelmed it.
160
 Mussolini’s tirades against Britain and 
France in the famous speech from the Palazzo Venezia’s balcony on 10 June 1940 ended all 
illusions of appeasement. The Duce harangued the crowd, booming that “(a) great people is 
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truly such if it considers its own commitments as sacred and does not evade the supreme 
trials which determine the course of history,” then adding “a nation of 45 million is not really 
free without access to the ocean.” By opposing the German and Italian “fertile and young 
nations” against the French and British “sterile and aging nations,” Mussolini officially 
switched Italy from a policy of “non-belligerence” to one of “parallel war.” On that day, Italy 
declared war on France. 
The 31
st
 March Memorandum and the Piazza Venezia tirade both forcefully asserted 
Italian irredentist claims on French territories that were long-standing. The cession of the 
Savoy territories in 1860 had never been completely accepted by nationalists, especially by 
those in the highest echelons of the state. After all, Italian school manuals in the 1860s still 
claimed the County of Nice as Italian territory “under French domination.”
161
 With the rise of 
Mussolini, these territorial claims were made openly by the Fascist intelligentsia. The 
irredentist propaganda campaign, which was disseminated throughout the Côte d’Azur by the 
Marseille and Nice consulates, had seriously eroded relations between the Italian emigrants 
and the local population. In one instance, 21 April 1924, a violent confrontation erupted 
between Nice French and Italian Leftist militants on the one hand and members of the local 
Fascio and pro-Fascist Italian notables on the other over the commemoration of Nicola 
Bonservizi, the head of the Paris Fascio, who had been assassinated a few days before. Only 
                                                     
161
 Auguste Brachet, L’Italie q ’on voit et l’Italie q ’on ne voit pas, Paris: Marion et Flammarion, 1883, p.38, 
cited in Paul Is ar , “Le 11 N vembre 1942”, Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 62 (June 2001): p.189. 
 
 66 




This incident did not stop Fascist irredentist rhetoric propaganda in the department. Il 
Pensiero Latino, a journal established in 1925 and which strictly adhered to the irredentist 
line, was so vehement in its hatred of the fuoriusciti and of the French state that was giving 
them asylum that it was shut down in 1927 by the prefect. Moreover, its director, Giuseppe 
Torre, was tagged as indésirable and expelled from France.
163
 The same fate also befell 
another Fascist agent provocateur, Ricciotti Garibaldi Jr., the grandson of the Italian national 
hero Giuseppe Garibaldi.
164
 An opportunist who double-crossed anti-Fascist organizations by 
unscrupulously playing on his family name, Ricciotti Garibaldi Jr. was arrested by the French 
police in November 1926 and expelled shortly after.
165
  
In the interwar years, southern France had become the main battleground between 
Fascist and anti-Fascist groups. Despite repeated leftist intimidation and attacks,
166
 the Fasci 
in the Alpes-Maritimes grew steadily until the late 1930s, largely due to support obtained 
through the efficient network of Italian state offices and organizations. Not only did the 
Alpes-Maritimes department now boast a consulate in Nice, two vice-consulates in Cannes 
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and Menton, and four consular offices in other cities, it also had six Case degli Italiani 
(Houses of the Italians) in Vence, Grasse, Menton, Beausoleil, Saint-Laurent-du-Var, 
Cannes, and most importantly, Nice.
167
 These buildings acted as foci for the Italian 
communities inasmuch as they favored the activities of Italian state-endorsed 
organizations.
168
 Local French authorities continued to meticulously track the whereabouts of 
irredentist groups.
169
 In fact, they became so anxious about the Italian nationalist campaign 
that they reified the Italian migration wave as part of a scheme by the Fascist regime to 
colonize the French regions bordering Italy.  
The suspiciousness of French state officials infected the local population, thus 
breeding an atmosphere of hostility against the Italians, especially those tied to political 
organizations.
170
 Italian emigrants in France dreaded the coming of a Franco-Italian conflict 
since the “enemy within” myth was spreading as fast as the German divisions. The 
emigrants’ anxieties were well-founded. Prefects’ prerogatives had been extended already by 
the decree of 18 November 1939 which granted them the power to expel or intern 
“individuals who posed a threat to national defense and to public security.”
171
 A top-secret 
dispatch from the Ministry of Interior Albert Sarraut made clear the extent of their new 
authority: “(T)his decree … put in your hands a formidable weapon … a wartime law, 
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implemented for the duration of the war … as long as the war will force us to face 
exceptional circumstances, which, both internally and externally, threatens the national 
safety.”
172
 It was a serious abrogation of the basic tenets of the Rights of Man and Citizen, 
paving the way for the repressive Vichy laws to come. Up to June 1940, this exceptional 
decree was directed against only Leftist activists such as the Italian fuoriusciti, as Fascist 
militants enjoyed immunity thanks to the frantic search by the French government for an 
entente with Mussolini’s regime.
173
 The respite was brief, however. As the rumors of an 
impending Italian attack intensified, the Ministry of Interior issued a secret directive on 14 
May 1940 which instructed the prefects to immediately “neutralize [Italians who were] 




In order to weed out the hostile minority from the majority of Italians who remained 
friendly to their host country, French authorities, in the wake of Mussolini’s declaration of 
war on 10 June 1940, immediately plastered every town and village with posters urging 
Italian residents aged seventeen to sixty to report to the local police by 15 June 1940. In 
police stations, Italian citizens were invited to file a declaration of loyalty, which could entail 
an eventual tour of duty in the French army. The response was overwhelming: in Nice alone, 
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more than 5,000 emigrants flocked to police stations in the first three days.
175
 In the Grasse 
region, 1532 signed the declaration, three of them partially (they refused to serve in the 
French army but agreed to submit to French civil authority). Only six refused.
176
 This kind of 
enthusiastic response was not confined to the Alpes-Maritimes. In the district of Digne-Les-
Bains, the capital of the Basses-Alpes, more than five hundred emigrants, the vast majority of 
the Italian male population, lined up to sign the oath. The same happened in the Forcalquier, 
another of the larger arrondissements in the Basses-Alpes.
177
  
We must be careful not to infer too much from these numbers. At first sight, the 
results could give one the impression of the Italian population unanimously siding, with a 
few exceptions, with their host country, to the point of embracing its fight against their or 
their ancestors’ original country. In most cases, this analysis is probably correct: many 
Italians wanted to show their gratitude to a nation that had granted them political asylum, 
economic prosperity and a chance to build a family. Some of them had even seen their 
children conscripted into the French army. A more careful examination however, reveals a 
more nuanced picture. It could be argued indeed that more than a few Italians filed out of fear 
of possible retaliation if they refused. A few, in bad faith, committed themselves to France 
only to change sides later with the arrival of the Italian occupation force. Such behavior 
would be severely punished after the war by the various Comités d’Épuration.
178
 Finally, a 
minority simply failed to report to the police stations. If some of them, in good faith, were 
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Départementales des Alpes-de-Haute-Provence (hereafter ADAHP) 42 W 81. 
178 The ADAM 318 W series has numerous examples of this kind of conduct. 
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not aware of the authorities’ injunction, and that was particularly true in the most remote 
inland areas where communication was difficult, some of those living in towns deliberately 
refused to heed the order. The French authorities automatically equated this last group with 
the Fascist militants. Some of these emigrants, however, refused to sign, not out of loyalty to 
Mussolini’s regime, but out of fear of the dreadful prospect of having to face relatives and 
friends conscripted into the Italian army. Needless to say, the French bureaucracy eyed these 
recalcitrant emigrants with considerable suspicion. 
French authorities did not wait for the deadline to begin their arrests. In fact, sticking 
to the letter of the 14 May directive, the Prefects opted for a “carrot and stick” strategy. 
Massive round-ups of suspected Fascist militants were carried out at the same time as the 
placards were posted. Starting in the afternoon on 10 June, policemen were hastily 
dispatched to arrest known suspect Italians. This category encompassed any Italian working 
in or volunteering for Italian-state endorsed organizations such as Dante Alighieri and Italian 
schools, and emigrants working for the Italian state (namely in consulates and in the 
Embassy), with the significant exclusion of the few Italians with diplomatic or consular 
status, which immunized them from penalty.
179
 Men were handcuffed, sometimes in front of 
their family, and taken away. A few were even beaten by overzealous policemen or openly 
ridiculed in the streets by hostile crowds. In fact, it was quite miraculous that nobody got 
killed in the frenzied atmosphere that followed the start of the Italian offensive strike through 
the Alps which began on 21 June 1940. The French population was furious over Italy’s attack 
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on France, contemptuously christened “un coup de poignard dans le dos” (“a stab in the 
back”). The figure of the traitorous Italian, by nature a turncoat imbued with Machiavellian 
traits, prone to betraying his old friends for selfish reasons, re-emerged with a vengeance.   
  All those arrested in the Côte d’Azur were first held in the Beziers (Languedoc) 
bullfighting arena, staying there for one full week in appalling conditions. Prisoners were 
forced to sleep in the open in the stands, with little shelter against inclement weather. Food 
was scarce and of dubious quality, while hygienic standards were abysmal as there were only 
six washrooms for three thousand people. Eventually all these prisoners were herded into 
different internment camps, among them Vernet (Ariege) and Saint-Cyprien (Pyrénées-
Orientales).
180
 Both camps antedated the round-ups of Italians and had been run since their 
inception by the French army (Garde Mobile). The St-Cyprien and the Vernet camps had 
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been created in July and October 1939 respectively.
181
 Prior to the arrival of the Italians, they 
had housed a heterogeneous population ranging from convicts with non-political criminal 
records to German and Austrian citizens who had escaped the Nazi regime, foreign 
Communists, namely those who fought with the International Brigades, and Spanish militants 
fleeing after the end of the Spanish Civil War.
182
 Thus, in an ironic twist of fate, Fascist 
militants ended up imprisoned with their hated compatriots, the fuoriusciti. It is unclear if 
their distrust of one another was set aside in light of their common misery. One thing is for 
certain: all endured incredible hardship. In Vernet, prisoners slept in crude shacks with no 
illumination. The lucky ones were given a little hay to build makeshift mattresses; the less 
fortunate slept on wooden planks. The food was tasteless at best and spoiled in the worst 
cases. No cutlery or dishes were provided, so the prisoners had to eat with their hands from 
discarded tins unearthed from the garbage heaps. The men worked six hours daily at road-
building and camp maintenance chores without any kind of protective equipment. As one 
resident explained, “… as regards food, accommodation and hygiene, Vernet was even below 
the level of a Nazi concentration camp.”
183
 Prisoners in Saint-Cyprien, most of them Italians 
from the Southern France departments (Alpes-Maritimes, Bouches-du-Rhone, Basses-Alpes, 
Var), did not fare any better. The Saint-Cyprien camp was twenty-five kilometers from 
Perpignan on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea. This condition exposed the prisoners to 
quite inclement and changeable weather. The combined effect of sand and wind not only 
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reduced the prisoners’ clothes to tatters, but also encouraged skin diseases.
184
 Prisoners slept 
in the damp sand, with a minimal layer of hay as insulation. Food rations, consisting of sticky 
rice, a few vegetables of dubious quality and a fetid soup, were minimal. Lice were so 
widespread they became the most frequent source of conversation among prisoners.
185
 
Nevertheless, what remained engraved in the collective memory of the Vernet and St-
Cyprien prisoners was first and foremost their arbitrary mistreatment by the French military 
jailers. Italians and prisoners of other nationalities alike were constantly humiliated with 
insults, slaps with leather crops and occasional beatings, sometimes resulting in 
hospitalization. Furthermore, the camp guards allegedly profited from a flourishing black 
market in the camp. 
If Mussolini’s declaration of war on 10 June 1940 was the beginning of an ordeal for 
many Italians in France, the same could be said for the Italian armed forces.  To fully 
appreciate the extent of Mussolini’s unrealistic order, one must first understand the degree to 
which the Italian army was still woefully unprepared. The Duce’s military advisors had 
continued to deliver alarming reports. As recently as the end of May, the Army Chief of 
Staff, Marshall Rodolfo Graziani gave a grim picture of the state of the Italian armed forces. 
The forty-nine Italian divisions quartered on Italian soil were inferior in terms of firepower to 
the French divisions, owing to the woeful binary division reform, an inferior number of 
artillery groups in each division (three against the five of the French divisions) and a shortage 
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in artillery and mortar ammunition.
186
 Moreover, echoing the Duce’s 4 May 1940 
Memorandum, Graziani lamented the inadequacy of the obsolete artillery guns which dated 
from the First World War.
187
 The artillery was too cumbersome to be carried up the mule 
tracks to positions where the guns could engage the concrete bunkers dotting the Alps. The 
bulky artillery in fact was only one factor explaining the appalling lack of mobility of the 
Regio Esercito. The Italian army needed twice as many trucks as it had in order to mobilize 
its units. The 12,600 requisitioned trucks they did have were of uneven quality, and to make 
matters worse, all the drivers suffered from poor training.
188
 Italian commanders tried to 
solve the mobility issue with the use of horses and mules, but even the latter, most of which 
came from the warmer climates of southern Italy, proved unreliable.
189
 The Italians were 
trailing not only in terms of infantry and artillery mobility, but also in terms of tanks. 
Graziani alarmingly noted that "the two armored divisions were such only on the paper,” as 
the Italian armed forces could boast only light L3 tanks, seventy medium ones and not a 
single heavy tank or armored car. Thus Graziani ruefully concluded that “(a)s of now, the 
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Army does not possess the armor and general modern equipment that have made possible the 
recent swift German penetration.”
190
 
In truth, the Italian army was not the only one struggling. The Armée des Alpes, the 
French formation that, since October 1939, had the responsibility of guarding the Alpine 
border, had watched its numbers dwindle rapidly between November 1939 and May 1940. 
Units had been relocated to the northeastern front to shore up the Maginot Line Proper 
following the French declaration of war against Germany on 3 September 1939. Thus, the 
Army of the Alps had lost more than half of its troops in six months, falling from 550,000 in 
October 1939 to a mere 175,000 in May 1940, with only 85,000 soldiers ready to fight.
191
 On 
the other side of the Alps, by 10 June 1940 the Italian army boasted nearly 300,000 privates 
and NCOs and more than 12,000 officers, divided into the 4
th
 Army in the northern half of 
the Alps and the 1
st
 Army in the southern half. Therefore, the Gruppo Armate Ovest (Army 
Group West), officially led by the heir to the Italian throne, Umberto di Savoia, Prince of 
Piedmont, but which in reality took orders from the Army Chief of Staff, Marshall Rodolfo 
Graziani, outnumbered the Army of the Alps by three to one.
192
 
Several factors nevertheless compensated for the imbalance of forces. The 
geographical features of the Alps clearly favored defense over attack. In 1860, Cavour and 
Vittorio Emanuele II could not have foreseen that their decision to hand the Savoy and the 
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County of Nice to France would have such grave strategic consequences eighty years later. 
France got the lion’s share of the mountainous land, giving her the advantage in case of an 
Italian attack because of two, or in some cases even three, protective parallel ridges.  The 
High Alps formed a formidable strategic barrier with their steep mountainsides and ravines. 
On the contrary, Piedmont was particularly exposed to possible French attack owing to the 
lack of depth of its mountain range.
193
  
The French army, moreover, did not rely solely on natural barriers. Starting in 1928, 
French military engineers built a network of concrete fortifications on the Alpine crests 
which dominated the entire mountain range. The Ligne Maginot Alpine, unlike its 
northeastern counterpart, the Maginot Line Proper, exploited the jagged natural terrain. 
Therefore, rather than an intricate web of armored forts with an uninterrupted line of 
interlocking fire, the Maginot Line of the Alps featured isolated, concrete-and-steel positions 
for machineguns and other weapons, located so as to command the few access routes and 
mule-paths on the Franco-Italian border, such as the road crossing the Col de Larche in the 
Basses Alpes. The Alpes-Maritimes border, on the other hand, was considerably more porous 
than the northern part of the Alps. For this reason, a wide array of small and medium 
entrenched ouvrages dotted the fortified sector from St. Etienne-de-Tinée to Menton, 
rightfully considered the weakest spot of the Ligne Maginot Alpine.
194
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It would be a mistake, however, to depict the Armée des Alpes as a collection of static 
units waiting passively in bunkers for the enemy’s attack. There were still a number of elite 
Alpine troops available despite the transfer of the rest of their mobile divisions to the 
northern front. The French High Command judiciously acknowledged the importance of the 
section éclaireur-skieurs (ski-scout platoons), or S.E.S., in a possible war in the Alps. These 
deep reconnaissance troops had an intimate knowledge of the mountains as most of them 
were enfants du pays. In June 1940, the S.E.S. would become a constant thorn in the side of 
the Italian formations, with their hit-and-run tactics.
195
 The Italians also had troops who 
excelled in mountaineering: the Alpini and the Guardie alla Frontiera, an Alpine corps 
created in 1937 for the task of manning the defensive network of forts on the Italian side of 
the Alps.
196
 Yet, Graziani himself admitted that the Italian army lacked enough scouting 
units.
197
 In fact, the Italian General Staff was deeply worried about the danger of a French 
attack across the Alps. As early as January 1938, the P.R. 12 (Piano Radunata 12 or Staging 
Plan 12), as well as in its updated versions of April 1939 and March 1940, assumed the 
formations on the Italian western border would take a defensive stance. This prudence 
stemmed from the realization that the French army, at least until May 1940, could boast 
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many more troops in the Alpine region than the Italian army, while the Alpine terrain favored 
attacks from French territory.
198
  
Until the onset of the hostilities, Italian military officials at all levels were dubious 
that the Regio Esercito could effectively penetrate the mountains. Graziani and the Under-
Secretary at the Ministry of War, Ubaldo Soddu, voiced their skepticism at a meeting with 
the Supreme Chief of the Italian General Staff, Marshall Badoglio, on 9 April 1940.
199
 Local 
commanders were concerned as well. In a very insightful report dated 4 June 1940, General 
Luigi Negri, head of the Corpo D’Armata Alpino, confirmed these fears, when he outlined 
the challenges of an attack across the Northern Alpine sector (Baltea – Orco – Sture). He 
stressed that the Italian units would probably meet “serious difficulties of implementing, 
sustaining and supporting the attack, owing to the lack of adequate communications routes 
and of positions accessible to artillery,” while adding that “everywhere the terrain presents 
serious difficulties while favoring the enemy both as concerns the defense and the counter 
maneuver.” He later concluded, that in light of the foul weather in the Alpine peaks, at least 
three months were required to deploy the army in his sector.
200
 
The start of the war also made it glaringly apparent that the Italian chain of command 





 Armies learned of Italy’s entry to war through the radio broadcast of Mussolini’s 
speech, as no one in the Army’s upper echelons had bothered to inform them. Only in the late 
                                                     
198 For more on the evolution of the P.R. 12, see Gallinari, Le Operazioni del giugno 1940 sulle Alpi Occidentali, 
pp.22-38. 
199 Gallinari, Le Operazioni del giugno 1940 sulle Alpi Occidentali, p.42. 
200
 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 500, IT 6673, 
Rapporto Generale Lu g  Negr , “L’Operaz  ne, sue m  al  à e  rgan zzaz  ne,” 4 June 1940.  
 
 79 
evening of 10 June 1940, several hours after Mussolini’s speech, were hostilities formalized 
by a telegram from the Army General Staff.
201
 On the other side of the Alps, General Olry, 
the commander of the Armée des Alpes, did not wait for orders to act. On 10 June 1940, upon 
hearing the Duce’s speech, Olry gave instructions to blow up bridges and railways by 
midnight, using fifty-three tons of explosives, to bar access routes to France. These orders 
were carried out with such thoroughness and speed that many French civilians living near the 
Italian border in Savoy and in the Alpes-Maritimes were cut off in their own retreat.
202
 The 
overzealousness of the military engineers coupled with the sluggish bureaucracy of French 
local authorities helps explain why most of the escaping civilians brought very little luggage, 
as there had been no warning issued. Food supplies and cattle were left behind.  
 The only exception to the chaotic evacuation of the population living near the 
Franco-Italian border was the city of Menton. Because the Mentonese coastal region was 
especially exposed to possible attacks from Italy (the Italian border was only ten kilometers 
away), and with the steady deterioration of Franco-Italian relations, evacuation plans had 
been devised in the second half of the 1930s. Fearing that the massing of three Italian 
divisions near the border was a harbinger of a military invasion, French local authorities 
launched the complete evacuation of Menton, Carnolès and Cap-Martin on the evening of 3 
June, under the codename “Executez Mandrin.” More than 13,000 people, with minimal 
luggage, were transferred in convoys of buses and trucks at first to Cannes and Antibes, and, 
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after a few days, on 7 June, further west in the Pyrenées-Orientales department.
203
 As in 
Savoy, the evacuation was not executed without problems. Local French officials, such as 
policemen and firefighters, who were responsible for protecting both public and private 
goods, were also forcefully evacuated by the French army and the local gendarmerie. In 
order to persuade the skeptical dwellers to leave almost all their belongings, the municipal 
officials in charge of the civilians’ departure stressed that the Alpine Maginot line would 
thwart any Italian strike while in the meantime, French soldiers would guard the houses 
against any possible wrongdoing.
204
 Ironically, it seems that these same soldiers extensively 
looted the homes, especially the most isolated ones.
205
  
If the local French authorities of the Armée des Alpes had known how reluctant the 
Italian General Staff was, they would not have rushed to evacuate the border areas. On 7 June 
1940, a telegram from Superesercito
206
 ordered the Army Group West to keep an “absolute 
defensive behavior both on land and on air,” which meant it was strictly prohibited from 
crossing the border and from shooting, unless provoked.
207
 A telegram on 9 June from the 
SMRE ordered the strengthening of the passive defenses against possible French tank 
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incursions from the Alps.
208
 This paradoxical “war without hostilities,” in the words of 
General Pietro Pintor, the Commander of the 1
st
 Army, was the product of the severe 
shortcomings of the overall Italian strategy. With little room to maneuver due to the severe 
lack of resources and the failure of the Germans to provide information, let alone consult 
with the Italians, the Italian General Staff had a hard time crafting a coherent war policy, 
even for a limited war such as the Battle of the Alps.
209
  
The timidity of the Italian strategy could also be explained by the gross 
overestimation of the strength of the French army made by Italian intelligence. Even a few 
days before the declaration of war, the General Staff was persuaded that “from Geneva to 
Mentone more than 1 million soldiers had been deployed.”
210
 While Italian generals mused 
about possible courses of action to overcome the operational stalemate, on the night of 12 
June, English bombers dropped bombs on Turin while S.E.S. scouting groups engaged Italian 
Alpine outposts in skirmishes.
211
 This bizarre situation, where the nation which had declared 
war not only failed to attack but was exposed to enemy incursions, lasted until 15 June.  
The collapse of the Reynaud government and the immediate appointment of Marshal 
Petain, who was widely known as an advocate of a policy of moderation towards Germany, 
persuaded the hesitant Duce to reverse his strategy in the Alps. On 15 June, Mussolini gave a 
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peremptory order to Army Group West to switch from its defensive posture to an offensive 
stance in three days, a task which would have been daunting even for the Wehrmacht, let 
alone for a poorly mechanized army which lacked even basic equipment. General Badoglio, 
the Supreme Chief of the Italian General Staff, was flabbergasted by the dictum of the Duce. 
The Duce, however, was adamant, as he feared that an eventual Franco-German armistice 
would deprive Italy of the coveted irredentist lands if the Italian army failed to invade French 
territory before the peace talks.
212
 In compliance with the Duce’s orders, two directives 
trickled down from the Italian General Staff to local commanders; the first one gave the 
green light for brief incursions into French territory while the second, by stating that the 
directive P.R. 12 was surpassed by the course of events, instructed the forward units to 
prepare to cross the Alps in case of a possible disintegration of the Armée des Alpes.
213
  
These initiatives, limited as they were, came to a grinding halt shortly thereafter. Late 
in the afternoon of 18 June, Army Group West received another telegram from Superesercito 
that “the hostilities against France had to be immediately suspended upon receipt of this 
order,” while adding that “the preparation for the previously announced West Group’s 
operations [the offensive in the Alps] should continue at the same pace.”
214
 The motivations 
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behind these confused orders still elude scholars.
215
 It certainly highlighted the massive 
unpredictability of Italian strategy and its utter dependence on external events, traits that 
became a leitmotiv of the Italian army’s campaigns in the Second World War. In the short 
term, this unilateral ceasefire only worsened the Regio Esercito’s readiness. When the Italian 
soldiers heard the rumor of a suspension of hostilities, they began to celebrate the end of the 
war and tried to fraternize with their French counterparts. The upper echelons keenly 
understood that these friendly contacts would make it that much more difficult for the 
soldiers to resume fighting.
216
 Front commanders were asked to explain to the rank-and-file 
the “high political reasons” behind the apparently contradictory orders.
217
 
The Duce’s meeting with the Führer in Munich on the 18 June laid bare the weakness 
of Italy's position. Mussolini’s claims on Nice, Corsica and Tunisia were deemed by Hitler to 
be serious nuisances in the delicate armistice negotiations with the French delegation. The 
Italian dictator thus understood that any territorial claim needed to be backed up by a formal 
military occupation before the start of the armistice talks.
218
 For this reason, on 19 June, 
Mussolini immediately issued a counter-order urging Italian troops to seek contact with 
French units and to pursue them in their eventual retreat. This injunction was further 
motivated by the belief, which later proved fatally wrong, that the Armée des Alpes was 
disbanding in light of Pétain’s address on 17 June in which he urged French soldiers to stop 
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 Local commanders deluded themselves with the belief that the French alpine 
army would dissolve as soon as the Italians unleashed their offensive.
220
 As a local 
commander put it, “a strong resistance cannot be anticipated, owing to the shaken morale of 
French Army units.”
221
 These rumors spread like wildfire among the lower ranks: Italian 
officers were already joking with their soldiers about behaving themselves with the French 
girls,
222
 while the Italian General Staff wrongly estimated that the German push towards 
Lyon would compel the French High Command to dismantle their Alpine garrisons.
223
 Thus, 
the Italian units ascended the mountain range in orderly columns and taking few precautions. 
Their purpose was to occupy as much French territory as possible before the armistice was 
signed.  The Italian troops were heading towards certain doom. 
On 21 June, the bewildered Italian troops were overwhelmed by a barrage of 
machinegun and rifle fire, mortar and artillery shells. The Italians, bogged down in the snow 
and taken by surprise, were easy targets for French marksmen perched above. S.E.S. squads 
repeatedly ambushed units on the winding mule trails.
224
  Italian artillery, essential to counter 
the French fortified positions, could not be towed up to the summits, due to inclement 
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weather conditions. In fact, the Italians’ inability to overcome fortified obstacles was 
probably the major operational reason for the Italian’s poor performance in the Battle of the 
Alps. Italian units were short of sappers, had only a minimal knowledge of French gun 
emplacements, and were not helped by Italian air force. Indeed, the chronic lack of 
cooperation between the Regio Esercito and the Aeronautica prevented any kind of 
coordinated assault. Commanders of front-line army units were forbidden to communicate 
directly with their navy or air force counterparts, as all coordination had to be effected 
through the higher level command.
225
 In any event, the air force had its own problems. Pilots 
had to fly in newly-arrived airplanes with little training, and in some cases lacked detailed 
maps of the French border. For the latter reason, and because of heavy fog and recurrent 
blizzards, half of the bombers in missions over the Alps between the 21 and 24 June did not 
even locate their objectives.
226
 In some cases, Italian airplanes bombed their own troops.
227
 
The stormy Alpine weather was probably the best ally the French had. Apart from 
nullifying any possible threats from the sky, heavy snowfalls slowed the Italian progress to a 
snail’s pace. Italian troops’ morale plummeted as much as did Alpine temperatures. At night, 
temperatures sank far below the freezing point, forcing soldiers to huddle together in 
makeshift shelters which, in almost every case, were torn away by the howling wind. As 
blankets froze, shivering Italian soldiers were unable to rest, while their French counterparts 
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were protected in casemates. With little rest, no shelter and thick fog, it is truly remarkable 
that any Italian units managed to mount assaults on the French positions.  
If the Alpine climate strained the soldiers’ will to its very limit, it also disrupted the 
logistics of the Regio Esercito. As Italian units had only a few days to ready themselves for 
battle, they couldn’t stockpile food and ammunition supplies in the forward area. The 
weather, moreover, prevented any provisioning through motorized means. Forward units, cut 
off from their supply lines, were literally starving. Wounded soldiers had to be carried by 
stretcher down the precarious slopes to the units’ main base. In fact, many local commanders 
complained that the stormy weather did not permit the units’ headquarters to be moved up 




From 22 to 24 June, the battle raged along the whole Alpine border.  On the northern 
half of the front, Italian troops were bogged down by the combination of fierce French 
resistance and extreme weather, to the point that, by the time of the armistice, they had 
penetrated only four kilometers into French territory. In the south, units of the Regio Esercito 
enjoyed more clement weather and were less hindered by terrain. Therefore, in the Alpes-
Maritimes, the Italian army was able to score some minor successes, even though the 
advance into French territory was hardly a promenade. To compensate for the greater 
geographical vulnerability there, the French had built a multi-layered cordon of fortifications 
supported by 38,000 soldiers. On the other side, the Regio Esercito mustered five divisions 
(Cuneo, Ravenna, Modena, Cosseria and Cremona) split between the III Corpo D'Armata 
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(Army Corps or CA) and the XV CA, with two additional ones in reserve (Cacciatori delle 
Alpi and Torino motorized division), totaling 80,000 soldiers. On 22 June, Italian troops 
succeeded in breaking through the Roja valley, occupying the village of Fontan. Further 
south, the Cosseria division was given the order to advance towards Nice, one of the key 
irredentist targets, supported on the right wing by Alpine troops coming down from the 
Vesubie valley and on the left wing by a sea landing of marine troops at the back of the 
fortifications line. The two roads (corniches) leading to the capital of the Alpes-Maritimes 
were closely watched by several French artillery bunkers, among them those in Cap-Martin, 
Roquebrune and on Mont Agel. On 22 June, Italian invading columns were halted there by a 
hail of shells. In the meantime, the planned amphibious operation petered out due to 
logistical problems.
229
 On 23 June, units from the Cosseria division, shielded by the foggy 
night, bypassed the French fortifications and entered Menton. After furious street combat, the 
French withdrew from the “City of Lemons,” except for the one impregnable fortified 
casemate at St Louis bridge.
230
   
While combat raged in France, armistice talks were firmly underway in Rethondes. If, 
in light of the crushing military defeat, the French meekly accepted the German 
conditions,
231
 they resented the Italian demands. The head of the French delegation, General 
Hutzinger, clearly stated that the French government would not accept the occupation of his 
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territory by a nation “which had never won against France.”
232
 This hardline stance was not 
only motivated by genuine national pride, but was part of a strategy to play the two Axis 
allies against each other. The French flattered the Germans, while, at the same time, belittled 
the Italian war effort. The Vichy government was fearful that France would be “polonized,” 
divided in two between the Germans and the Italians. In fact, these fears were not unjustified. 
Mussolini was pushing for the Italian military occupation of French territory streching from 
the Alps to the Rhone, along with Corsica and Tunisia.
233
 The French resoluteness paid off in 
the end: Hitler, worried that the Italian territorial claims would derail the negotiations, 
softened the Italian demands. On 21 June, Mussolini and his General Staff agreed to limit the 
military occupation of the territories to those conquered in the offensive strike.
234
 The 
Führer’s will however was not the only reason for Mussolini’s acquienscence. The Chief of 
the General Staff Badoglio cautioned the Duce that the possible occupation of southern 
France would tie up at least fifteen divisions, a luxury the Italian army could not afford.
235
 
Mussolini and his military advisors, moreover, could not ignore the disastrous result of the 
Battle of the Alps.
236
 Italian casualties reached 631 official dead and 616 missing while the 
French had suffered only 37 dead. If nothing else, the disparity in the body count shows that 
the attacks were as ineffective as they had been costly in human life. The occupation of 
Menton was the only success of any significance for the Italians.  
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Why did the Italian army fare so poorly in the Battle of the Alps?  Unquestionably, 
the daunting terrain and climate were dominant factors. Blizzards and fogs hampered any 
form of reconnoitering, an essential procedure for artillery preparation.
237
 Entire squads got 
lost or fell prey to avalanches. Snowstorms became so intense that the Italian soldiers had to 
wear their gasmasks to breathe. The Italian push was constantly slowed down by snow on the 
higher ground and quagmires in the valleys. These conditions should not however obscure 
the appalling condition of the Italian army at the onset of war. The only type of tank widely 
available, the L3, was too light to cross road obstacles and too poorly armored to resist 
landmines. In one case, a leading tank hit a landmine strategically placed on a narrow road 
which was the only way up a cliff, thus halting the whole column. The tanks following, 
unable to move and badly exposed, were mercilessly dispatched by French artillery 
barrage.
238
 In another instance, a tank battalion came to an halt when two tanks became 
entangled in barbed wire, followed by another which, upon trying to outflank the obstacle, hit 
a mine, and another which ended up in a ditch on the other side of the road. Yet another two 
suffered engine failure.
239
   
The Italian soldier was sent to fight with poor materiel. Infantry rifles such as the 
91/38 model, whose mechanism froze in cold temperatures, were still commonplace in the 
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Alpine corps. Indeed, this type of rifle proved so inaccurate that it earned the ironic nickname 
of “Il Pietoso” (“The Merciful”).
240
 Moreover, Italian troops were equipped with uniforms in 
lanital, a surrogate for wool (lana in Italian) derived from the casein. This new textile, a 
product of the autarchic Fascist policies, resulted in shoddy clothes which offered little 
protection against frigid temperatures while wearing out easily. Italian soldiers were so 
underequipped that some lacked even socks or waterproof boots.
241
 Non-alpine divisions in 
particular went to fight dressed in a thin coat and flannel shirt.
242
 The non-fatal casualty 
figures of 2,631 wounded and 2,151 cases of frostbite, show that Italian soldiers fell prey as 
much to the cold weather as to bullets and shells. Italian officers desperately repeated the 
pleas of their subordinates, like Captain Notari of the Superga Division, who wrote: “almost 
all the soldiers were afflicted by dysentery. Several cases of frostbite or frozen limbs. We are 
in the middle of a blizzard.  Supplies are running short. I cannot communicate with anyone, 
all radios are broken. […] The whole battalion is almost collapsing, as it has been 24 hours in 
open snow. […] Another night in the same conditions would be difficult to endure.”
243
    
 In truth, the morale among Italian troops was already low before the start of the 
conflict. The rank-and-file had been puzzled by the period of “non-belligerence,” not 
understanding why, after years of flamboyant speeches about the new Italian warrior race, 
the Duce in 1939 had decided to sideline Italy.
244
 Soldiers had the impression that Italy 
would never enter the conflict. Discipline was lax as a “peace mentality” spread among the 
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ranks of the Regio Esercito.
245
 The Italian Alpine troops moreover had been fraternizing with 
the Chasseurs Alpins until a few hours before the beginning of hostilities. It had not been 
uncommon to see relatives from both armies chatting over hot coffee and grappa.
246
 The 
prospect of fighting their neighbors in a war that many Alpini considered of dubious merit, 
left Italian soldiers appalled.  
Moreover, instead of using the prewar period to strengthen and train troops, the 
Italian High Command had disbanded entire regiments and cut back the strength of several 
divisions.
247
 Extended leaves were granted to recruits living in rural areas during harvesting 
season. This policy depleted the officer corps so much that the Regio Esercito was short of 
twenty percent of regular officers (Ufficiali in Servizio Permanente Effettivo or S.P.E.) on the 
eve of hostilities. This deficit was tackled by the two-pronged policy of speeding the 
promotion of junior officers and NCOs while also recalling reserve officers (Ufficiali di 
Complemento). Not surprisingly, these moves considerably lowered the quality of the Italian 
officer corps, as junior officers were given responsibilities far beyond their level of 
competence and reserve officers were of very uneven quality, some having not served in the 
Army for one or even two decades.
248
  
Certainly, the quality of the High Command was no better. Instead of concentrating 
the attacks on a salient in order to unlock the Alpine Maginot Line, the Army’s upper 
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echelons chose to divide the attacking forces over a wider area.
249
 The various columns had a 
hard time coordinating their attacks due to the almost complete malfunctioning of their 
radios, the batteries of which froze in the Alpine cold.
250
 Poor communications led to serious 
tactical blunders. For example, on 21 June, at 2 p.m., the Corpo d’Armata Alpino Command 
sent out the news, later confirmed by the headquarters of the Taurinense division, that the 
French fort of Traversette, which overlooked the crossing of the Saint-Bernard pass towards 
the town of Bourg-Saint-Maurice, had been captured by an Italian company of the Alpine 
battalion Aosta.  This information seemed to be confirmed by the fact that the Fort of the 
Traversette was on the receiving end of artillery strikes from another French outpost, the Fort 
of the Falconnière. However, this piece of information proved to be completely wrong as 
later discovered by Italian units crossing the Saint-Bernard pass: the French were still in 




The worst error committed by the Italian army commanders was their 
underestimation of the French army. Italian military officials at all levels shared the mistaken 
illusion that the Armée des Alpes was on the verge of collapse. Even after suffering the 
French artillery barrage on 21 June, Italian commanders were still persuaded that the “enemy 
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 Roatta’s unrealistic proposal to parachute soldiers behind the 
French lines on 23 June in order to link with the southbound German army illustrates the 
extent to which the upper echelons of the Italian army were stymied. That the French were 
anything but resigned to the defeat was clear by 21 June when Lieutenant-General Marcalli, 
one of the sub-commanders in the 4
th
 Army, drily noted in the war diary of the IV Army 
corps, that “the enemy not only does not show signs of retreat, but reacts with increasing 
violence by the hour, disrupting the liaisons, suspending communications and inflicting 
casualties.”
253
 Historians in fact have mused about the outstanding performance of the Armée 
des Alpes in June 1940. Apart from widespread agreement on the strategic acumen of 
General Olry, it would appear that the Alpine forces benefitted from the fact that the French 
General Staff, chiefly preoccupied with the German menace, paid little attention to Alpine 
front. This “strategic and administrative isolation” explains why the debacle in Northern 
France had few repercussions on the French Alpine army.
254
 Thus, the French success in 
southern France was more than a mere baroud d’honneur and it had earned them the Italians' 
respect. For instance, the garrison of Chasseurs Alpins in the already mentioned Fort of the 
Traversette, also known as the Redoute Ruinée, held in check an entire Italian division for 
four days, without any resupply in food or ammunition. The Italians were so impressed by 
such a display of enduring forbearance that they authorized the garrison to march out the fort, 
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with their own individual armament, between two wings of Italian soldiers who granted the 
men the honors of war.
255
  
The importance of the Battle of the Alps should not be underestimated. First of all, it 
revealed in all its dramatic evidence the weakness of the Italian army at all levels. Materiel 
was scarce and of dubious quality, and this recurrent weakness throughout the war was 
matched by the lack of training and the overall poor quality of an officer corps still tied to 
their caste privileges and largely consisting of hastily-trained reservists. Second, the 
appalling performance in the Alps set the tone for the disastrous Italian campaign in the 
Second World War. The Italian army's prestige was considerably tarnished by not having 
been able to defeat the French units in the Alps. Even if the invasion through the Alps was 
objectively a difficult task at a tactical level due to the jagged peaks and the dreadful weather 
conditions, the comparison with the blazing push of the German army in nothern France was 
unforgiving. Moreover, the botched offensive strike severely undermined the morale of the 
Italian soldiers as well as their trust in their cadres and in the decisions of the Duce. Finally, 
the Italian setback fuelled French contempt for the Italians. The Italians had tried to 
shamelessly exploit the state of extreme exhaustion in the French army with the coup de 
poignard dans le dos, and, in the eyes of the French population, had been justly punished for 
their treacherous move. In fact, this odium for the Regio Esercito will be later confirmed in 
the first months of the occupation after November 1942. 
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The Armistice period (June 1940-November 1942): the role of the 
CIAF  
 
Aware of sitting at the table of the negotiations only by the grace of the Führer, and 
perhaps ashamed by the disappointing results of the Battle of the Alps, the Italians came to 
the Italian-French armistice talks, which took place on 23-24 June 1940 in Villa Incisa, with 
an unexpectedly moderate set of demands. Indeed, the French delegation, headed by 
General Charles Huntziger, was quite surprised by the temperance of their Italian 
counterparts, after experiencing the one-sided Franco-German negotiations which ended 
with the Rethondes Diktat. Indeed, in the Rethondes train, the Nazi dignitaries had dealt 
France a humiliating blow in a clear revanchist spirit. France was stripped of its army, its 
economic resources and half of its territory. Moreover, more than one million prisoners of 
war were sent to Germany to labor camps. The Armistice at Villa Incisa, on the other hand, 
copied only the less severe clauses of the Franco-German armistice, such as the 
demobilization of the French army, the docking of the disarmed warships in French ports, 
and the obligation to store in depots all war materiel, but lacked the most punitive articles 
of the Rethondes armistice such as the enormous indemnities imposed to cover the cost of 
the occupation troops.
256
 At Villa Incisa, the French delegation was actually allowed to 
voice its opinion on several topics addressed by the first draft of the armistice. Manifold 
issues were smoothed over, in many cases to the advantage of France. For instance, in the 
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final armistice document, no mention was made of the irredentist claims raised only a few 




 As a matter of fact, it was agreed that the 
Italian army would occupy only the territory which had been seized in the Battle of the 
Alps. The armistice pushed back the Franco-Italian border, known as the Green Line, but at 
most a mere ten kilometers inside the old border. This small strip of land was mainly dotted 
with pastures and a few rural villages, with only one medium-sized town, Menton in the 
Alpes-Maritimes. To ensure a buffer zone in the eventuality of future conflicts, Article 3 of 
the Armistice compelled the French army to demilitarize the area up to a distance of fifty 
kilometers as the crow flies from the occupied territories, a border to be known as the 
Purple Line. Finally, at the behest of the Italian General Staff, Italian troops were permitted 
to cross the Green Line in order to facilitate the transportations of supplies to remote Italian 
outposts. This logistics line (the Red Line) would spark several conflicts between Italian 
officers and French local authorities. In all, thirteen communes were occupied: nine in the 
region of Savoy
258
 (Séez, Montvalezan, Sainte-Foy, Bessans, Bramans, Lanslevillard, 
Lanslebourg, Termignon, Sollières), two in the Hautes-Alpes (Mont-Genèvre and Ristolas) 
and two in the Alpes-Maritimes (Menton and Fontan). Additionally, small parts of land 
were seized in other communes, especially in the Alpes-Maritimes.
259
 In the end, the Italian 
occupation zone spanned 82,217 hectares and in theory encompassed a population of more 
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 (See Map 1) However, it is safe to assume that most of the population, 
especially in the case of Menton, had already fled before the beginning of the conflict. The 
Battle of the Alps gave the Italians little land, most of which was devoid of inhabitants, at a 
staggering cost in human lives.  
One of the biggest consequences of the Armistice of Villa Incisa was the creation of 
the Commissione di Armistizio con la Francia (CIAF), which would play a major role in the 
Italian occupation of France. As underlined by Article XXIII, the CIAF was given the task 
of “overseeing and controlling […] the enforcement of the present Armistice Convention.” 
A few days after the signing of the Armistice, on 27 June 1940, the Duce issued an 
ordinance which officially sanctioned the existence of the CIAF. The new commission fell 
under the direct command of the Italian General Staff.
261
 Its structure, housed in its 
headquarters in Turin, was pyramidal, with as its president General Pietro Pintor, 
Commander of the First Italian Army in the Battle of the Alps until December 1940, 
followed by General Camillo Grossi until June 1941 and finally, from 16 June 1941 to 9 
September 1943, General Arturo Vacca Maggiolini. Below it were four Under-
Commissions: three for each army service (Army, Navy and the Air Force) and one called 
General Affairs, responsible for the protection of Italian citizens in non-occupied France.
262
 
The Presidency's role was to issue general directives, rule on general matters, interpret the 
Armistice clauses and manage relations with the German Armistice Commission (CTA) 
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and Vichy. The President charged the Under-Commissions with more specific questions 
pertaining to their field, and the Under-Commissions themselves delegated their tasks to 
different bureaus both in Metropolitan France and in its colonial territories. With the 
Wiesbaden accords (29 June), the two Axis powers had delineated their respective sphere of 
influence in the Zone Libre, the French territory governed by the Vichy regime. The Italian 
zone was delimited on the Western border by the Rhone, and on the northern side by the 
Savoy region.
263
 Thus, the CIAF Under-Commissions established delegations in a zone 
which roughly corresponded to the one the Italian army would occupy in November 1942. 
The Navy Under-Commission enjoyed permanent delegations in three major ports, Toulon, 
Ajaccio, and Bizerte, where it could keep an eye on the French Navy. Similarly, an Army 
office was established in Gap (Hautes-Alpes) to oversee the demilitarization of the Alpine 
border. French military installations had to be rendered inoperable by the dismantlement of 
the artillery guns and French engineers were ordered to remove all minefields and 
roadblocks. As a buffer, a fifty kilometers-deep demilitarized zone was created. Moreover, 
several other Army offices were created in relevant cities, such as Chambery, Annecy, 
Valence, Marseille and Nice to check French army depots and to supervise the French 
troops’ demobilization.
264
 In fact, Italian authorities were especially worried about a 
possible resurgence of a French threat, an idea which would soon become an obsessive 
leitmotiv until the end of the Italian occupation in September 1943. The Italian General 
Staff of the Armed Forces, the Comando Supremo, was so suspicious of an eventual 
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resurrection of the French Army, it insisted that the Regio Esercito check police rosters, 
especially to “ensure that soldiers do not disguise themselves as civil servants.”
265
 The 
worries of the Italians of a revanchist spirit within the French army were confirmed by the 
nomination at the head of the French delegation of Turin of Admiral André Duplat, the 
former commander of the French Mediterranean fleet which had successfully carried out 
bombing attacks on the port of Genova a few days after the beginning of the hostilities. 
Duplat was a staunch believer in a strategy of antagonizing the Italians as much as possible 
and of procrastinating on Italian demands, arguing either that the dire condition of the 
French economy made certain demands impossible or quibbling about details and the 
interpretation of the Armistice clauses.
266
 After all, the French delegation estimated that, in 
the “land of Machiavelli”, the best tactic to get the best results from the negotiations was to 
tackle the issues indirectly.
267
 
The Armistice of Villa Incisa was meant only to deal with the most urgent matters, 
primarily military questions, such as the disarmament of the French army. It is clear then, 
that, in the beginning, the CIAF served only a military function, as confirmed by its first 
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roster, in large part military personnel.
268
 The vast majority of the twenty-six articles of the 
Armistice Convention dealt with military issues such as the demilitarization of the French 
army and of its fortresses on the Alpine border which needed urgent clarifications. In fact, 
aside for the few articles announcing the creation of the CIAF, only Article XXI, which 
stated that Italian military and civilian prisoners in French prisons should be handed over to 
the Italian army, had any political relevance. This shortsightedness likely originated from 
the staunch Italian conviction that the war would end quickly. Confident that the 
forthcoming Battle of Britain was the last campaign of the war, the Duce was looking 
forward to a peace treaty which would sanction the expansion of Italy in Europe, a wish he 
and Ciano repeatedly reasserted in the manifold meetings with Hitler and Von Ribbentrop 
in the second half of 1940.
269
 Thus, they were willing to wait to the aftermath of the conflict 
for the settlement of the political questions such as their territorial claims on the County of 
Nice.  
The definitive postponement of the invasion of Britain upset Mussolini’s master 
plan as the end of the war seemed not so imminent. Nonetheless, the Duce’s ambition to 
incorporate Corsica and the County of Nice into the Italian state had not been tempered by 
the poor military results in the Alps. The Italians insisted unremittingly on their territorial 
claims, as they feared Germany and Vichy might form an alliance to the detriment of the 
Fascist regime. In truth, the Italian worries were not exaggerated. The successful resistance 
by the French naval forces against Anglo-Gaullist forces in Mers-el-Kebir (14 July 1940) 
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and Dakar (23 September 1940) persuaded Nazi officials that French colonial troops would 
remain loyal to Marshall Pétain and could thus represent an important element in the 
control of trade routes to the colonies. Therefore, in the Brenner Pass meeting in October, 
while giving assurance to the Duce that his territorial claims would not get unheeded, Hitler 
reaffirmed the importance of co-opting France into an anti-British alliance.
270
 Albeit in a 
veiled way, Hitler let the Duce understand that he would not subordinate his grand strategy 
to the aspirations of his junior partner. 
Thus, the alarming scenario of being sidelined by her senior partner to the benefit of 
France was slowly materializing in the last months of 1940. On 24 October 1940, the 
famous handshake between Hitler and the Marshall Pétain in Montoire formalized France’s 
entrance “into the path of collaboration.” Notwithstanding the fact that the meeting had no 
tangible consequences for German-French relations, its symbolic meaning cannot be 
overrated. Vichy had actively sought to launch a new relationship with the Nazi regime. 
The negotiations between Germany and France emboldened Vichy officials to resist Italian 
wishes. The French authorities, both civilian and military, countered by using any kind of 
excuse to delay the implementation of the Armistice. For instance, French military 
weaponry, ammunition and materiel, which in theory had to be stocked in depots under 
Italian surveillance (Articles X and XI of the Armistice of Villa Incisa), were concealed in 
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In light of the evolving political situation, the Italians counterattacked in several 
ways. First, Italian newspapers, encouraged by the Fascist establishment, started a massive 
campaign advocating the annexation of territories. Fascist panegyrists pompously predicted 
that “after the death of the French front, Nice, the Savoy region, Corsica, Tunisia, the 
French Coast of Somaliland, and other territories [could already be considered as] being 
returned to Italy or in the process of….”
272
 Ezio Maria Gray, the Vice-President of the 
Chamber of Deputies, went even further by boldly titling his rather biased historical 
account, published in 1941, Le terre nostre ritornano… Malta – Corsica – Nizza (Our lands 
return…Malta – Corsica – Nice).
273
 Others gloated that it was about time that Italy got her 
revenge for the Vittoria Mutilata (Mutilated Victory) of the Versailles Treaty.
274
 
More importantly, the CIAF gradually expanded its prerogatives. With the 
acknowledgement that the war would not end shortly, the CIAF was asked to tackle issues 
not strictly pertaining to the military field. As a matter of fact, until November 1942, the 
CIAF rapidly became the sole Italian interlocutor available to French authorities to discuss 
political, economic, military and financial matters.
275
 For instance, the CIAF was 
instrumental in securing the economic deal, struck on 23 August 1940, by which Italy 
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agreed to trade food for raw materials such as iron, aluminum and coal, which were dearly 
needed by the Italian war industry. However, accords were a rarity between the two 
countries. Notwithstanding the fact that this deal was freely negotiated by both parties, 
unlike the arbitrary requisitions imposed by the German Armistice, economic relations 
failed to coalesce. Italy and France accused each other of inflating their prices, but the real 
reason behind the failure was likely French resistance to the idea of feeding the Italian war 
effort with their own raw materials.
276
  
However, it is in the political domain that the CIAF was most interested in 
expanding its influence. Its strategy was twofold: on one hand, it wanted to win over the 
local Italian population; on the other, it wanted to challenge the French state on its own turf 
to compromise its sovereignty. Both strategies were geared toward the common goal of 
preparing the ground for a future Italian annexation. In fact, it would not be an exaggeration 
to state that the incorporation of the Provence and the French colonies into the Italian 
empire as the main raison d'être of the CIAF. However, CIAF officials had little to work 
with. The countries were still formally at war and, thus at least at the beginning, no 
consulate in the Zone Libre could be reopened. The Franco-Italian Armistice text made no 
mention of any bilateral relations outside military affairs. The only excuse CIAF officials 
could use to impinge on French internal affairs was Article XXI of the Armistice. In it, the 
Italian state had demanded the immediate liberation and subsequent handing over to Italian 
military authorities all “the prisoners of war and the Italian civilians interned, arrested or 
condemned for political or military reasons or for any deed in favor of the Italian 
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government.” The second part of the Article XXI had granted the Italian government “the 
right to request the handing over of any given person with Italian citizenship at the signing 
of the Armistice, … who lived in French non-occupied territory.”
277
 If the first half of the 
Article was aimed at liberating Fascist militants, alleged or otherwise, detained in camps 
such as Vernet and Saint-Cyprien, the second part of the article was more controversial. 
General Huntziger vigorously protested it to his Italian counterpart, General Badoglio, 
arguing that it would violate the right of political asylum France had given to Italian exiles 
in the thirties. The French delegation tried to minimize the reach of the article by stressing 
its one-time effect: only Italians who had been interned in concentration camps before the 
Armistice fell within the range of Article XXI. Moreover, they argued, Italians freed by the 
French authorities should be repatriated immediately. Conversely, the CIAF retorted that 
the French state could not deny any Italian the right to stay on French soil if he was willing 
to return to his home. As long as the Armistice was valid, the Italian state claimed the right 
to intervene at any moment “during the whole armistice period to prevent all limitations to 
the personal freedom of the Italian citizens for reasons connected to the state of war or for 
acts or feelings in favor of their country.”
278
 In other words, the CIAF would not accept any 
arrests or discrimination based solely on political or ethnic reasons for the duration of the 
Armistice.
279
 Arguably, much more was at stake than simply the fate of the few Italians on 
French soil. The French delegation understood that the Italians were using the only political 
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article of the Armistice to wrest for itself part of French sovereignty by challenging the 
French arrests. Clearly, CIAF officials were seeking to delegitimize Vichy as much as they 
were endeavouring to protect their compatriots.  
The ratification of the Armistice did not immediately ameliorate the fate of the 
Italians held in internment camps. Some prisoners chose not to wait for the Italian 
authorities to act: they petitioned at once to the prefect of their department of residence for 
their liberation.
280
 Some French camp commanders acted on their own volition, shrewdly 
guessing that, in light of the stalemate in Franco-Italian talks regarding the interpretation of 
Article XXI, many prisoners would resort to anything to recover their freedom. 
Commanders gave "their" Italians the opportunity to return to their homes in France and 
resume their lives, on the condition that they signed a declaration of loyalty to France 
issued by the camp commanders. By signing it, the prisoner explicitly claimed political 
asylum and thus was de facto seen to be relinquishing their Italian nationality.
281
 Many 
witnesses reported that the camp commanders used openly menacing arguments in order to 
break the most stubborn. Men were told they would not be able to see their families again 
unless they signed the declaration. Interestingly, notwithstanding their near unanimous 
desire to continue to live on French soil, it appears that most of the prisoners refused to fold 
under the pressure of the blackmail.
282
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The prisoners' hardline stance was probably the consequence of the CIAF campaign 
to have Article XXI enforced. Beginning in early July, two Italian military commissions, 
headed by Colonel Edmondo De Renzi and Lieutenant Enrico Giglioli, visited the 
internment camps and provided a preliminary report of the appalling conditions, prompting 
the Italian state to demand the immediate release of all Italian prisoners.
283
 After mid-July, 
French authorities began to comply, starting with the prisoners who had large families or 
who had been wrongly accused of Fascist militancy, but eventually moving to liberate even 
the most ardent Fascists.
284
 To supervise the enforcement of Article XXI, the CIAF created 
a bureau, the Organismo di Controllo Esecuzione articolo XXI, which was split into two 
commissions.
285
 As a result of its work, by 28 October 1940, all Italians had been liberated 
from French prison camps except 400 fuoriusciti in the Vernet camp, most of them former 
members of the International Brigades who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Within a 
few months of the Armistice, French authorities were considering returning these 
indésirables to Italy.
286
 In February 1941, General Huntziger, in a letter to the Italian 
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authorities, officially offered to repatriate the fuoriusciti.
287
 This sudden reversal of policy 
suggests that, in protesting Article XXI, the French government was more interested in 
reaffirming what little authority it had than in protecting the Italian fuoriusciti from possible 
Fascist retaliation.  
The liberation from internment camps was only the first step in what would be the 
long journey for these men, as they rebuilt their lives. Many prisoners had lost their jobs 
and, upon their return, found themselves ostracized by their neighbors and the French 
administration. The Italian authorities faced the conundrum of how to help these former 
prisoners and more generally the Italian citizens in France, as well as protect them from 
possible French retaliation. Yet, by helping the Italian community in France, they also 
recognized the marvelous opportunity offered by the circumstances to interfere in French 
internal affairs.  
The Italian state started to build up a network in the Zone Libre, under the 
supervision of the General Affairs Under-Commission, to spread its influence. In July 1940, 
consulate functionaries were attached to the Italian military bureaus in the Free Zone under 
Italian control, thus underlining the shift towards a more civilian nature of the CIAF. Their 
reports focused on alleged discriminatory acts, internments or expulsions meted out to 
Italian citizens and were sent to the Organismo di Controllo Esecuzione articolo XXI, 
which in the meantime had became a permanent bureau in November 1940, housed in the 
building of the former Italian consulate in Lyons. Vichy, fearful that the activities of these 
functionaries would undermine its authority, asked in October 1940 if the protection of 
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Italians could be entrusted to Red Cross offices, as such was already the case in the part of 
the Free Zone supervised by the Germans.
288
 Not only did the Italians refuse but they also 
expanded their network by creating additional bureaus in Avignon, Cannes and Bastia in 
December 1940.  
The Italians were not satisfied by this situation, as the legislative position of these 
civil officials was based on a rather subjective interpretation of Article XXI.
289
 They 
therefore embarked on further negotiations with French representatives in January 1941. 
The agreement reached on 4 February 1941 in Turin upgraded these civil officials to 
Delegati per l’Assistenza ed il Rimpatrio (Delegates for the Assistance and Repatriation).
290
 
These delegates were formally charged with assisting the Italian communities in France and 
carrying out the repatriation of emigrants willing to return to Italy. To facilitate their task, 
the delegates were granted several privileges: the right to meet the local prefect and every 
Italian citizen; free circulation within their zone of competence; complete freedom to 
contact the Italian Foreign Ministry, the CIAF in Turin, and Italian border authorities by 
wire and mail; and the right to freely choose their staff.
291
 In return, Vichy hoped that the 
Fascist militants would leave France and that the repatriation campaign would considerably 
thin out the population, thus ultimately reducing the activity of and need for CIAF officials.  
At first sight, it is puzzling that the delegates were not given formal diplomatic 
titles, even though some of them had been consuls in France before the war and now had 
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the same prerogatives, except for notary acts, that consuls had always enjoyed according to 
international law. The Fascist state, however, feared that the official opening of Italian 
consulates could be interpreted as an implicit acceptance of the non-Italian status of the 
contested territories, such as the County of Nice.
292
 It is also likely that this compromise 
was in part the result of the strained relations within the Italian administration, more 
specifically between the Italian Farnesina (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the CIAF. In 
truth, the Italian diplomatic corps resented the intrusion of an organization headed by army 
officers into what seemed traditionally the purvue of diplomats. As a matter of fact, the 
CIAF had to take over relations with Vichy as the Farnesina did not have representatives in 
Vichy and could not because officially Italy was still at war in France. In January 1942, 
Franco-Italian diplomatic relations were renewed but in an embryonic way. The Fascist 
state nominated Ambassador Gino Buti as "political plenipotentiary" in Paris while 
appointing only a consul general to Vichy, Count Vittorio Zoppi. This decision echoed the 
German approach, whose main representative, Ambassador Otto Abetz, was residing in 
Paris, but technically as the representative of the German government in France and not the 
German ambassador to Vichy. As Ambassador, Buti was granted only limited power by the 
Duce, who specifically asked him to refrain from taking any political initiative.
293
 Thus, the 
CIAF kept their diplomatic privileges intact. The upper echelons of the Farnesina loathed 
the recruitment of career diplomats to the CIAF and their dependence on local Italian 
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military delegations in the Zone Libre. So, the Foreign Affairs Ministry created the 
Direzione Generale degli Italiani all’Estero (Directorate-General for the Italians Abroad) 
on 27 November 1940 with the same coordinating role as the aforementioned Organismo di 
Controllo Esecuzione articolo XXI, but apparently the new bureau enjoyed as little leeway 
as the Farnesina. 
The uneasiness of the relations between civil and military Italian authorities was 
such that the CIAF President, General Pietro Pintor, felt compelled to issue a circular in 
December 1940 to underline the special status of CIAF officials in France. The civil CIAF 
personnel were not considered part of the Regio Esercito, insofar as they were only Ufficiali 
di complemento in congedo (reserve officers on unlimited discharge). Due to their delicate 
role as mediators between the French state and the local Italian communities, the future 
delegates were not required to wear their military uniforms “whenever they may be an 
obstacle to carrying out the civilian tasks of the Control Delegations, instead of facilitating 
them.”
294
 Furthermore, as their task required the ability to respond to any local crisis 
involving Italian citizens, the civil officials were exempted from justifying their trips and 
from eating at the CIAF mess. This relative freedom however should not be interpreted as 
an independence from the CIAF headquarters in Turin. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued another circular which emphasized the complete subordination of the delegates to the 
Farnesina, advising that CIAF personnel should be deferential in their dealings with the 
local Italian Military Delegations. Yet the letter added, although with clenched teeth, that 
“for necessary reasons of coordination ... civil officials will write every fifteen days a report 
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on their work ... and will send a copy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the CIAF 
Sub-committee General Affairs.”
295
 (italics are mine). In reality, the Delegati per 
l’Assistenza ed il Rimpatrio were acting as intermediaries between the civilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the military Italian Armistice Commission in France as much as 
between local Vichy authorities and the Fascist regime. 
This rivalry between the Italian civilian and military administrations was one of the 
main characteristics of the Italian occupation of France. This antagonism was envenomed 
by a misunderstanding regarding the hierarchical relations between Italian officials: Italian 
military authorities insisted that military ranks determined the hierarchy in the CIAF 
bureaus in France. This generated confusion as minor civil servants, in theory, thus enjoyed 
a higher status than even consul-generals because of their military rank.
296
 Some officials 
argued that this convoluted network of organizations was necessary as a double guarantee 
of assistance to Italian citizens in case of a sudden crisis in Italian-French relations. It is 
undeniable however that these continual overlapping of spheres of influence undermined 
the cohesiveness of the Italian strategy in France. If nothing else, the bureaucratic confusion 
considerably lowered the prestige of Italian officials in the Free Zone in the eyes of French 
local administrators.  
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Yet the importance of the Delegati per l’Assistenza ed il Rimpatrio should not be 
underestimated, both from a pragmatic perspective, insofar as they helped the Italian 
community in France, and symbolically as a threat to Vichy's legitimacy. While the military 
delegations carefully supervised the demilitarization of the Alpine zone, the rounding up of 
French military materiel in guarded depots, and checked that the Armée d’Armistice was not 
expanding outside the limits indicated by the German and Italian armistices, the civil 
delegations were not idle. First, delegations throughout France were assisting those 
emigrants willing to return to Italy. Delegates could not issue or renew passports, a 
privilege only granted to consuls, but were given the right to issue certificates valid for 
repatriation.
297
 From October 1940 to March 1943, more than 70,000 Italians repatriated to 
Italy. The repatriation campaign had mixed results. At the beginning, it enjoyed relative 
success, as repatriations peaked at 5,000 per month until early 1941. Then their numbers 
stabilized at 3,000 until the invasion of November 1942, when they plummeted to less than 
1,000 each month.
298
 The gradual petering out of the campaign was attributable to several 
factors, among them a renewed belief in the imminent annexation of the County of Nice in 
light of the Italian army invasion. On the other hand, the explosion in numbers at the 
beginning of the Armistice period reflected the traumas suffered in the internment camps 
and the surge of discriminatory behavior following the Battle of the Alps.  
More importantly, CIAF delegates stepped up to help the Italian emigrants in France 
as a way to bolster both their personal and the Italian state's prestige. Prior to the official 
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inception of the delegations in February 1941, Italians, even those harboring Fascist 
loyalties, brought their complaints to the French police.
299
 With the establishment of the 
delegation, the CIAF offices in Nice had quickly become a bureau of grievances for the 
Italian community. The CIAF delegation proved invaluable to Italians who had lost their 
jobs for economic or political reasons and, more generally, for those who had been 
discriminated against, allegedly or not. Italians were asking for assistance for matters as 
diverse as pensions, admissions to seniors' homes, speeding tickets, apartment sales or 
disputes over untilled land.
300
 The Nice CIAF delegation also received numerous 
grievances lodged by Italian citizens who were at loggerheads with their French neighbors 
for even more trivial reasons. Anything from a disputed right-of-way, noise at night, a dog 
urinating on a fence, or unpaid rent sparked stormy exchanges. Italians were supposedly 
tagged with racial slurs such as “Spaghettis,” “Macaronis” and “Sales Piémontais,” and 
often invited to go back to Italy to eat “Mussolini’s bread” or “polenta.”
301
 Indeed, in a 
department on the verge of famine, disputes over food became the norm. Italian grocers 
were accused of making illicit profits by selling under the counter at exorbitant prices or 
only to Italians. Heated arguments erupted in the endless queues for rationed staples.   
Quarrels were made worse by misunderstandings arising from linguistic challenges. 
As stressed by CIAF delegates, the majority of Italians in France, including those who 
arrived in the interwar years, were poorly educated. First-generation emigrants did not go to 
French high school and were unable to understand or communicate in French. In fact, the 
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difficult challenge of trying to explain to a French bureaucrat the particulars of an 
individual's situation in Italian coupled with the Italians' mistrust of the French state which 
had implemented discriminatory legislation were probably the main reasons for the decision 
of many to file their complaints with the CIAF delegation. It is reasonable to assume that 
Italian officials encouraged this type of behavior both for propagandistic reasons and as a 
means of connecting with the local Italian community.  We should not forget, however, that 
these linguistic problems could also be used as an excuse to freely insult the other party. In 
some cases, the petitioners played the xenophobia card, as they shrewdly understood that 
their case would be more interesting to the CIAF if there was an anti-Italian element 
involved. Thus, they tended to exaggerate any slurs which directly attacked Italy and the 
Italians. Petty quarrels between neighbors which, in time of peace, would have been 




In truth, not all the issues stemmed from petty quarrels or language barriers. In some 
working environments, the Italians were truly discriminated against. Vichy had unilaterally 
declared null and void every prewar Franco-Italian treaty and accord, on the grounds that 
the state of war had severed all legislative ties between the two countries. In particular, the 
abrogation of the 30 September 1919 treaty, which had granted Italian workers the same 
social rights as their French counterparts, had severe repercussions for the Italian 
community. In light of the faltering economy, foreign workers, and especially Italian ones, 
were the first targeted for layoffs. Employers sometimes used detention in internment 
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camps as a reason to fire Italian employees. That certainly seemed the case with the 
dismissal of some Italian emigrants working in the port of Marseille on 11 June, the day the 




 If the latter cases were the result of private initiative, French authorities seldom 
objected to it. As seen in a report by the CIAF delegate in Gap, Eugenio Mazzarini, Italian 
entrepreneurs were sometimes cut out of calls for tender, as Vichy legislation gave 
municipalities the authority to refuse to outsource public works to companies managed by 
foreign entrepreneurs.
304
 In the Alpes-Maritimes department, Italian entrepreneurs fared 
little better. Over the century, Italians in Nice had specialized in small grocery stores, 
lacking both the capital and the skill to start bigger companies. After the defeat, severe 
shortages of fuel and food prompted the prefecture of the Alpes-Maritimes to forbid the 
circulation of any kind of gas-propelled vehicles, two-wheelers included, with the 
noteworthy exceptions of companies deemed “of primordial importance for the supplying 
of the department,” few of which were Italian-owned. Italian grocery owners voiced their 
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Of course, xenophobic measures in France had not been unique to the Vichy regime. 
In fact, decrees discriminating against non-French populations were not uncommon in the 
thirties, especially in times of economic and political crisis. On 11 December 1936 alone, 
ten decrees were implemented establishing quotas in key industries as diverse as dairy 
products in the Cher department to cork-producing factories in the Bouches-du-Rhône.
306
 A 
21 April 1933 law barred foreign doctors and dentists from practicing, unless their own 
countries allowed French doctors to practice, while a 19 July 1934 law restricted access to 




 However, Vichy significantly accelerated this xenophobic trend. Fed by the 
resentment provoked by the humiliating defeat in June 1940, an array of laws curtailing the 
civic rights of foreigners on French soil was rapidly implemented. The distrust of foreigners 
was enshrined in the 17 July 1940 law which restricted access to civil service to only those 
French citizens whose father was of French nationality. The real target behind this 
watershed legislation was made evident by another law passed on 22 July 1940, which 
stated that any naturalization after 1927 could be subject to revision. Vichy wanted to 
separate itself as much as possible from the massive naturalization campaigns of the 
interwar governments. To this end, Vichy legislators made the 17 July law retroactive. 
Therefore, recently minted French citizens were not only thereafter denied any possibility 
of employment in the civil service, but those already working in public administration were 
fired on the spot. In the Alpes-Maritimes, every Italian working at a municipal level was 
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 Laws restricting access to liberal professions surpassed those implemented under 
the Third Republic. Doctors and lawyers, unless French and born to a French father, were 
forbidden to practice, as stated respectively by the 16 August and the 10 September 1940 
laws. Waivers were available only to former soldiers or sons of soldiers who had fought in 
the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1940 or by special dispensation granted by the Minister of 
Justice based on exceptional merit. Italian delegations vehemently protested against these 
discriminatory regulations with mixed results: although the physicians were no longer 
stricken from the professional registers, they were not permitted to practice.
309
  
If the Italian delegations took great pain to help these professionals, it was because 
these doctors and lawyers were in some cases Italian notables who actively supported or at 
least sympathized with the Fascist cause.
310
 In fact, in return for the Italian state's protection 
against discrimination, the Italian CIAF expected these professionals to bridge the transition 
with the rest of the Italian community. Lawyers, along with the Delegates, helped destitute 
Italian families resolve legal problems such as evictions, breaches of contract, or even 
criminal charges, by taking care of legal expenses and providing free assistance. Local 
Italian doctors and pharmacists helped with the distribution of drugs sent by the Italian 
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army, starting from September 1940.
311
 Furthermore, the CIAF created a network of 
outpatient clinics, attached to every Delegation office, which could even perform minor 
surgery and blood tests. Thus, the Nice CIAF delegation endeavored to help all Italian 
emigrants regardless of their social status by providing moral and legal support.  
Food assistance was probably the major asset of the CIAF delegations, in terms of 
winning the hearts and minds of the Italian and, to a lesser extent, of the non-Italian 
population in the Italian-controlled Zone Libre, owing to the worsening living conditions in 
Vichy France. It is a truism that civilians have always suffered in the event of military 
invasion. Soldiers loot and live off the land, and in this respect, the German occupation was 
no exception. The Nazi state plundered without scruple, seizing raw materials and food 
supplies, justifying it by referring to Article 18 of the Franco-German Armistice, which 
stated that the “expenses of the German occupation army will be borne by the French 
government.” The food issue was aggravated by the fact that the German occupation zone 
encompassed regions which produced more than three-quarters of the nation's production of 
wheat, butter and sugar.
312
 Accordingly, the Free Zone's population experienced an 
increasing deficit in food supplies from the onset of Vichy’s regime. On 27 September 
1940, at the express behest of the Germans, Vichy refined the use of ration cards. A variety 
of basic products such as bread, milk, rice, sugar, meat and coffee became available only 
upon the submission of appropriate ration coupons to the vendor. Over time, the size of the 
rations diminished and a widespread illegal market flourished.  
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Southeastern France was more severely hit by rationing than most of the other 
French regions, beginning as early as the drôle de guerre in 1939. During the interwar 
years, farming productivity in this region was well below the French average owing to the 
rugged landscape, extended urbanization and the underdevelopment of the agricultural 
sector. The Alpes-Maritimes relied heavily on nearby departments not only for food, but 
also for raw materials and fuel. If nothing else, the ravages of war disrupted both the food 
supply network and the regional agricultural production by disrupting the main axes of 
communications between the various departments. For instance, the cutting of trade with 
North Africa stopped imports of a variety of food such as wine, eggs, sardines, wheat and 
olives.
313
 No wonder, then, that the official rationing system started to crumble in larger 
cities such as Nice and Cannes as early as April 1941. Police reports noted alarmingly that 
“some staples are becoming increasingly scarce: skimmed milk, eggs, fruits,” while meat 
had become so rare that “the majority of consumers do not even use all their [monthly 
meat] coupons.”
314
 Not only did the Alpes-Maritimes department underproduce basic 
staples such as wheat and milk, but it also sheltered a significant minority of wealthy 
families, who had no intention of compromising their standard of living. The conflation of 
all these factors fuelled an extensive and very lucrative black market.  
 Black marketeering in the Côte d’Azur cannot be explained without recognizing the 
importance of the inland rural departments, which, in peacetime, supplied the coastal 
regions with basic staples. Generally speaking, these departments were less impacted by 
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food rationing than their more developed counterparts. For instance, in July 1941, the 
population in the Basses-Alpes
315
 department still enjoyed relative prosperity in terms of 
food supplies.
316
 This state of grace however rapidly deteriorated within one year: farmers 
complained in the summer of 1942 that the government’s fixed prices for products such as 
wheat, pork meat and potatoes were so low that they were making hardly any profits. The 
excessive rigidity of the market prices was not the only grievance found in the farmers’ 
cahiers de doléances. The Basses-Alpes faced a severe shortage of both manpower and 
seeds.
317
 The Digne Prefecture’s report also noted the proliferation of the black market in 
the department, as farmers illegally sold their goods at exorbitant prices to city dwellers 
coming from the coastal departments such as the Alpes-Maritimes and the Bouches du 
Rhone. Indeed, urban residents, or their middlemen, were endlessly roaming the 
countryside in search of food unavailable in city markets. For the above reason, in flagrant 
contrast to Vichy’s propaganda praising the rural France Éternelle, farmers were openly 
labeled in many regions as unscrupulous hoarders of food, profiting from the desperate 
needs of the French population.
318
  
 In this bleak context, the help stemming from the Italian delegations, especially in 
the Alpes-Maritimes, was seen as a godsend by many immigrants. Two thousand tins of 
condensed milk were distributed over one year in 1940-1941. This charitable act was not 
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only crucial at a time when fresh milk was becoming a rarity, but also because Italian 
women were denied the priority card, created on 18 June 1941 to allocate extra shares of 
milk to women with at least two small children.
319
 The Italians organized a network of soup 
kitchens to ameliorate the daily food intake of the most destitute. For obvious 
propagandistic reasons, the Italian part of the population was helped first, but the Italians 
also tried to reach out to the French populace. Soup kitchens were also formally open to 
French individuals. This endearing campaign to seduce non-Italians enjoyed some success.  
An Italian report observed that the scarcity of drugs in France induced some Frenchmen to 
seek help at CIAF clinics.
320
  
However, it is evident that the majority of the population, even a fair portion of the 
Italian one, was deaf to the Italian aid. For instance the Italian soup kitchen, a useful means 
to reach out not only to the Italian emigrants, but also to the French population, had fallen 
from serving 20,000 meals in the interwar period to 750 in 1941.
321
 Part of the population 
even reacted with evident hostility. Local Italian officials received anonymous letters with 
death threats, while a French butcher even went as far as to hurl insults at CIAF officials 
from his shop door.
322
 As a matter of fact, the CIAF delegates, as the embodiment of the 
state which gave France the coup de poignard dans le dos, became the primary target for 
the French population’s anger. On 9 May 1941, two young men, upon seeing members of 
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the Nice delegation of Sea Traffic Control, provocatively yelled “Vive la France, à bas 
Mussolini.” Chased by the two Italian officials and two French gendarmes, the young men 
were able to sneak into a soap and washing powder factory and escape capture. The 
successful flight of the culprits would have settled the matter if some factory workers had 
not started to sing the Marseillaise. One of the delegates lost his temper and yelled back, 
threatening the workers with possible imprisonment. The placating attitude of the other 
Italian delegate and the policemen notwithstanding, the excited Italian official became 
outraged as yet another worker cried aloud “Vive la France, à bas Mussolini!” The head of 
the Italian delegation of Sea Traffic Control, General Lombardi, filed an official complaint 
which resulted in closure of the factory for one day and the trial of this last factory worker, 
who received a six-month suspended sentence.
323
 Other minor incidents compelled the 
Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes in March 1941 to issue an appeal for calm, asking the 
population to “maintain vis-à-vis members of the Control Commission the most reserved 
and correct attitude.”
324
 Disputes between Italian representatives in France and the local 
population were not limited to the Alpes-Maritimes. Digne-Les-Bains, the capitol of the 
Basses-Alpes department, was the scene of two minor incidents in April 1941. In one 
instance, two members of the small CIAF delegation in Digne were allegedly barred from 
entering the cathedral for the celebration of Palm Sunday by a few young men and girls 
who mocked them. It seems however that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding: 
the young French themselves had been denied entry as the cathedral was packed beyond its 
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 In another instance, the head of the local Italian delegation, Lieutenant 
Viscardi, furiously kicked a drunkard in the street who was hurling half-slurred insults 
about Italy. Not satisfied, Viscardi threatened to punch a French captain, who had objected 
to what he thought was excessive action by the CIAF official.
326
 In fact, clashes between 
CIAF officials and the French population happened in most of the departments under Italian 
control to such an extent that all prefects felt compelled to call for calm. The Italian 
delegation in Corsica too was not immune to the populace’s resentment. On 25 August, a 
CIAF official, while strolling in Ajaccio, was hit on the nape of his neck with a rifle 
cartridge case thrown by an unknown passerby. Later that day, a wall of the city’s main 
street was tagged with the ominous graffiti, “A quand la Saint-Barthélémy de la 
Commission.”("When will there be a Saint-Bartholomew
 




These minor incidents were representative of the prevailing mood in France. The 
Italian delegates stressed in their reports that the French populace was deeply hostile, even 
though they interpreted this as a reflection of the French people's reputedly chauvinistic 
haughtiness and disdain for all non-French. Nonetheless, it would a mistake to view the 
French behavior as solely the product of a general attitude of condescension towards all 
foreigners. Italian officials were loathe to admit that the Battle of the Alps had resulted in a 
strongly negative reaction among in the French population, especially in the border regions. 
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The French population were increasingly upset at the sight of individuals strolling around 
their towns in the military uniform of an enemy country which they considered to have not 
truly defeated France. Indeed, jokes targeting the Regio Esercito abounded in the Free 
Zone, especially after its poor performances in Greece and North Africa in 1941. For 
instance, a cabaret artist, Pierre Dac, in a sketch performed at the Nice Nouveau-Casino, 
explained that his car did not need any gas to back up because the reverse gear used 
“macaroni” as fuel, a reference to at the derogatory nickname used for Italian immigrants in 
France.
328
  In another instance, at a meeting held in la Roche sur Foron (Haute-Savoie) in 
February 1941, one group of Compagnons de France, a Vichy youth organization, cried on 
stage “Les Macaronis vont se faire casser la gueule” ("The Macaronis would have their 
faces smashed in"), provoking hilarity and cheers among the audience.
329
 Sometimes, the 
French population resorted to more indirect means to express their contempt.  Songs 
parodying famous Italian or French famous songs sprang out of the blue starting at the end 
of 1940. One version of La Marseillaise, rechristened Allez, Enfants de l’Italie, become 
widespread in Monaco and Nice in March 1941. The song belittled Italian military prestige 
from the very first verse (“Allez enfants de l’Italie / Le Jour de fuite est arrivé”), then 
ridiculed their poor campaign in the Balkans (“Il nous faut quitter l’Albanie / si nous ne 
voulons pas y crever”) and finally derided the most important Italian war decoration calling 
it the “Order of the Hare.”
330
  This parody of the French anthem was by no means the only 
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one circulating in the Alpes-Maritimes. In February 1941, at the village of Breil near the 
Green Line, a 20-year old was caught humming the Fascist anthem "Giovinezza" 
("Youthfulness") in the Breil patois, a local dialect similar to Italian. Interestingly, the song 
already hinted at the beginning of the rationing in Italy ("Avant que l’on chante Jeunesse / 
40frs par jours on gagnait / Maintenant que l’on chante Jeunesse / On meurt de faim et de 
faiblesse").
331
 It is interesting to note that most of the anti-Italian songs were based on 
children’s popular songs or came from the milieu of the youth. For example, the Grenoble 
CIAF delegation came into possession of a leaflet of two anti-Italian songs, one of which 
was based on a popular children song from the French Revolution, Cadet Rousselle.
332
 The 
juvenile nature of the anti-Italian propaganda could be even more blatant. In early June 
1941, several Italians in Nice received tracts in their mailboxes addressed to them 
specifically and containing anti-irredentist slogans such as “Nice est Française” (Nice is 
French) and “Mort aux Piémontais” (Death to Piedmontese). The perpetrators of the tracts 




That is not to say that opposition only ran rampant among the youngest of the 
French population. In a brilliant attempt to underline the momentary Italian retreat against 
the Greek army, anonymous adult hands tagged a wall in front of the new Italian territory at 
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the Pont de l’Union checkpoint “Grecs, ici c’est la France” (Greeks, this is France).
334
 In 
some instances, adult French became quite creative in expressing their feelings: Petrol 
drums shipped from Antibes to Italy as part of the renewal of economic ties were tagged 
with derogatory slogans such as “Abas (sic) Mussolini mangeur de macarons” ("Down with 
Mussolini, the macaroni-eater") and “La Grèce c’est plus forte que l’huil (sic) de ricino” 
("Greece is more powerful than castor oil").
335
 To preserve their anonymity, the 
perpetrators only tagged the side facing the ground when the drums were in vertical 
position; thus the insults were discovered only when the drums were unloaded on the other 
side of the border.
336
 
Unable to win the heart and soul of the French population, CIAF officials attempted 
to mobilize local Fascist militants. On 2 August 1940, the CIAF delegation in Marseille 
organized a mass to commemorate the liberation of the internees of Saint-Cyprien and 
Vernet, officiated by Don Luigi De Biasi, himself a former Saint-Cyprien prisoner.
337
 On 
11 August 1940, under the aegis of the Italian consulate in Monaco, the same 
commemoration was held in the Principality of Monaco, officiated by the same Italian 
priest. However, the second ceremony was much more eventful. The Principauté de 
Monaco, a sovereign country since 1861, was really a hyphen between Italy and France in 
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the interwar years. It stood midway between Nice and the Italian border, and its population 
was as much Italian as it was French. That Italian community, however, was heavily 
divided between a hardcore group of fuoriusciti, based in Beausoleil, a commune in the 
Alpes-Maritimes, and a growing pro-Fascist cell in Monaco, supported by the Italian 
consulate. Several incidents erupted between 1934 and 1936, following the opening of the 
Casa degli Italiani in Monaco, but these violent episodes did not seem to deter people’s 
affiliation to the Fascists, as allegedly, up to twenty per cent of the Italian adult population 
held a PNF membership card between 1920 and 1943.
338
 On 10 June 1940, after the Italian 
declaration of war, the Prince of Monaco made the decision to side with his French 
neighbor, arresting a hundred pro-Fascist Italians, later to be herded into French internment 
camps. After their liberation, the Italians prisoners returned to Monaco embittered by the 
trauma of the detention, where they fuelled the tension with their account of the poor 
conditions while detained. On the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Italian leftist 
emigrants increasingly felt cornered between reactionary Vichy France and Fascist Italy. 
 On the day of the commemoration mass for the former detainees of the French 
concentration camps, a mob of fuoriusciti and antifascists gathered outside the church and 
started to scream insults against Italy and the Italian regime. Two Italian CIAF officials on 
their way back to Nice cautiously waded through the hostile crowd in Beausoleil. The 
Monaco police showed up but, according to the consul’s report, the only reason the 
situation did not degenerate in chaos and violence was the self-control of the CIAF 
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personnel, not because of the French police's presence.
339
 In fact, local Italian authorities in 
both Monaco and Nice openly accused the French and Monaco police of conniving with the 
fuoriusciti. They demanded and obtained the resignation of the Monaco Head of Police, Le 
Luc, and the incarceration of the most active fuoriusciti.
340
 In response to accusations that 
the mass had been a trap to stir up the Leftist expatriates, they pointed out that the 
officiating priest had previously obtained permission from the Bishop of Monaco; the event 
had not been advertised in any newspaper; and it had been planned for seven o’clock in the 
morning. Moreover, allegedly, no Fascist or Italian flags were hung up and the sermon did 
not mention the political situation.
341
 Thus, it was hardly provocative. Unfortunately, no 
French police report about the incident was found, but it seems doubtful that local Italian 
authorities did not anticipate that, at a time of tension between pro-Fascist Italians and 
Italian political emigrants, the latter supported by French leftists, an event featuring 
previous internees and Italian officials in military uniform would not be perceived as open 
provocation.  
CIAF delegates, however, found out that the mobilization of local irredentists was a 
double-edged sword. By December 1940, the head of the CIAF delegation in Nice, Consul 
Silvio Camerani, was monitoring suspiciously the whereabouts of several “shady 
characters” and “agents provocateurs” who had made contact with the CIAF delegation. He 
admonished his subordinates not to mingle with these individuals, as he feared these 
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outspoken irredentists were being kept under strict observation by the French police.
342
 
Camerani’s worries were well-founded. An anonymous French official, probably from the 
Ministry of Interior, filed a thirty-five-page-long report at the beginning of 1941 on “the 
evolution and the present situation of the antinational propaganda carried out by the 
Italians.”
343
 The French police report focused on the activities of Ezio Garibaldi, the 
grandson of the Italian national hero, Giuseppe Garibaldi. Ezio Garibaldi, as did most of his 
siblings, fought in the First World War with the Légion Garibaldienne on the Argonne and 
Alpine fronts. However, the Garibaldi family had divided after Mussolini's rise to power: 
Sante remained loyal to his Leftist origins while Ezio joined to the PNF, becoming a deputy 
in the Parliament from 1924 to 1934. After the armistice, Ezio Garibaldi renewed his ties 
with the irredentist cause. In December 1940, he founded the Gruppi d’Azione Nizzarda 
(Nice Action Groups, also known as GAN) in Rome. In the usual dithyrambic irredentist 
jargon, the GAN’s constitution proclaimed that its overarching goal was “to contribute, by 
any means, to returning the land of Nice to the fatherland which was iniquitously torn from 
it in 1860 through blackmail and intrigue (sic).”
344
 The GAN was open to four categories of 
people: inhabitants of the County of Nice willing to contribute to the “incorporation of the 
territories not yet freed, to the Fascist Motherland,” Garibaldi’s legionnaires, PNF 
members, and veterans of the Battle of the Alps.  
The fact that Garibaldi wanted to make inroads in the Regio Esercito was a telltale 
sign of the intended purpose of the GAN, to act as shock troops for a coup on the model of 
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the Fiume putsch of 1919, in which 2,000 Italian irredentists led by the nationalist poet 
Gabriele D’Annunzio successfully ousted Entente troops from the Dalmatian city, or, in the 
worst case, as fertile ground for a future military occupation.
345
 Indeed, 300 irredentists 
gathered in Menton on 21 December 1940.
346
 The meeting, headed by Ezio Garibaldi, 
fuelled wild rumors in the Côte d’Azur that Italian irredentists were preparing a Marcia Su 
Nizza (March on Nice) nicknamed after the October 1922 March on Rome which had 
brought Mussolini to power. At the end of April 1941, reunions were organized by local 
GAN with the help of the PNF in support of the cause of Nizza Italiana in major Italian 
cities, especially in the regions bordering France. On 28 April, Ezio Garibaldi chose to 
celebrate the Giornata D’Azione Nizzarda in Savona, an important city at one hundred 
kilometers from the French border.
347
 The tone was set by the historical flag of the County 
of Nice mounted behind the stage, surrounded by the banners of the local towns and Fascist 
organizations. If the symbolic display of flags was not blunt enough, the speeches removed 
any doubt. The first speaker, the National GAN Inspector Gustavo Traglia, started his 
speech by eulogizing the soldiers who had died in the assault of the bunker of St-Louis 
bridge in Menton, some of them hailing from the Liguria region. He then listed all the 
alleged French wrongs against Italy and the Italians, ranging from French colonial 
greediness in North Africa to the massacre of Aigues-Mortes. In fact, many orators stressed 
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the poor treatment Italian emigrants had received on French soil. Traglia then advocated the 
return of the County of Nice, including the Principality of Monaco, to its legitimate 
homeland: Italy. Ezio Garibaldi briefly spoke announcing that the GAN became officially 
sanctioned that very day by the Fascist state by incorporating it in the PNF. Finally 
Garibaldi concluded the meeting with the flamboyant rallying cry "O Nizza o Morte!" 
("Nice or Death"). Aside from the GAN, Garibaldi launched a newspaper Il Nizzardo to 
promote the irredentist campaign. Published weekly from 15 March 1942 to 27 June 1943, 
Il Nizzardo took its name from an 1860 Italian newspaper which had campaigned against 
the French annexation of the County of Nice. Its first issue set the tone. In his front-page 
column, Ezio Garibaldi proclaimed its rallying cry "Nizza fino alla morte" ("Nice until 
death"), and gloated over the impending conquest of the French irredentist lands. 
Il Nizzardo was merely echoing the wishes of irredentist militants in the County of 
Nice who were already excitedly anticipating the coming of Nizza Italiana, when “the 
oppressors will become the oppressed.”
348
 Their Monaco fellows were no less enthusiastic. 
Irredentists were already speaking of “sunbathing in the shade of our flag.” One veteran of 
the First World War could not wait to meet the Italian army as he planned to “put a wine 
keg in front of his house to drink with soldiers, especially his fellows, the Alpini.”
349
 
However, it is debatable whether the desire to see Nice incorporated into the Italian state 
truly reflected deep irredentist feelings among the Italian population. Some Italians living in 
Nice complained about the strict food rationing in the Alpes-Maritimes and hoped that the 
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coming of the Italians would improve their living conditions.
350
 Others viewed the 
incorporation of Nice simply as a way to see their Italian relatives without the hassle of 
border controls at a time where Vichy, and sometimes the Italian authorities, openly 
discouraged travelling between the two countries.
351
  
The brazen attitude of the GAN was shunned by Italian officials in France, 
complaining that the irredentist campaign was harming Italian interests in France. Boastful 
proclamations of an imminent Italian conquest of the Côte d'Azur by hordes of blackshirts 
had the effect of radicalizing the French population, thus thinning the already meager 
chances of winning over the local populace to the CIAF welfare campaign.
352
 Moreover, 
the Nice CIAF delegate, Consul Camerani, stressed in his 11 January report that the rumors 
of a possible coup were just the excuse the French government needed to remilitarize the 
regions near the border, if within the Armistice’s limits.
353
  
The GAN's attitude was equally rebuffed by Count Quinto Mazzolini, the new CIAF 
delegate in Nice who replaced Camerani in May 1941. Along the lines of his precedessor, 
Mazzolini chided the Gruppi D’Azione Nizzarda for previous demonstrations and forbade 
any irredentist demonstration without his consent. For this reason, he explicitly prohibited 
the disclosure to Il Nizzardo of any information from his 1942 March report about the 
French authorities in the Alpes-Maritimes. Moreover he vetoed the nomination of the son of 
Lieutenant-Colonel Bandini, one of the most virulent Il Nizzardo editorialists, to the CIAF 
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military delegation in Nice.
354
 Mazzolini’s distrust of the GAN however went beyond a 
simple difference of opinion over strategy. He questioned the sincerity of some GAN 
leaders, accusing them of riding the wave of irredentism for reasons of self-interest. 
Mazzolini was upset that some of these leaders in fact were criminals, charged in Italy with 
a variety of crimes such as desertion, theft and criminal bankruptcy fraud.
355
  
One episode can serve to underline Mazzolini's contempt for the irredentists in Nice. 
On 16 May 1942, a major Italian newspaper, La Gazzetta del Popolo, reported a brutal 
physical and verbal attack on Italians by Frenchmen in Nice. But it soon backfired, badly 
embarrassing the Nice CIAF delegation. Mazzolini discovered that the two victims, 
notorious irredentists, were completely drunk when they started quarreling with a horse 
carriage driver and his clients. Moreover, the xenophobic motivation was ruled out, as the 
French had not known the nationality of the irredentists. Significantly, Mazzolini angrily 
stated that the two individuals were “among the worst I had ever seen among the ten 
thousand who had come to my office in one year,” and that the Gazzetta del Popolo 
recounted the episode “in a way totally contrary to the facts, so that the version should be 
regarded as completely false.”
356
   
Yet, the irredentists and the Commission did write against their common enemy, the 
French local authorities, who fought tooth and nail to counter the irredentist propaganda. 
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This confrontation stemmed from the fact that some departments, such as the Alpes-
Maritimes, Italy's main irredentist claim, was also one of the key departments in Vichy's 
struggle to assert its sovereignty. The Fascist state equated the Alpes-Maritimes to the 1860 
County of Nice and thus stressed its Italian heritage. Vichy, which had already lost half of 
the French territory to the Germans and with its Empire in dire straits, was very reluctant to 
part with any part of its metropolitan territory. Therefore, the Prefecture of the Alpes-
Maritimes and the CIAF Delegations in Nice and Cannes along with Il Nizzardo fought a 
war of propaganda, resounding speeches and never-ending negotiations over regulations 
and reports on each other’s activities.  
The CIAF delegate in Nice, Silvio Camerani, who had been the former Consul on 
the eve of the June 1940 hostilities, started criticizing the local French authorities as soon as 
he was back in France, devoting special attention to the Bishop of Nice, Monseigneur 
Rémond, and to the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes, Marcel Ribière. Both were accused of 
launching, with the help of the two Nice newspapers, le Petit Niçois and L’Éclaireur de 
Nice et du Sud-est, a campaign with the two-pronged aim of belittling the prestige of the 
Fascist state and reasserting the French character of the County of Nice.
357
 Furthermore, 
Camerani accused Monseigneur Rémond of fuelling the patriotism of the French clergy 
while ostracizing clergymen who sympathized with the irredentist cause.
358
 Camerani's 
successor, Count Mazzolini, was even more vitriolic in his criticisms of Monseigneur 
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Rémond, unceremoniously labeled as the man who “perfectly summed up the fanaticism of 
the French officer and of the Gallic clergy always obsessed ... with nationalist ideas instead 
of divine ones.”
359
 Il Nizzardo moreover blamed Monseigneur Rémond for his 
uncooperative stance and his speeches were always carefully monitored for any anti-Italian 
ideas.
360
 Il Nizzardo became the most outspoken vehicle of an Italian campaign aimed at 
defaming the French authorities in the Alpes-Maritimes. The Prefect Ribière was held 
responsible for the supposedly thriving Gaullist movement and for the general hostility 
directed against the Italian CIAF delegation.  Even Jean Médecin, the Senator-Mayor of 
Nice, was targeted for backing a proposal to rebuild Vieux Nice, which, in the mind of the 
irredentists, was an effort to destroy the most tangible proof of Nice’s Italian heritage.
361
 
The irredentists' contempt was well-placed, as both Vichy representatives in the 
Alpes-Maritimes were known for their staunch patriotism and their firm opposition to any 
Italian annexationist aims. It was widely known that Monseigneur Rémond, a former 
military chaplain on the Rhine front, was fiercely anti-Italian, especially after the coup de 
poignard dans le dos of June 1940.
362
 Monseigneur Rémond's hostility towards Italian 
annexationist claims was supported by the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes, Marcel Ribière. 
First cousin of the conservative politician and former Prime Minister Pierre-Etienne 
Flandin, Ribière was a hardline Pétainist, who believed that his mission was twofold: to 
spread the word of the Révolution Nationale as far as possible and preserve the territorial 
                                                     
359 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 68, Memorandum delegato CIAF Mazzolini al Ministero Affari 
Esteri, Affari Generali, R me, 20 Mar h 1943,  e    n II, “ ulla    uaz  ne Generale.” 
360 Jean-Louis Pan  a   , “Un J urnal Irr  en  s e s us l’O  upa   n: Il Nizzardo,“ Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 
33/34  (December 1986-June 1987), pp.144-145. 
361 Il Nizzardo, n°20, year IX, 26 July 1942, p.2. 
362
 For more on Monseigneur Rémond Ralph Schor, see Un évêq e  ans le siècle: Monseigne r Pa l Rémon  
(1873-1963), Nice: Serre Editeur, 1984. 
 
 136 
integrity of southeastern France. The first goal was achieved by implementing, to the letter, 
all directives issued by Vichy. More than 550 municipal officials in Nice alone were fired 
after the 17 July law; thirty-five municipal councils, most of which were Leftist 
municipalities such as Grasse and Saint Laurent du Var, were disbanded; people affiliated 
with Freemasonry were forced to resign following Vichy 13's August 1940 law against 




Coincidental to the political cleansing of the department, a widespread campaign to 
glorify Maréchal Pétain was carried out. In the Alpes-Maritimes, Pétain was especially 
revered owing to the high concentration of veterans in the region. Indeed, the Légion 
Française des Combattants, created in July 1940 a few weeks after the debacle that was the 
defeat, was made up of war veterans from the First World War and a select few from the 
Second World War and was intended to be the chief vehicle for implementing the National 
Revolution. The Legion became the eyes and the ears of Vichy as its adherents were 
encouraged to denounce any activity that was directed against the new moral and political 
tenets to the police authorities.
364
 The Legion was particularly significant in the Alpes-
Maritimes, as a result of the popularity of its local leader, Second World War veteran 
Joseph Darnand. With its 28,000 members, in a population of 516,000, the Legion received 
a lot of attention in CIAF fortnightly reports, despite the fact that Italian officials were 
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quick to dismiss it as any real military threat.
365
 Moreover, because the Maréchal owned a 
country house in Villeneuve-Loubet, the mayors of nearby villages obtained official 
permission in March 1943 to rename the region La Vallée du Maréchal.
366
 Pictures and 
portraits of the “Hero of Verdun” were hung in every municipality in place of the 
traditional bust of Marianne.  
If Pétain’s portraits were omnipresent in the Zone Libre, his worship in the Alpes-
Maritimes was harnessed to a broader campaign to stress the French character of the 
County of Nice and preserve France's territorial integrity. In November 1940, a Nice 
newspaper, L’Éclaireur Du Sud-Ouest published the controversial pamphlet “Nice est Bien 
Française” ("Nice is really French") written by the most famous Nice writer and historian, 
Louis Cappatti.
367
 Local newspapers were also used by French authorities to advertise the 
start of the public works to be carried out in the department. Country roads were paved and 
widened and Vichy chose to centralize the cinematographic activity of the Zone Libre in 
Nice’s Victorine Studios. The goal of this vast campaign was twofold: first of all, public 
works were dearly needed to create jobs at a time when the French economy had ground to 
a halt due to the war. But more importantly, by investing money, Vichy wanted to send a 
clear message to the local population and the Italian state alike that the French government 
was not forsaking the Alpes-Maritimes department.
368
 For instance, on Labour Day (1 May 
1941), the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Jean Berthelot gave a speech in 
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Nice to herald the construction of a highway that would link, both symbolically and 
tangibly, Provence with the County of Nice.  
    Public works were not enough, however, to enthuse the populace. Most 
conservative regimes make wide use of heroes considered to embody the nation, virtue and 
spirit of sacrifice, and in this regard, Vichy was not an exception. Vichy’s panegyrists chose 
to exploit a traditional heroine recently canonized in 1920, Joan of Arc. Her cult was not a 
novelty in France: Since the nineteenth century, the French Romantic Movement had 
lionized the “Maiden of Orléans.” The apogee of her cult, however, was reached after the 
Armistice. It was a blunt message. Joan of Arc was a French heroine who fought foreign 
invaders. The Vichy propaganda shrewdly tied the Maréchal’s cult to devotion to Joan of 
Arc. For instance, L’Éclaireur Du Sud-Ouest sponsored an essay contest in 1941 for school 
pupils themed “De Jeanne D’Arc à Pétain, la France continue.“
369
 
Nothing however stirred French nationalism as much as Italian irredentist claims.  
After the already mentioned Giornata D'Azione Nizzarda in April 1941, the French 
population was rabid. CIAF officials in Nice immediately had condemned the irredentists 
for fear that they would fuel the anger already directed against the Italians still living on 
French soil. Italian fears were not groundless: on 9 May, an Italian was beaten in a bistro 
for wearing the Italian medal given to the veterans of the First World War, wrongly 
mistaken as a display of irredentist badges.
370
 Vice-consul Fragnito warned at the beginning 
of May that the French government was preparing a reply to the Giornata D’Azione 
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 Across the Free Zone, a massive celebration was held on 11 May, Joan of Arc's 
Saint day, to rally the populace to the new regime. Only in Orléans, notwithstanding 
Pétain’s visit the day before, did religious public speakers avoid political proclamations and 
that was because the city was in the German occupation zone.
372
 In Nice, the celebrations 
were organized in grand style: flags, rosettes, tricolored ribbons and portraits of Pétain were 
distributed for free. Twenty-five thousand school pupils paraded in front of Joan of Arc’s 
statue, placed by the organizers on the stairs of the Church of Notre-Dame. More than 
20,000 members of the Légion marched on the Promenade des Anglais and gathered for a 
mass, officiated by Monseigneur Rémond, near the Monument des Morts (Monument for 
the Fallen Soldiers).
373
 Nice’s historical center was also decked with flags in demonstration 
of the national fervor of its population. 
In fact, the flags became a means to single out unpatriotic citizens. CIAF local 
authorities complained that those who had refused or neglected to hang flags or ribbons 
were allegedly threatened by the populace.
374
 In one case, an Italian woman was labeled a 
troublemaker as she hung up a black skirt instead of a French flag. Later that day, she 
discovered that the skirt was stolen.
375
 French authorities had warned against any kind of 
disorderly behavior. The Prefect Ribière issued an appeal inviting the population to retain 
its composure and reminded everyone that “any incident could harm France’s interests.”
376
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CIAF officials noted in their report that local Vichy officials so refrained from alluding to 
Italian irredentist claims in their speeches that they “could have been given in any other 
French city.”
377
 In fact, it was the leaders of the Legion, backed up by the Prefect and the 




This self-moderation in the orators’ discourse should not be considered as a 
disowning of the defense of the national soil. Local French authorities simply wanted to 
avoid inflaming the political situation in the Alpes-Maritimes. They feared that an eruption 
of ethnic violence between the two communities could be an excuse for the Italian army to 
step in. CIAF officials and local irredentists, on the other hand, were still suspicious of 
Vichy's local representatives as they feared the forbearance in their speech masked a 
prospective French military resurgence. If no high state officials participated at the Joan of 
Arc day, the Vichy state was still not far away, as Marshal Pétain was at in his country 
house in Villeneuve-Loubet for the whole day and was visited successively by the Prefect 
Ribière, Monseigneur Rémond, Joseph Darnand, and other local French officials. In fact, 
the grandiose display of French patriotism was probably aimed at the German state as much 
as the Italian one, in an effort to convince the German officials of the French character of 
the County of Nice.
379
 We should not forget that this nationalistic campaign was also aimed 
at reasserting Vichy's legitimacy in the minds of the French populace. Local Italian 
authorities rightly argued that this propaganda strategy was also a way of combating the 
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growing influence of the Gaullist movement in the Alpes-Maritimes.
380
 In fact, the Italians 
were dismayed by the degree of cohesiveness and coordination between the Legion and the 
Vichy youth organizations. Il Nizzardo harangued the local leaders of the Legion Sauvaigo 
and Arneodo, for having repudiated their ancestors’ country. The birth of a more militant 
part of the Legion, in December 1941, the Service d’Ordre Légionnaire (SOL), was 
reported by the Italian newspaper with the warning “Watch out for the SOL!” Again, CIAF 
reports mirrored the worries of Il Nizzardo. The February 1942 CIAF report, for instance, 
gave a detailed account of the onset of the SOL movement. In fact, they were worried that 
the radicalization of the Legion might presage the rebirth of a revitalized French Army.
381
 
Until the Italian military invasion in November 1942, Nice remained one of the 
cornerstones of the Révolution Nationale. To bolster the francité of the Côte d’Azur, Darlan 
visited Nice on 9 October 1941, who, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, of Defense and of 
the Interior, was the de facto deputy of Marshal Pétain. The symbolic importance of this 
one-day visit, which triggered the usual flags, parade and official speeches, was not Darlan 
himself, but Pétain. French authorities insisted that the visit had been completely organized 
by the French government supposedly unbeknownst to Pétain. Both Pétain and the general 
public had been kept in the dark until the 7 October when local newspapers heralded the 
incoming visit of the Pétain's dauphin.
382
 However, as had been the case with Jeanne D’Arc 
Day, the Maréchal was in Villeneuve-Loubet, which was hardly a coincidence. His 
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symbolic presence in the department was so important that wild rumors spread that Pétain 




Darlan's visit was just the first of the many official trips between February and 
October 1942 made by leading Vichy officials, including State Secretaries Paul Marion 
(Information) and René Belin (Work), and leading French fascists such as Philippe Henriot, 
Charles Maurras and PPF leader Jacques Doriot. All these orators harangued the Nice 
populace, to the point that Nice earned the nickname of Fille Aînée de la Révolution 
Nationale (Eldest Daughter of the National Revolution).
384
 However, Marshal Pétain never 
visited Nice, although he did visit Chambery and Annecy on 21-23 September 1941. If the 
pretext for the visit to the Savoy region was to counter the growing resistance movement in 
the mountains, Vichy's officials acknowledged that Pétain’s visit to Nice would probably 
trigger a backlash from the Italian government, as it would be interpreted as an assertion of 
France's claim to the city.  
In fact, both the prudent attitude of Vichy authorities and the cool reaction of CIAF 
officials to the GAN militants could help explain why the mutual scorn of the Italian and 
French communities rarely erupted into violent confrontation. Only one major incident 
physically pitted Italian civilians against French in the Alpes-Maritimes. On the night of 30 
October 1940, Pierre Weck, eighteen years old and French, was strolling back home from 
the movies with a few friends and his sister in Monaco. On the way, he ran into two Italians 
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who were allegedly yelling “Viva Mussolini, Vive le Duce.” Weck asked them to stop their 
singing and in reply got punched. He then fell while fleeing and was repeatedly kicked in 
the head by a mob of Italians. Pierre Weck succumbed to his wounds at the hospital a few 
days later.
385
 This episode caused an uproar in the French community. Wild rumors spread 
that the Italian surgeon had indicated in his report that the youth had died from hitting his 
head on the pavement, thus exonerating the two assailants.
386
 The Italian Consul in 
Monaco, Sanfelice, confirmed the Italian surgeon’s explanation. In his report of the 
incident, Sanfelice asserted that the French group had started the confrontation. Pierre 
Weck was, he reported, particularly virulent in his insults “because of the support of several 
friends or maybe to act as a braggart to impress some girls.” As soon as the two Italians had 
threatened to beat him, Weck ran and slipped on the sidewalk, mortally injuring himself by 
hitting his head on the paving. The Consul’s report moreover accused the local Legion, 
which had provided legal support to the victim’s family in the trial, of adding to the tension 




Pierre Weck's death happened in the first months after the Battle of the Alps and, 
coupled with the previous incarceration of allegedly Italian Fascists in June 1940, the 
unfortunate incident could have foreshadowed the beginning of xenophobic violence. Yet, 
notwithstanding the increasing uneasiness in the department, owing to the tightening of 
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rationing and the growing fear of an Italian invasion, no major crime based on xenophobic 
motivation was recorded after the Weck incident before the Italian military invasion in 
November 1942. Even the CIAF delegate in Nice Quinto Mazzolini admitted that the CIAF 
delegation was often exaggerating the threat for propaganda reasons when he wrote, “I 
often explain the facts [incidents between French and Italians] to the French authorities 
with the necessary dramatization (italics are mine), but to the Royal [Foreign] Ministry I 
have to concede that at present time, the Italian community in the Alpes-Maritimes lives 
almost undisturbed.”
388
 Xenophobic riots between Italians and French simply never 
happened and the relations between the two communities never deteriorated to the point of 
no return. This relative calm stemmed from two factors: first of all, both communities were 
in an attentiste mood, waiting for the armistice situation to clarify itself. Even the most 
ardent anti-Italian inhabitants were cautious in expressing their contempt, in case of an 
Italian invasion.
389
 On the other hand, the Italian irredentists started to tone down the 
expression of their nationalist feelings, especially in light of the moderation of CIAF 
officials. However, this does not fully explain why the tension never fully erupted into a 
racial war. It appears that the absence of widespread violence could also be attributed to the 
high degree of integration of the Italian immigrants into the French society. Mixed 
marriages were common and for good reason; both communities were largely Catholic and 
shared common cultural roots. In fact, each community had suffered from the war equally. 
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A few Italians enjoyed some advantages gratis the CIAF delegations, at least until rationing 
also hit Italy hard, but this material help was counterbalanced by the limitations imposed on 
their civic rights, a consequence of the xenophobic laws implemented by Vichy. 
Notwithstanding this truce, CIAF officials were treading dangerous ground in the 
Zone Libre. The Italian CIAF personnel stationed on French soil to supervise the armistice 
clauses soon became embroiled in a war of influence with local French authorities. Indeed, 
the impact of the mere presence of delegations of an enemy state, which in the mind of the 
local population and Vichy authorities had not defeated France, should not be 
underestimated. Italian delegations always had to move carefully to avoid any direct 
confrontation with the French state. In their reports, however, they never hid their contempt 
for the Vichy regime. For instance, Italian officials scathingly noted that in Nice “speeches 
were more copious than provisions,” hinting here at the worsening rationing situation along 
the French Mediterranean coast.
390
 Conversely, Vichy prefects resented the Italians' 
interference in public matters as Italian officials saw themselves as paladins of the Italian 
community in France. This confrontation even existed to an intelligence level. The 
Deuxième Bureau, the French military intelligence service, instructed its agents in the 
Basses-Alpes to carefully monitor the CIAF officials in Digne and report any of their 
activities taht went beyond the scope of their official role, such as food distribution to needy 
Italians, espionage or arms trafficking.
391
 In fact, the French noted that these activities were 
                                                     
390 AUSSME, D7, CIAF, Box 19, CIAF Notiziario Quindicinale n°29 (1-15 February 1942), p.35.   
391
 ADAHP 42 W 80, Circulaire n°106/S/2-SR/SCA "Instruction particulière n°4, Renseignements sur les 
incidents eventuels avec les autorités des commissions de contrôle d'armistice," 18 April 1941. 
 
 146 
often linked together, for CIAF officials paid local Italians to spy in return for food.
392
 The 
quarrel between the two states inevitably fuelled the brooding tensions between the French 
and Italian communities in France. Italians were seen as the fifth column in France, scouts 
for the future annexation of France and these suspicions occasionally erupted in violence, 
although never on a large scale.  
As a matter of fact, local authorities and the populace were right. CIAF authorities 
had a hidden agenda besides the aid of Italian citizens living on French soil. They strove to 
undermine the newly created French state from within by exploiting the frail legitimacy of a 
regime born of a crushing defeat which had cut its territory in half. The tool used by CIAF 
officials was the Armistice, but especially Article XXI, the wide interpretation of which 
allowed them to impinge on French internal matters. It thus appears reductive to assert that 
the impact of CIAF delegations "was extremely limited" because of the terms of the 
Armistice.
393
 It is true that they were mostly "dealing with the daily economic interests of 
the Italian citizens living in France," but this concern for Italian permanent residents in 
France held far wider consequences at the local level. The CIAF official mediating to 
reinstate Italian workers who had been laid off or to get an Italian mother access to the 
carte alimentaire reserved for French women with toddlers was not merely affecting the 
local economy but was also impinging on French internal affairs. His act was political. By 
doing so he directly challenged the authority of Vichy prefects and the French jurisdiction. 
For example, by strongly endorsing a program of food distribution to poor Italian 
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emigrants, CIAF delegates very effectively belittled the work of Vichy relief agencies such 
as the Secours National or the Entr'aide Nationale, whose soup kitchens and fundraisings 
were coordinated by the Vichyite Legion.
394
  
That the CIAF delegates' actions were inspired mostly by political reasons is evident 
from their open contempt for the Italian communities in France. There was little 
humanitarian sentiment underpinning the relief campaign promoted by the Fascist state in 
France. In a scathing report, Vice-Consul of Nice Count Borromeo admitted that the soup 
kitchens’ popularity did not constitute proof of the Fascists' appeal among the Italian 
community in France. The vast majority of the Italian workers were modest people, with 
relatively low incomes and even less education. Their first and foremost worry was to 
provide food for their children and to find an occupation in the stagnant job market. The 
Italian delegations provided concrete assistance on both issues. Thus, Borromeo bitterly 
concluded that “the very aspirations to see Nice being returned to Italy, most of the time, 
are in the mind of a plain laborer or of the conscientious carpenter only the most genuine 
expression of his hope of seeing an improvement in his living conditions.”
395
 Mazzolini 
also dismissed the Italian community as individuals with "poor intellectual level" (basso 
livello intellettuale), further adding that the colony "did not shine either in their past history, 
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their way of life or civil obedience." (precedenti, costumi e disciplina).
396
 In fact, the many 
destitutes living in the Italian community in a territory claimed by the Fascist state were 
nothing less than a "shame" (disdoro) which hurt Italian prestige at an international level. 
Derogatory remarks regarding Italian permanent residents in France were not confined to 
southern France. An inspector of the Fasci all'Estero Bureau sent to Paris was appalled by 
the poverty he found among the Italian community in Paris. He deeply deplored the relief 
campaign promoted by Italian agencies in France as it only benefited those who were "more 
skilled at whimpering" (più abili a piagnucolare).
397
 Italian officials thus acknowledged 
that the relief campaign would only benefit the more indigent part of the Italian population 
on French soil. On the other hand, most of the Italian notables, with a few exceptions, were 
loath to side with the Fascist state as they were either sincerely grateful to their host country 
for their prosperity or were wary about being losing all the benefits they had accumulated 
over the years. Moreover, the fact that the Italian diplomatic personnel were from the upper 
bourgeoisie, if not from the nobility, prejudiced them against the destitute, for they thought 
that material poverty not only inferred intellectual paucity but also moral slackness. No 
wonder then that they failed to connect with the majority of the Italians in France. 
It is not surprising then that CIAF delegations even had issues with the minority in 
the Italian populace who were willing to help them; the irredentists. To be sure, the two 
parties still shared the same overarching goal of seeing the Italian flag fly in the County of 
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Nice one day. They dissented however on the way to achieve this objective. The irredentist 
movement openly voiced its opinion by any means and aimed to foment nationalist riots 
within the Alpes-Maritimes hoping eventually to compel the Italian army to cross the border. 
This outspoken attitude achieved nothing except to breed hostility towards the Italian 
community and the CIAF. Still it remains undeniable, that CIAF officials, even though they 
did not fully trust people from the local irredentist movement, were forced to rely on them as 
they were the only faction in France sympathizing for the annexation cause. Indeed, CIAF 
delegates never lost sight of their ultimate mission, which was to prepare for the future 
annexation of the Free Zone. All the CIAF forthnightly reports carefully analyzed the French 
internal situation with the goal of identifying which forces might eventually oppose any 
invasion. In the words of Mazzolini, "We never failed to provide any possible support to the 
idea of our territorial claims."
398
 Of course, at least until November 1942, this annexationist 
policy was always carried out in a semi-clandestine way for fear of alarming Vichy officials. 
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The Italian occupation zone: an inchoate colonization? 
If the CIAF officials enjoyed little leeway and often clashed with Vichy prefects in 
the Zone Libre, the situation was very different east of the Green Line. Here the military 
occupation had given the Italians complete control over the entire occupied zone. 
Therefore, local CIAF officials could openly express their desire of annexation with 
incurring the anger of French authorities. In truth, the zone had little prestige and no 
economic importance, as it included only a small city, Menton and a few small villages 
along the border. Nonetheless, the Italians endeavored to make the most of it by Italianizing 
and colonizing the entire zone, with special regards to Menton. This strategy served two 
purposes. First, the Italians wanted Menton to become a model of Italianization for the 
consumption of both Italian and French public opinion. Italians were encouraged to resettle 
into new conquered territories; the French would be shown the alleged superior quality of 
life under Italian rule. Most importantly, with the reconstruction of Menton and the 
occupied zone, the Italians, and especially the CIAF, were willing to experiment with a 
policy of colonization, which, in the minds of the Italian leaders, would later carried over in 
all irredentist lands. Thus, the Italians focused their efforts on Menton, a city known before 
the war as a tourist resort, widely renowned for its mild climate and breathtaking view of 
the Mediterranean Sea.  
This policy was not well accepted by local Italian military commanders, for the new 
strip of conquered land held a crucial role in security matters, which superseded its political 
value, or so they thought. The Italian army was endeavoring to create a new buffer zone 
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between Italy and France, both to prevent any future invasion of the French army and to 
screen individuals who transited from France to Italy. Arguably, this security strategy did 
nothing to facilitate the task of Italian civilian officials who strove to restore the zone and 
especially its biggest town, Menton, to its former glory, with a two-pronged campaign 
intended to encourage former inhabitants to return home and tourists to visit the area. 
Therefore, as it would happen when the occupation zone expanded to include the a wider 
territory of southeastern France in November 1942, the internecine rivalry between Italian 
army commanders and Italian CIAF officials over occupation policy in France was 
ultimately won by the former, who emphasized security measures over political.  
Initially, however, the power lay with the CIAF, who did not time underscoring the 
importance of the zone. On 5 November 1940 a separate bureau, the Amministrazione dei 
Territori Occupati, (Administration of Occupied Territories Bureau) was created in Turin, 
headed by an Italian prefect who supervised the Civil Commissars and the Italian civil 
administrators of the municipalities in the Italian occupation zone. It was crucial for the 
Fascist authorities to re-establish legal order in the occupied zone immediately, as the 
departure of the French civilian authorities a few days before the war had left a 
jurisdictional vacuum. The Italians urgently needed to assert the legitimacy of the Italian 
occupation in the contested zone. Thus, on 30 July Mussolini issued the “Proclamation 
Concerning the Administration and the Judicial Organization of the Occupied Territories,“ 





 Appointed by the Italian High Command, this zone's Civil Commissars were 
subordinated both to the Administration of Occupied Territories’ Bureau at the central 
CIAF headquarters in Turin and to local military commanders, especially with regards to 
questions of public order.
400
 Nevertheless, each Civil Commissar, whose purview 
encompassed one municipality, still enjoyed a high degree of autonomy and his role 
mirrored the role of the French prefect in Vichy France.  The Civil Commissar supervised 
the police force and ruled over municipal councils.
401
 Any French decree issued by French 
local or national administrations had to be approved by the Italian authorities before 
becoming law in the occupied zone.
402
 Thus, Civil Commissars were one of the most 
significant features in the Duce’s Proclamation and the supreme civilian authority in the 
occupied zone. 
The Proclamation warned that Civil Commissars could release from their duties 
local French authorities who had abandoned their post prior the conflict and who did not 
return within ten days.
403
 This provision was probably meant to force a limited number of 
French civil servants to return to the occupied territory. The presence of French mayors, in 
particular, was important both for the Italian and the French states for diametrically 
opposed reasons. The Italians were hoping to effect a smooth transition from French to 
Italian administrations, drawing on the knowledge and experience of the French 
functionaries, as well as to lure French citizens into moving back to the occupied zone. 
                                                     
399 The full text of the “Pr  lama   n   n ern ng  he a m n s ra   n an   he ju    al organization of the 
   up e   err   r es“  s ava lable  n Rainero, La Commission italienne  ’armistice avec la France, pp.407-413. 
400 Proclamation Articles 2 and 3. 
401 Proclamation Article 4. 
402
 Proclamation Article 5. 
403 Proclamation Article 6. 
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Vichy itself was interested, for reasons of prestige, to ensure a continued presence of some 
representation of French state authority. For instance, the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes 
instructed the Mayor of Menton, Paul Durandy, to resume his work, who agreed to do so, 
crossing the new border (the Green Line) on 29 June.
404
 
 This did not mean that the Italians were willing to embrace the old administration 
as if nothing had happened. Durandy was joined after two months by only a handful of 
municipal civil servants, mostly clerks, handpicked by the Italian authorities. Strict rules 
were enforced by local Italian authorities in the entire occupied zone, across the four 
departments. Mayors and the bare minimum of municipal office workers needed were 
allowed to return to their alpine villages, but other functionaries were forbidden to follow 
suit.
405
 No other French official - not a firefighter, a policeman, or member of the 
Renseignements Généraux,
406
 not even a postman - was allowed to resume his pre-war 
position. All these officials were forced to relocate across the border; in the case of Menton, 
at Roquebrune-Cap Martin. 
This moderate, yet condescending attitude towards French officials reflected the 
Italian two-pronged policy. In the short-term, the occupation zone needed to be rebuilt, 
especially in the case of Menton, and its infrastructure restored. French administrators were 
tolerated insofar as they could help restore the economic and social network of the occupied 
zone. Yet, the Italians always saw them as an intrusive presence that would be dismissed as 
                                                     
404 Molinari and Panicacci, Menton dans la Tourmente, 1939-1945, p.47. 
405  ADAM 616 W 260, “C nf ren e p ur l’  u e  es pr blèmes p s s par l’   upa   n e  la pr pagan e 
  al ennes  enue à V  hy le 16    embre 1940“, pp.8-9. The only exception was the firefighters in some Savoy 
territories, who were allowed to return. 
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 The Renseignements Géneraux was a branch of the police created in 1911 whose role consisted of 
 b a n ng  nf rma   n  n pe ple  r  rgan za   ns wh    ul  un erm ne  he s a e’s se ur  y.   
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soon as the situation stabilized. In fact, in the long run, after the reconstruction period, the 
Fascist state was determined to Italianize the zone, both by favoring its colonization with 
immigrants coming from Italy and by stripping the region of its French heritage and 
administration.  
 Before contemplating Italianization, however, the Italians were confronted with the 
poor state of the zone after the short, yet quite destructive, military offensive. Indeed, June 
1940 had been a devastating period for the occupied French territory and, in particular, for 
Menton. Parts of the “City of Lemons” had been partially ruined by Italian shells and street 
combat. To add insult to injury, Menton had had to endure widespread looting. Italian 
authorities pointed an accusatory finger at the retreating troops of the Armée Des Alpes. 
While it is possible that French troops may have occasionally looted, it is clear that the 
Italians were the major culprits. Taking advantage of the forced exile of two-thirds of 
Menton's inhabitants and almost all farmers in the countryside, some Italian soldiers, as 
vengeance for their fallen comrades, rampaged through the streets, combing whole 
neighborhoods in search of portable, yet valuable, goods such as silverware or lingerie. 
Summer villas of rich English citizens were targeted first both for their luxury goods and 
because of the certainty that their owners would not return soon to lay claim to their 
property.
407
 Italo Calvino, who would later become one of the major twentieth-century 
Italian novelists but was at that time a Fascist Avanguardista, testified to the devastation in 
                                                     
407 Most of the villas were occupied or given to Italian units or civilians. The 31 August 1941 decree of the 
Duce, by impounding properties of citizens of hostile countries, de facto formalized these expropriations. 
Administrators were nominated by army Commanders to manage the properties. See ADAHP 42 W 81, 
Rapp r  n°852/In  pr sen   par le Ma  re  es Requê es au C nse l  ’E a  The s, Pr s  en   e la   us-
D l ga   n p ur les Affa res A m n s ra  ves, à l’Am ral Dupla , Pr s  en   e la D.F.C.I.A., 11 July 1942, pp.2-3. 
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Menton which he witnessed when he toured the occupied zone with his fellow 
Vanguardists. Everywhere, the desolate streets were littered with broken glass, while 
broken doors lay ajar. Buildings’ walls were defiled with patriotic slogans such as W il Re, 
W il Duce, W i morti and W la Cosseria.
408
  
The soldiers were not the only category of people roaming the city in search of 
valuables.
409
 Workers brought from Italy to clear the rubble eagerly joined the pillaging. 
They probably got the lion’s share of the loot, methodically clearing the houses as much as 
the roads, their trucks filled with furniture and other valuable goods.
410
 If it is difficult to 
estimate the extent of the depredation, it is far more challenging to determine the time 
period in which most plundering occurred.  Most of its inhabitants did not return to Menton 
until the end of the Italian occupation and so started filing complaints only in November 
1943. Therefore, it is unclear how many houses were looted in 1940 or in the following 
years.
411
 It is worth noting that the razzia also spread to the small villages in the Italian 
occupied zone. In Breil, for instance, a schoolteacher complained in July 1941 that the 




                                                     
408 “W”  n slang means Viva (Hurray). The slogans therefore translate as "Hurray for the King," "Hurray for the 
Duce," Hurray for the dead," "Hurray  for the [Division] Cosseria." In some houses, soldiers with a wicked 
sense of humor tagged the walls with Grazie, era buono (Thank you, it was good). 
409 Italo Calvino, L’entrata in G erra, Torino: Einaudi, 1954, pp.33-44. Calvino interestingly adds that the Italian 
villages bordering France shared the same fate as their French counterparts. Soldiers from divisions camped 
near the border, awaiting orders to invade France, pillaged without scruple a few days before the beginning of 
hostilities. Calvino, L’entrata in G erra, pp.28-29. 
410 Molinari and Panicacci, Menton dans la Tourmente, 1939-1945, pp.44-45. 
411 For some of the complaints, which made clear the methodical nature of the looting of buildings, see ADAM 
397 W 59. 
412 ADAM 616 W 161, procès-verbal dated July 4, 1941, interview with Mme Francine C. 
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With the rebuilding of the infrastructure underway, the Italian authorities turned to 
their overarching objective of integrating Menton and the occupied zone into the Italian 





 spheres. Trade barriers between the occupied zone and Italy 
were lifted, but instituted between the zone and France.
415
 The Italian lira was made the 
official currency while the French franc was officially demoted to a second-rank currency, 
and the exchange rate set at an outrageous 30 lire for 100 francs.
416
 The Proclamation was 
even more drastic in its revamping of the judicial system. The French were left only with a 
Judge of the Peace who doubled as juge d’instruction (examining magistrate). This same 
magistrate, however, was carefully supervised by an Italian military prosecutor and had to 
abide by Italian penal and civil laws.
417
 Any crime committed against the Italian military 
forces was to be prosecuted by a special Italian military tribunal.
418
 Finally, depending how 
far the case might progress, one could only appeal within the Italian legal system to the 
Turin Court of Appeals. 
With the integration of the occupied zone into the jurisdictional, political and 
economic framework of the Fascist state, the Italian authorities set in motion their long-term 
goal of Italianizing the whole occupation zone, and in particular in Menton. In the convoluted 
language of the Italian bureaucracy, the goal of every Civil Commissariat was 
                                                     
413 Proclamation Articles 9-12. 
414 Proclamation Articles 21-32. 
415 Proclamation Articles 9 and 12. 
416 Proclamation Article 13. 
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 Proclamation Articles 21-23. 
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to endeavor as much as possible to contribute to giving a typically 
Italian imprint. To this end, it should enact a series of measures similar or 
parallel to those adopted in the national territory and implement a daily and 
concrete activity through the Italian commissars’ offices, with the general aim 





This campaign developed in two directions. First of all, local Italian authorities were 
to root the Italian language, customs and traditions in the newly occupied territory. In the 
meantime, local administrations would be purged of the few remaining French civil 
servants who would be replaced by Italian ones.  
It is a truism that the national language is one of the pillars upon which a nation 
rests. In fact, since the end of the nineteenth century, mandatory schooling was one of the 
principal vehicles used by modern nation states to instill a national consciousness in their 
populace. Pupils were taught to realize that they shared a common culture and history.
420
 
This was the plan of the Commisssariats. The Italianization of the occupied zone, 
nevertheless, was uneven. In the Alpine occupied zone, the Italians tolerated the reopening 
of French schools. The reason for the difference was simple. Fewer efforts were made to 
provide school services in Italian in the northern Alpine departments (Savoy, Hautes and 
                                                     
419 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 2, Rapporto 
511/R6/gab Commissario Civile Mentone Giuseppe Frediani al G.B.Marziali, Prefetto CIAF dei Amministrazione 
Territori Francesi Occupati, 1 June 1942, p.2. 
420 For more on the creation of nations and the harnessing of nationalism by modern states, see Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, London: Verso, 1983. 
On how the French public school system in the nineteenth century created a national consciousness in France, 
see Eugen Weber, Peasants into Frenchmen, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976, pp.303-338. 
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Basses Alpes) as they were not the primary objective of the irredentist plans.
421
  On the 
other hand, the County of Nice, as well as Tunisia and Corsica, ranked high in the 
expansionist agenda of the Fascist state especially since Ciano’s speech in the Italian 
Parliament on 30 November 1938. Italian irredentist panegyrists insisted that the French 
Riviera “belonged unmistakably by the nature of its people, the language spoken, its 
customs and the religious, civic and warlike spirit [to Italy’s Western Riviera].”
422
 
Therefore, Italian officials took great pains to create new Italian schools in that chunk of the 
County of Nice which had been included in the occupied zone. Menton, due to its 
demographic and symbolic importance, was a special target of this policy. By October 
1942, the Italian administration had set up no less than nine Italian schools, ranging from 
daycare to secondary schools, with more than 1,000 pupils enrolled.
423
 
In the Alpes-Maritimes, like the northern Alpine departments, coincidental with the 
development of Italian schools, the Italian authorities refused to allow the French schools to 
reopen. This odd situation spurred the French community in Menton to act swiftly to 
protect their cultural heritage. French teachers and other educated citizens organized 
clandestine lessons in private houses and even cellars.
424
 Starting from the beginning of 
October 1942, the French community went as far as to set up fee-paying French lectures, 
taught by two clergymen and a university student. Realizing that the Civil Commissar 
                                                     
421 Jean-Louis Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, Sud-Est de la France, Juin 1940-Septembre 1943, Rennes: 
Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010, p.46. 
422 Gray, Le terre nostre ritornano… Malta – Corsica – Nizza, p.108. 
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would never give them permission to teach even in private settings, the French 
ecclesiastical authorities disguised the lessons as Catholic catechism.
425
 Italian authorities 
reacted swiftly to what they deemed a threat to Italian sovereignty in the occupied zone. 
The unofficial schools in San Michele and Sacro Cuore’s churches were closed in early 
November and the French priests were strictly admonished not to stray again from Italian 
regulations.
426
 Things were no different in the rural parts of the department. In the 
municipality of Fontan, the school offered classes only in Italian, with an Italian teacher 
who came daily from across the border. Pupils who wished to study in French had to take 
private lessons, paid for by their families.
427
 The same situation popped up in the hamlet of 
Isola, where the intransigent Commissar Guido Botto refused to allow the return of the 
French teacher until May 1942.
428
    
Tied to the issue of the education system was the question of clergy. Both the 
Italians and the French realized the significance of controlling Catholic worship in a region 
where the influence of the Catholic Church was still strong. The Catholic religion had 
always played an important part in the regional identity of both the County of Nice and the 
bordering Liguria and Piedmont regions. Rural villages were built around churches and the 
social fabric was woven through local parishes. Clashes between the local French Catholic 
                                                     
425 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 2, faldone 21, 
Rapporto n°8/269 Giuseppe Valenti, comandante della 21sima Compagna Speciale CC. RR. al Commissario Civile 
di Mentone, 15 October 1942. 
426 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 2, Faldone 21, 
Rapporto 784/gab/R6 Commissario Civile di Mentone Giuseppe Frediani alla CIAF, Amministrazione dei 
Territori  Francesi Occupati, 19 November 1942. 
427 618 W 161, Rapp r  n°2022  e l’Inspe  eur  e P l  e M rl   ur   s, Bre l, 28 ju n 1941.  ee als  
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Breil, 2 février 1942. 
428 Panicacci, Les Alpes-Maritimes 1939-1945, p.140. 
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Church and the Italian one were not new. In the late 1800s, the Italian church had sent 
priests or missionaries to France to address the needs of the growing Italian community that 
was otherwise unable to understand the sermons or confess, even though the French 




Again, policies varied markedly between departments within the occupation zone. It 
seems that the farther the department was from Menton, the more lenient the Italian 
authorities were concerning the enforcement of occupation policy. Bishops enjoyed free 
access to those parts of their dioceses located in the Maurienne and Tarentaise valleys in 
Savoy, even without safe-conducts.
430
 On the contrary, in the Alpes-Maritimes, the Italians 
and the French, not surprisingly, locked horns. The Bishop of Nice, Monseigneur Paul 
Rémond, who in light of his patriotism was quickly identified by Italian officials as a 
nefarious influence, used his position to undermine the authority of the Italian Catholic 
Church in the occupied zone. Appealing to the highest Vatican authorities, he successfully 
lobbied against the Bishop of Ventimiglia coming to Menton, out of fear that such a visit 
could be construed as a step towards the incorporation of Menton into Ventimiglia's Italian 
diocese. This suggests that the Vatican adopted a studied neutral stance with regards to 
irredentist plans, for the inclusion of Menton into a Italian diocese would have been yet 
another confirmation of the Italian claim over the region. Italian authorities lashed back by 
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denying Monseigneur Rémond a safe-conduct to visit Menton, forcing him to delegate his 
prerogatives to the eldest clergyman in Menton, Canon Ortmans.
431
  
The conflict even trickled down at a parish level. From the moment of the creation 
of the occupation zone, Italian authorities had tried to persuade local parish priests to 
deliver sermons only in Italian, but were forced to accept masses in French, due to the 
limited availability of local priests who spoke Italian and their reticence to alienate their old 
parishioners. Even those who spoke Italian were not necessarily cooperative. In Fontan, a 
small hamlet in the Alpes-Maritimes divided in half by the new border (the Green Line), the 
priest, Don Antonio Pellegrino, notwithstanding his Italian nationality and the injunction 
coming from the Bishop of Ventimiglia, categorically refused to preach in Italian. The Civil 
Commissar did not dare expel him from Fontan, as Don Pellegrino had been officially 
supported in his decision by the Vatican who ruled, in this instance, that Fontan, as much as 
Menton, was still to be considered part of the diocese of Nice. However, he was prohibited 
from crossing the border to officiate in the French Zone Libre and was severely admonished 
by the Civil Commissar when he preached a mass on Joan of Arc’s name-day.
432
 In the 
hamlet of Le Bourghet, Italian authorities had even less success. A curate from the nearby 
commune of St-Étienne de Tinée had to cross the Green Line nearly every day to act both 
as parish priest and as schoolteacher. This problematic situation stemmed from the decision 
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of the local Civil Commissar to appoint an Italian who had no knowledge of French 
language and was thus unable to communicate with his French pupils.
433
  
The forced Italianization was not limited to education and religion, but touched 
other aspects of daily life. In Menton, road signs were changed to conform to Italian 
signage. New milestones were erected to mark the kilometers to Rome.
434
  Street names 
were renamed after the myths and heroes of Italian Fascist propaganda. Thus, “Promenade 
du Midi” changed to “Passeggiata Mare Nostrum,”
435
 “Promenade Georges V” became 
“Passeggiata Italo Balbo,” and several streets were dedicated to fallen Italian soldiers of the 
Battle of the Alps.
436
 The topographic upheaval in Menton included the Italianization of 
stores’ and buildings’ names: “Palazzo del Comune” replaced “Hotel de Ville” and grocery 
stores were renamed Alimentari. The rest of the occupation zone was not spared this 
Italianization, as for instance, Fontan, the second largest village in the occupation zone after 
Menton, saw its "Mairie" become a "Municipio."
437
  
The forced colonization of the occupied zone was further implemented by Italianizing 
local administrations. Between 1941 and 1942, the number of Italian civil servants swelled 
dramatically, as new bureaus were created at the Civil Commissariat to help in the 
reconstruction of Menton. At the same time, Italian authorities dismissed the most important 
French civil servants, such as the mayor of Menton, Paul Durandy. Durandy had been given 
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express permission by the Italians to return to Menton and the occupation authorities had 
wanted to use him as a decoy to lure the French population to return to Menton. Therefore, at 
the beginning, the relations between Jean Durandy, and the Italian authorities were 
courteous. In fact, the mayor had been so accommodating that the Alpes-Maritimes Prefect 
Ribière dryly complained that “(t)he mayor, Mr. Durandy, does not act as a resolute 
French.”
438
 Indeed, as a sign of favor, the three chief Italian dignitaries in Menton, among 
them Civil Commissar Giuseppe Frediani, attended the mayor’s wedding reception on 16 
October 1941. As a token of goodwill, Jean Durandy and his new wife also accepted the 
Italian authorities’ invitation to spend their honeymoon trip in Italy.  
However, this forced cohabitation petered out shortly thereafter. Municipal 
functionaries, as the sole representatives of the French state, were bound to become the target 
of the Italian irredentist campaign. After all, the most ardent irredentists could not stomach 
the anomaly of Italian towns headed by French administrations. Across the occupied zone, 
Civil Commissars were increasingly wary of anything or anyone that might undermine their 
authority, especially possible contact between French mayors in the occupied zone and 
French authorities in the Free Zone. For instance, in October 1941 the mayors of Séez, 
Sainte-Foy and Montvalenzan were dismissed for having travelled to Bourg-Saint-Maurice to 
attend a meeting with the local prefect.
439
 In Menton, Durandy and his staff had lost their 
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usefulness in the eyes of the Italian authorities now that the transition period was over. This 
new hostile stance was embodied in the Menton Civil Commissar Giuseppe Frediani, who 
made the point in June 1942 that the French town council in Menton enjoyed only a fictitious 
decision-making power. Frediani in fact had been slowly, but steadily, draining the town 
council of its rights, passing them over to Italian officials.
440
 By 1942, it became clear that 
the real puppet master behind the council was the Civil Commissar, who not only held the 
right, by grace of the 30 July 1940 Duce’s decree, to cancel any decision made by the 
municipality, but also fully controlled the municipal budget. The Italians first targeted the 
head of the Mayor’s personal staff, Marcel Barneaud, who was given a one-week ultimatum 
to leave the city in April 1942 for alleged anti-Italian espionage and for immoral behavior. 
The future Combat resistant was openly accused of travelling to France to deliver political 
and military reports on Menton.
441
 To tarnish his reputation even further, the Italian 
authorities hinted at a possible affair, a slander vehemently denied by his wife.
442
 
That the sand in the French mayor's hourglass began to flow was evident by the 
launching of a campaign to discredit Durandy himself. The full frontal attack came in the 6 
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September 1942 edition of Il Nizzardo, with an article entitled, “The hopes of the mayor of 
Menton.” Durandy have been allegedly heard in a cafe in Nice uttering scornful remarks 
about the Axis powers and predicting that 1943 would be a turning point in the war. The 
journalist wryly concluded the article by advising the mayor to be more careful in the 
future.
443
 The mayor did not get a chance to heed the advice however. Even though Durandy 
immediately wrote a letter to the Civil Commissar, vehemently denying the article’s 
allegations,
444
 the Italian authorities had already decided to exile the mayor and to take 
advantage of the upheaval to dismiss the entire town council.
445
 The Prefect for the 
Administrated Occupied Territories, Marziali, ruled out both French nominees for the 
mayor’s office: General Charreyre, a member of the pro-German elite Groupe Collaboration, 
suggested by the French delegation in Turin;
446
 and Marcel Firpo, the head of the local 
autonomist movement, the Comité des Traditions Mentonnaises, backed by Nino Lamboglia, 
the most prominent irredentist intellectual living in Menton.
447
 In the end, Marziali picked an 
Italian engineer born in Menton and known for his Fascist sentiments, Giovanni Marenco. 
Not surprisingly, Il Nizzardo hailed the appointment of Marenco as the “end of the 
misunderstanding,” created by having “a French mayor and a French town council [ruling 
over] the very Italian (italianissima) Menton.” On the other hand, the CIAF report flatly 
                                                     
443 Il Nizzardo, Anno IX, n°26, 6 September 1942. 
444 A copy of the letter can be found in AUSSME, CIAF, M3 34, Lettera di Jean Durandy al Commissario Civile di 
Menton, 7 September 1942. 
445 Molinari and Panicacci, Menton dans la Tourmente, 1939-1945, pp.63-64. 
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the Italian army, pp.302-305. 
 
 166 
stated that “on 27 October the installation in the town hall of Mentone of the municipal 
extraordinary commissar Engineer Giovanni Marenco has been carried out, as a replacement 
for the French mayor, Engineer Durandy, suspected of treachery against us, and singled out 
by Il Nizzardo and other newspapers.”
448
 
If the Menton Civil Commissar was adamant about crushing the last remnants of 
French sovereignty, he tolerated the Mentonese autonomist movement. No document was 
found to explain this decision, but the logic behind it probably stemmed from the desire to 
severe the bonds tying Menton to its French heritage to underscore its cultural affinity with 
the Italian peninsula.
449
 Indeed, sovereignist aspirations in Menton were not new. In 1848, 
members of the Mentonese elites, led by a local noble, Carlo Trenca, had staged a bloodless 
revolution which severed the city’s link with the Principality of Monaco and won the status 
of “free city for Menton and the nearby city of Roquebrune.”
450
 In June 1848, the city’s 
inhabitants had voted unanimously in favor of Menton becoming part of the Kingdom of 
Sardinia. Later, Menton was integrated into the County of Nice and thus became French in 
1861.  
The Civil Commissar in Menton keenly understood that, by fostering the local 
autonomist movement, the Comité des Traditions Mentonnaises, which consolidated in 
                                                     
448 Il Nizzardo, Anno IX, n°34, 1 November 1942;  AUSSME, Fondo CIAF, D7 37, Relazione mensile n°36 
sull’a   v  a’ sv l a  alla C mm ss  ne I al ana D’Arm s  z   nel per     16 O   bre – 15 Novembre 1942-XXI, 
Amministrazione nei Territori Francesi Occupati, p.2. It is worth noting that, from the perspective of the 
French state, Durandy remained the mayor of Menton on the grounds that a small part of the municipal 
territory of Menton was still in the Zone Libre, see ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio 
informazioni (1940-1943), Box 1, Faldone 14, Rapporto n°748/gab/R4 Rapporto Commissario Civile Mentone 
Giuseppe Frediani ad Amministrazione Territori Francesi Occupati, CIAF, 31 October 1942. 
449 In the opinion of this author, the Mentonese dialect seems much more related to the Ligurian one than to 
the Provençal.  
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 No modern book exists on the life of Carlo Trenca. A good resumé of his life is available at the internet site 
of the Augustus Hare Society: http://augustus-hare.tripod.com/mentone12.html, consulted on 12 June 2009.  
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February 1942, Italian authorities could make inroads into the French part of the Mentonese 
population. For this reason, the Comité enjoyed relative political and economic freedom.
451
 
Its president, the controversial Marcel Firpo, became the head of the Ufficio Assistenza per 
il Rimpatrio dei Mentonaschi (Office for the Repatriation of the Mentonese Population).
452
 
The newly-created organization, which took over the rooms in the city hall previously 
occupied by the French police superintendent, was given the task of enticing Mentonese 
refugees to return and of providing assistance to these Mentonese upon their return in the 
city. An article in the Giornale di Genova described in flattering prose what awaited the 
Mentonese emigrant entering the office: “In the waiting room, a notice in pure Mentonese 
stated: “Here you are at home.” This will give the emigrants who get back the certainty that 
they could express freely their wishes.… Greeted by the Head of the Office Marcel Firpo, a 
pure blood Mentonese, with his proverbial kindness, the emigrants will find an almost 




   The Italian state was not the only one interested in repatriating the 10,000 
displaced Mentonese still living in southwestern France, mostly in the Pyrénées-Orientales 
                                                     
451 The Comité des Traditions Mentonnaises was partly financed with a one-time payment of 50,000 lire by the 
Italian authorities. See Archivio  ell’Uff        r     ell    a   Magg  re  ell’Eser     (hereaf er AU  ME), 
CIAF, M3 34, CIAF, Amministrazione dei territori francesi occupati, "Pro-mem r a   n ernen   le  rreg lar  a’ 
es s en   nell’amm n s raz  ne  el C mm ssar a   Civile di Mentone e proposte sul modo di sanarle," Torino, 
21 September 1942, p.8. 
452 A detailed dossier on Marcel Firpo is available in the dossiers de procédure, Cour de Justice, Section Nice, 
ADAM 318 W 63. Furthermore, a few Italian reports on him could be found in ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile 
di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 2. Firpo was sentenced to seven years in prison after the 
war.  
453 Giornale di Genova, 17 March 1942. A French translation of the article is available in ADAM 166 W 10, 
Rapport n°1072 du Commissariat spécial de Menton, replié sur Cap-Martin au Préfet Régional des Alpes-
Maritimes, 18 March 1942. 
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departement. Vichy too encouraged them to return by extending grants to Menton refugees 
who returned home.
454
 Of course, the primary motivation behind the French state campaign 
was different, if not completely opposite to the Italian one. By sending back French 
citizens, Vichy endeavored to reassert the French character of the Cité des Citrons. More 
pragmatic motivations should not however be dismissed: Ten thousand displaced persons 
were a serious social and economic burden for the Pyrénées-Orientales department, 
especially in a period of increasing rationing and food shortages, and their departure would 
arguably reduce tensions between the evacuees and the local population.
455
  
However, Menton’s refugees were reluctant to accept Vichy’s offer for several 
reasons.  First of all, as underlined above, most of the people had lost their belongings in 
the looting at the cessation of hostilities, and in some cases even their houses or shops. 
French refugees were neither compensated by the Italian state, as the Italian decree of 26 
October 1940 regarding damage related to war events limited the indemnification to Italian 
citizens, nor by the French state, as French loss adjusters were forbidden to come to Menton 
to evaluate the extent of material damage.
456
 This very material issue was further worsened 
by a currency exchange rate clearly disadvantageous for the French, a fact that even the 
Civil Commissar Giuseppe Frediani could not deny.
457
 Moreover, French citizens would be 
                                                     
454 Dossiers of some of these grants can be examined in ADAM, 560 W 215.  
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457 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 1, Rapporto 
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cut off from any French administration, with the exception of the municipal authorities, and 
even they had only infrequent contact with the department's administration in Nice.
458
 What 
is more, French refugees from Menton, as a condition of returning to their homes, were 
required to obtain a safe-conduct from Italian authorities
459
 and every Menton dweller, 
regardless of his or her nationality, was given a new Italian identity card which identified 
their race.
460
 The bleak prospect of being subjected to Italian laws without the possibility of 
appealing to French authorities dissuaded more than one possible candidate. This sense of 
isolation was further heightened both by the new postal policy in the occupation zone 
(letters sent to France were not only charged international postage rates but were carefully 
scrutinized by the Italian censors), and by the impossibility of phoning France, a privilege 
enjoyed only by the Italian authorities.
461
  While food supplies were better in the Italian 
occupied zone than in Vichy’s territory, chiefly because the population of Menton received 
food from the Italian army and, outside Menton, also from the French Ravitaillement 




If this situation was not enough to discourage prospective returnees, the 6 April 
1941 decree was a cold shower for many. Pre-war Fascist legislation unilaterally deemed 
                                                     
458 The I al an au h r   es’ pr h b    n wen  s  far as    f rb    he p s  ng  f pla ar s by  he Secours National, 
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each individual of Italian descent to be an Italian citizen, even if he or she had previously 
relinquished their nationality in order to become French. The 6 April decree however took 
these even further, severing these individuals' ties with France. The Fascist state deemed 
their French nationality to have lapsed and thereafter considered them to be full Italian 
citizens. This new status had a dangerous implication. French citizens of Italian blood could 
well “receive the postcard” from the Genova or Turin military district and be drafted into 
the Regio Esercito.
463
 Local fears worsened when, in 1941, the Italian authorities ominously 
conducted a census of every male between 17 and 24 years of age in the occupied zone.  
In response to these moves by the Italian occupation authorities, Vichy attempted to 
coerce those young Frenchmen living in the Italian zone, but working in the Zone Libre, to 
enlist in the French forces. They threatened to imprison them if they failed to do so. In 
retaliation, the Italians cancelled the men’s safe-conduct passes, even though this measure 
effectively choked off the economic recovery of the Italian occupation zone by drastically 
increasing the number of jobless men.
464
 Moreover, in light of the ongoing war effort, even 
those who were deemed unfit for military duty, including minors aged fourteen or older and 
women, could eventually be called to perform the servizio obbligatorio del lavoro 
(mandatory work service). Given that approximately one-fourth of the population in the 
                                                     
463 From the 1870s until recently, Italian male citizens in their eighteenth year received a pink call-up postcard 
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464 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 1, Fascicolo 14, 
Lettera of the Commissario Civile di Mentone Virgilio Magris al comandante dei Carabinieri di Mentone, 1 May 
1941; Lettera n°2570 f C. Vittorelli, Prefe    per l’Amm n s raz  ne  e  Terr   r  O  upa  ; Rapporto A.85 
Commissario Civile di Mentone Virgilio Magris  all’Amm n s raz  ne  e  Terr   r  O  upa  , 30 May 1941. 
 
 171 
region was Italian or had been naturalized in the 1930s, the potential impact of the 6 April 
decree was significant. The French delegation in Turin vigorously protested to no avail. 
Conversely, the Italians were adamant that no residents in the occupied zone could be 
enrolled in the French Armée d’Armistice, probably for fear that any French military service 
would provide the seeds of rebellion.
465
 Italian authorities were so anxious about a possible 
fifth column emerging in the occupied territory that even youth organizations such as the 
Chantiers de la Jeunesse were banned.
466
   
In light of the ongoing tension between the two countries and the dire prospect of 
living a precarious life in a foreign city, the Mentonese refugees ignored the repatriation 
campaign. In April 1941, less than 6,800 people were living in Menton, compared to 21,000 
in 1939. This number increased only to 7,200 by the end of the occupation in 1943. The 
decrease in population was even more marked when one takes into account that the figures 
included the more than 400 Italian civil servants, along with their families, who had 
relocated in Menton as replacements for their French counterparts. Three out of four 
inhabitants in Menton were Italian in late 1942, whereas in 1939 they had represented only 
one-fourth of the total population.
467
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467 ACS, CIAF, Commissariato civile di Mentone ed Ufficio informazioni (1940-1943), Box 1, Fascicolo 1, Civil 




Unable to persuade Menton refugees to return, the Menton Civil Commissars sought 
to recruit Italians to Menton.
468
 Starting in 1941, a major propaganda campaign which 
depicted Menton as the embodiment of the dawn of a new Italian Empire unfurled in Italian 
newspapers and magazines. The Duce himself had visited the town, only one week after the 
end of combat, on 1 July, to underline the importance of Menton in the Fascist expansionist 
discourse.
469
 This explains why Menton's re-population was of such concern to the Italian 
authorities. Significantly, the railroad line between Ventimiglia, the coastal town across the 
border, and Menton was not only reopened, but also electrified, as a way to reinforce 
Menton’s link to the Italian territory. The local tourist office, the Costa Azzurra di Mentone, 
commissioned several leaflets which praised the geographic beauty of Menton along with 
sites such as the Saint Louis Bridge where Italian and French troops had clashed in June 
1940. Moreover, a notorious postcard of the XV Army corps portrayed an Italian soldier 
toppling a border milestone engraved with “France 1861” with his rifle butt, a clear allusion 
to the 1861 incorporation of the County of Nice into France.
470
 The Fascist state was so 
determined to use Menton as the symbol of Italy’s resurgence that the City of Lemons 
enjoyed an unusual abundance of food, at least until July 1941, at a time when both France 
and Italy had already fallen into daily rationing.
471
 The campaign had the two-pronged goal 
of enticing workers, mostly from the Liguria region, to settle in Menton and of helping 
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1943): storia postale, pp.51-53. 
471
 ADAM 616 W 260, “C nf ren e p ur l’  u e  es pr blèmes p s s par l’   upa   n e  la pr pagan e 
  al ennes  enue à V  hy le 16    embre 1940“, pp.25-26. 
 
 173 
restore the key sector of tourism. This colonization policy, denounced by both Vichy and 
French civilians, met with some success, as one out of five inhabitants of Menton in 1941 
had not been living in the city before the war.
472
  
No matter, the French Riviera town was hardly the idyllic place it had been before 
the war. Menton was still half-deserted, its image blemished by soaring unemployment and 
the impossibility of communicating with the French Free Zone due to a break in the 
telephone network. Even basic utilities needed for everyday life, such as gas, water and 
electricity, were in short supply.
473
 Before the war, Menton depended for water, electricity 
and gas on a distribution network linked to the Zone Libre inasmuch as the municipality 
had granted these concessions to three French private companies. After the Armistice, the 
Italian authorities voided these contracts, as they refused to let French technicians into the 
occupied zone for security reasons. However, the Civil Commissars soon realized that the 
French companies were the only ones capable of assuring the city’s return to the prewar 
standard of living. No alternative existed for gas distribution and the population had few 
alternatives other than wood-burning stoves. For water, the Italian army resorted to digging 
artesian wells. However, this makeshift solution only resulted in a supply of running water 
for a short period of time each day, and the Mentonese experienced water shortages during 
summer droughts. Electricity at least was guaranteed by an Italian company, but its poor 
quality forced the Civil Commissars to reconsider to the French company Énergie 
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473 P.T.T. (Postes, Télégraphes et Téléphones) technicians, evacuated in June 1940, had dismantled and taken 
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Industrielle. Negotiations with Énergie Industrielle, like those with the gas and water 
companies, fell through as both sides refused to compromise. The Italians would only allow 
the French companies to resume their previous positions on the condition that local 
management and administration would be subcontracted to Italian companies; the French 
refused to tie Menton to their network if not allowed to bring back their technicians.
474
 
Furthermore, the French state tied the electricity problem to the postal policy, as inhabitants 
of the occupied zone had great difficulties sending and receiving letters from the Free 
Zone.
475
 They proposed that, in return for permitting these companies to work in the Italian 
zone, mail from the occupied zone sent to France be charged the French domestic postal 
rate.  Eventually, the prospect of facing another arid summer and damp winter forced the 
Italian authorities to yield. Énergie Industrielle, Compagnie Génerale des Eaux and 
Compagnie Génevoise de l’Industrie du Gaz were allowed into the zone between December 




The Italianization campaign, the plummeting of the standard of living and the 
extenuating negotiations for the distribution of basic utilities served to exacerbate the 
already strained relations between the French and Italian communities. Tensions in Menton 
between the isolated French minority and the Italians were building daily, tearing the 
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delicate social fabric of the town. To the outrage of the French community, on the night of 
10 April 1942, unidentified vandals toppled the bust of the République in the central square 
of Menton, which symbolized the 1860 annexation of Menton by France. Brazen Fascist 
activities such as a weekly Saturday parade of Avanguardia and Ballila youths in their 
black uniforms and the celebrations on 23 June of the anniversary of the “capture” of 
Menton were considered provocations by the French population. Fights erupted in the 
bistros between Italian soldiers and French youths, the latter eventually ending up in jail for 
a few days. Shops owned by outspoken Fascist militants were targeted by French youths 
and their windows shattered with stones.
477
 Anti-Italian graffiti and anonymous pamphlets 
belittling the Italian invasion and inviting the Italian soldiers to desert were common.
478
 
French citizens who collaborated with the occupying authorities, such as Marcel Firpo, the 
head of the Office for the Repatriation of the Mentonese Population, had their houses 
defaced with insults such as Sellout (Vendu) and Traitor (Traitre).
479
  
The Italianization campaign ran into serious limitations outside of Menton as well. 
For a local holiday in Fontan, the Civil Commissar brought a musical band from Italy to 
play in the central square. According to the French police, however, the Italians did not 
seem to have made inroads into the local population as the majority of Fontan's inhabitants 
did not show up for the event.
480
 The French populace’s attitude was hardly surprising. The 
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replacement of the word “Mairie” with the Italian equivalent “Municipio” on the façade of 
Fontan’s town hall during the first days of the occupation clearly demonstrated that, as in 
Menton, the Italian authorities had no qualms about pursuing their plans for the 
italianization of the County of Nice.
481
 For the same reason, the French population in 
Fontan abandoned the local celebration of the 1942 Epiphany, despite the fact that they 
would miss the distribution of children’s toys, food and money. The French likely resented 
the unscrupulous use of the Twelfth Night for propaganda purposes and its Italianization in 
the form of Befana.
482
 Therefore, as a French report in July 1942 dryly stated, it appears 
that the Italian effort to instill Fascist values in the French border population had been 
ineffective. Even the consensus among the Italian population began to waver with the 
passage of time. On 10 June 1942, the Italian authorities organized a celebration of the 
anniversary of the declaration of war against France and England. According to the Breil 
police report, the bulk of the crowd was made up of Italian troops, as even the Italian 
populace was thinly represented.
483
 Even that part of the population originally sympathetic 
to the Duce’s appeal was slowly losing interest, in spite of the favorable rationing 
conditions enjoyed by the population of the occupied zone.  
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The implementation of the Italianization policy appears to have been less thorough 
in the rest of the occupied zone, probably due to the region’s insignificance in terms of 
resources and inhabitants and the minor importance of the Alpine region in the irredentist 
discourse. The Italian and French archives are not conclusive one way or the other. It 
appears that notwithstanding the official policy stemming from Turin, relations at the local 
level in remote areas depended heavily on the whims of the local Civil Commissar or 
Italian commander. On the scale of flexibility of the Italian policy in the occupied zone, the 
Alpes-Maritimes, and in particular Menton, stand out as a case of Italian inflexibility, while 
in the other departments, Italian authorities were more tolerant. This laxity extended even to 
the treatment of French authorities. For instance, the Prefect of Savoy was given permission 
to tour Bonneval-Sur-Arc, in spite of having to cross the Italian occupation zone, as the 
village was one of the four communes enclavées (“enclosed villages”), villages in the 
French Zone Libre which were accessible only by passing through the occupied zone.
484
 
Furthermore, the Italian attitude towards farmers with fields or houses in the occupied zone 
was generally lenient.
485
 The occupation authorities also tolerated the summer movement of 
cattle between pastures in the Italian and occupied zones.
486
 One particular episode 
exemplifies the easygoing mindset of the Italian occupying forces outside the Alpes-
Maritimes. In the Basses-Alpes, Italian forces guarding the border arrested two young 
hikers from Lyon. Italian authorities insisted that these arrests were only motivated by the 
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fact that the two young men were found with cameras and military maps of the zone, 
circumstances which meant the border guards could not turn a blind eye, implying that they 
would have if they could have. The two French were released a few days later without 
being mistreated and were not charged with any offense.
487
  
It is possible that the lassitude of the border guards in the Alpine border was as 
much a reflection of the virtual impossibility of patrolling the Green Line, which cut 
through a mountainous range peaking at 2,500 meters above the sea level. The challenging 
task of securing such a hostile environment was further aggravated by the massive 
demobilization in the Italian army. More than 600,000 soldiers out of 1.6 million were 
discharged in October 1940. This drastic decision was ordered by the Duce in the belief that 
the war would be over in a few months upon the surrender of Great Britain. This decision 
seriously crippled the Italian war effort as the esprit de corps of the Italian units, which, in 
some cases lost as much as seventy percent of their roster, was irremediably weakened. To 
halt the hemorrhage, the General Staff chose to draft the army reserves going as far as to 
recall the 1901 class. To ensure that the Italian war economy would not be compromised, 
only those who were single, jobless, unskilled or working in a non-vital sector of the 
economy were targeted. While this new recruitment may have alleviated unemployment in 
Italy, it worsened the effectiveness of the Regio Esercito by raising considerably the 
average age of the soldiers in the units, not a wise choice for troops who had to work in 
difficult physical conditions.
488
  All the Italian Alpine outposts were positioned at least 
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1,500 meters above the sea level. Indeed, because the Armistice line literally ran across the 
peaks, the Italians were not able to occupy the French lower reaches and were thereby 
forced to winter in the Italian valleys in the harshest months. Only Maison-Méane’s 
garrison remained in place, but continuous avalanches and heavy snowfalls made the 
movement of supplies extremely difficult.
489
 While the extreme climatic conditions 
heightened the sense of isolation felt by the Italian soldiers, they also brought them closer to 
the local population. As Marius Sarraz-Bournet noted, in the face of the utter isolation of 
the small rural villages in the Alpine range, the Italian soldiers in the Presidi (outposts) and 
the local population quickly bonded. In addition, many of the Alpine troops came from 
similar regions just across the border, such as the Valle D’Aosta or the Piedmont, and 
therefore had more cultural affinity with the local populace than with the rest of Italy.
490
 It 
was a situation which promoted close contact between Italian civilians and troops on one 
hand and French civilians on the other.  
The case of the Presidio of Maison-Méane in the Basses-Alpes department was 
itself emblematic of the emerging entente between Italian soldiers and the French populace 
and the carefree attitude of the Italian troops guarding the Alpine border. The Armistice of 
Villa Incisa had given the Italians a small strip of the eastern border of the Basses-Alpes. 
As was the case with most of the newly-acquired territories, the strip (147km² of rugged 
mountainous landscape rolling into pasturelands) was only valuable to the Italians in the 
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very remote chance that in 1940, the French army would rise from the ashes and attack the 
Italians. Otherwise, the utility of the occupied French land was minimal as the Regio 
Esercito had failed to secure locations, apart from Menton, that would be effective as 
bridgeheads in the face of any prospective invasion, especially in wintertime. The Italian 
presence was truly minimal. The Italians in the Basses-Alpes occupied only two hamlets, 
Combremond (Commune of Saint Paul de Ubaye) and Maison-Méane (Commune of 
Larche), which a total of only thirty-two inhabitants.
491
 The Italian garrison in Maison-
Méane initially consisted of one company of the Borgo San Dalmazzo Battalion of the 
Alpine Divisione Cuneense.
492
 Starting in late 1940, the elite Alpine divisions were 
progressively transferred to the Greek and Eastern fronts, passing the baton to units of the 
Guardia alla Frontiera (G.a.F.), an Alpine corps created in 1937 with the task of manning 
the defensive network of forts on the Italian side of the Alps.
493
 Beginning in 1941, even a 
few G.a.F. units were relocated to the East to cover the abysmal human cost of the Greek 
and Russian campaigns.
494
 As a result, the garrison of Maison-Méane never exceeded five 
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This small number of troops arguably contributed to the development of a modus 
vivendi between the Italian occupation army and the French population in the rural regions. 
From the onset of the occupation, the Regio Esercito supplied the occupied hamlets with 
free food, although starting in January 1941, the quantity of these supplies gradually 
diminished, due to the tightening rationing of food in the Italian peninsula.
496
 Granted that, 
as was the case in Menton, this policy had a clear propagandistic purpose, it set the mood 
for cordial, and in some instances, even friendly relations between civilians and soldiers, as 
in the village of Larche. There, in October 1940, the Prefect of the Basses-Alpes alarmingly 
noted that, due to the food coming from Italy and the good manners of the Italians, “a wave 
of popularity seems to be taking shape in Larche towards our former opponents” to the 




The popularity of the Regio Esercito was also enhanced by bringing an effective 
health service system to the region. Italian military doctors were dispatched to remote areas 
to practice “freely and with dedication.”
498
 It is true that the occupied zone population did 
not really have a choice, as French doctors from the Free Zone were strictly forbidden by 
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the occupation authorities to practice in the occupied zone. However, in some cases, even 
the French population living in the Free Zone near the Green Line did not hesitate to turn to 
the Regio Esercito’s doctors because the French ones had more limited access to drugs than 
their Italian counterparts. Furthermore, the inhabitants of the isolated hamlets found it 
easier to reach  Italian doctors just across the border than French physicians living in larger 
French towns, especially in emergencies, such as on 27 July 1942, when a child in Larche, 
Basses-Alpes, was seriously injured by falling on a wooden stake.
499
 This was not an 
isolated case. As a matter of fact, the whole population of the border village relied on the 




 Some young French women were especially interested in mixing with the Italian 
soldiers. It was not uncommon for French girls to seek out the Regio Esercito’s officers, 
much to the dismay of French authorities. It is worth understanding why Vichy officials 
objected to this fraternization. In one case, three young girls paid a visit to the Italian 
guardhouse at the border near Larche in December 1941. The sub-prefect of Barcelonnette 
reproachfully wrote in his report that “some accordion tunes were heard, which probably 
indicates that they spent the whole afternoon dancing with Italian soldiers.”
501
 In Vichy’s 
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eyes, these casual relations were intolerable, not only because they compromised the girls’ 
morals and because they feared the civilian population would fraternize with the occupation 
forces, but also because Pétain’s regime, as a way to demarcate itself from the decadent 
Third Republic, had strictly outlawed public dancing as of July 1940. Dancing was held to 
be indecorous when so many Frenchmen had been killed or were languishing in prisoner-
of-war camps. Finally, the Maréchal had argued that France’s defeat had been the result of 
the moral breakdown of French society. Clearly the French authorities shared his concerns, 
because they clamped down on what they considered immoral behavior.  
The esprit de jouissance which had replaced the esprit de sacrifice was reified not 
only in public dancing, but in others facets of everyday life such as cinema, music, 
literature, prostitution, and gambling.
502
 Vichy officials were especially wary of young 
French women who socialized with Italian soldiers as they were considered to be 
compromising their future role as diligent housewives and mothers who would bear and 
rear French children by doing so, and therefore should not indulge in vain pleasures or 
casual relationships.
503
 It is understandable therefore that French officials were even more 
concerned by a second episode of fraternization between the young French girls and Italian 
officers in Maison-Méane. On 31 May 1942, three girls, two of them the daughters of the 
mayor of Larche, met with Italian officers to play football. The French official in his report 
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insisted self-righteously that “[the girls] went so far as to undress in front of the soldiers to 
play in shorts.” Moreover, it appeared that the eldest daughter of the Mayor, Hélène V., had 
actually flirted with the Italian captain in command of the outpost of Maison-Méane. Aside 
from its moral undertone, the report is particularly significant for its articulation of the 
grave consequences that, from the standpoint of French officials, such fraternization 
threatened. Hélène worked in the Larche commune and thus had access to French mail. The 
French official was worried that top-secret documents from Vichy could end up in Italian 
hands through unprincipled exploitation of the girl’s naiveté.
504
  
Thus, the mutual understanding between members of the Regio Esercito and the 
population of Maison-Méane showed that a modus vivendi between Italian soldiers and 
French civilians was not an utopian idea even in a time of military occupation. In truth, the 
Italians and the French had a symbiotic relationship, in that the Italians enjoyed the 
company of French civilians who alleviated the tedious boredom of guard duty in isolated 
border passes, while the local population certainly derived benefits in the form of goods and 
services. The result is that they tended to forget that they were dealing with enemies. In 
fact, these relationships were only the prelude to the entente that would take shape when the 
Italians occupied the Zone Libre in November 1942. In the scathing words of a French 
gendarme, "Self-interest is more powerful than the [patriotic] feeling" ("L'intérêt a plus 
souvent force que le sentiment").
505
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In fact, the population obtained fresh supplies from either the French Ravitaillement 
services or the Italian army, and sometimes from both.
506
 Sometimes, the benefits stemmed 
not from dealings with the Italian army, but from the nature of the occupation itself. French 
authorities were flabbergasted to discover that, starting in 1940, shopowners in the occupied 
zone had no qualms about selling unregulated quantities of rationed products such as dairy 
products and meat at prices significantly higher than the state-imposed limit, or even 
bartering them for manufactured goods such as shoes or clothes.
507
 As seen before, the 
black market was by no means confined to the occupied zone, but it is evident that the 
geographic location of the occupied zone and the limited nature of French sovereignty over 
it favored its evolution as a hub in a strong clandestine network in goods. For instance, 
selling cattle from the French Zone Libre in the occupied zone became widespread as the 
cows sold at fifty percent more than their legal French price due to the official and fixed 
currency exchange rate which so favored the Italian lira.
508
 
Yet, it would be a mistake to view Italian-French relations at a local level only as a 
mutually beneficial relationship between Italian soldiers and the civilian population. There 
were mutual needs, but a relationship seems to have developed that went beyond one based 
simply on need. The occupied zone, especially the Alpine part, was far better supplied than 
the Free Zone, as it was rich in pastureland. Milk and dairy products were widely available. 
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Thus, local civilians were less dependent on Italian military aid to feed themselves. In fact, 
Vichy officials' worries about relationships between French women and Italian soldiers is a 
telltale sign that a network of friendships was developing. In this regard, the occupation of 
the border zone in June 1940 anticipated the promiscuous relations which would spring up 
with the occupation of the Free Zone in November 1942. 
Yet, we should not take this argument too far. First of all, it is difficult to gauge the 
real extent of the relationships based solely on the French reports. Unfortunately, Italian 
military reports make little mention of this fraternization and no memoirs have been written 
about the occupation of the Alpine outposts. Moreover, the fraternization and relatively 
tolerant attitude of the Italian authorities towards the transit of goods and individuals was 
not the norm everywhere. Crossing the border without papers remained strictly forbidden 
and was indeed a risky business. In a few cases, Italian sentinels went so far as to shoot at 
illegal travelers, sometimes with deadly results. On 11 July 1942, a 37-year-old Frenchman 
was mortally wounded by the Milizia Confinaria.
509
 On 28 December 1942, two 
unidentified adolescents were killed while crossing the border near Carnolès (Alpes-
Maritimes).
510
 These episodes were a grim reminder that the occupation zone was still a 
war zone.  
As well, despite the occasional entente in the Alpine small villages between the local 
population and Italian soldiers, the Italians had to finally resort to repressive instruments to 
curb anti-Italian acts. These ranged from the denial of safe-conducts to persons who were 
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believed to have an anti-Italian or anti-fascist agenda to meticulous body searches at border 
checkpoints; from apartment inspections to open intimidation.
511
 Arrests and imprisonment 
were the ultimate punishment. From June 1941 to January 1943, more than 1,200 people 
were arrested, most of them for illegally crossing the border, minor anti-Italian activities, or 
simply on suspicion of such. For example, the arrival of Axis dignitaries such as German 
Hans-Gustav Felber, one of the German commanders in charge of southern France, in 
December 1942, triggered a wave of preventive arrests. A sojourn in jail was generally a first 




The ongoing repressive campaign in the occupied zone hinted at the problematic 
result of the Italian occupation in the border zone. Since the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, the real test is how the colonization system operated in actual practice. It is not an 
understatement to conclude that the Italian experiment in the occupied zone was a serious 
failure. The Italians had underestimated the patriotic sentiment of the local French 
population, who did not intend to relinquish their own nationality and heritage. The failed 
revival of Menton was also the consequence of the Italian's dismal failure to win the hearts 
and souls of the local population. The French inhabitants who had fled the Italian invasion 
did not go back to live in the Occupied Zone for fear of being cut off from the French state 
and of being ostracized. Moreover, the city was still in shambles in 1942, both structurally 
and economically, a factor that hardly seduced any prospective Italian colonist. Indeed, the 
new administration was unable to solve the financial cost of the occupation. The Italian state 
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had injected 800.000 lire into the local economy, but this was just a fragment of the 195 
million lire estimated by the Civil Commissariat as necessary to completely refund the local 
population for war damages.
513
 The massive expenditure required to pay for the expanded 
numbers of personnel and for the public works projects needed to rebuild the city irritated 
more than one Ministry in Rome, at a time when every lira was needed to bolster the war 
effort in the Balkans and in North Africa. Furthermore, the public cost of the occupation 
could not be alleviated by taxation. Between 1940 and 1943, no income or property taxes 
were levied in the occupied zone, as a way to encourage the repopulation of the territory. To 
add insult to injury, an inspection stemming from the CIAF headquarters in Turin uncovered 
several cases of corruption and abuses. In a very revealing and scathing letter, G.B. Marziali, 
the Prefect of the Administration of Occupied Territories, reported a sudden suspicious climb 
in unnecessary expenditures and budget irregularities, a result of leisure trips being reported 
as business travel, inflated propaganda leaflets’ bills, unscrupulous use of long-distance calls 
and vehicles, and outrageous expenses for the luxurious renovation of the Commissariat’s 
building.
514
 In the same letter, Marziali chastised Frediani for hiring employees without prior 
permission from Turin. Consequently, he considerably restricted Frediani's freedom of action 
and strongly advised him to pursue a policy of austerity.  
As damaging for the Italian occupation as the malpractice of its officials were the 
internecine rivalries within the Fascist state. Conflicts between different seats of power 
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mirrored the vested and conflicting interests of the Italian national ministries. Several 
ministries, such as the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs and Popular Culture 
(MINCULPOP) vied for control in order to further their own particular interests. In his June 
report, Frediani had requested an extension of his power in order to deal with the frictions 
between the different departments in the Commissariat.
515
 In the same report, Frediani 
affirmed that, as a militant of the PNF, he was shunned by the Italian military Presidio 
(garrison) in Menton. In truth, this conflict was much more than mere political antipathy, as it 
was indicative of two fundamentally different and ultimately irreconcilable policies. On the 
one hand, the Menton Civil Commissar Frediani had based his policy on the development of 
local tourism, the only activity that could have bolstered Menton’s prestige and economy in 
Italy and abroad. Under his supervision, the City of Lemons saw a partial normalization of its 
life: schools opened, the food distribution network became more organized, and the 
reopening of the local casino and some hotels attracted a few tourists. A massive propaganda 
campaign carried out by local and Italian national newspapers touted Menton as the ideal 
spot for a relaxing sojourn. The Comité des Traditions Mentonnaises, under the supervision 
of Frediani, celebrated the rebirth of the new town by authorizing a Menton exhibition stand 
at the 1941 Milano Fair, one of the most important in Europe. The Menton stall was graced 
with a chorus in traditional costume who delighted the public, among them the King of Italy 
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Vittorio Emanuele III, with its repertoire of songs in Mentonese dialect.
516
 Despite the 
choir’s tour in the neighboring regions which won flattering reviews, even the Comité’s 
campaign was partly hamstrung by strict controls at the Italian border.   
In strident contrast with Frediani's policy, military authorities prioritized the security 
of the region over its economic recovery and always underscored that, until the peace treaty 
was signed, the occupied zone was considered a Zona d'operazione (operation zone). 
Supported in their decision by the local head of the state police, Inspector Rosario 
Barranco,
517
 they tightened their grip on the borders, as they believed that every visitor could 
be “a possible spy or a currency trafficker.”
518
 Italians wishing to enter the occupied zone had 
to apply for a permit issued by the Italian police. This burdensome procedure, which could 
take as long as thirty days, discouraged one-day visits from nearby regions and severely 
hampered any chance for Menton’s tourist industry to return to its past levels of success.
519
 In 
April 1942, the military Italian authorities relaxed the border crossing by allowing members 
of the Partito Nazionale Fascista (the Italian Fascist Party) into Menton on the strength of 
their membership cards.
520
 However, it was not enough for the Civil Commissar Frediani, 
who opposed this rigid policy as it hindered the resuscitation of tourism, the only activity that 
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could have bolstered Menton’s economy and prestige. In the end, Frediani was ultimately 
forced to yield, only because the 30 July 1940 decree stated that the Civil Commissar was 
subordinate to local military commanders, especially on security matters. The Italian 
invasion in November 1942 would seal all the borders of the occupied zone, once and for all 
dooming tourism in Menton.
521
  
Therefore, the Italian occupation was seriously weakened by its conflicting goals:  it 
was a military occupation, designed to secure the border and prevent the French army from 
rising from its ashes, but it was also concurrently used by the Fascist civilian administration 
as a means to promote Italy's image both in the peninsula and worldwide. The two agendas 
were not compatible, and the tension would only worsen from November 1942. In truth, the 
dualism between the Italian army and the civilian authorities was not the only issue 
explaining the failed development of Menton. The forced Italianization campaign was as 
responsible as the military contingency. The Prefect of Imperia, Marcello Tallarigo, wrote a 
terse letter to the Interior Ministry underlining the dreadful approach undertaken by CIAF 
Commissars in Menton. The latter were guilty of using the same blatant colonization policy 
carried out in Albania, Africa and in the Balkans. Instead, Tallarigo, explained, it would have 
been "advisable to implement from the beginning a homeopathic diffusion of the Fascist 
ideology, given the fact that the organism we were confronted with had never been very 
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receptive to a prescription with the double tag of Italian and Fascist."
522
 This possible 
explanation was corroborated with the example of the successful reconstruction of 
Montgenèvre, a small village in the Hautes-Alpes department. The local civil commissar, 
Marquis Saporiti, favored the complete renovation of the village, which had been partially 
destroyed by the June 1940 offensive. According to Fascist propaganda, the village was 
rapidly rebuilt and even outshone its former self, quickly becoming a thriving Alpine 
resort.
523
 Arguably, the task in Montgenèvre was far less complicated than in Menton, as the 
village was smaller, was in a region not directly touched by the irredentist propaganda and 
had little strategic importance. But the strategy implemented there seemed to demonstrate 
that a different, softer approach might have stood some chances of winning over the local 
population. 
This partial success did little to mitigate the overall poor results of Italian policy in 
the Occupied Zone. Its most representative city, Menton, which in the mind of Fascist 
panegyrists should have been the jewel in the crown of the Italian empire, instead became a 
thorn in its side. Italian officials grimly acknowledged that the half-hearted revival of the 
City of Lemons was hurting the prestige of the Italian state abroad as much as the Italian's 
military appalling performance in the Battle of the Alps.
524
 Menton, with its rivalries, its 
shady embezzlement and its empty houses, far from being a showcase for the new idealized 
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Italian empire, instead became a tarnished symbol of the failing Fascist regime, a microcosm 
of the reality of Mussolini's Italy.  
It was clearly a missed opportunity for the Fascist state who could have more 
effectively exploited the experiment of colonizing a small territory before proceeding to a 
more populated one such as the County of Nice. It seems, in fact, that the Italians made the 
same mistake as the Vichy regime, by wanting to rebuild the foundation of the house while 
the roof was on fire. The Fascist regime, prisoner of its own irredentist propaganda, could not 
wait until the peace treaty to transform the new zone into an Italian colony. By rebuilding 
while the war was still raging, the Italians took a great risk. The exigencies of the war would 
necessarily affect the grander scheme for the reconstruction of the newly conquered territory. 
Indeed, as soon as the economic situation deteriorated, the living conditions in Menton and 
the Occupied Zone degraded irreversibly. Moreover, local Italian officials were confronted 
with their own internal divisions and a hostile population. In addressing these challenges, 
Italian authorities chose a heavy-handed approach which ultimately backfired. The failure of 
this italianization campaign probably shaped the occupation policy of November 1942.  No 
document has been found to acknowledge whether the Italians understood their mistakes, but, 
Italian army top rank leaders did take note of the impossibility of furthering Italy's political 
goals at a time when the demands of the war suggested security and strategic issues were 
more important. Thus, when the full-fledged occupation started in November 1942, the army 





The November 1942 Invasion 
In November 1942, the situation changed drastically with the full-scale invasion of 
more than 150,000 Italian soldiers into the Zone Libre following the Allied invasion of 
North Africa. The Italians occupied nine departments of southeastern France, a vast zone 
delimited by the Rhône on its western border and the Savoy to the north. Many 
"unredeemed lands" such as the County of Nice, Savoy, and Corsica were occupied 
effortlessly by the Italian army in just a few weeks. No wonder the irredentist movement 
hailed this occupation as the achievement of the Mare Nostrum, Italy's full control of the 
Mediterranean Sea. However, what was in theory a political victory shortly became a 
strategic nightmare. The Italian army was already overstretched in different theaters of war 
all over Europe and North Africa. The deployment in France had also depleted the already 
thin defenses of the peninsula's coastline. Poorly organized, suffering from low morale, 
lacking resources in terms of both manpower and materiel, Italian soldiers wearily spread 
out along the French Mediterranean shore. In fact, Fourth Army cadres were as worried 
about a possible uprising by the French population as about a possible Allied invasion. The 
Italian military, therefore, was not interested in the short term in any policy of colonization 
or Italianization which would exacerbate the hostility of the French populace. Thus, the 
Menton experiment was never repeated, to the utter disappointment of both the CIAF 
officials and local irredentists.  
Rumors of a prospective Italian invasion of the Zone Libre had started as soon as the 
ink of the Armistice of Villa Incisa dried, and with a reason. In fact, whenever Italian state 
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officials felt that the French were cheating or dragging their feet in the negotiations, plans 
to invade southern France were once again reviewed. As early as August 1940, in light of 
French hostility at the CIAF level and of the loss of some French colonies to the Gaullist 
movement, the Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito (Italian Army General Staff) or SMRE was 
given the order to plan an occupation of all the French territory east of Rhône, a plan known 
as the Esigenza R.
525
  However Esigenza R was soon put on hold. On 2 October 1940, the 
War Undersecretary General Ubaldo Soddu, with the approval of both Mussolini and 
Badoglio, issued a directive that drastically cut the size of the Italian Army by one-third. 
Six hundred thousand soldiers, mainly belonging to the 1901-1916 classes, were granted 
either unlimited furloughs or seasonal, in the case of agricultural workers. The measure 
severely affected the Italian divisions quartered on the peninsula, as the demobilization did 
not apply to troops in the Aegean Sea, North Africa or Albania.
526
 The start of the Greek 
campaign in October 1940 further drained effectives from the Alpine front, with those 




Mussolini’s decision to reduce the Italian military forces reflected his belief that the 
war would be over by the end of the year, or at least that Greece would be settled by the 
beginning of winter.
528
 Immediately, the SMRE registered its displeasure. It stressed that 
the draconian reduction of the Regio Esercito would render useless the collective training 
                                                     
525 Literally Exigency R. (R stands for Rodano or Rhône). Schipsi, L’occ pazione italiana  ei territori 
metropolitani francesi (1940-1943), p.41. 
526     u’s   re   ve  an be f un   n ARC, C lle    n  f I al an M l  ary Re  r s 1935-1943, National Archives 
Microfilm T-821, Roll 127, IT A1143, Lettera U. Soddu, Rome, 2 October 1940. 
527
 Schipsi, L’occ pazione italiana  ei territori metropolitani francesi (1940-1943), p.47. 
528 Rochat, Le Guerre italiane 1935-43, pp.255-6. 
 
 196 
undertaken since the mobilization in 1939, while seriously hindering the esprit de corps. It 
pointed out that Laval’s dismissal in December 1940 had compelled both the Germans and 
the Italians to make preparations for a possible invasion of the Zone Libre, for fear that it 
represented a reversal of Vichy's policy of collaboration. Finally, the SMRE warned that the 
divisions on the French border would require, after the demobilization, at least three months 
to become fully operational.
529
 For these reasons, the old plan, Esigenza R, was replaced in 
February 1941 by a new one, Operazione 215. The new invasion’s master plan anticipated 
the occupation of the demilitarized zone, which meant the Alpine departments and the 
County of Nice. The modesty of its goals was a reflection of the reality of the situation, as 
almost all nine divisions had been cannibalized for more urgent theaters of war.
530
 
The situation evolved considerably in 1942. Rumors of an invasion increased 
exponentially in the Côte d'Azur. At first, the offensive was supposed to be on 21 April, the 
birthdate of the city of Rome;
531
 the next possibility was 30 April, when Senator Ermanno 
Amicucci, the author of the propagandist book Nizza Italiana, gave a particularly virulent 
irridentist speech.
532
 May was even more frenzied: three possible dates (10, 24 and 28) were 
bandied about. It was unclear who spread these panic-inducing rumors and for what 
reasons. The CIAF accused real estate speculators who wanted to convince the populace to 
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hastily sell their assets, which would inevitably depreciate with any invasion.
533
 In the 
eighth issue of Il Nizzardo (3 May 1942), an anonymous journalist titled his column, “Le 
Jour viendra” ("The Day Will Come"). A French title in an otherwise Italian publication 
had a double inference. On one hand, according the columnist, French agents provocateurs 
were creating a red herring in the form of speculation about a possible Italian invasion. 
These subtle maneuvers supposedly kept the French populace focused on the external 
threat. It was also a way of exposing the irredentists of the Alpes-Maritimes by tricking 
them, with false hopes, to expose themselves. On the other hand, the ominous title was also 
a reminder to the French authorities that they were playing with fire. Using agents 
provocateurs could well backfire, as an Italian invasion of the County of Nice was going to 




The escalation in irredentist propaganda matched pace with the worsening of 
Franco-Italian relations. Ironically, Laval's return in April 1942 now worried the Fascist 
hierarchy as they feared his reappointment meant a closer rapprochement between Vichy 
and Berlin. In spite of German officials’ reassurances, this suspicion was confirmed in the 
meeting between the CIAF and CTA (Franco-German Armistice Commission in 
Friedrichshaven held 10-17 June 1942. The head of CTA, General Vogl, mollified the 
CIAF by stressing the superiority of the Axis Powers with regards to Vichy, but also 
insisted that Germany and Italy should be generous with Vichy. As the war began to turn 
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against Germany, the Germans were prepared to offer France compensation in order to get 
full access to its industrial resources and to get the support of its colonial army. The CIAF 
President Vacca Maggiolini furiously replied that Italy could not accept the minimization of 
its territorial claims, as the latter were the main reason for Italy’s entry into the war in the 
first place.
535
 Mussolini and the leadership had not budged from their position of the 
summer of 1940. They demanded that Italy should be fully rewarded for its war effort and 
that the Axis should reject any major collaboration with France on the grounds that Vichy 
would probably ask for compensation in return for its help.
536
 That Mussolini had no 
intention to give up his irredentist demands was clear in the heated Italian press campaign 
demanding the liberation of the Terre Irridenti (Irredentist Lands). In the Italian-German 
meeting in Venice on 22-28 September, Italian officials tried to persuade their German 
counterparts that France had a hidden plan to instill the seed of discord between the Axis 
partners as a way to secretly aid the Allied effort. Several arguments were presented as 
evidence: France’s neutrality vis-a-vis the United States, Gaullist dissension which was 
gaining ground in the French Empire, and the French populace’s hostility towards both Italy 
and Germany.
537
 They were not persuasive, but it was clear that the Italians vehemently 
opposed making France a partner. 
Therefore, the army was instructed to lay out in May 1942 a strategic plan for a 
prospective invasion, the Esigenza Ovest, (Plan West, or simply known as Esigenza O). The 
occupation was to focus strictly on the territory claimed by Italy: the County of Nice and 
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 However, in July 1942, the Italian senior military was asked to change 
the invasion plan to encompass the whole Mediterranean coastline up to Toulouse in 
southwestern France. This drastic shift in strategy stemmed from the evolution of the war. 
The Western Allied powers were seeking to open another front, in order to take the pressure 
off the Soviet Union. The Army Italian General Staff wanted to ensure that France's 
Mediterranean shores would be adequately defended as rumors of a possible Allied landing 
in southern France grew in intensity.
539
 If the Allies were successful, a bridgehead in 
southern France would give the Anglo-Americans a base to carry out military operation 
against Italy and Germany, and, thus, the Axis powers wanted to ensure this dreaded 
scenario would not happen. Therefore, the very nature of the future Italian invasion of 
France was shaped by strategic requirements. The goals of the imminent Italian military 
occupation would not be anymore political, but strictly strategic. The invasion was not 
intended as prelude to an annexation of southeastern France, at least in the short term, but 
instead would secure Fortress Europe against an enemy landing on a crucial strategic point.  
 It is therefore not baffling that the British-American invasion of Algeria and 
Morocco on 8 November 1942, codenamed Operation Torch, triggered the occupation of 
southeastern France by the Italian army. The Axis feared that the northern Mediterranean 
area was next in line for an Allied invasion. Moreover, the Germans no longer trusted the 
Vichy regime. Notwithstanding Petain’s immediate call to resist, Hitler was furious at the 
ambiguous attitude of some high-ranking officers, in particular the obfuscation of Admiral 
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Darlan, who had just happened to be in Algiers to visit his ailing son. Prime Minister Laval, 
who went to Munich the next day, 9 November, with the daunting task of convincing Nazi 
officials of Vichy’s loyalty, was severely chastised by the Führer.
540
 The “North-African 
Imbroglio” had finally managed to unite Germans and Italians on the issue of France after 
two years of dissension. Both Ciano and Hitler agreed that a joint invasion of France was 




At 9:55 p.m. on 10 November, the Chief of the General Staff Army, General 
Vittorio Ambrosio, wired the formal order to the Fourth Army to begin the latest version of 
the Esigenza Ovest, at 7 a.m the next morning. The Fourth Army was divided into three 
Corpi d’Armata (Army Corps or CA), each one with its own task: the I CA (GaF mobile 
units, 20° Alpini Sciatori (Alpine Skiers), the Rovigo in reserve) which was deployed along 
the upper part of the border, would occupy the Alpine departments, from the Savoy to the 
Hautes-Alpes, mainly through the Modane and Bourg St-Maurice valleys; the XXII CA 
(GaF, Taro, Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro (EFTF) and Pusteria) was assigned to the 
center and was given the targets of Basses-Alpes and upper Alpes-Maritimes; the XV CA 
(Lupi di Toscana, Legnano and Piave mobile units) would deal with the coastline. XXII and 
XV CA units were given the task to push, first up the river Var and subsequently further 
west to the line of Cannes - Grasse - Entrevaux.
542
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As had been the case in June 1940, most of the units quartered on the French border 
were unprepared for action. The I CA was in its winter barracks down the Turin valley far 
from the border; the key division of the XXII CA was moving east to defend the Liguria 
coastline; the XV CA had no divisions within thirty kilometers from the border.
543
 
Moreover, many divisions were still severely undermanned. Although orders were issued 
recalling every officer, NCO or soldier on leave, it did not solve the problem.
544
 The 
efficiency of the Fourth Army was further marred by the chronic paucity of materiel that 
continually plagued the Italian Army in the Second World War. In October 1942, the 
scarcity of shoes in the Fourth Army was endemic, owing to the arrival of soldiers from the 
Russian and Greek campaigns whose shoes were in desperate need of repair.
545
 In another 
October 1942 report, the head of the I CA General Federico Romero complained of the lack 
of food, aggravated by the difficult challenge of finding any staples at a time of heavy 
rationing in the peninsula. In the meantime, morale was low as the rank-and-file were also 
growing increasingly worried by the erosion of their allowances and benefits.
546
     
To add insult to injury, the Italian alpine forces had been repeatedly weakened in 
1942 by the Italian General Staff decision to use full divisions of the Fourth Army as reserves 
to relieve other units fighting in hotter theaters of war such as Russia, Greece and North 
Africa.
547
 In September, the Stato Maggiore dell'Esercito (Italian General Staff Army or 
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SMRE) was so worried about a possible attack on North Africa that two divisions quartered 
near the French border, the RECo. Cavalleggeri di Lodi and Centauro, were sent to Libya. 
Just hours before the North African Allied landing, the Piave was ordered to move to Naples 
to bolster the defenses of the Campania coast.
548
 The Commander of the Fourth Army, 
General Mario Vercellino, complained that the impact of directives was to reduce his units to 
the point of compromising the occupation of Southern France. He insisted on keeping the 
Piave, as it was one of the only motorized units of the Fourth Army, and he considered it 
essential to his operation. In a last minute decision, the SMRE, aware of the poor mobility of 
the Fourth Army, agreed to leave the mechanized companies of the Piave division on the 
French border, notwithstanding the fact that its commander, General Tabellini, was already 
in Rome to supervise the transfer of the other half of the division.
549
 At 1 a.m. on 11 
November, the SMRE postponed “crossing the Rubicon” by twenty-four hours, to the night 
of 11-12 November.
550
 Then, fifteen minutes later, the SMRE reversed its orders and General 




It seems that senior Fascist officials and the Italian military command were in fact 
torn between the strategic risk of overstretching the already strained logistics of the Regio 
Esercito and the political need to move deeper into France to occupy as much land as 
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possible to facilitate its possible annexation at the end of the war. Indeed, the decisive factor 
was, in all likehood, the knowledge that German troops were going to invade the Free Zone 
at 7 a.m, 11 November. If the Italian army wanted to take the coastline and southern France 
for itself, given its relative lack the mobility, it had to act immediately. 
The 1942 Italian occupation of southern France went relatively smoothly and without 
any major incidents.  At noon on 11 November, G.a.F. units crossed the border at three 
different points (Val D’Arc, Upper Roja and Mentone) paving the way for the divisions of 
the three Army Corps. The XXII CA, in the middle, fell behind, as its units were still moving 
up from Turin, far from the French border. Thus until 12 November, only GaF troops had 
entered the former Zone Libre, occupying Breil and Saorge.
552
 In the northern and southern 
sectors, the Italian units fared better. I CA units in the Alpine sector overcame snowy roads 
and managed to reach Modane and the Orelle Valley.
553
 The XV CA met even fewer 
problems as motorized Piave units, followed closely by Legnano units, entered Nice at 3:30 
p.m.. Thus, two out of the three army corps met the goals set by the Esigenza O. The Orelle 
Valley and the crucial bridge on the Var River that linked Nice to the western part of the 
Alpes-Maritimes department were quickly and easily secured. Only the XXII did not reach 
its objective, the Mescla Bridge on the Var River.  
Nevertheless, the Fourth Army Command was not given the time to savor the relative 
success of the operation. On 11 November, at 8:45 p.m., the SMRE sent a telegram with new 
directions for the occupation forces. The Fourth Army was ordered to secure the entire 
                                                     
552 AUSSME, DS 1099, Diario Storico 4° Armata, 11 November 1942 entry. 
553
 AUSSME, DS 987, Phone conversation Comandoo GaF VIII Settore and Comando I CA, , Diario Storico I CA, 
Allegato 48, 11 November 1942. 
 
 204 
southern French territory up to a line drawn from Geneva, skirting Lyons, to Toulouse. As in 
June 1940, this new line was the consequence of the strategic choices of the Germans. In the 
Munich meeting with the Stato Maggiore dell’Esercito (Italian General Staff or SMG) on 11 
November, the OKW emissaries (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the German General 
Staff) explained that the invasion of the Zone Libre could not be delayed any longer. They 
made clear that “(i)n the event that the Italian troops, given their formation, [were not able] to 
advance swiftly, ... armored German units [would advance] certainly towards the coast. 
German units [would then draw back] to the demarcation line already agreed upon (Geneva-
Lyons-Toulouse) with the [subsequent] unfolding of the Italian occupation.” Fortunately, 
while the Germans were determined that the zone be fully occupied, they were not 
particularly interested in managing the whole zone themselves. Thus, they were willing to 
accommodate the Regio Esercito. The OKW representative in Rome Von Rintelen reassured 
the SMG that the division of the Free Zone would not be shaped just by the swiftness of each 
army’s deployment in securing the French territory, but also by the distribution and density 
of Italians among the local population. If the County of Nice, the most heavily populated 
Italian region in Southern France, was easily occupied by Regio Esercito’s troops owing to 
its short distance from the Italian border, the SMG was worried about the two other coastal 
cities with important Italian communities, Marseille and Toulon. Italian officials agreed that 
both cities ideally should be occupied by Italian troops both as a means to control the whole 
Mediterranean coastline and as a mark of prestige. A too swift German advance might indeed 
ruin the party.  
 
 205 
Thus, the Italian Chief of the General Staff, General Ugo Cavallero, immediately 
phoned Vercellino. The new order was to occupy as much territory as possible. Cavallero 
exhorted the commanders to push forward “day and night,” adding optimistically that troops 
should be transported by train. Occupying the territory became mandatory to the point that 
“resupplying should not be prioritized.”
554
 Clearly Cavallero was not reassured by the 
OKW's blandishments. It is also probable that Cavallero's urge was directly connected to the 
desire of the Duce and his top civilian aides to occupy as much French territory as possible 
so as to be in a strong position for the eventual negotiations after the war. Even when Italy 
was exposed to a grave danger, Italian Fascist officials, obsessed by their imperialistic 
dreams, could not help but think of the French territory as future war booty. 
Cavallero’s directive remained nothing more than wishful thinking. The SMG soon 
discovered that their strategy was far too ambitious. The SMRE master plan for the 
occupation of the Mediterranean coastline up to Toulouse would have necessitated at least 
twelve fully motorized divisions.
555
 Moreover, hopes of taking Marseille were soon dashed. 
When the 10th Armored Division of the Felber Armeegruppe stormed the capital of the 
Bouches-du-Rhône department on the afternoon of 12 November, the Piave units were still 
some fifteen kilometers from Toulon.  
The differences in mobility between the two partners was in part because of the 
Germans' savvy exploitation of the railway. The Franco-German armistice of June 1940 had 
established a board of German engineers who had been assigned the task of managing the 
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French railway network in the Occupied Zone. Furthermore, a Franco-German commission 
in Lyons had supervised the integration of the French railway network into the German. It is 
not surprising then that the Germans succeeded in moving three entire divisions by train on 
11 November.
556
 If the German mobilization had been exemplary, the exact opposite could 
be said of its Italian counterpart. Right from the start of the invasion, even before crossing the 
border, the Regio Esercito faced several challenges. Units of the XXII CA, which were 
already located far from the Alpine border, were further delayed by the shortage of railway 
carriages and locomotives in Piedmont. Thus, the XXII CA units had difficulty just getting 
into position along the Upper Roja in the Tenda region.  
However, the weakness of the Italian railway network was not the only reason why it 
took up to ten days for several units to reach their headquarters in Cannes and Grasse, a mere 
seventy-five kilometers from Menton.
557
 The lack of cooperation on the part of the French 
CIAF delegation was instrumental in crippling the deployment of the occupation army in the 
Zone Libre. Several I CA and XXII CA units were delayed when the French delegation in 
Turin denied the Italian convoy permission to use the French network, notwithstanding the 
local civilian authorities' fear of the consequences of having to billet these troops in their 
communes.
558
 No wonder French officials guessed the annexationist ambitions behind the 
operation and thus did whatever in their power to hinder the Italian operation. To make 
matters worse for the invaders, the Italian army was short of truck drivers and trucks. Old 
trucks broke down in the middle of mountain trails, leaving entire companies stranded, 
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forced to continue their journey by foot. In some cases, the disorganization of the convoys 
was such that entire units got lost and had a hard time finding their way back, as the local 
population apparently enjoyed giving false directions to the befuddled drivers.
559
 This 
farcical situation thus forced the Lupi di Toscana division to cover 150 kilometers by foot in 
three days in order to reach its destination in the Grasse region. Intense negotiations only just 
defused the situation on 15 November. Italians were finally authorized to run two daily trains 
from Modane and Menton to both supply and move their garrisons.
560
  
The transportation issue had severe repercussions for Franco-Italian relations. Vichy's 
refusal to allow the movement of Italian troops on its railway network became the Italians' 
justification for invading the Savoy region. Italian officials argued that quartering of troops in 
Savoy would not have been necessary if the French had allowed the Regio Esercito’s trains 
on French tracks, which would have enabled the swift westbound deployment of Italian units 
to Valence and Orange along the Rhône. Outraged French officials retorted that the 
occupation of Savoy had minimal strategic value in any operation against an Allied landing 
as the Savoy region was not part of the Mediterranean coastline. In a meeting on 14 
November with the CIAF president Vacca Maggiolini, the head of the French delegation, 
Admiral Duplat, vehemently denounced the Italian strategy, in spite of Italian officials’ 
assurance of the temporary nature of the occupation.
561
 French fears were heightened as 
Italian newspapers celebrated the occupation of southern France as the culmination of the 
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irredentist campaign.  All these factors reinforced the French belief that the Italian army was 
using short-term and questionable strategic "needs" to achieve the Italians' ultimate goal in 
the occupation of France: the future annexation of the contested territories.
562
      
The French, however, had misconstrued the Italian motives. The Italian army's sole 
interest, at least in the short run, was strategic and not political. In both its telegram formally 
ordering mobilization and the subsequent phone call, the SMRE insisted that the Italian army 
should “retain a reserved attitude (contegno assolutamente riservato) without any reference 
to irredentism or any political claims,” and should not open fire unless attacked first. In other 
words, as explicitly stated in another directive issued on 14 November, Italian soldiers were 
to maintain an attitude of absolute reserve even in dealings with the Italian population.
563
 
Even Italian officials such as the Civil Commissars were instructed to be accommodating 
towards Vichy's representatives.
564
 Along this line, SMRE directives instructed the 
commanders to inform the French population that “[the invasion] will be carried out 
exclusively to oppose Anglo-American operations in the demilitarized zone.”
565
 To this 
effect, Italian military airplanes dropped thousands of leaflets in the County of Nice and in 
the Alpine valleys. Written both in Italian and French, they asked the population for their 
cooperation and stressed the temporary nature of the occupation, in an effort to quell fears of 
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 To reinforce this, Mussolini, following the advice of the CIAF 
president Vacca Maggiolini, denied Ezio Garibaldi and all other irredentist leaders' 
permission to enter the French territory with the Italian troops.
567
 
It would be wrong to see this self-restraint as a change of heart regarding Italian 
territorial ambitions. The Duce and his topmost advisors still believed the irredentist 
territorial claims were absolutely legitimate. However, they reluctantly recognized that the 
timing was not right to effect a political annexation such as the one carried out in Menton in 
June 1940. The contingency created by the Allied landing in North Africa forced the Italians 
to temporarily shelve their expansionist plans. The defense of the Mediterranean coastline 
had to be the top strategic priority. The Axis powers could not afford any internal French 
military action while the Allies were gathering their troops just across the Mediterranean. 
The SMRE's longstanding fear of a resurgent Armée d’Armistice fed this decision. The 
Italian Army General Staff had continued to be suspicious of the French government’s 
loyalty, considering its attitude towards the Axis powers as dubious (dubbio) at best.
568
 As 
well, the Italians were especially worried that a guerilla insurrection, possibly fed by 
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In retrospect, the worries of the Italian army were exaggerated. Neither the Vichy 
army nor the Resistance had the potential to organize a full-scale rebellion against an army, 
which even in its paucity in equipment and men, was still operational and equipped with 
heavy weapons and armored cars. Military intelligence had its faults, but so did CIAF's. It 
was not uncommon for CIAF officers in French territory to write up erroneous or 
exaggerated evaluations based upon scanty evidence or shaped by their own worries about a 
French uprising. As a matter of fact, Italians tended to overdramatize their reports. They did 
it sometimes on purpose, as a way to demonstrate to their superiors that their diligent work 
was fruitful, and sometimes without realizing it, especially in their constant overestimation 
of the importance of the threat posed by Vichy organizations. One CIAF official in Gap, 
Eugenio Mazzarini, was alarmed by the enlistment campaign for the Armée d’Armistice. In 
his opinion, due to the efforts of local newspapers under the supervision of the Hautes-
Alpes prefect, a great number of volunteers were flocking to the recruitment centers. In his 
report, he concluded that “the great flow of volunteers raises many hopes for a rapid 
[military] recovery.”
570
 Interestingly, the head of the CIAF delegation in Gap, General 
Micheletti, disagreed. He considered the worries of his subordinate exaggerated. He 
claimed that not only was “the enlistment drive ... not moving at an accelerated rhythm, ... 
but the Army ... rules out any possibility of undertaking a war campaign.” Moreover, 
Micheletti added, “[the Legion] does not give rise to any suspicious activities.”
571
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Indeed, the situation was very different from the one in June 1940. Now the 
demilitarized zone, along with the vast demobilization of the French Army, ensured the 
Italians had control of the system of Alpine bunkers and army depots. Thus, there was little 
opportunity for a rapid French mobilization. At most, in a few isolated cases, soldiers sang 
the Marseillaise or hid their weapons. In most cases, French officials surrendered their arms. 
This widespread passive behavior was not a coincidence, but stemmed from directives from 
above. A fierce debate raged among Vichy’s upper echelons over the policy the French state 
should adopt in light of the new military contingency. Hardliners such as General Verneau, 
the future leader of the Organisation de résistance de l'armée (Resistance Organization of 
the Army), and General de Lattre de Tassigny, felt that the French should exploit popular 
resentment and rise up against the Nazis. In response to this, some officers of the Armée 
d’Armistice near Montpellier tried to organize an insurgent movement, but their fanciful 
project was immediately crushed by their division commander. In fact, the majority of the 
Armistice Army still remained faithful to Pétain. Thus the directive issued by the War 
Minister General Bridoux two hours after the beginning of the German invasion, was heeded 
by almost all officers. All units were confined to barracks and were instructed to offer no 
resistance. On the contrary, when called upon, they were instructed to provide full 
cooperation.
572
 French local authorities were to be courteous, if not helpful. In Bourg-Saint-
Maurice and Grenoble, Italian units were politely received by the local mayors.
573
 The 
Italians however had the distinct impression the French civil servants were deliberately 
keeping their collaboration to a strict minimum.  
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Nonetheless, the Italians took no chances. In every single village along the Franco-
Italian border, border guards and gendarmes were forced at gunpoint to hand over their 
individual firearms and were, in some cases, even arrested and confined to jail.
574
 Italian 
commanders gave the order to disarm entire garrisons such as the one in Chambery, 
notwithstanding the fact that Vichy’s troops generally offered no resistance.
575
 In Castillon, a 
small village thirteen kilometers north of Menton, the Italian soldiers cut the telephone wires 
upon arriving, thus isolating the village from the outside. The local mayor, along with the 
few gendarmes and border guards, were confined to the school and released only at dawn. In 
Sainte-Agnès, the entire population of the small hamlet was herded to the border post and the 
French flag ripped from its pole.
576
 The same episode was repeated a few kilometers south, at 
the border post of the Pont de l’Union in Menton. Italian units spearheading the invasion 
broke the border fence, tore down the French flag, replacing it with the Italian one, as well as 
disarmed border guards and arrested a few passersby.
577
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The nervousness of the Italian troops was in part a result of the logistical difficulties 
arising up from a hastily-prepared invasion. Aside from the already mentioned bottleneck at 
the border, accommodation for thousands of soldiers was not easily found. In their push 
towards the occupation of the Basses-Alpes, Italian soldiers of the Taro Division were forced 
to bivouac in the middle of the downtown plaza in Castellane.
578
 Officers often resorted to 
quartering their troops in the biggest buildings available: churches, gendarmeries, schools 
and sometimes in hotels or private houses.
579
 The last alternative was in fact the most 
problematic. The high number of vacation houses along the coastline rapidly became the 
alternative of choice for local commanders in search of accommodation for their units. 
However, as in June 1940, the lack of control, the landlords’ absence, and the relative 
poverty of the rank-and-file resulted in an explosion of looting. In Roquebrune-Cap-Martin, 
several houses were sacked for goods as diverse as silverware, linens, clothes, kitchen 
utensils and liquor.
580
 What is more, the hungry soldiers emptied the cellars and the orchards 
of any edible staple.
581
 In some cases, in what became a sad leitmotiv throughout the 
occupation, the soldiers resorted to outright theft, breaking into garages in search of food and 
stealing vegetables in gardens.
582
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If finding adequate lodging was problematic, feeding thousands of soldiers, most of 
them young men with healthy appetites, quickly became a critical concern. The troops 
spearheading the invasion were often left to live off the land. The Italian troops had to 
requisition bread and cheese in Castellar the day after crossing the border.
583
 In one case, a 
squad of forty soldiers who, upon arriving in Nice, found themselves ignored by the Italian 
army food service, turned to the local Casa d’Italia for food, to the amusement of the local 
French populace.
584
 In light of the alarming reports pouring into his office, the Prefect of the 
Alpes-Maritimes, Marcel Ribière, issued a telegram on 12 November stressing that even 
Italian troops were bound by French legislation. Thus, “no staple [should] be delivered to the 
operations troops unless authorized by the Ravitaillement Géneral. ... Only French ration 
tickets are valid.” Another telegram on 13 November elaborated on the previous one, stating 
that any kind of provision should be remunerated in hard currency or, in the case of food, in 
ration tickets.
585
 Ribière insisted local authorities should do everything in their power to 
enforce Vichy's regulations, as a way to affirm that the French government was still in 
control of the Zone Libre. In a message sent a few days later to the Subprefect of Grasse and 
to the department’s mayors, Ribière was insistent: “You are not occupied. The Italian troops 
are not occupation troops, but operation troops (troupes d’opérations) ... The sovereignty of 
French authorities is integrally preserved.”
586
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In fact, the expropriations were not so much a result of an Italian desire to wrest 
sovereignty from Vichy, but a reflection of the disorganization of the Regio Esercito. Most 
French reports emphasized the diverse lines of conduct between Italian units. For example, 
the attitude of the Italian soldiers in Breil was absolutely correct, unlike the expropriations by 
their fellows in the nearby villages.
587
 In fact, the Police Commissar in Breil observantly 
noted that “the majority of the Italian detachment commanders acted, while occupying the 
villages of this sector, in such different ways that one got the impression that they followed 
more their personal feelings or resentments than the instructions their leaders had given 
them.”
588
 Many French reports stressed the demoralized attitude of the average Italian 
soldier. The Italian rank-and-file was described as “exhausted and poorly-dressed.” The 
logistical disorganization made obvious to even the most casual observer the inchoate nature 
of the Italian invasion, reflected in the numerous remarks about the Italian soldiers’ 
individual carriage. A bystander in Nice noted that many of the soldiers “were marching 
hanging their heads, looking demoralized in their down-at-heel shoes.”
589
 In the Basses-
Alpes, the Digne population negatively commented upon the drab Regio Esercito 
uniforms.
590
 A police report from Castellane in the Basses-Alpes zeroed in on the “general 
sense of scruffiness, lack of discipline and of good manners” pervading Italian units. War 
materiel was strewn about haphazardly and left unguarded. The average soldier seemed fed 
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up with the war and seemed to have little enthusiasm and even less willingness to fight.
591
 
This view of the Italian soldiers was not confined to Vichy officials. The contrôle postale, 
the French police postal surveillance, reported that the Italian soldiers were "in somber mood, 
tired and defeatists." ("mornes, las et défeatistes"). In fact, these soldiers "thin as cuckoos" 
("maigres comme des coucous") were so poorly equipped as to look like "an operetta army in 
filthy rags" ("troupes d'opérettes en vêtements crasseux). The report concluded, "their misery 
had ended up moving the populace's sympathy" ("fini par émouvoir la pitié générale").
592
 
The morale of the Regio Esercito was reinvigorated in part by the warm greetings 
they received from the Italian population in France. In Digne, Italian civilians gave the troops 
hot beverages to fight the Alpine cold.
593
 In Roquebrune, Italian irredentists, who mistook the 
advancing columns as the onset of the March on Nice, offered wine, fruits and flowers from 
the wayside.
594
 Yet, the Italian soldiers were more embarrassed than happy to be greeted in 
Nice by black-shirted men showing off the Roman salute. One soldier, upon seeing a man 
making the Fascist salute, allegedly scolded him to put his hand down and invited him to take 
his place as a soldier instead.
595
  
The Italian soldiers were not the only ones annoyed by these irredentist 
demonstrations. French civil servants stressed that “the behavior of these [Italian] foreigners 
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who had been well received and who often had grown rich in our country” was severely 
criticized by the French populace.
596
 On the night of the 13-14 November in Cap D’Ail, the 
houses of those who had celebrated the coming of the Italian troops in the streets a few days 
before were painted with xenophobic slurs.
597
 In Antibes too, houses of known Italian 
irredentists were smeared with pitch and in a few instances even became the target of hails of 
stones.
598
 The same report, however, stressed that no incidents had occurred between the 
French civilian population and the Italian soldiers. In fact, Italian and French reports alike 
agreed on the relative uneventfulness of the first days of the Italian occupation of the Zone 
Libre. The Italian soldiers, having received strict orders to avoid any attitude which could be 
interpreted as political such as fraternization with the irredentist movement and, perhaps, 
ashamed of invading a land they had not conquered, but had entered almost on the sly, did 
little to provoke a reaction from the local populace. On the other hand, the French population 
and army, directed by the local authorities and the military commanders to avoid any 
opposition to the Italian military operation, may have eyed the invaders with hostility, but 
refrained from actively opposing the Italian advance. 
However, to insist that the Italian invasion and occupation went smoothly would be 
misleading, for it would sweep under the carpet the impact the Italian occupation had on the 
Côte d’Azur. The Principality of Monaco is an interesting test case to demonstrate how far 
the Italian commanders were willing to impinge on local politics, given the fact that, in 
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November 1942, Monaco was still a neutral state. The Esigenza O, the Italian master plan for 
the invasion, was clear on that point. The units of the XV CA which had to push along the 
coastline were not to cross into Monaco's territory unless attacked by Monaco units or if 
defending French troops sought refuge in the Principality.
599
 Notwithstanding this order, a 
few units crossed the frontier into Monaco, as the Moyenne Corniche, one of the roads 
linking Menton to Nice, bordered the neutral state. This act of trespass, notwithstanding its 
limited nature, was enough to stir up the nationalistic zeal of the Italian irredentist 
community. More than four hundred people, twenty of whom donned the black shirt for the 
occasion, gathered in front of the Prince’s palace and in the Place des Armes chanting 
“Monaco Italienne” and “Vive Mussolini” and singing Fascist anthems.
600
 It was short-lived. 
During the next few days, the situation reverted to pre-invasion normalcy, except for a small 
contingent of Italian soldiers left guarding the railway line. 
 The tension however escalated at the state level on 14 November. The Italian consul 
in Monaco, Lepri, formally asked for the formal collaboration of the principality in the Italian 
invasion, later to be sanctioned by a deployment of a Regio Esercito detachment within the 
city. Emile Roblot, Prince Ranieri’s Minister of State, flatly refused, in the face of the 
Italians' insistence, solemnly declaring that the invasion of the Principality would 
fundamentally violate the internationally neutral position of the sovereign state of Monaco.
601
 
In fact, the real target of the Italians was not the Monaco’s monarch or his government, but 
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the American consul in Monaco, Walter Oberaugh. To understand why the Italian Foreign 
Ministry was so interested in the US consul, it is necessary to return to October 1942. The 
US consulate in Nice, as admitted by Oberaugh in his autobiography, had clandestine 




November, Oberaugh, at 
that time consul in Nice, was urged by the US embassy in Vichy to open a consulate in the 
principality as soon as possible. This diplomatic move was no coincidence. Officials in 
Washington realized that the onset of Operation Torch would mean the end of diplomatic 
relations with the Vichy regime. The Italians resented this intrusion of diplomatic personnel 
of the most important Allied state into a territory considered within the Italian sphere of 




This diplomatic wrangling did not prevent the Italians from advancing their program. 
On 16 November starting at noon, Italian units closed every access to Monaco, whether by 
sea or by land. They then invited all the American citizens to stay home. No arrests were 
made, but only because the Italians deemed that all the British and American citizens who 
had links with the Allied secret services had already fled the city. In the face of this imminent 
threat to the neutrality of his realm, Prince Louis Ranieri de Monaco wrote to both Pope Pius 
XII and even to the Führer himself complaining of this breach of Monaco sovereignty.
604
 The 
pro-French population was also mobilized. On the morning of 16 November, the mass at the 
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Monaco Cathedral for the commemoration of the dead princes of Monaco turned into a 
demonstration of support for the Ranieri dynasty.
605
 The crisis rapidly escalated. On 17 
November, Italian soldiers, guided by the Vice-President of Monaco's Fascio, as well as an 
employee at the Italian consulate, Guido Bruni, stormed the US consulate and locked up the 
consul and his personnel on the second floor.
606
 The Prince, along with his Minister Roblot, 
reiterated their protests and threatened to break diplomatic relations if the American consul 
was not allowed to leave the consulate.
607
 Thus, it is evident that even purely strategic 
decisions had political consequences in the chaotic situation of southeastern France. The 
Italians needed to protect their advance into the French territory and thus had few scruples 
about crossing the Franco-Monaco border in order to cover their flanks. Moreover, local 
commanders, probably influenced by the Italian consul in Monaco, were suspicious of the 
activities of the Anglo-American community in Monaco, especially those of the American 
consulate. These security reasons were carefully exploited both by the irredentists and Italian 
civil authorities to further their own political agendas, which in turn fuelled the anger of local 
French or Monaco authorities and the local populace.  
The atmosphere grew increasingly tense as the most prominent irredentists used the 
situation to settle scores with some of their political and personal adversaries. On 17 
November, a former prisoner of St-Cyprien, Georges A., shielded by two Italian soldiers, was 
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illegally caught checking papers in the streets of Monaco. Taken in for questioning by the 
Monaco police, he was later committed to prison for "usurping the responsabilities of the 
state" (usurpation de fonctions). A few hours later, thirty armed men led by Domenico S., an 
employee of the Italian consulate, broke down the door of the prison and freed the 
irredentist.
608
 In some cases, the irredentists targeted people with whom they had quarreled in 
the past. Charles D., a French croupier at the local casino, was arrested by Italian soldiers 
allegedly based upon the denunciation of the irredentist Alfred R.
609
 Another report 
contradicted the first one, explaining that Charles D. had failed to show his personal 
documents at one of the border posts established by the Italian army along the perimeter of 
the principality and also had insulted the Italian sentries.
610
  
No matter the reasons for his arrest, the case of Charles D. was the first of a long 
series of arrests made by the Italian occupation army along the Côte d'Azur. Already in the 
morning of 12 November, Italian officials with the help of soldiers of the Regio Esercito had 
arrested, approximately ten individuals - mostly in Nice, both Italian fuoriusciti and French 
citizens.
611
 It appears that even local Italian irredentists actively participated in the blitz to 
capture Italian antifascists, such as in the case of the arrest of the former Communist mayor 
of Ormea (Cuneo), Carlo Bava.
612
 These sudden seizures in the former Zone Libre raised a 
commotion among the populace and caused the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes to send a 
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formal letter of protest to the Italian local authorities on 19 November underscoring that these 
police operations were overreaching the official goal of the occupation of France, which was 
to counter an eventual Allied landing in southern France, and in doing so were further 
undermining Vichy’s sovereignty.
613
 The Commander of the XV Army Corps, General 
Bancale, replied the next day that the wave of arrests would cease immediately.
614
 In fact, 
these orders originated from the head of the Italian forces in France, General Mario 
Vercellino, who, in a short telegram on 20 November to the SMRE, ordered the immediate 
cessation of any activity of the “political police” and “counterespionage.”
615
 
Yet, shortly thereafter the Italians moved towards a harsher policy. The order to 
terminate the arrest of civilians in the former Free Zone was explicitly called off by the Duce 
on 24 November and relayed by the Fourth Army Command on 25 November.
616
 According 
to this directive, Italian military commanders had to ask the French authorities and police 
forces to take into custody “dangerous individuals ... whenever possible and convenient [for 
the Italians].” In practice, Italian commanders, who deeply mistrusted Vichy officials, often 
took the situation in their own hands. Between the end of November and the beginning of 
December, Italian authorities resumed the rounding-up of fuoriusciti in Nice, among them 
Paul A., a former army officer, who had emigrated in France before the war for his political 
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ideas and Armand A., an Italian socialist who admitted campaigning for the enlistment of 
Italians in the French army and for taking part in the screening of alleged Fascist Italians 
after the declaration of war on 10 June 1940.
617
  
To understand this sudden shift, yet again, in policy, it is important to recognize that 
the Italians had to strike a delicate balance between a harsh policy of rules set in stone and a 
more lenient and flexible approach intended to ingratiate the civilian population. On one 
hand, the Italians wanted to avoid antagonizing the French population as they had no forces 
to spare to deal with a prospective pro-Allied insurrection and they wanted to accommodate 
French prefects as they needed the local authorities for routine administration. On the other, 
the Italians did not want to appear too lenient, for fear of losing prestige in the eyes of the 
Italian community in France. Moreover, establishing their authority in the occupied zone 
through application of a rigorous policy was also a sign to the French government and the 
French civilian population that the Italians would not tolerate any interference in the 
implementation of their occupation. 
These shifts in approach can also be seen with a careful look at another document 
issued on 20 November.
618
 In a message to all Fourth Army commanders, Vercellino warned 
that the relative calm and the absence of reaction in the occupied territories should not lull 
the Italian army into thinking that the population would remain forever passive. On the 
contrary, Vercellino admonished, the current situation should be acknowledged as the calm 
before the storm of an Allied invasion by sea, probably supported by a Resistance uprising. It 
was a frightening scenario to contemplate, especially in light of the inherent deficiencies of 
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the Italian army. The Fourth army lacked air support, and its deployment would be marred by 
logistical issues such as the poor road and railroad networks in southern France, most of 
which were not under Italian surveillance, and the total dependence of the Regio Esercito on 
the already existing French communications network. For the above reasons, Vercellino 
emphasized the new tenets of the Italian occupation: the importance of deploying reserve 
troops, useful not only to dam any possible leak in the coastline defenses, but also as a way to 
quell any possible French rebellion; the implementation of an Italian military radio network 
and a liaison network utilizing motorcycle or bicycle couriers; and the creation of army 
depots to guarantee supplies of materiel in case of crisis.  
The two last parts of the document, titled Provvedimenti di carattere politico 
(Political measures) and Provvedimenti di carattere informativo e di tutela del segreto 
militare (Measures of informative nature and for the protection of military secrets), shed 
further light on the policy which would be implemented by the Italian occupation army in the 
next months. Vercellino was skeptical about the possibility of finding a modus vivendi with 
local authorities owing to the bad blood and divergent state interests. However, relations with 
the civilian populace were an entirely different matter. Winning the hearts and souls of the 
populace would be a difficult task; nevertheless the Italian army was directed to strive to earn 
the respect of at least part of the local population, thus “cracking the solidarity of resentment” 
(incrinare la compatezza del risentimento e la solidarieta’ nel rancore). Thus, Vercellino 
deemed it important to implement policy “without faltering or weakness but at the same time 
without harshness or brutality.” Italian troops and their commanders should always 
demonstrate propriety and composure (correttezza di forma and compostezza di vita) towards 
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both the French authorities and the civilian population. However, the Fourth Army Command 
directive also stressed in its last part that the Italian soldiers should limit any kind of contact 
with the civilian population to a bare minimum. This warning was the result of Italian 
intelligence reports that Allied agents were trying to fraternize with the rank-and-file in order 
to gain valuable information and to sow seeds of discord by encouraging the soldiers to 
desert and by spreading defeatist and scaremongering rumors. To thwart this anti-Italian 
propaganda, Italian commanders were asked to keep a watchful eye on their underlings. 
Conversely, the careful use of informants was crucial to garner intelligence on anti-Italian 
organizations, be it Resistance or Vichy-based. To this effect, local commanders were told to 
seek help from the CIAF delegates, who, as Italian officials with established social networks, 
were people well-suited to act as local counselors.  
The paranoid attitude of the Italian forces was not entirely groundless, as 
demonstrated by the unfolding of events at the naval base in Toulon. The main French naval 
base of the Mediterranean had sheltered the core of the French Navy since the débacle of 
June 1940. Following Article XII of the Armistice of Villa Incisa, the warships had been 
disarmed and left without fuel to thwart any possible effort to join the Gaullist forces in 
Africa. The vigorous opposition of the French Navy against its erstwhile ally, the British 
fleet, at Mers-El-Kébir (3 July 1940) and Dakar (23-25 September 1940), changed the view 
of the Axis powers, who intepreted this as solid evidence that the French Navy was loyal to 
the Vichy regime. Thus, the Germans, and, more reluctantly, the Italians, agreed to ease the 
armistice clauses regarding the Navy.
619
 The relaxation soon ceased with the Allied landing 
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in North Africa and the subsequent occupation of southern France. The Germans were 
worried about the allegiance of the French troops after the confusion caused by Admiral 
Darlan's betrayal. On 11 November, the Führer himself wrote an incendiary letter to Marshal 
Pétain, bluntly questioning the loyalty of the French troops in the event of an Allied landing. 
The fear of a possible French reversal of strategy was heightened on 12 November by an 
order issued by Admiral Laborde, the head of the French Navy, to the Toulon Navy to warm 
up the battleships’ engines. In any event, the Germans and the Italians would have been 
unable to reach the Toulon zone at the beginning of the invasion, and therefore they were 
obliged to leave the French Navy command in place. Thus, Admiral André Marquis, the 
Préfet Maritime of Toulon, was left in control of the Place de Toulon (Stronghold of 
Toulon), which stretched east along the peninsula of Hyères to the cities of St. Raphaël and 
St. Tropez.   
It was clear however that the Axis local commanders were increasingly 
uncomfortable with the French equivalent of two full divisions in the stronghold, some of 
which were battalions of the Armée d’Armistice.
620
 A telegram from the Italian Army 
General Staff dated 24 November reported that “the behavior of the French forces is 
becoming more dubious and even less clear,” so much that he believed Italian units should be 
ready to advance in case French units in Toulon joined the coming landing invasion.
621
 In 
truth, the Regio Esercito was hardly prepared to take Toulon. The reduced enlistment of its 
divisions, coupled with severe deficiencies in the armored forces, had already impeded the 
Italian forces' attempt to take Marseille, notwithstanding the large Italian community living 
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therein. Not surprisingly, the occupation of that city by the Wehrmacht was seen as a 
humiliation by the Fascist state.
622
 With Marseille already lost, on 26 November the SMRE 




The Germans, well aware of the poor condition of the Italian army, were loathe to 
rely on the Italian units for the forthcoming Operation Lila (the seizure of the French naval 
base at Toulon). Therefore, they did not even bother to notify the XXII CA command, which 
was fifty kilometers north of Toulon in the town of Brignoles, until the German divisions of 
the Felber Armeegruppe were already besieging the Préfécture Maritime de Toulon, Fort La 
Malgue. Presented with a fait accompli, the XXII CA command had no choice but to update 
its orders: the Taro Division, which in the previous directive was given the task of occupy the 
port of Toulon, was instead relegated to occupying the village of Hyères, twenty kilometers 
east of Toulon, and a few airfields.
624
 
Operation Lila was in fact, a serious tactical blunder. German troops failed to reach 
the arsenal before the battleships and the submarines were either scuttled or, in some rare 
instances, scurried away to join the Gaullist forces in North Africa. In all, more than eighty 
vessels, including fifteen destroyers, three battleships and twelve submarines were 
                                                     
622 AUSSME, DS 1101, Telegramma n°8843/Op. di pr  . “L nea     emar az  ne  ra f rze   al ane e german  he 
nel  err   r   fran ese,” D ar      r    XXII CA, Allega   40, 21 N vember 1942. 
623 AUSSME, DS 1101, Lettera n°9051 di prot. “P azzaf r e    T l ne,” Comando Quarta Armata, Diario Storico 
XXII CA, Allegato 75,  26 November 1942. 
624 AUSSME, DS 1101, Lettera n°4078/02 di prot. Comando XXII CA, Diario Storico XXII CA, Allegato 76, 27 
November 1942. The XXII CA received a communication from the Felber headquarters at 6 a.m. on 27 
November. The German attack on Toulon began at 3 a.m. 
 
 228 
purposefully sunk by French Navy personnel. The Axis engineers salvaged only a few ships 
and divided up the scuttled ships for scrap metal.
625
  
The occupation of Toulon was in fact the key element in what was a much larger 
operation by the Germans and the Italians to disarm the Armée d’Armistice. The Fourth 
Army Command issued a directive at 11 a.m. on 27 November, ordering Italian troops from 
the three Italian Army Corps in France to disarm all French military units and to confine 
them to their barracks, separating the officers from their soldiers. Meanwhile, Italian squads 
were ordered to ensure that no military goods were smuggled from French armistice depots 
and to secure all airbases to prevent any defection by the French air force.
626
 These tasks 
were carried out at once. French troops were disarmed in department administrative centers 
such as Digne, Gap, Annecy, Grenoble and Nice, while airbases and important armistice 
depots brought under Italian control in Orange, Le Pontet, Valence and Grenoble. The whole 
operation went without a glitch, apart from occasional half-hearted protests by French 
officers. 
Interestingly, the only problems experienced by Italian units were created by their 
German counterparts. Strategic airbases in the Rhone Valley, along with their armistice 
depots, while officially in the Italian occupation zone, were seized by Wehrmacht troops. An 
Italian unit was dispatched to Chambery only to find the administrative center of the Savoie 
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department already occupied by German soldiers.
627
 In fact, these areas were handed over to 
Italy only three weeks later, starting on 15 December.
628
 That same day, the Italian Navy 
command in France, headed by Admiral Vittorio Tur, took over the administration of the port 
of Toulon.
629
  Apparently, as German units withdrew, they also took with them some French 




At the heart of the problem in the relations between Germans and Italians were their 
different views on the occupation of Southern France. The Wehrmacht was worried 
exclusively about a possible Allied landing on the Mediterranean coast. The occupation of 
Marseille and Toulon was done solely for strategic considerations, as the two cities were the 
most important ports in southern France, and because the Italian army was incapable of 
securing cities of such an important size. The Italian army too had strategic and military 
motivations for the push, as they sought to grab as many French army depots and supplies as 
they could before the Germans could put their hands on them. However, they had other 
underlying motivations. Firstly, their inferiority complex vis-à-vis their senior partner and the 
French army, especially after the debacle of the Battle of the Alps, surely played into the 
Italian decision to occupy as much territory as possible. The Italians' purpose was to 
demonstrate that they could contribute to the defense of France. Furthermore, the Italian 
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army was certainly not oblivious to the political motivations behind the invasion. The Fascist 
state wanted to show to the Italian population in France that it could defend the interests of 
its citizens spread along the French coast. Therefore, it is understandable that the failure to 
take the two major cities with important Italian communities, Marseille and Toulon, deeply 
stung Fascist and military officials.  
 Regardless of motivation, the Italian Army General Staff had, in fact, no choice, but 
to leave Marseille and Toulon to the Wehrmacht. If nothing else, the deployment in France 
had dangerously strained the military resources of the Italian army, as it depleted the reserves 
which would have been used to defend the Italian coastline. The success of the North African 
landing only served to highlight the Italian strategic weakness. The Italian front along the 
Italian shores was already overstretched. The 7,600 kilometers of coastline suddenly became 
an enormous burden for the Regio Esercito, given the fact that many of its divisions were still 
mired in North Africa, the Balkans and France. Confronted with the strategic dilemma, the 
Italian General Staff opted to prioritize the defense of the peninsula. A directive on 7 
December to Fourth Army commanders stated that the task of their units was primarily “the 
occupation and defense of French territories ... and the defense of the national soil.” It 
minimized the French occupation, stating that while the Italian army should watch over the 
French coastline and the Swiss border, only a minimal Italian presence was needed in the 
most important cities and in the French armistice depots.
631
 The SMRE then started to recall 
units quartered abroad to bolster the Italian coastline defense. On 9 December, the XV CA 
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Command and the 1° Gruppo Alpini “Valle,” stationed in Savoy and Isère, were called back 
to Italy to consolidate the front in Liguria.
632
  
This decision infuriated General Vercellino, who, supported in his opinion by the 
Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, estimated that the Fourth Army was dangerously weak and 
that, in fact, additional units should be assigned to France.
633
 This was rebutted by General 
Ambrosio, the head of the SMRE, who bluntly stated that he did not agree with Vercellino 
and the OKW. He deemed the density of forces on the Italian zone in line with that in the 
German zone.
634
 If one looks at the map, Ambrosio seemed to be right: the Italian army 
occupied 350 kilometers of coastline with four divisions (from the Italian border westbound: 
Emanuele Filiberto Testa di Ferro (EFTF), Legnano, Taro, Lupi di Toscana). The Germans 
had deployed three divisions to cover 150 kilometers east from Toulon. Nevertheless, their 
zone required much more in the way of manpower due to the two cities of Toulon and 
Marseille.
635
 Moreover, the German divisions were far superior to the Italian ones in terms of 
both quantity and quality. Due to the already-mentioned binary reform, the Italian divisions 
each consisted of only two regiments, instead of three. Moreover, Wehrmacht divisions could 
each boast six anti-tank companies and at least one battalion of armored cars or tanks, none 
of which were available to support the Fourth Army units.
636
 The Regio Esercito also lacked 
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any kind of air support.
637
  It is unlikely that Ambrosio did not know about these differences 
between the Regio Esercito and the Wehrmacht. His reply instead underscored the secondary 
nature of the French front as far as the Italian General Staff was concerned. In light of the 
Allied invasion of North Africa, the defense of the Italian coastline became a primordial 
point in the Italian strategy. Thus, in autumn 1942, the Italians were no longer interested in 
conquering colonies for a future empire, but were locked into a defensive posture, suddenly 
feeling extremely vulnerable.  
 The weakest link in the chain was without a doubt the mobile division EFTF, which 
had an incomplete roster and was lightly armed.
638
 At the beginning of December, the Fourth 
Army Command chose to switch the EFTF with the Legnano, the flagship division in the 
Italian array, as the initial sector of the EFTF, St.Tropez-Antibes, was by far the most 
topographically vulnerable of the Italian occupation zone.
639
 However, the same Legnano 
was seriously short-staffed. Its commander, General Marciani, gave the order to reduce to a 
bare minimum the crews manning the coastline fortifications and those guarding the 




Vercellino’s complaints eventually partially paid off. Later in the occupation, the 
SMRE chose to reinforce the Fourth Army front. Two Divisioni Costiere (coastal divisions) 
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were created in January 1943 in an effort to buttress the Italian defense line, especially in the 





 coastal divisions, the latter forming the bulk of the Presidio Militare di Nizza 
(Military Stronghold of Nice), both having been created in late February.
641
 However, at 
closer look, the deployment of these two units was just an attempt to patch up the worn fabric 
of the Italian defensive network and abotched one at that. The coastal divisions were formed 
out of a mix of demoralized Alpine troops who had survived the harrowing winter 1942 
retreat from the Russian front and poorly trained senior soldiers. Not surprisingly, their 
equipment was sub-par, even by Italian standards. In the words of one Italian historian, the 
Divisioni Costiere were an "unfortunate invention fitting the Fascist climate" of boastful 
propaganda full of hot air.
642
  
The buttressing of the Italian forces in France was probably also the result of an 
evolution in Franco-Axis relations in late 1942. The scuttling of the Toulon navy had 
infuriated the Axis powers and heightened suspicion that French authorities would prove 
duplicitous in the case of an Allied invasion. Indeed, at the beginning of January 1943, 
General Vercellino issued a directive to all Fourth Army commanders warning about the 
potential escape of Marshal Pétain to North Africa via boat, plane or even submarine. 
Pétain’s villa in Villeneuve-Loubet (Alpes-Maritimes), deemed the logistical base for the 
escape, was carefully monitored day and night, and no one was allowed in or out of its 
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 It seems in retrospect that the Italian worries were misplaced: Marshal Pétain, by 
that time already 86 years old, had requested to stay in the Côte d’Azur simply to enjoy a few 
days away from the chilly weather of Vichy.
644
  
       The Italians and the Germans met in the forest of Görlitz on 18 December 1942 
to update their policy vis-à-vis the Vichy state. Hitler, while still distrustful of the French, 
favored a moderate stance, feeling that the Axis powers still needed the Vichy administration 
to ensure the maintenance of public order in the French territories. This “useful sovereignty 
fiction” was instrumental to avoid the cluttering French soil with additional Axis troops and 
civil servants at a time when the Italian and German armies were already lacking able men.
645
 
However, the Germans were not shy about reminding the French who was at the helm of 
occupied Europe. On 27 December, General von Neubronn, the OKW representative in 
Vichy, gave the French government an official note which officially sanctioned what had 
already happened one month earlier, the handing over to the Wehrmacht of all the armament, 
materiel and buildings of the former French army. Moreover, the document added that “the 
French government should support by any means the orders of the Supreme Commander 
West.”
646
 In other words, Vichy officials remained in charge of the normal administration, 
but were bound to obey orders coming from Berlin. France was now a mere vassal of its 
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Teutonic neighbor, a condition made real by the loss of its two biggest strategic assets, the 
colonial empire and the navy.  
The German declaration was based on Article 3 of the Franco-German armistice 
which stated that “In the occupied French regions, the German Reich exercises the right of 
the occupant power (puissance occupante).” This important article did not have any 
equivalent in the Armistice of Villa Incisa. Thus, the Italian pretensions rested on shakier 
legal ground. The Italians however were undeterred. The Commissione Consultiva per il 
Diritto di Guerra presso il Consiglio dei Ministri (the War Law Advisory Committee of the 
Council of Ministers) came up with a solution to solve the potential impasse. The 
Commissione, basing its judgment on Italian and international war jurisprudence, noted that 
the Armistice had not ended the state of war between Italy and France. As a matter of fact, 
the Italian board of jurists argued that by occupying French territory without the consent of 
its sovereign state, the Italian army had started de facto a wartime occupation (occupazione 
bellica).  Therefore, the Commissione concluded, "the occupation of an enemy territory 
entails the effective replacement of the authority of the state which has the jurisdiction over 
the occupied territory, with the authority of the occupying state."   
This new status held three important legal repercussions. First of all, “the occupant 
armed forces bring with them their own legal laws and their own jurisdiction.” In other 
words, Italian soldiers could not be prosecuted by French justice courts, no matter the 
severity of the crime. More importantly, any person committing a crime against the Italian 
armed forces, their personnel or their employees would be judged by an Italian military court 
in Turin. Secondly, the document continued, “the occupant authorities assume the civil 
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administration of the occupied territory, which could be carried out also by using the local 
authorities” (italics are mine). In fact, the Italians, paralleling Hitler’s notion of the “useful 
sovereignty fiction,” gladly relinquished daily administration to Vichy civil servants for both 
political and pragmatic reasons. This was however, the text insisted, an "autolimitation" 
(underlined in original), as the Italian state reserved the right to take over the civil 
administration at any moment for reasons of security and prestige.
647
  
On 16 January, a note was sent from Rome to the Laval government via General 
Avarna di Gualtieri, the Italian General Staff representative in Vichy, which reiterated the 
major details of the conclusion of the War Law Advisory Committee. The French were 
bluntly told that the Italians would thereupon “exert all the prerogatives of an occupant 
power ... with the subsequent legal loss of the French sovereignty on the territories [formerly 
subjected to the Italian armistice control]. Thus, notwithstanding the aforementioned 
autolimitation for “political opportunism,” the Italian military authorities took upon 
themselves the right to issue proclamations or decrees.  
The CIAF Italian authorities in France were also not forgotten. The note from Rome 
explicitly underscored the importance of their role as guardians of the Italian immigrants in 
France. French police authorities were required to communicate any arrest of Italian citizen 
to local CIAF representatives. No penal proceedings could be initiated and no deportation 
orders could be executed against Italians without the prior consent of local Italian authorities. 
Finally, CIAF requests for administrative concessions such as special permits for ration cards 
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or exemption from the Relève, were expected to be granted.
648
 Thus it seemed, at first sight, 
that, after November 1942, the role of the CIAF had greatly expanded. Starting on 1 January 
1943, Delegates for the Assistance and Repatriation who had operated in the former Zone 
Libre since February 1941 were officially upgraded to the role of Italian consuls. This 
unilateral decision was made possible by the new events, for the November 1942 military 
occupation had ended any possible ambiguity regarding the sovereignty of the Zone Libre: 
the opening of consulates which could have been previously seen as the implicit Italian 
acceptance of the authority of Vichy France in the contested territories was now touted by the 
Farnesina as the prelude of the Italian annexation of southeastern France.
649
  
A more careful examination of the Italian occupation, however, reveals a more 
complicated picture. Relations between Italian civil and military authorities in France were 
often terse. The commander of the Fourth Army, General Mario Vercellino, and his 
underlings, did not hesitate in expressing their contempt for the CIAF officials in France. 
CIAF delegates were often sidelined by local commanders of the Regio Esercito. For 
instance, Consul Alberto Calisse, who had replaced Quinto Mazzolini in August 1942 as 
CIAF delegate in Nice, wrote a report on the ceremony to pay homage to Garibaldi 
orchestrated by the commander of the Legnano Division upon his arrival in Nice on 14 
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November. Calisse wryly added that the CIAF delegation had not been informed of, let alone 
invited to, the event.
650
  
This episode should not be dismissed as an example of personal antipathy, but as a 
sign of a profound structural issue plaguing the Italian occupation of France. Italian military 
and civil authorities clashed, sometimes bitterly, over their roles in occupied France. The 
army's role was theoretically limited to military and security matters. However, they quickly 
extended their influence over matters that were the CIAF's prerogative, mantaining that every 
political issue could impinge on both the prestige and the security of the army. For instance, 
Regio Esercito commanders took an interest in the fate of Italian citizens in French jails, 
treading on CIAF toes when they did so, as the liberation of Italian prisoners had always 
been considered part of the armistice (Article XXI). At the end of November, allegedly in 
retaliation to a wave of arrests carried out by the Italian occupation army, the French 
authorities in the Alpes-Maritimes incarcerated a score of Italian immigrants for "public 
order reasons." General Marciani, the successor of General De Cia at the head of the 
Legnano, immediately demanded a list of the arrested Italians from the prefect and their 
immediate release from the Vernet prison camp. Calisse, head of the local CIAF, ruefully 
explained in his report on the matter that he was not consulted. To add insult to injury, 
Calisse had only found about the episode because Prefect Ribière had reported Marciani's 
query to him, as Ribière had insisted that any talks on the matter had to be done via CIAF 
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 On 11 December, the EFTF and the Legnano divisions switched their occupation 
zones, but the new commander in Nice followed in the footsteps of his predecessors. He 
informed the prefect that the Italians in the Vernet camp had to be sent back to the Division 
command, explicitly ordering that the Nice consul "not meddle in this affair."
652
 In light of 
the alarming reports from the Italian consul, the Foreign Affairs Ministry immediately wrote 
to its liaison attached to the Fourth Army, Count Vittorio Emanuele Bonarelli di 
Castelbompiano, to ask General Vercellino to intercede with his local commanders.
653
  
But Bonarelli's reply bore bad tidings. Following two meetings with Vacca 
Maggiolini, Vercellino insisted that all the CIAF representatives in occupied France should 
fall under the control of the Fourth Army.
654
 In other words, the commander of the Italian 
occupation army in France insisted that the CIAF delegations should fall under the army 
umbrella for any of their actions could impinge on occupation policy and thus had to be 
preventively authorized by local military authorities. Vercellino's claims were strongly 
supported by what was happening on the German side. The German Armistice Commission 
(CTA) was already merging with the German Army Command in the West 
(Oberbefehlshaber West or ObW) headed by General Gerd Von Rundstedt, and the ObW had 
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progressively taken over the CTA tasks. The remnants of the CTA in Wiesbaden had been 
relegated to a minor juridisdictional role.
655
  
Vacca Maggiolini, undaunted by the German example, at once counterattacked by 
writing a memorandum to Vercellino in which he argued in earnest that, notwithstanding 
repeated French violations, the Armistice of Villa Incisa was still in effect. As a matter of 
fact, for Vacca Maggiolini, "the Franco-Italian Armistice is the only document which exists 
and the armistice commission is the only agency which embodies in an official and 
indisputable way the position of superiority of the victorious Italy over vanquished 
France."
656
  The CIAF president decided to bring the issue to the attention of Chief of the 
Italian Supreme Command, General Ugo Cavallero, but Cavallero's response proved 
evasive.
657
 Vacca Maggiolini, fearing that the restructuring of the CTA foreshadowed a 
similar fate for the CIAF, tried to strike a compromise. In a memorandum sent to Cavallero 
on 6 January 1943, Vacca Maggiolini agreed that the CIAF military undercommissions 
(Army, Navy, Air force and Armaments) should be integrated into the Fourth Army 
administration. However, he insisted the CIAF should keep its role as enforcer of those 
matters assigned to it by the armistice, such as the management of the French army depots 
and the liberation of Italian prisoners.
658
  
 On the issues of Italian prisoners, however, the army commanders refused to stop 
interfering. On 6 January 1943, the same General Vercellino sent a message to all Fourth 
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Army commanders, underscoring in bold letters that any arrest of Italian citizens on French 
soil weakened the prestige of the Italian occupation army. The Regio Esercito was thus 
honor-bound to free their compatriots in prison, especially those whose only guilt was to 
have fraternized with the invading army. If French authorities refused to comply with the 
army orders, local commanders were invited to free the prisoners, manu militari if necessary. 
Moreover, while Vercellino underlined the importance of coordinating the effort with the 
local Italian state representatives, he added that the latter were especially useful as lightning 
rods to channel the protests of the French authorities. In other words, their role was to be a 
passive one: to relieve the army of the burden of endless quarrels with Vichy.
659
 That not 
much had changed, despite Vacca Maggiolini's protests, was demonstrated by a report a few 
days later. The Nice consul Calisse complained to the CIAF president that the head of the 
Delegazione Esercito Controllo Scacchiere Alpino (Army Delegation for the Control of the 
Alpine Front or DECSA) in Nice, a former CIAF bureau which had been attached to the 
Fourth Army administration on 9 December 1942, was tampering in the consul's business, 
namely the protection of Italian citizens.
660
 
Thus, it was evident that, from the inception of the invasion, Italian civilian and 
military authorities would have a hard time accepting each other's presence. The CIAF 
representatives resented the intrusion of the military into what they deemed their private 
hunting ground, both in terms of territory (the former Zone Libre) and activities (the care of 
the Italian emigrants' interests). Moreover, they feared the proverbial uncouthness of military 
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men would shred the web of networks they had woven locally over two years, both within 
the local Italian communities and with the French administration. Army commanders, on the 
other hand, objected to any interference by Italian civilians in the operation of their military 
occupation. However, the military was almost content to have the CIAF act as a lightning rod 
for French complaints, as it wished to focus on strictly military matters. The CIAF, of course, 
resented being the focus of the French authorities' protests without having the authority to 
address them. 
The first part of the Italian occupation of the southeastern France departments thus 
delineated the ambiguous nature of the Italian occupation policy from November 1942 to 
September 1943. Fourth Army commanders swung between a policy of strict firmness, both 
to dissuade internal dissidents from rebelling and to reassert their prestige in the region with 
an eye to its future annexation, and an attitude of forbearance, intended to avoid any 
unnecessary confrontation both with the French authorities and with the local population. 
The firm attitude did not please the French population and Vichy authorities, while the more 
lenient aspect of Italian policy did little to endear CIAF officials and local irredentists. 
However, this mixed policy seemed to pay off, at least until 1943, for during the invasion, 





The impact of the Italian occupation in southeastern France 
Any military occupation is always a trauma for the local population, and in that 
respect the Italian occupation was no different. Local inhabitants were confronted with new 
constraints such as curfews and evacuations, which made their lives more miserable than 
they were already were, while food shortages, the black market and thefts became even more 
widespread. In addition, the Italians inflicted random arrests and round-ups, creating an 
atmosphere of constant tension. The population's frustration was heightened by the belief that 
the occupation was not legitimate in that the Italians had not won the war against the French 
army and by the fear that the invaded territory would be annexed. However, the impact was 
less than one would think. Soldiers, who were lacking discipline and morale and whose main 
desire was to get back home, adapted quickly to local conditions by befriending the 
population and actively participating in bartering and black-marketeering. Indeed, structural 
factors of the Italian occupation such a widespread laxity within the Italian ranks, the cultural 
proximity to the Italian population and the shortage of resources allocated to the Fourth 
Army by the Italian General Staff explains the relatively moderate nature of the Italian 
occupation.        
By the beginning of 1943, the military situation was stabilizing in the Italian 
occupation zone. The total number of Italian soldiers in France had reached 185,000 at the 
beginning of the occupation, but fell abruptly in December 1941 to 115,000, and then 





 Most of the XV CA, which accounted for nearly one-third of the Fourth Army, 
was quartered in Liguria, the Italian region bordering the Côte d'Azur. Therefore, only 
roughly 105,000 soldiers and officers - the Fourth Army Command (25,000), two army corps 
(I and XXII, 35,000 each, the roster of three divisions), and the Pusteria division (10,000) - 
were occupying France. The deployment of the Fourth Army clearly underscored that the 
defense of the Mediterranean Coast was the strategic priority of the occupation of the former 
Zone Libre. Only thirty per cent of the roster, the Pusteria division, the Raggruppamento 
Tattico Argens (Argens Tactic Group, XXII CA reserve), and the mobile division EFTF (I 
CA reserve) were deployed to the inland parts of southern France.
662
 The other seventy 
percent (Fourth Army Command, I CA and four-fifths of XXII CA) were amassed within 
fifty kilometers of the coastline.  
Beginning in January 1943, the Italian army in France endeavored to bolster the 
coastal defenses. To this effect, the territory was divided into two zones: the first, christened 
the Combat Zone, was a zone stretching from the coastline inland roughly thirty kilometers, 
while the second encompassed the rest of Italian-occupied France. The Combat Zone was by 
far the most important of the two, as most of the Italian units were huddled along the 
coastline. Italian military leaders deemed it the most probable location for any Allied 
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invasion. The Zone thus needed to be cleared both of its inhabitants and of Vichy 
organizations.  
The Italians had no qualms about expropriating buildings to quarter their troops. 
Sometimes domestic security needs matched strategic considerations. For instance, the Fort 
Carré, an imposing sixteenth-century structure overlooking the port of Antibes, was 
requisitioned both because the fortification was strategically well-placed atop a hill and also 
because it housed the Chantiers de la Jeunesse, a Vichy youth organization which the 
Italians feared was becoming the vanguard of a future army of resistance.
663
 More serious 
and problematic for the Italian commanders was that the local population needed to be 
removed from this zone. The coastline was the most heavily populated zone in southern 
France and removing the whole population from the Combat Zone would be a challenging 
task. Army commanders began by encouraging the population, with the help of the prefects, 
to relocate at least four or five kilometers inland, while in the meantime, forbidding anyone 
to relocate to the Combat Zone, even if just temporarily, either for weekends or for the 
summer. As a matter of fact, to enter the new buffer zone, civilians needed a laissez-passer 
from the local prefectures approved by the Italian army.
664
  
The coastal defense impinged not only on the everyday life of those who lived near 
the coastline, but also on those who worked at sea. Once settled in France, the Italian army 
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had forbidden fishing at night for security reasons to the dismay of local fishermen.
665
 In late 
January 1943, even fishing during the day was forbidden, a decision that caused a flurry of 
protests among the local population, for the seafood industry was an important resource at a 
time of heavy rationing. The populace could not understand the rationale behind these 
regulations for, in the German Zone, fishing was still allowed during daylight hours.
666
 In the 
face of the protests, a week later, the Italian military authorities authorized fishing in the 
Mediterranean but with tight restrictions: the crews and the boats were inspected by Italian 
soldiers both upon departure and upon their return to harbor. Those few boats allowed to sail 
at night had to take Italian border guards with them.
667
 As time went by, Italian local 
commanders loosened the requirement in exchange for ten percent of the daily catch.
668
 
The agreements reached with the French fishing community did little, however, to 
lessen the impact of the Italian occupation, for the buttressing of the coast significantly 
altered the vista of the Côte d'Azur. The Italian army dotted the Combat Zone with capisaldi 
(strongholds) - fortified positions surrounded by minefields and barbed wire, packed with 
machine guns, mortars and anti-tank weapons, with a wide range of fire.
669
 The capisaldi 
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were the bulwark against any prospective Allied beachhead, intended to resist to the bitter 
end, even if surrounded by enemy forces. Not only ammunition, but provisions, water and 
sanitary supplies were stored in the event of a long siege. No French civilian was allowed to 
enter their premises, and the Italian military authorities started to evacuate the population 
living near the capisaldi both out of fear of possible spies, but also in dread of civilians 
getting in the way should the Allies strike.  
It is important to emphasize that the Italian forces chose to entrench themselves in the 
capisaldi out of necessity. A report from General Federico Romero, commander of the I CA, 
explained that the Italian army was forced to employ defensive tactics such as the P.O.C. 
(Posti di osservazione costiera or Coastal observation post), nuclei fissi (static groups) and 
capisaldi, because the scarce number of forces available did not allow it to otherwise 
effectively cover the whole coastal zone, in spite of the fact that the I CA had been reinforced 
in January with two coastal divisions and could also boast the flagship division of the Italian 
forces, the Legnano.
670
 As noted in December by General Vercellino, Supreme Commander 
of the Fourth Army, entering France had dangerously overstretched the Italian forces. The 
Italian army commanders were also skeptical about the effectiveness of this defensive 
network on the French Mediterranean coast. That was clear from the way in which the Italian 
forces rehearsed responses to mock Allied landing operations. As much emphasis was put on 
reinforcing the inland fortified positions and on coaching the reserve divisions to shore up 
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any leak in the Italian defenses, as on training units to man the capisaldi. In fact, General 
Romero found himself apologizing for the army maneuvers that seemed "in opposition to the 
faith that we have in the efficiency of the capisaldi," for the rehearsals assumed that the 
Allies would succeed in establishing a bridgehead. Nonetheless, he was also bluntly 
pragmatic, arguing that "the enemy could intensify its preparation and its push in the attack 
so as to almost completely eliminate and neutralize the efficiency and the resistance of any 
capisaldo." The Allies held complete mastery of the sea and the air in the Mediterranean 
theater, especially after their victory in Tunisia in May 1943. This advantage gave them the 
choice of the battleground. He also pointed out that the Axis had to dilute their defenses 
along thousands of kilometers of coastline, as the Allies' target for an attack could not be 
predicted. 
Romero was not the only Italian commander worried about the effectiveness of the 
Italian defensive network along the Mediterranean coastline. Much of the concern was over 
the quality of the capisaldis' construction. General Vercellino, after a tour of the Italian 
coastline defenses, scathingly noted that "the fieldworks carried out until now are more a 
testimony to the goodwill of the executors than the solidity of the fortifications." He 
described the fortifications as "fit at best to stand the sporadic incursions of a few airplanes 
or shots from light naval units, [but] they are bound to shatter under massive air 
bombardments, which could not be hindered by the modesty of our anti-aircraft defenses." 
He urged the units to dig the trenches deeper and to reinforce the bunkers with concrete 
walls. In addition, he wanted reserve units to be prepared to move quickly to relieve any 
pressure on capisaldi. His logic was that a wise use of reserves placed so as to swiftly 
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intervene at as many points as possible would go some way towards blunting the important 
strategic edge that the Allied forces enjoyed by having the freedom to choose the site of the 




If the Italian frontline of fortifications was still far from being completed in spring 
1943, the rear lines were in even worse condition. The Italians were worried about airborne 
troops parachuting behind the rear lines, linking up with French insurgents and sabotaging 
key infrastructure and roads. For this reason, the Fourth Army created the Nucleo 
antiparacadutisti (N.A.P. or Anti-Paratrooper Units), each consisting of forty soldiers 
commanded by an officer. Every NAP was given its own sector to patrol by either truck, 
motorcycle or bicycle. However, these second-line units were also second-rate units: their 
armament was extremely light (they were issued at most a few machineguns) and their roster 
was filled with the dregs of the Fourth Army. Not surprisingly, commanders of frontline units 
were loath to lose their best soldiers. Thus, when asked to contribute to the NAP, divisions 
sent artillery personnel, truck drivers, middle-aged men just to fill out the ranks. The latter 
category was especially unfit for units whose task of intercepting airborne troops required 
men capable of quick action and constant patrol.
672
 The inefficiency of the NAP reached 
embarrassing proportions: in some instances, NAP squads were not given even basic 
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equipment, such as machine-guns, or even the trucks needed to patrol.
673
 Besides having poor 
or insufficient equipment, NAP soldiers displayed an abysmal deficiency in military 
techniques while drilling: in one instance, it took one-and-a-half hours for a NAP unit to 
arrive at the scene of a prospective parachute landing, in part due to the fact that this 
particular NAP leader fell back asleep after the alarm was given.
674
  
The ineptness of the NAP was only the tip of the iceberg. The Italian occupation army 
as a whole was inherently weak both in terms of materiel and men. Fourth Army 
commanders struggled until the very end with insufficient rosters, inadequate armament and 
untrained soldiers. The frailty of the Fourth Army can be demonstrated best with an 
examination of the Division Legnano, both because it was reputed to be the best unit of the 
Italian occupation army and because its commanders, General Giovanni Marciani 
(November-December 1942) and General Roberto Olmi (December 1942-September 1943) 
were very outspoken in their criticism of it, while at the same time never failing to push their 
troops to better themselves.  
The two generals never failed to point out the chronic shortage of men. In fact, they 
disconsolately noted that they could only raise the number of troops in their division by 
drawing from other units in the Fourth Army.  Therefore, the fragile blanket of the Italian 
occupation army was always pulled in different directions, laying bare one or more services 
at any one time.  In December 1942, General Marciani gave orders to his subordinate 
commanders to keep the crews in the fortifications and guarding arms depots to a bare 
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minimum, as more manpower was required for the mobile units patrolling the coastline.
675
 A 
more equitable redistribution of forces was nothing more than wishful thinking. A few 
months later, the new Legnano commander General Olmi, admitted that no soldier could be 
moved from coastline outposts because local commanders had been given orders to defend 
the coastline "with feet in the water" ("piedi nell'acqua"). In other words, the Italian army 
was expected by the Italian Supreme Command to make a stand on the beaches of the 
Mediterranean. But this was not even enough, as the coastline units actually needed extra 
soldiers to man the French artillery posts and the Hotchkiss machine-guns which had been 
withdrawn from the armistice depots. Italian artillery units and non-combat personnel were 
not faring any better. The Legnano division found itself required to improvise training 
courses for both radio operators and truck drivers as it was seriously short of trained men for 
both positions.
676
 Ultimately, local Italian commanders were compelled to use soldiers from 
reserve units for important chores such as guarding armistice depots, patrolling city streets 
and anti-paratrooper activities (NAP). The division commander concluded alarmingly that 
this meant that the reserve units thus cannibalized would be unable to back up frontline 
divisions in the event of an Allied assault.
677
 The transfer of manpower from one army 
service to the other was merely robbing Peter to pay Paul.  
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To add insult to injury, the average soldiers' training and morale left much to be 
desired. Even one month after their deployment to France, soldiers had a hard time orienting 
themselves in the new territory and easily got lost. Officers lacked even a basic knowledge of 
the procedures for calling for support from the artillery or reserves.
678
 One of the criticisms 
leveled against the rank-and-file and officers alike was their excessive search for comfort, to 
the point that it impacted negatively on the effectiveness of the Italian fortification network. 
For instance, the locations of regiments' or battalions' headquarters were sometimes too far 
from their batteries or units, as commanders preferred to stay in more cozy, inland positions 
than in weather-beaten locations near the coastline.
679
 In some instances, officers and soldiers 
agreed to place their lodgings as far as possible from one another in order not "to hamper 
each other's freedom." In other words, at least some officers were turning a blind eye to the 
irregular behavior of their subordinates just as they themselves did not abide by the rules.
680
 
Vercellino was appalled, for example, to discover that many soldiers were idling about on 
1942 New Year's Eve and on the first of January, justifying their laziness with the excuse that 
the period was a holiday in Italy in normal times.
681
 More importantly, soldiers were the first 
to break the curfews established by the local commanders. Unarmed privates were caught 
strolling in town on days when all leave had been suspended for security reasons after 
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 and officers often failed to return to their barracks after evening curfew, 
preferring to stay with civilians in movie theaters or bars.
683
  
The sloppiness in discipline worsened the gaping holes in the Italian security 
network. Soldiers were ordered by their commanders to stop civilians from taking pictures 
near Italian military camps and beach fortifications. However, it appears that soldiers were 
not only allowing passersby to take pictures in the vicinity of the Italian military sites, but 
they even encouraged civilians to include them in the pictures.
684
 That is not to say that 
civilians were not taken into custody if they were caught taking pictures while lurking around 
military premises. However, soldiers were so unfamiliar with cameras that, in some cases, 
they exposed the film to the sun by awkwardly opening the box without the due precautions, 
thereby rendering the film unusable as proof of possible crimes.
685
 
Moreover, even a casual glance at the transcripts of Italian military court trials reveals 
the Italian sentries' failure to stay focused on their tasks. Soldiers were found guilty of 
"abandonment of post or violation of orders," mostly to indulge in vices such as drunkenness 
and sex. Soldiers could not resist, it seemed, the appeal of bars and women even while on 
guard duty.
686
 Sometimes, their absence hid darker motivations: one sentry exploited his 
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position as guard at a railway station to steal from the railcars.
687
 In another instance, the 
sentry abandoned his sentry post to sexually harass a small child.
688
 Leaving his rifle behind 
to urinate a few meters from the sentry post could get a soldier into serious trouble.
689
 
Sometimes, foul weather undermined a soldier's will to stay on duty: a soldier was 
discovered by his captain repairing the leaking roof of the sentry post. In another instance, 
two sentries guarding an army vehicle depot took shelter during a rainstorm in a truck instead 
of staying in the tent which served as sentry post.
690
 Military authorities ruthlessly punished 
every little infraction. 
This negligence was reflected in the shoddy carriage of the soldier of the Fourth 
Army. Local commanders were extremely condemnatory of their underlings' appearance. For 
instance, a report of Colonel Caputo, Commander of the Frejus sector, a subunit of the 
Legnano division, ruefully reported that some soldiers left the collar of their military shirts 
open, as they argued that the collar was too tight to be buttoned up. Moreover, their uniforms 
were messy and threadbare; tunics and trousers dusty and sometimes even stained; belts hung 
loose. Even worse, they strolled around with their hands in their pockets. What was more 
appalling, though, was the indifference of the officers who witnessed this lack of discipline. 
Colonel Caputo angrily wrote that "not even one, and I do mean not one of the several 
officers who were present stepped in to point out the faults."
691
 In fact, NCO and junior 
officers were sometimes the first to offend, especially with regards to their interactions with 
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women. Vercellino's report especially condemned those officers who chastised Italian 
privates for frivolous relations while being themselves incautious in their affairs.
692
  
Vercellino's diatribe needs to set in context. The Fourth Army's general and 
commanders were not bothered by the moral questions raised by the troops having 
relationships with local women, if they were limited to simple sexual gratification. A 
reflection of their male chauvinism, they felt soldiers were entitled to "physiological 
satisfaction of sexual needs (soddisfazione fisiologica delle necessità sessuali)."
693
 In fact, a 
military chaplain ruefully commented that "a very impressive immorality is pervasive; kindly 
souls, in the face of the appeal of sex forget their dearest family ties (affetti più cari), their 
most intimate bonds (vincolo più intimo), [and even] their more important duties."
694
 Thus, 
the army commanders tolerated the use of brothels, which were carefully divided between 
those reserved to officers and those for the rest of the army.
695
 Sometimes, the brothels were 
shared with the French populace, but in those instances in order to avoid dangerous 
confrontations, certain timeslots would be reserved for the Italians.
696
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Obviously, prostitution was practiced not only in brothels, but in hotels and even 
private houses.
697
 However, Italian military authorities openly discouraged relationships 
outside brothels for two reasons. First of all, they feared the spread of venereal disease 
among the ranks of the Regio Esercito and, to avoid this, prostitutes in brothels were required 
to undergo periodic examinations by Italian army doctors.
698
 This would have been 
impossible to manage for those prostitutes operating outside of the brothels.  
Secondly, the senior officers of the Italian army were afraid that love affairs would 
cement into stable relationships. This was frowned upon both on the grounds that it was 
morally inappropriate for Italian officers to be seen in public with women of an enemy 
nationality, but also for security reasons. Between the sheets, Italian soldiers and officers 
could easily blurt out confidential information. Pillow talk was dangerous. Therefore, Italian 
generals did not hesitate to use heavy-handed tactics to cut off any temptation. For instance, 
one Navy officer in Cannes fell in love with a Brazilian dancer and moved into her 
apartment. The two made no effort to keep their relationship secret. This brazen act was too 
much for the local Italian commander.
699
 The Navy officer was transferred to another city 
and his lover placed under house arrest in a small inland village.
700
 In fact, the Italian military 
police suspected the Brazilian dancer of being part of a Resistance network whose members 
were being carefully monitored by the Italian counterespionage operation. Italian fears were 
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not entirely groundless it seems. In at least one instance, a soldier, who befriended an Italian 
woman, came to believe that she was part of a Resistance network. He set out one evening to 
spy on her and was beaten, apparently by members of the Resistance, as a warning.
701
  
The loquaciousness of the average soldier, however, was not confined to the 
bedrooms of squalid bordellos or to the comfortable bed of sultry women. Officers and 
soldiers of the Regio Esercito were just as careless in public spaces such as streets, plazas 
and public transportation.
702
 An enemy spy confessed while being interrogated by the Italian 
police that he had obtained key information on the Italian war situation merely by 
overhearing the conversation of two Italian officers in a train compartment.
703
 Furthermore, it 
is evident members of the Italian occupation army took few precautions to safeguard military 
intelligence. As a matter of fact, officers used the French telephone network extensively to 
communicate between units. Not only were their conversations taped, but, in some cases, 
Italian officers used the phone in French police offices, where French gendarmes could easily 
eavesdrop on their conversations. Vichy officials apparently were not the only ones who had 
access to Italian communications; the Resistance had allegedly installed wiretaps on Italian 
military telephone lines.
704
 The lack of discretion was not limited to slips in front of the local 
populace. In December 1942, the Italian War Ministry deplored the "careless loquaciousness 
(loquacita' imponderata) of soldiers, who discuss and talk with relatives and friends about 
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directives issued by Italian military authorities, causing serious damage to the security of 
military intelligence."
705
 It appeared that soldiers in France had few qualms about spreading 
alarming news through the post. In a probable effort to make the account of the invasion 
more dramatic than it was in reality, one Alpine soldier quartered in Savoy wrote at the 
beginning of December 1942 to his family that "it has been one week that we have been 
fighting the French; they are giving us a good thrashing (botte da orbi), ... [the unit 
quartered] in Val Cenischia has already suffered sixty or more casualties."
706
 Officers were 
also rebuked for the verbosity of their reports. General Olmi, the commander of the Legnano 
Division, complained in his usual direct style that important documents with vital 
information on Italian strategy had trickled down even to small outposts headed by junior 
officers. Olmi rightly asserted that the red letterhead Segreto (Secret) or Riservato Personale 
(Reserved for the commanding officer) "did not guarantee in itself [that the] directive would 
remain private." The situation was made worse by the tendency, the General complained, of 
local commanders to fob off onerous or tedious tasks to their underlings by passing orders on 
the formulaic instruction, "assicurazione" ("make it so").
707
  
If the Regio Esercito failed to ensure the protection of military intelligence, they also 
did a generally dismal job in securing the main roadways in southern France. The Italian 
army, owing to the large extension of its occupied territory coupled with an insufficient 
number of soldiers, established checkpoints only on the arterial roads. These checkpoints 
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were manned by a squad of six soldiers, led by a non-commissioned officer, one interpreter 
of the Regio Esercito, one Italian carabiniere (Italian military police) and one French 
gendarme, whose presence was important if only to ensure that no violation was committed 
by the Italian soldiers.
708
 The Italian directive in fact explicitly stated that the gendarme 
"should not check either the travelers or the cargo in the car, but only attend and facilitate the 
check." However, to the dismay of local commanders, some Italian NCOs, out of laziness, 
permitted the French gendarmes to overstep their bounds and actively check inside cars as 
well as identification papers.
709
 In fact, the Italian carabiniere sometimes forgot to check 
identification papers, contenting himself with looking only at the travel documents.
710
 Once 
again, criticism on the part of the Italian army's higher echelons highlighted the excessive 
nonchalance of the Italian soldier in France when checking cars. "(L)eniency and 
effeminacy" which translated into "smiles, bows and ceremonies" were deemed 




Sometimes, this "effeminacy" hid a disconcerting naiveté. One carabiniere failed to 
inspect inside a truck as he took the Red Cross emblem at face value.
712
 This gullibility 
assumed grotesque proportions in January 1943, when an unscheduled German plane landed 
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in an airport guarded by the Italians. The German pilots justified their emergency landing by 
blaming their poor navigational skills, for they had lost their way in French airspace. They 
replenished the plane's tanks and took off after a few hours. A terrible doubt crept in the 
soldiers' mind as they remembered that the pilots had drawn a sketch of the camp. Later, the 
Italians were dismayed to find out that no such plane or crew existed in the German 
records.
713
    
This last episode underscored the paramount danger of enemy intelligence-gathering 
which faced every occupation army. Italian commanders incessantly reminded their 
subordinates that Allied spies could easily mask their real identity behind Italian or German 
uniforms. Thus sentinels were expected to check the identification papers of every unfamiliar 
officer, no matter the grade. However, the army warned, even papers could be falsified, and 
therefore, guards had the right to question the officers and, if doubt subsisted, to report them 
to their command.
714
 However, it appears that not only did soldiers fail to check papers, but 
they also had the disconcerting habit of disclosing military information to unfamiliar officers 
without even checking their identity.
715
 Yet, there was more here than merely the NCOs' and 
rank-and-file's carelessness and lack of motivation. Italian soldiers regarded their officers 
with a reverential awe which sometimes bordered on outright submissiveness. When 
sentinels or junior officers asked for papers, they were sometimes chastised by Italian 
officers who haughtily refused to comply. This issue became so recurrent that the head of the 
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Fourth Army General Vercellino publicly disciplined a senior officer for having denied his 




This snobbish attitude coupled with the abovementioned appalling laxity in the 
officer corps in part explains the ineffectiveness of the Italian occupation army. A serious 
gulf had developed between the Regio Esercito officers and their underlings, due to the 
privileges enjoyed by the officer corps, at a time when the rank-and-file was coping with a 
sudden decrease in their standard of living. In a circular issued on 25 January 1943 and 
widely distributed to all the officers of the Italian occupation army, Vercellino sternly 
rebuked his officers as he noticed the "little interest officers bore in the continuous and 
overwhelming needs of their soldiers" on one hand, and the "double standards" (due pesi e 
due misure) between officers and soldiers in terms of the conditions of service on the other 
hand. Vercellino singled out the most flagrant double standards:  
When wine distribution is erratic or inadequate, it irritates the soldier to see the van of 
the officers' mess full of bottles and flasks pass through. When the tobacco distribution is 
inadequate and the canteen has none, it irritates the soldier to see the officer light cigarettes, 
one after another. When strategic reasons, or simply railway traffic, call for a limitation on 
leaves, it irritates the soldier to see the officer sent on leave because "the use of a few seats in 
first class carriages does not hamper the service." When you remove from the senior soldier, 
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who is far from his family, the possibility of seeing his relatives, oftentimes it irritates to see 
young officers show off the conquest of venal women.
717
   
 
The flagrant disparity between officers and soldiers in the Regio Esercito was 
certainly not limited to the Fourth Army. In August 1941, the War Ministry issued a directive 
to inquire about the possibility of adopting a common ration and distribution system, not only 
for units operating on the frontline, but for all the units in the field. A fairer food distribution 
system, it was thought, would help strengthen the bond between the officer corps and the 
soldiers.
718
 The result was disappointing. All officers agreed that on the frontline the officers' 
mess was a luxury that could not be guaranteed. Indeed, in the North African and Greek 
campaigns, officers of frontline units tended to eat the same rations of their soldiers for 
logistical reasons, as it would have been too problematic to distribute separate menus. 
However, the majority of the officer corps fiercely rejected the proposal, generally for 
specious reasons. First of all, they argued that the soldiers themselves reacted oddly to seeing 
officers eating at their mess. The presence of their own officers made them uncomfortable. 
Soldiers were so amazed by the novelty that some thought that it was a part of a collective 
punishment inflicted on to the officer corps for the campaign's poor results. Furthermore, the 
generals feared that eating together might lead to "excessive familiarity and loss of prestige" 
and would put at risk the officers' esprit de corps. Secondly, the hierarchical rationing system 
was instrumental "in putting the officer in the physical and psychological condition necessary 
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for the accomplishment of his difficult task" and was therefore needed "for the purpose of the 
officers' morale." As General Balocco, commander of the Fifth Army Corps pointed out: 
[the privileged ration system] would prevent dietary dysfunctions stemming from the 
fact that cadres, most of them reserve officers, are accustomed, due to their [sedentary] life of 
study and office, to a light and brain tonic (tonica-nervina) diet, easily digestible and with 
little fat, while the soldier-farmer or blue collar loves rich and fatty staples (large quantities 
of bread, bacon, stew).  
In truth, the officers had a point when they argued that eating at the same time as the 
soldiers would disrupt the officers' daily administrative chores, which conflicted with the 
soldiers' dinner hour, but one gets the impression that the Regio Esercito cadres were also 
just not ready to give up their privileges. In other words, the Italian army was still nurturing 
an officer caste mentality, stemming from the Bourbon army, which was completely 
counterproductive in the 1940s.
 719
  
This was in marked contrast to the Regio Esercito's partner, the Wehrmacht, which 
stressed the necessity of creating a strong bond between officer and soldier, called 
Kameradschaft, a bond which went beyond the simple acceptance of military hierarchical 
authority.
720
 The Italians were amazed to see that German units trained with their 
commanders, who led the rank-and-file in the attack. More importantly, the Italians were 
                                                     
719 All quotes from ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, 
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 Perhaps the comparison with the Wehrmacht could, in part, explain why discontent 
was spreading through the Italian ranks. An artilleryman of the 48
th
 Regiment of the Taro 
Division openly vented his anger that the mess rations of the regiment were not on par with 
those of the regiment's command. Only the strong intervention on the part of the commander 
of the soldier's battery prevented the situation from degenerating into open rebellion.
722
 
Tensions between officers and troops sometimes escalated into open insubordination. 
Sometimes, soldiers went so far as to threaten higher-ranking officers with death, most of the 
time while under the influence of alcohol.
723
 In a few isolated cases, soldiers had no qualms 
about coming to blows. A gunner of the 58° Artillery Regiment of the Legnano Division 




It is interesting to note that the gunner was sentenced only to thirty years of prison, a 
relatively mild sentence for the murder of a non-commissioned officer. The explanation 
reflected the cardinal importance of the value of the family in Italy, especially with regards to 
the figure of the mother. The military court had recognized extenuating circumstances on the 
grounds that insulting his mother was a severe provocation, especially for a soldier from 
                                                     
721 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Unsigned report "Relazione sulle unità tedesche in transito nel territorio del corpo d'armata," 20 August 1943. 
The ten-page report bears the seal of the I CA, and was probably edited by a Commander of one the last units 
which stayed in France until the 8 September Italian Armistice with the Allies. 
722 AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 83, n°2932 del processo, 1 April 1943. 
723 See for instance the case of Luigi M. of the Legnano Division, who on Christmas Day, threatened to kill his 
unit Commander with hand grenades. AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 83, n°2863 del 
processo, 2 April 1943. 
724 AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 83, n°3561 del processo, 28 February 1943. 
 
 265 
Southern Italy. In another similar episode, a lieutenant who had punched a soldier twice for 
calling the officer's mother a whore, got his sentence reduced by two-thirds. The military 
court acknowledged that the accused had justification for his violent act as the soldier had 
uttered his insult in the Neapolitan dialect in front of regiment's soldiers, most of whom were 
from Naples.
725
 In addition, military courts seemed to be far more lenient with officers than 
with privates. In March 1943, a lieutenant repeatedly punched a private who had refused to 
lend him a deck of cards. What is informative about this episode was not only the arrogance 
of the officer, who had overstepped his authority to demand a personal belonging from a 
subordinate, but also the fact that at first the unit command had tried to downplay the 
incident and blame the soldier. In fact, only the overwhelming number of witnesses forced 
the upper echelons to act and even then, the officer was sentenced only to four months.
726
  
   Conversely, any insubordination by the rank-and-file was perceived as an attack on 
the Italian occupation army as a body and was severely dealt with. The simple act of 
insulting an officer could get the fante into serious trouble: Romano V. of the Taro Division 
was sentenced to four years of prison for having slandered his officer by calling him 
"cornuto" ("bastard") in front of his fellows.
727
 Soldiers were aware of the untouchable aura 
surrounding the officer corps. In a telltale episode, an alpine soldier of the 20° 
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726 AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 84, n°3543 del processo, 27 May 1943. 
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Raggruppamento Alpini Sciatori, Giuseppe L., menacingly yelled to his unit commander that 
"Only mountains stand still, we will meet [after the war] in civilian clothes."
728
  
From these examples, one could get the impression that the Regio Esercito was an 
institution rife with tension between officers and soldiers, weakened by a serious lack of 
discipline. This can be overstated. The Italian army, and the Fourth Army in particular, had 
many officers who proved not only qualified, but also concerned about the well-being of 
their subordinates. For instance, a 223° Coastal Division captain lent some soldiers of his 
unit to local farmers to use as laborers. All the wages were reinvested in buying four sheep, 
as well as staples at the army canteen. The food was split equally among the soldiers and the 
officers to augment the daily rations, with a special allocation to those who had worked.
729
 In 
another example, a battalion commander complained about the transfer of two of his most 
able junior officers to another unit. The commander explained that the officers were "most 




Thus, there were officers, and not isolated cases, who were conscientiously fulfilling 
the responsibilities. They faced a daunting task in keeping the soldiers' attention riveted on 
the war at a time when the frontline seemed thousands of kilometers away and the luscious 
                                                     
728 AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 84, n°3671 del processo, 25 May 1943. 
729 The captain was formally prosecuted by his Commander because business with civilians was strictly 
forbidden unless authorized by division Commanders, but upon discovering that the captain did not intend to 
speculate with the goods, but on the contrary, redistributed the proceeds fairly, the 223° Coastal Division 
Commander decided to drop any disciplinary measures. ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, 
National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 268, IT 3102, Rapporto n°31 R.U. "Inchiesta disciplinare a carico del 
Capitano D. del 512° Bt Territoriale Mobile," 4 April 1943. 
730 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 268, IT 3102, 
Rapporto n°386 R.U. "Sottotenente L. Gaetano," 28 July 1943. The episode occurred in an Alpine unit and it is 
well known that Alpini soldiers and officers bonded more than any other unit in the Regio Esercito. 
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landscape of the Côte d'Azur lulled them into complacency.
731
 To bolster the men's fighting 
spirit, Italian commanders of elite divisions made much of the reputation of their units. Upon 
his arrival in November 1942 at the head of the Legnano Division, General Marciani issued a 
directive to be read to all Legnano soldiers that emphasized the major battles fought by the 
two major regiments, the 67
th




 Officers headed reading groups that analyzed 
newspapers and Italian agency news with the goal of reinforcing the Fascist propaganda.  
Italian commanders however acknowledged that they needed to do much more than 
simply insist on Italian military traditions or praise the Fascist regime to boost the Italian 
soldiers' morale. Stranded far away from the front but also from his family, the fante risked 
falling into apathy. Therefore, the MINCULPOP sent to France not only Italian or German 
propaganda documentary reels, but also light-hearted movies to be played using motion-
picture cameras mounted on trucks (autocinema) or in French movie theaters rented by the 
Italian army.
733
 Each Army Corps created its own musical band which travelled from unit to 
unit, performing concerts and comedy shows. Hobbies such as chess, draughts and cards 
were openly encouraged among the rank-and-file, while intra-division football or bocce 
tournaments enjoyed wide success.
734
 Furthermore, the Italian army supplied Fourth Army 
                                                     
731 AUSSME, DS 1102, Rapporto n°1245/07 "Mentalità combattiva integrale," Comando XXII CA, Diario Storico 
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732AUSSME, DS 989, Ordine del Giorno Comando Divisione Legnano, Diario Storico Divisione Fanteria Legnano, 
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The army thus partially contained the loss of morale experienced by the Italian 
soldiers in France by enhancing their leisure options and bolstering a sense of community 
within units. Yet, one should not be overly optimistic. No embellished newssheet could hide 
the appalling string of defeats that had occurred since the beginning of the war. The Battle of 
the Alps, the North African campaign and the invasion of Greece were indelible stains on the 
Regio Esercito's World War Two record, nor were they counterbalanced by any significant 
victory. A war that had been incessantly touted as the war that would lead to the rebirth of 
the Italian nation had become a desperate defense of the motherland. Beginning in late 1942, 
the tide of war had decidedly changed and Italy was looking more like a cornered dog than a 
defiant lion. After Operation Torch, the Allies had taken control of the entire North African 
coastline except for Tunisia, which eventually fell in May 1943. After that, they dominated 
the Mediterranean Sea and openly threatened Sicily.  
The major consequence of this reversal in national fortune for the soldiers was that 
army leaves became increasingly difficult to obtain. At the beginning of 1943, leaves became 
available once again, a decision the military command made explicitly to boost the morale of 
the Italian troops abroad. Some men had not seen their homes for at least a year. 
Unfortunately, the decision had one significantly damaging effect. Soldiers who had been led 
by the military censorship to believe that the home front had been spared by the war, were 
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shocked to see first-hand the great economic difficulties experienced by their families and the 
devastation of the Allied bombing attacks. The plummeting of the Italians' standards of 
living, which had been expunged from official Fascist reports and newspapers, instantly 
became common knowledge among the rank-and-file. Upon their return to France, soldiers 




In fact, the Italian Supreme Command decided in spring 1943 once again to cancel all 
leaves for Sicilian and Sardinian soldiers. This drastic measure was issued because rumors of 
an imminent Allied invasion of Sardinia and Sicily were running rampant. The two islands 
had been fortified and declared operations zones, which meant the Italian army had to seal 
their borders. Moreover, the Italian army command feared that Sicilian and Sardinian soldiers 
would desert en masse if given the opportunity to get back home. This decision, however, 
fuelled anger and resentment among the soldiers. Some went so far as to forge documents 
that reported dying relatives in order to get permission to visit their families. Others simply 
deserted.  
Desertions were certainly facilitated by the proximity of the Italian peninsula and the 
porosity of the Franco-Italian border. Moreover, most soldiers who deserted did so while in 
Italy, using their leaves as an opportunity to vanish into the countryside, sometimes shielded 
by relatives and friends. Yet, desertions never became an endemic problem. Records of the 
Fourth Army show that there was only a steady trickle, even in 1943, averaging sixty 
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desertions every two months, roughly one desertion per day over the whole period. What is 
more, the statistics included the cases of soldiers who had returned late from their leaves. 
These men were generally punished for a short period and then reintegrated in their units. 
Nonetheless, the possible impact of these acts of insubordination on the overall morale of the 
rank-and-file cannot be dismissed. The evolution of the attitude of the Italian military leaders 
is enlightening to this regard. At the beginning of the conflict, the Comando Supremo did not 
fully grasp the long-term implications of the multiple desertions and their policy was 
therefore very lenient. The Duce's proclamation of 20 June 1940 indicated that sentences of 
ten years or less for any criminal offence would be postponed until the end of the war. This 
lax policy was reinforced by another decree, issued on 9 July 1940, which widened the use of 
suspended sentences, even for desertion, provided the soldier did not defect to the enemy.
737
 
This was in marked contrast to the policy of ruthless disciplinary action for any form of 
insubordination in the First World War. Giorgio Rochat, a leading Italian military historian, 
suggests that because Mussolini and his generals believed in June 1940 that the war would 
end in a few months, they thought that suspending the sentences would keep the soldiers of 
the Regio Esercito focused on the war. As time went by, however, they became worried 
about the mounting resentment of the soldiers of a war poorly led and the growing list of 
failed campaigns. Thus, the protraction of the global conflict forced the Italian army to 
enforce stricter rules. Offenses were suspended only if their sentences did not exceed three 
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years, and thus, desertions, which were punished with between five and fifteen years, were 
automatically excluded from any suspension.
738
  
In truth, the morale of the German army was also worsening. But the German 
commanders had a considerable advantage compared to their Italian counterparts. The 
Wehrmacht could boast striking successes against Poland, in Scandinavia and against France. 
Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda made sure to capitalize on these triumphs throughout the 
war. Furthermore, the German commanders never failed to underline the differences between 
the German and Italian campaigns. This contempt was expressed even at the rank-and-file 
level. In fact, news was leaking that the Axis front in Russia was crumbling, and that the 
relations with the Wehrmacht had become stormy, if not downright hostile. In the laconic 
words of a Fourth Army bulletin, "the support of the Germans for our troops was not what 
would have been reasonable to expect."
739
 This lack of cooperation also shaped the French 
theater of war. The Delegazione Trasporti Militari (Military Transport Delegation) which 
was in charge of the transportation and distribution of Italian military goods in France felt the 
sting of ostracism at the hand of the Germans, in addition to the uncooperative attitude of 
French railway workers. In particular, members of the Organisation Todt, the German 
construction firm in charge of building the Atlantic Wall, requisitioned French locomotives 
which had been leased to the Italian army, allowing the Italians to use them for only a limited 
time at the end of each day.  
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 AUSSME, DS 1218, Rapporto n°1106 "Relazione del servizio "A" del mese di febbraio 1943," Comando 
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In light of this situation, it is not surprising that relations between German and Italian 
soldiers were at best ones of "mutual respect, but without familiarity."
740
 To add insult to 
injury, Italian soldiers openly complained that German pay was much higher than theirs.
741
 
This disparity, on top of the already strained relations between the regular troops and their 
officers, was aggravated by the fact that the soldiers of the Fourth Army inexplicably were 
not receiving the special allowance generally given by the Italian army to troops of units 
quartered outside national territory.
742
 Thus, they could save very little money to send to their 
own families or to pay for extra food and staples at the unit canteen. Eventually, the protests 
paid off, but only to a degree. Fourth Army soldiers were granted extra money in June 1943, 




In essence, the strategic worsening of the Italian campaign, the deterioration of the 
Axis entente both at state and at grassroots levels, in addition to the material conditions of the 
average Italian soldier cast an ominous shadow across the overall morale of the Fourth Army. 
In March 1943, a local commander alarmingly reported that "many Italian soldiers, while 
talking with French civilians in shops, quickly confessed to tiredness or even of 
demoralization," because they had been serving continuously since the beginning of the 
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 Cracks in the Italian army's morale were so widespread that even French 
authorities could not help noticing them. A member of the Renseignements Généraux who 
watched the screening of an Italian Luce newsreel in the courtyard of the nearby Italian 
barracks from his apartment's balcony noted that the appearance of the Duce on screen did 
not spark even a single cheer or any applause.
745
 In June 1943, the French police in Digne 
were quick to record that the walls of the Regio Esercito barracks were tagged with graffiti 
such as "Duce, Vogliamo pasta suta pano (sic), vino e congedo." (Duce, we want pasta, 
bread, wine and discharge).
746
   
Food, its quality and quantity, became a recurrent complaint in every single report of 
Fourth Army commanders for the whole occupation period. In a scathing report, General 
Vercellino neatly summed up the cahiers de doléances submitted by his local commanders. 
Bread "shows up poorly baked or preserved, ... the quantity of the individual bread ration is 
not always honored, ... the wine is sometimes undrinkable, and the tobacco distribution is 
lagging."
747
 The General's ire was aimed at the Fourth Army Intendenza (Service Corps) for 
failing to provide even the most basic staples. The reply from the head of the Fourth Army 
Service Corps was immediate. General Raffaello Operti excused his underlings, stating that 
the poor quality of the bread and wine was due to the inherent deficiencies of the Italian 
military transportation network. For lack of gas and trucks, most of the staples had to be 
shipped via train. Thus, the distribution bottlenecked at the French-Italian border, as the only 
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railway line linking northwestern Italy to the Côte d'Azur, the Genova-Mentone-Nice-
Marseille, became overcrowded and was often the target of the Allied bombing campaign. 
This slowed down the distribution of food significantly, so much so that the bread had to be 
baked in a special way to ensure it did not deteriorate before reaching the troops. This 
process meant, however, that the resulting bread was of poor quality, something about which 
the troops constantly complained.
748
  
Operti's report also hinted that the supply issue was not just due to disruption by 
Allied bombers, but also due the fragile Italian economy: "Italy is a poor country and did not 
become richer on 11 November." Indeed, the disarray of the Fourth Army mirrored the 
breakdown of the Italian economy. The Italian populace was hit hard by the war. The conflict 
had already reduced salaries to subsistence level and starvation threatened great numbers of 
people, especially city dwellers. In March 1943, widespread strikes broke out in major 
centers in northern Italy, the heart of the Italian industrial region. As a consequence, Italian 
military authorities were unable to reliably supply their troops. Wine was unavailable for 
weeks, as were other diverse goods such as radios, razor blades and soap.
749
 Soldiers' socks 
and boots were already worn down by years of war, as the Italian army had lacked the 
material to repair or replace the threadbare uniforms. Even soldiers coming as reinforcements 
in December 1942 lacked rations, uniforms and even, in some cases, weapons.
750
 The 
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situation had become drastic. Italian soldiers resorted to begging local civilians for food and, 
in some cases, to outright theft.
751
  
Compounding the problems created by the severely dysfunctional nature of the Italian 
army supply system, the local French economy was incapable of filling the gap. A report 
from the Legnano division officer in April 1943 provides an effective synthesis of the 
harrowing food shortages experienced in southern France during the Italian occupation. The 
report underlined the underdevelopment of agricultural production in a region where all the 
pre-war investment had focused on building tourism infrastructure. Thus, the agricultural 
output could not cover the regional needs. Everything from flour to vegetables, from hay to 
meat, had to be imported from the interior. In addition, the local distribution network had 
been severely disrupted by the war. Thus, the officer warned, there was no "possibility, in 
case of emergency, of exploiting local resources." On the contrary, if there was a complete 
interruption of food distribution "the local population would, in a matter of days, lack 




The Italian army report was not exaggerating. Indeed, the Fourth Army decision to 
rely on French food producers to feed its soldiers contributed considerably to the depletion of 
the already meager food supplies in the region. Unquestionably, Vichy's Ravitaillement 
services were certainly not able to keep up with the rations allocated. At the top of the food 
chain, farmers were increasingly confronted with serious impediments to production, ranging 
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from shortages of fertilizer and seeds, to a lack of oil and gas for their agricultural equipment. 
It certainly did not help that 1942 and 1943 suffered extensive droughts in both the spring 
and the summer seasons. Moreover, the rural communities complained about the strict price 
controls imposed on dairy products, at a time when the war was driving up the prices of raw 
materials dramatically. Not surprisingly, the peasants were not motivated to sell their goods 
to the Vichy Ravitaillement services which bought at prices fixed at a level that did not even 
cover the farmers' basic expenses. Thus, farmers sold their goods on the black market or 
bartered them.
753
 The situation in 1943 in the major cities had become nothing short of 
drastic. Vegetables such as tomatoes and onions disappeared from market stalls, and only the 
cheapest ones, such as Jerusalem artichokes (topinambours) and cabbage, remained 
available. Even these were becoming a rarity: cauliflower was cut in small parts to meet 
everyone's ration ticket. Dairy products such as milk and butter became a rarity, fresh fruit 
was nowhere to be found, nor was olive oil; tickets for matières grasses were worth nothing 
more than the paper on which they were printed. Weekly rations of meat in Nice fell to 
ninety grams, bones included.
754
 
When people did manage to get something, it was not uncommon to discover to their 
dismay that the quality of the goods was abysmal: sausages and cold cuts turned black within 
hours of being sold and local authorities reported several cases of food poisoning.
755
 The 
appalling state of the food supply stemmed not just from the disrupted food distribution 
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network, but was also due to the outright dishonesty of some shopkeepers and producers. 
One of the most common offences discovered by the Direction de la répression des fraudes 
was the adulteration of goods. Dishonest shopkeepers fobbed off watered down milk (lait 
mouillé) as natural cow's milk and sour wine (vin piqué) as red wine. Vichy inspectors 
became so concerned about the black market that every good sold was required to have its 
price tag attached. This measure did not stop some merchants from using counterfeit tags on 
their products: artificially-colored water was passed off as orange or lemon juice and articles 
of clothing were tagged as silk when they contained none. In some extreme cases, the staples 
were outright toxic: bread was made with ashes or even sawdust to increase its weight.
756
  
Fraud was not confined to the French Free Zone. The XV CA military tribunal, whose 
jurisdiction encompassed the territory occupied by the Italian army in June 1940, also 
prosecuted Menton inhabitants for "selling adulterated goods." The Italian authorities were so 
intent on eradicating illegal practices at a time when heavy rationing was established in the 
Italian peninsula, that they even charged Fascist militants. In May 1943, two Mentonese 
women, both registered as members of the PNF, were sentenced to a hefty fine for watered-
down milk.
757
 The same fate befell a shopkeeper who sold watered-down wine in July 
1943.
758
 Menton shared in the usual array of scams linked to food rationing found in the 
Second World War period: one common fraud consisted of putting hidden brass weights on 
                                                     
756 A summary of the 1942 frauds is in ADAM 157 W 29. 
757 ACS, Tribunali militari di guerra e tribunali militari territoriali di guerra: Seconda Guerra Mondiale (1939-
1945), Tribunale Militare XV Corpo D'Armata, Volume XIV, processo n°260 Luiga R. and Yvonne G., 6 May 
1943. 
758
 ACS, Tribunali militari di guerra e tribunali militari territoriali di guerra: Seconda Guerra Mondiale (1939-
1945), Tribunale Militare XV Corpo D'Armata, Volume XV, processo n°993 Carlo M., 27 July 1943. 
 
 278 
the pan of the scales when the food was weighed;
759
 another was to sell liquor without a 
permit.
760
 But the most common one remained selling staples far above the legal price.
761
 
In light of this situation, the "have-nots," most of them city dwellers, vented their 
frustration at a number of targets. Farmers were the first scapegoats. Antagonism between 
urban and rural inhabitants was not new to France, but it reached new heights in these times 
of dire restrictions. In June 1943, an exasperated retired grocery owner, Emile G., picked up 
pen and paper and wrote to the prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes to denounce the black market 
network that existed between the city and the countryside. He wrote that "the producers, in 
light of the growing presence of clients and the advantage of selling their wares directly at 
their farms, without costs, at unlimited prices, disregard any taxes or state regulations, and 
desert city markets, hence the absence of staples in the city."
762
 The population's anger was 
echoed by the Prefect of the Basses-Alpes, Marcel Delpeyrou, one of the rural departments 
expected to feed the Côte d'Azur. In his monthly reports, the prefect never failed to mention 
the severe disruption of the food distribution network, in part due to the illegal market 
fostered by cattle breeders and grain producers, both groups openly hostile to Vichy's price 
policy.
763
 The population's anger was not limited to the farmers, but also directed against 
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another category of food producers, the fishermen. In April 1943, the Antibes police accused 
the fishermen of withholding a considerable part of their daily catch for the black market.
764
  
The same report warned that the population was also angry with the government for 
failing to provide sufficient food to the "have nots" and to crush the black market. 
Spontaneous demonstrations in front of municipal halls in Antibes and Nice by desperate 
housewives demanding food were an alarm bell, warning that the rationing system was 
teetering on the edge of an open chasm. Protests widened to schools. Pupils erupted in anger, 
for the French state was incapable of supplying school cafeterias, so much so that some 
schools had had to close their boarding programs.
765
 
 The local French authorities' inability to address the inequities of the food 
distribution considerably undermined their prestige in the eyes of the local population, but 
that was nothing compared to the rumors which were spreading in Nice regarding the 
privileges enjoyed by the local notables. According to another Italian report, local Vichy 
authorities were widely corrupt and in league with the traffickers.
766
 One story recounted that 
a delivery boy bringing goods to the Prefecture accidentally dropped a "large basket filled to 
the brim with white bread." This rumor was followed shortly by another in which a delivery 
boy was mistakenly arrested by the French gendarmerie while transporting twenty liters of 
olive oil to the Bishop's palace in Nice. It is likely, and the Italian military report did not 
deny it, that these were slanders deliberately spread by irredentists and maybe even by Italian 
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authorities, for they were directed against two of the staunchest opponents of the Italian 
military occupation, the Alpes-Maritimes prefect Marcel Ribière and the Bishop of Nice 
Monseigneur Rémond. They had been accused of hoarding two key rationed staples which 
had become a rarity in southern France and were only found on the black market, bread and 
olive oil. However, notwithstanding the fact that they were likely fabrications, the 
widespread acceptance of these rumors by the populace was a telltale sign that the Vichy 
regime's popularity was dropping like a stone.
767
  
To justify their failure in administering the food ration system effectively, local Vichy 
authorities blamed the Italian occupation. Their reports never failed to emphasize how the 
Italian army was drawing heavily on the local market to supply its soldiers. In truth, Italian 
Army Corps commanders had been instructed to stock up on fresh staples such as fruits and 
vegetables using local wholesalers in light of the difficulty of transporting supplies from 
Italy. In early December 1942, a gendarmerie report noted that fresh vegetables had vanished 
from market stalls as soon as the Italian army had occupied the Zone Libre.
768
 In the Alpine 
regions, the Italians bought lumber for heating and forage for their horses and mules, 
especially in the first critical months after the invasion.
769
 The population was especially 
enraged that the Italian army food services were permitted to buy significant quantities of 
staples, even at market stalls, without queuing up.
770
 In fact, the war was not merely an 
excuse used by French authorities to deny their responsibility for the rationing disaster. There 
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is no question that the addition of 160,000 soldiers to the region broke a food distribution 
network that was already on the verge of collapsing. French historian Jean-Louis Panicacci 
estimated that, between the Italian occupation (November 1942 - September 1943) and the 
German occupation (September 1943 - August 1944), foreign armies consumed between two 
to seven tons of fresh staples each day.
771
 In the face of an extreme shortage of food 
combined with the addition of the high Italian demand, prices for dairy products and fresh 
vegetables skyrocketed. One kilo of butter which normally sold for 120 francs, cost 750 
francs in October; one liter of olive oil rose from 160 francs in October 1941 to 1500 francs 
by March 1943. Italian army reports made it clear that wholesalers could not keep up with 
their contracts as local production fell precipitously.
772
  
It was inevitable that the lack of discipline of the Italian soldier, coupled with the 
increasing food deficit of the region, would fuel an already thriving black market in the Côte 
d'Azur. Notwithstanding the strict prohibition on any kind of transaction between Italian 
soldiers and French civilians, a mutually beneficial barter system came into being as soon as 
the Italian units settled in the former Zone Libre. On 22 November, a few days after the 
invasion, a restaurant owner in Nice was found with a bag containing seven kilograms of 
beef to be delivered to Italian soldiers. It is interesting to note that the civilian asserted that he 
had bought the beef from another Italian unit, but his explanation made no sense and was 
probably given to excuse himself and the beef wholesaler.
773
 It should not come as a surprise 
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then that, starting from as early as November 1942, half of the letters intercepted by Vichy's 
contrôle postal mentioned black market activities, while in the pre-occupation period only 




 Italian soldiers roamed the markets and countryside in search of any edible good. 
Mutually profitable exchanges were concluded with French civilians accepting virtually any 
kind of good or equipment to which Italian soldiers had access. Horse feed made by grinding 
carob pulp (Energon) was traded for potatoes,
775
 shoes for money,
776
 and fuel for food.
777
 
Fuel, in fact, became a primary currency for all kinds of illegal transactions: it was 
exchanged for wine (a meaningful barter, as wine was considered as important as food in an 
army made up of farmers and workers).
778
 Sometimes fuel was simply sold to local 
civilians.
779
 The fuel trade was particularly successful in rural departments like the Basses-
Alpes where local farmers desperately needed it. Between December 1942 and January 1943, 
four Italian soldiers stole sixty liters of gas from their units' depots and bartered it for ten 
kilograms of potatoes, ten kilograms of beans and one rabbit.
780
 On 15 January, two truck 
drivers of another unit quartered in the Basses-Alpes siphoned off a few liters of gas from 
their vehicle and exchanged it for potatoes and olive oil.
781
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The most striking features of both cases was not just that they happened almost as 
soon as the Fourth Army units had settled down in their locations, but also that they 
continued over time. For the above reasons, the Fourth Army Military Tribunal handed down 
sentences intended to send a message, ranging from eight months to three years. In spite of 
this, the practice became widespread, for even unit officers were seen striking deals with 
civilians. In Méailles, a small village in the Basses-Alpes, an officer, along with a few 
soldiers of the Regio Esercito, was sent to legally buy three hundred kilograms of potatoes. 
He approached a local producer, offering to barter fuel or pasta for two or three calves. The 
lieutenant explicitly stated that this latter trade was not part of a regular requisition or 
purchase, but was to be considered a black market deal.
782
  
In most instances, the troops bartered Italian goods found in army depots in France 
which were relatively easy to pilfer. Sometimes though, the scheming was much more 
elaborate. Some soldiers smuggled goods across the border, a much more risky business, but 
not uncommon. For instance, six soldiers sent to Italy by their commander to buy rice and 
other staples not available on the local market, also brought back extra bags of rice and forty-
liter demijohns of olive oil. Bewildered military authorities discovered that these soldiers, 
under the cover of regular food distribution, had created a black market network supplying 
restaurants in the Côte d'Azur with hard-to-find consumer goods.
783
 In fact, smuggling olive 
oil, which sold at 800 francs per liter on the black market, was a lucrative business. Several 
other smuggling rings were dismantled by the Italian authorities. Among them was one 
headed by an Italian lieutenant, a former restaurant owner in Italy, which meant he knew how 
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to get rationed staples.
784
 Smuggling of goods into France was not just done by Italian 
soldiers; Italian civilians also participated. On 23 December 1942, a Mentonese was caught 
trying to smuggle gold jewelry from France to Menton.
785
 Italian border guards also 
uncovered several cases of illicit French perfumes being brought into Italy via Menton.
786
 
Even Italian civil servants actively participated in the black market. A clerk of the CIAF 
delegation in Nice was caught with jewels and wads of Italian banknotes in his coat 
pockets.
787
 Sometimes, the diligence of Italian border guards led to unexpected results. One 
soldier returning from leave was prosecuted for attempting to bring three kilograms of 
tobacco and several pairs of stockings and socks across the border. However, upon careful 
examination, the Italian military tribunal realized that the soldier, due to his perfect 
bilingualism, was a member of the Service "I," the counterintelligence bureau present in 
every Fourth Army unit. The confiscated goods were meant to reward French informants and 
the soldier had been previously authorized by his field officer to buy them in Italy. This case, 
which was in itself emblematic of the lack of communication between different services in 




Italian soldiers' black market activities were not the aspect which damaged most the 
reputation of the Italian army in the eyes of the local populace. Thefts and burglaries by 
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soldiers of the Regio Esercito were more frequent and their effects more visible than 
contraband across the border. In fact, they became so endemic on the Côte d'Azur as to 
become a recurrent worry for anyone with valuable goods or staples. French prefects' desks 
threatened to collapse under the stacks of local authorities' reports. From these reports, it was 
clear that the Italian soldiers resorted to thievery first and foremost to quell their hunger.  
Their first targets were food warehouses. Arguably, food depots of the Italian army 
were the easiest to access for Italian soldiers, as seen in the aforementioned cases of black 
marketeering. Thus, the case of three privates of the infantry regiment Lupi di Toscana 
stealing goods from their own regiment food depot should not come as a surprise.
789
 
Charitable organizations were not spared by the wave of thefts. Seven Alpini pried open a 
window of the Secours National depot in Chambery to steal thirty kilograms of chocolate.
790
 
And wine was very much a coveted good. In January 1943, dark stains on the floor near a 
warehouse persuaded a few Alpini that the building might store kegs of wine. The thirsty 
alpine soldiers at first tried, without much success, to siphon off the wine with the help of a 
hose, but then opted for brute force, smashing the front door of the depot.
791
        
The easiest prey for the pillagers were the railway cars used to transport food for both 
the Italian army food service and the Ravitaillement Général. The Prefect of the Basses-
Alpes complained to his Bouches-Du-Rhône equivalent that, during the night of 12 
December, a group of Italian soldiers had broken the lock of a wagon parked inside the 
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Digne station and stolen five hundred kilograms of potatoes.
792
 On 23 December, twenty-six 
soldiers were arrested for having cleaned out a wagon of food and soap.
793
 In most cases, it 
was only a few individuals who, under the cover of shadows, sneaked into a railway station 
to grab whatever food and other goods, such as stockings and socks, they could carry.
794
 The 
pervasiveness of theft is made clear by looking at the reports of the Delegazione Trasporti 
Militari (Military Transport Delegation). Its head, Colonel Martinotti, regularly complained 
about the incessant "thefts from Italian railways car transporting food, a plague which shows 
no sign of abating."
795
  
To curb the wave of robberies, the Italian army established squads of Carabinieri and 
soldiers to patrol the railway stations. However, in some cases, the same persons who were 
supposed to be guarding the carriages were found pilfering goods. For instance, two sentries 
of the Carnoules (Var) railway station were caught stealing a chunk of red meat from a 
refrigerator carriage.
796
 In another case, two Carabinieri who had been expressly posted near 
a carriage that had been already broken open could not resist the temptation of taking two 
provoloni.
797
 In another incredible episode, two French policemen noticed, while walking 
beside the depot in Cannes (Cannes Bocca), that an Italian soldier was stealing goods from a 
wagon. The French gendarmes dashed to arrest him but stopped abruptly as two Italian 
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sentries interceded, giving the pillager time to flee the scene. In the ensuing presumably 
heated conversation, the Italian sentries feigned ignorance, asserting that neither had seen 
anyone approaching the wagon. Their bad faith was confirmed when the two gendarmes, 
after recruiting the head of the station, noted that several bottles of liquor were now also 
missing, along with all the Italian soldiers.
798
 In fact, the Cannes Bocca railway station 
became a no man's land in March-April 1943 where Italian soldiers repeatedly plundered 
carriages. In some cases, the robbers threatened the gendarmes and made away with their 




While all these robberies undoubtedly added to the strain on the food supply, the 
general population was not very aware of them. On the other hand, the plundering of 
orchards and kitchen gardens was felt directly by French civilians and considerably 
undermined the image of the Italian soldier in the eyes of the French public opinion. 
Unfenced fields became easy targets for bands of Italian marauders, who pillaged anything 
edible, from cabbage
800
 to potatoes, from onions to lettuce.
801
 Disheartened beekeepers 
bemoaned the soldiers who tore apart their beehives in order to get at the honey.
802
 The 
French population was well aware of the many thefts committed by Italian soldiers. The 
mayor of Mandelieu, a village near Cannes in the Alpes-Maritimes, bitterly complained to 
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Vichy police authorities that fields were often plundered at night. He insisted that, while it 
was difficult in the dark to  distinguish more than black shadows moving along these fields, 
their vicinity to Italian encampments  and the trails of heavy military boot prints left no doubt 
about the culprits' identity.
803
 Sometimes, brazen soldiers did not bother to wait for darkness. 
A farmer in the Basses-Alpes was shocked to discover soldiers cutting down trees on his 




It happened occasionally that local commanders sent patrols in search of pillagers. In 
January 1943, at Saint Laurent-du-Var, a soldier found stealing vegetables was shot in the leg 
while fleeing an Italian patrol.
805
 Records of the Fourth Army indicate that, on average, fifty 
to eighty soldiers were arrested each month for theft, about thirty percent of the total 
arrests.
806
 These numbers were in line with the average for the Italian army in the Second 
World War more generally. Recent studies have determined that seventy percent of Italian 
military tribunals' sentences were for theft, black market, illegal trading (ricettazione) or 
insubordination.
807
 However, it is safe to assume that the thieves actually caught and charged 
were only the tip of the iceberg. Italian soldiers and officers often turned a blind eye to minor 
offenses for several reasons. Owing to the dearth of men, and facing a possible Allied 
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invasion and partisan insurrection, the theft of goods from French fields was ranked low on 
the scale of threats. Thus, patrols did not focus on chasing thieves. Additionally, some 
officers and NCOs felt it would not be advisable to systematically punish every minor 
infraction. They feared a hardline policy would sour relations between soldiers and officers 
and considerably deplete the already insufficient number of soldiers on French soil. Thus, 
military tribunals' sentences appear to have been relatively lenient in the treatment of thefts, 
unless the stolen goods were the property of the Italian army. Finally, we should not 
underestimate the pressure put on honest soldiers by their unscrupulous peers. A corporal 
who had denounced some privates responsible for the theft of honey and chickens received 
death threats from the culprits.
808
  
Given this permissive attitude, coupled with the desperation of the hungry, some 
soldiers became bolder and bolder and began targeting livestock. Lambs were stolen from 
passing flocks; rabbits and chickens were pilfered from their enclosures.
809
 They did not 
hesitate to break doors and locks of shacks and pigpens, even though this "violence on 
goods" was considered an aggravating circumstance by the military courts.
810
 The logical 
next step in the ladder of offenses was to break into private homes. Hungry soldiers smashed 
windows, grabbing whatever food they could find.
811
 Sometimes, they resorted to creative 
tricks to force the owner to hand over his goods. Two privates, passing themselves off as 
Italian army police, tried to intimidate a farmer, arguing that his small bonfire which he had 
lit in front of his house was a beacon for the enemy planes. Threatening him with a hefty 
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fine, the Carabinieri impersonators agreed to turn a blind eye in exchange for three 
rabbits.
812
 In another classic swindle, an Italian soldier, under the pretext of waiting for the 
military courier to arrive at the village, invited himself into a home for a glass of wine with 
the owner, while an accomplice tried to break into the rabbit hutch out back.
813
  
Break-ins into private houses were few, however, as the risk of being caught was 
high. Owners moved heaven and earth to find the culprits as the stolen goods often 
represented the entirety of their often meager stores, and the difference between survival and 
serious hardship. Instead, many Italian soldiers resorted to a more direct way to get food - 
shoplifting. Staples as diverse as cheese, condensed milk, mortadella (Italian cold cuts) and 
sugar were stolen from shop shelves.
814
 The populace was particularly incensed by the fact 
that the soldiers were even shoplifting non-consumable and non-essential goods as diverse as 
cameras, postcards, souvenirs and jewels.
815
 One soldier was even caught stealing a wallet 
left on a counter by an absentminded customer.
816
  
Thus, hunger was not the sole motivation for these actions. Italian soldiers were in 
search of goods either to barter on the black market or for their own comfort. Allegedly, 
Italian officers were even using cars which were either the property of local municipalities or 
of private individuals.
817
 In Digne, a bicycle which had been reported stolen was found in an 
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Italian military barracks, oddly without its wheels.
818
 There were also a few instances of 
robberies perpetrated by soldiers lodged in civilian houses. In two separate cases, orderlies of 
Italian officers took advantage of the situation to steal jewelry, silverware and money 
belonging to their hosts.
819
 The greediness of some members of the Italian occupation army 
was especially evident when the soldiers started looting abandoned houses. There was little 
chance of finding foodstuffs in houses which had not been inhabited for at least a couple of 
years. In a repetition of the aftermath of the Battle of the Alps in Menton, isolated country 
houses, abandoned by their owners who lived outside the region or even outside France, were 
repeatedly pillaged for their furniture and goods.
820
  Therefore, their actions were not just 
driven by need.  
The Italian army impacted in the population's everyday life not only by indulging in 
black market activities and theft, but by their galling misuse of public goods. Just a few days 
after their deployment in southern France, some soldiers were found washing their clothes in 
a tank which stored the water feeding several apartment buildings, oblivious to the obvious 
health issue that they were contaminating the residents' drinking water.
821
 Lacking fuel to 
keep warm during the cool and humid nights of southern France, Italian soldiers had no 
scruples about cutting down trees, whether on private property or public land.
822
 In Cannes, 
Italian units occupying the aerodrome tore down a few sheds and broke up some furniture to 
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 If the disorganization of the Italian invasion was as much to blame as the lack 
of discipline among the Italian rank-and-file, other incidents reflected a marked lack of 
respect for French laws. French civilians accused the Italian soldiers of shooting domestic 
pets such as cats and dogs.
824
 The Italians also had the nasty habit of hunting game without 
any recognition of French hunting regulations.
825
 French reports noted with alarm that these 
hunters also endangered the local population, for stray shots came perilously close to hitting 
farmers cultivating their fields and even people strolling in village streets. In fact, military 
court records report at least one case of a French civilian shot in the leg by an Italian soldier 
who was hunting hares.
826
 Italians had even less scruples about fishing, commonly using 
explosives to increase the size of their catch.
827
 
 Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that, owing to the scarcity of fuel, traffic on the 
roads was light, there were several road accidents involving cars or trucks driven by Italian 
soldiers. In many cases, excessive speed and reckless driving were a decisive factor, as 
Italian drivers typically had an arrogant attitude and considered themselves the undisputed 
masters of the road. On 30 January 1943, an Italian truck driver was not able to get his 
vehicle around a bend due to his speed and mortally injured a French pedestrian.
828
 In August 
1943, an Italian motorcyclist, while driving at top speed in the village of Sisteron, hit a 
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French civilian. Not content with having injured the civilian, the Italian officer abused the 
French gendarme who was writing down the motorcycle's license plate and insulted 
passersby.
829
 In another unfortunate incident, a French truck which failed to pull over to let 
past an Italian car became the target of several shots to its tires. In the face of protests from 
the French prefect, the Italian commander in Digne icily replied that this "natural reaction" of 
the Italian soldiers was simply the consequence of the careless driving of "French drivers 
who did not comply with traffic regulations, especially when they are near Italian military 
vehicles."
830
 It is worth noting, that this reckless driving also impacted the Italian army. In 
another unfortunate circumstance, another Italian army driver swerved into the opposite lane 
to avoid crashing into a horse-drawn carriage. In doing so, the truck collided with a car of 




Additionally, soldiers of the Regio Esercito had assumed responsibility for 
maintaining law and order from the French security forces, and they resented any intrusion. 
However, as traffic policemen, their tactics could be unorthodox. Cyclists who failed to stop 
in the face of soldiers' challenges risked slaps or even a severe beating.
832
 These incidents 
sometimes escalated into fights, as in the case on 9 December 1942 in Nice when French 
citizens came to an unlucky cyclist's defense, and ended up in a brawl with Italian irredentists 
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who vigorously backed up the soldiers.
833
 Even essential services such as ambulances and 
public transportation were not spared. On 19 January 1943, the driver of an ambulance 
carrying two sick people had the misfortune of crossing a Italian military procession in the 
streets of Nice. Given the urgency of his task and having received the green light from a 
NCO, the driver moved forward, thus cutting the procession in half. An officer, deeming the 
move of the French civilian an impudent affront to the Italian army, immediately rushed to 
punch the driver in the face. Only the intervention of a French agent prevented the situation 
from escalating.
834
 In another incident, a tramway driver had the windshield of his vehicle 
cracked by a soldier's rifle butt.
835
 Vichy officials were also targeted, as they were considered 
both a challenge to the authority of the Italian army in France and a possible threat in the case 
of an anti-Italian insurrection. French gendarmes who patrolled at night to enforce the curfew 
were severely chastised by an Italian military patrol when the former directed their flashlight 
beam into the soldiers' faces.  
This episode not only demonstrated that the Italians were wary of any interference in 
security matters, but also demonstrated the constant tension under which the Italian forces 
lived. The occupation army was like a coiled spring, in constant fear of possible attacks from 
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 This fear lay behind the curfew measure established by the Italian 
garrison commander in the small village of Gattières after a sentry opened fire on an 
individual who, upon approaching the camp and being ordered to stop, instead precipitously 
fled the premises.
837
 The obsessive dread of a possible insurgence sparked yet another 
incident. A tax collector was arrested in mid-January in Nice and his gun confiscated. The 
arrest stemmed from a misunderstanding: the French civil servant had been seen showing his 
gun to one of his fellows in a cafe. A witness, who thought the two tax collectors were 
possible resisters, reported the incident to an Italian patrol who proceeded to arrest the 
alleged insurgent.
838
    
Nervous Italian soldiers were also prone to overreact when they believed that they 
had been mocked or insulted by Frenchmen. On 14 December 1942, the gendarmerie of the 
small village of Vence was stormed by an Italian squad in response to an alleged rude gesture 
made by a French gendarme at an Italian column the day before. Even though the situation 
was quickly defused when it became clear that the whole incident was the result of a 
misunderstanding, the population of Vence was shocked by the excessive use of force.
839
 
French police officers were often suspected of scoffing at Italian troops. Two gendarmes 
were accused by an Italian officer of making fun of bersaglieri troops, whose wide-brimmed 
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hats were decorated with black capercaillie feathers.
840
  The Italians seemed exceptionally 
sensitive, perceiving insults where none was intended. A gendarme who failed to greet a 
passing Italian officer was considered to have insulted him, even though, at that time, the 
gendarme was focused on hunting down poachers.
841
    
This arrogance and prickliness disturbed and angered the French, who sometimes 
reacted with sarcasm and irreverence. These rash answers to Italian provocations could 
considerably envenom a situation. A bartender who, in response to a haughty comment by 
the Italian officer to the effect that Fascists were not afraid of anything, defiantly answered 
back that the French too had no fears, was threatened at gunpoint by the officer.
842
 A 
customer in a bar who, upon hearing an Italian soldier slandering the French army for not 
being able to resist the Wehrmacht in June 1940, replied that it did not matter because the 
Americans would soon come to free the French, was immediately arrested and brought to 
Italian army local headquarters.
843
 A common site for these kinds of confrontations was the 
cafe, as a result of immoderate alcohol consumption by Italian soldiers. In January 1943, four 
soldiers in Thoard, Basses-Alpes, who had been refused wine, fired several shots into the sky 
to intimidate the owner.
844
  In June 1943, a brawl in a bar in the village of Manosque, Basses-
Alpes, between French customers and Italian soldiers rapidly escalated into a wider street 
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 It is worth noting that in all of these incidents, both Italian commanders and the local 
authorities worked to resolve the tension and to restore order. Both parties feared street 
brawls could degenerate into riots with dire consequences for the stability of the region. The 
local Italian commander certainly did not want to stir up any trouble in a department with 
few Italian troops and no irredentist claims. To this end, most of the civilians arrested were 
freed within hours or days. In fact, while these brawls demonstrated the omnipresent 
animosity between the French populace and the soldiers of the occupying army, their 
relatively mild endings reflected a will on both sides to diffuse the tension. 
Faced with this wide list of criminal activities, ranging from black marketeering to 
outright theft, one might get the impression that the Italian army was rife with burglars, 
traffickers and the corrupt. It is important to place the Fourth Army in the context of the 
wartime occupation of France. None of these offenses were unique to the Italians, for the 
French civilians also indulged in illicit activities during the occupation. In the words of an 
historian "almost everything was for sale during and immediately after the occupation."
846
 
Black marketeering and illicit trafficking had been thriving in southern France since 1940, 
long before the Italian army occupied southeastern France. Trips by French civilians into the 
countryside in search of food were already a common occurrence. In fact, notwithstanding 
repeated reassurances by Vichy officials, the "Système D" is probably the phrase which 
embodies the essence of the experience of occupied France, for, no matter the department or 
the social class, one who had lived in France during the Occupation was bound to deal either 
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directly and indirectly with the black market.
847
 Many increasingly resorted to either illicit 
trade or theft to satisfy their needs, often at the expense of the weaker or more honest part of 
the population. Some unscrupulous persons even resorted to stealing packages sent to the 
French prisoners of war in Germany by their families.
848
 Thefts of foodstuffs and ration cards 
had become a daily event in the Côte d'Azur as early as 1941. Thieves raided Ravitaillement 
offices for ration tickets, even blowing safes to get them. This situation became so 
widespread that Vichy increased the penalty for those who distributed or used counterfeit or 
illegal ration tickets, in some extreme cases sentencing felons to life sentences.
849
 Moreover, 
thefts were not limited only to food or the ration system, but encompassed a high variety of 
goods. For instance, an average of four bicycles were stolen each day in the city of Nice.
850
 
As a matter of fact, the Italian presence was convenient for some. It appears that some 
civilians were quick to blame the soldiers of the Regio Esercito in order to cover their own 
crimes, knowing how much the population was prejudiced against the occupation army. In 
January 1943, the CEO of a French distribution company complained to the Prefect of the 
Alpes-Maritimes about the numerous robberies targeting the wagons which transported food 
from Marseille to the department of the Alpes-Maritimes. SNCF, the French national railway 
company, openly accused the Italian soldiers of the thefts. However, the manager of the 
distribution company suggested that some of the robberies may have been, in fact, committed 
by "unscrupulous SNCF employees [who] used these thefts as an excuse to carry out their 
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own." In support of his theory, one CEO accused SNCF of having allegedly ordered its 
employees to blame the occupation army as a way to avoid having to refund the plaintiff 
companies.
851
   
In fact, starting in the summer of 1943, there were encouraging signs that the Italian 
troops and the local population had reached a modus vivendi.  A Vichy police report 
regarding the Basses-Alpes in May 1943 revealed that, due to the goodwill of both the 
soldiers and the populace, the atmosphere was much more serene.
852
 By June, "thefts 
[committed by Italian soldiers] had more or less ceased."
853
 By this time, Italian soldiers had 
proven a boon to the local economy. Italian troops "[were] for some categories of shop 
owners such as coffee shop owners, watchmakers and perfumers a source of profit."
854
 
Moreover, many were impressed by the kindness of the Italian soldiers. A woman who had 
been run over by a car driven by a member of the Italian military was promptly taken by the 
soldiers themselves to the local hospital.
855
 Relations also improved in the coastal regions. 
For example, the Sub-Prefect of Grasse took the time to write a letter to the I CA Italian 
commander to praise the deeds of two Italian soldiers who had helped French civilians put 
out a fire in a pasta factory.
856
 At a grassroots level, some Frenchmen were praising the 
Italian soldiers for being "good fellows" (brave gens) who were not terribly disruptive to 
French daily life. The local population therefore "no longer regretted that it was the Italians 
                                                     
851 ADAM, 166 W 3, Lettre du PDG de Guichard-Perrachon & Cie au Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes, 27 January 
1943. 
852 ADHAP, 42 W 42, Rapport n°4041 /Q.7-2 du Commissaire Sangla, 31 May 1943. 
853 ADHAP, 42 W 42, Rapport n°3074 du Commissariat de police de Digne, 4 June 1943. 
854 ADHAP, 42 W 42, Rapport du Commissariat de police de Digne, 24 June 1943. 
855 ADHAP, 42 W 42, Rapport d'information du Commissaire Principal, Chef du District de Police des Basses-
Alpes, 29 January 1943. 
856
 ADAM, 28 W 75, Lettre du Sous-Préfet de Grasse au colonel Mariani, chef d'Etat Major du Géneral 
Commandant le Ier Corps d'Armée, 6 July 1943. 
 
 300 
who were occupying [southeastern France] and not the Germans."
857
 In some instances, 
relations between the Italians and the local population even became friendly, as in the case of 
an officer in Nice who gave some milk to a French family in return for their hospitality and 
"acts of kindness" (gentilesses) to him and his men.
858
 Even attempts to export or import 
consumer goods in France sometimes hid more noble motivations. Some soldiers sought to 
help families in France who were having difficulty due to the extreme shortages of food. An 
Italian corporal gave eight loafs of bread, stolen from his unit kitchen, to a struggling Italian 
family in Nice who subsequently had, on many occasions, invited him over to dine and 
washed his clothes, as a token of gratitude.
859
 This was not an isolated act. Another attempted 
to bring in illegal olive oil, eggs, and women's stockings as a way to thank his relatives in 
Nice for their hospitality.
860
 
Thus, Italian soldiers were able to reach a modus vivendi with the local population, 
whether French or Italian. Understandably though, the soldiers of the Fourth Army generally 
became more intimate with the Italian population because of the common language and 
culture. Various kinds of relationships emerged in the Italian occupation, but perhaps none 
were more complex than that between the Italian men and local women. It would be a twisted 
interpretation to view the relationships between soldiers of the Regio Esercito and local 
women only through the lens of prostitution. In many cases, local girls genuinely fell in love 
with Italian officers and soldiers, in a way which strongly mirrored the relations between 
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German soldiers and the derogatively called Filles aux Boches (literally Girls for Krauts).
861
 
The two categories of women, prostitutes and soldiers' lovers, shared the common trait of 
being generally despised by the population. Every woman who befriended a soldier of either 
occupation army was almost immediately branded a harlot. Rich women were especially 
targeted as their villas were often used by the Italian army to billet their officers, thus 
incidentally encouraging promiscuous contact between the Italians and their female hosts. A 
fourteen-year-old girl was denounced after the war by her neighbor for having indulged in a 
debauched life (vie de débauche) with Italian, and later, German soldiers. The denouncer, a 
sixty-year-old school teacher, was horrified by the scandalous attitude of the girl, who 
"embraced tenderly an Italian [soldier], each day a different one." The teenager was 
eventually sentenced to four years, not a surprising sentence if we remember the chauvinism 
of 1940s France and the fact that the teacher was also the local president of the Comité 
D'Épuration.
862
 In another case, a former Italian nun who had become a nurse for a rich 
widow was accused of an allegedly scandalous attitude regarding the Italian officers billeted 
in her employer's villa. A witness had seen her "hug (embrasser) three or four times" a few 
Italian officers. The neighbor was so outraged by the presence of what he considered a 
prostitute in a bourgeois neighborhood that he once yelled her, "You lackey of Mussolini 
(Espèce de sale Mussolini) would be better gone to a brothel than housed in a convent." 
Another neighbor accused the former nun of "dancing and laughing with Italian officers," an 
intolerable moral crime in Vichy France.  The Italian nurse was ultimately acquitted of any 
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crime, as both the rich aristocratic widow and the Bishop of Nice Monseigneur Rémond 
vouched for her.
863
 However, the fact that she was charged based on these accusations says 
much about the local attitude towards women's fraternization with Italian troops. 
However, some relationships evolved into something stronger than simple flirtation. 
These love stories rarely enjoyed a happy ending owing to the fact most of the Italian 
military left France precipitously in September 1943 with the declaration of the Italian 
Armistice with the Allies. That was the case of a divorced Italian woman in the alpine village 
of Isola, who befriended a sergeant and then became his lover in February 1943. 
Notwithstanding the fact that soldiers were not permitted to live with women, the sergeant 
openly dated her and was extremely fond of her three small children. The Italian soldier was 
probably a godsend for an unemployed single woman with three children to feed at a time of 
heavy rationing and when women had great difficulty finding employment. The two had even 
talked about getting married. Unfortunately, the idyll lasted only a few months until June 
1943, when the sergeant's unit was sent back to Italy. The two lovers continued to stay in 
touch by mail for a short period of time, until in September 1943, when the sergeant was 
taken prisoner and sent to a POW camp in Germany.
864
 Sometimes, women took drastic 
measures to continue the relationship in spite of the war. A twenty-one-year-old girl, tired of 
waiting for news from her fiancée who had left Nice in September 1943, decided, without 
telling her parents, to cross the border in Menton illegally, paying a hefty 2,000 francs to a 
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Affairs between Italian soldiers and women were certainly an important part of the 
relations between occupiers and occupied at a grassroots level. Such affairs are hardly 
surprising given the fact that France was missing one and a half million of its men who were 
in German prison camps and factories, and that the occupiers were largely young men in their 
prime. However, relations developed in another important area of daily life: business. The 
Italian army had arrived in France with its own supply services, and the General Staff's initial 
plan was to be fully autonomous of French suppliers. However, as explained earlier, it 
became quickly evident that the Italian army would have to rely on local production, 
especially in foodstuffs, all the more so as the Italian peninsula itself was experiencing severe 
shortages. Therefore, Fourth Army commanders quickly established commercial ties with 
local producers, wholesalers and retailers. At a grassroots level, grocery stores, a trade 
practiced by many Italians in southeastern France, were often visited by Italian soldiers in 
search of staples to supplement their inadequate rations. It was not uncommon for Italian 
grocery owners to sell their goods, out of either patriotism or simple greed, to the Italian 
rank-and-file, in spite of Vichy's rationing regulations that forbade them to sell to anyone 
who did not have ration coupons for the corresponding staple.  
Of course, some shrewd Italian entrepreneurs quickly realized that the presence of the 
Italian army was a boon which could be exploited profitably. A few individuals specialized 
in collecting manure from the horses of the Italian army, a lucrative business at a time when 
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fertilizers were widely unavailable.
866
 Wide margins of profit were also made by 
businessmen who anticipated the needs of the Italian army. One entrepreneur in Nice made 
his fortune by selling typewriters to the CIAF office in Nice and movie projectors to Italian 
units.
867
 Another one specialized in the distribution of coal and wood to heat the Italian 
barracks. This particular business was a marked success and enabled him to live an expensive 
lifestyle, according to the French police house search in 1944, which uncovered a large 
quantity of foodstuffs, including white bread, an extreme rarity at the end of the war.
868
  
These profits were widely regarded in postwar trials as illicit hoarding made by 
Italian immigrants, dismissed at that point as merely "guests" of France at a time when the 
population was enduring serious economic deprivation. In the vitriolic opinion of a French 
inspector, each of these individuals was "the typical Italian, who, after having profited from 
the French hospitality to earn an adequate living, had sided, when the time came,  with those 
backstabbing France, probably as a way to thank us."
869
 These entrepreneurs, in the minds of 
many French, were doubly guilty of having amassed a considerable fortune during the war 
years, while helping the army of an enemy state. The popular opinion in postwar France cast 
them as Fascists or irredentists who maneuvered behind the scenes to prepare the ground for 
a future annexation. Of course, some of these Italians combined a flair for business with a 
staunch belief in the future Italian supremacy in southeastern France, but the story was more 
complex than it appears at first. The case of an Italian building contractor in Nice, Albert O., 
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who was prosecuted in the aftermath of war for having worked for an enemy country, serves 
as a good example. A postwar French police report began by stating that the defendant's 
company had not been in good shape before the war, nor had its condition improved when 
the war started. No explanation was offered for this but one could infer that the business was 
doing badly as its chief clients were the local municipalities, which had had their funds 
drastically cut, one of the consequences of the enormous reparations that Vichy France was 
paying to Nazi Germany. In addition, and perhaps more significantly, many Italian 
businesses suffered from the backlash of the coup de poignard dans le dos. The local 
population deserted Italian-owned stores and companies as they did not want to fund what 
they deemed an Italian fifth column in the region. A tailor in Monaco demanded substantial 
reparations from the CIAF declaring that, after his detention in June 1940 in French 
internment camps, his store had been shunned by the French population and the pro-French 
Monegasques, presumably impacting his bottom line dramatically.
870
  
Albert O. and others like him who were shunned by the French population regardless 
of their political ideas, were delighted to see a potentially good client, the Italian army, come 
to France. Albert O. testified that he was forced to work for the Italian Corps of Engineers as 
otherwise his company would have been requisitioned. In the end, the defendant's company 
built three blockhouses and a few roads for the Italian army. However, while it is plausible 
that the Italians might have forced him to collaborate, that did not explain why Italian 
military engineers were often seen dining at his house. In fact, he did not refute the 
accusation, explaining that "speaking fluently Italian and working for them [the engineer 
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officers], I had no reason to be in bad terms."
871
 Thus, business relations could also easily 
lead to more intimate relations between occupiers and at least one segment of the occupied 
population.  
Indeed, local Italian commanders who needed companies or local people to help their 
units settle or ameliorate their daily life in France opted for Italian civilians when they could, 
people with whom they could relate more easily, if just because of language, culture and way 
of eating. It is not hard to imagine that strong friendships might emerge from first hesitant 
contacts. Examining the dossiers of the Comité d'Epuration for the Alpes-Maritimes, one 
finds numerous examples of Italian soldiers and civilians socializing in a variety of ways: 
inviting the soldiers to dinner or to have a drink, chatting, singing and socializing in bars and 
shops. Soldiers were asked about news from Italy, of particular interest to Italian immigrants 
coming from the same region, or even from the same city as the troops. In one case, one 
Italian emigrant discovered that his nephew was stationed near his house.
872
 At a time when 
crossing the Italian-French border was very problematic for civilians, unless one worked for 
the CIAF, soldiers returning to Italy on leave were asked to carry packages and letters to the 
emigrants' relatives and to inquire about their whereabouts.
873
  
Sometimes, the relations between soldiers and civilians were akin to a symbiotic 
relationship, especially when it came to health care. An Italian from Cannes, having moved 
to the alpine village of Isola for health reasons, immediately befriended the medical officer of 
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the local Italian garrison who kindly visited him and his mother-in-law at home.
874
 An Italian 
villager in Castillon developed a steady friendship with the local commander, as his daughter 
worked as a nurse for the local unit.
875
 In another mutually beneficial relationship, one Italian 




In conclusion, the impact of the Italian occupation can be gauged by examining the 
evolution of the relations between the soldiers of the Fourth Army and the local population. It 
is difficult to generalize as the occupation encompassed a wide variety of experiences, but 
certainly a pattern seems discernible. Many of the clashes happened in the first two months 
of the occupation, when the Italians were uneasy in their role as "protectors" of a population 
who had no love for them. Continuous warnings by Italian military leaders to avoid any kind 
of fraternization with the French population and not to trust the French security forces, who 
could easily turn their weapons against the occupation force in the case of an Allied landing, 
contributed to the paranoia and fears of many fanti. Moreover, local inhabitants were 
annoyed by the boorish attitude and lack of discipline of the Italian soldiers, combined with a 
self-conscious arrogance which was worsened by a "couldn't-care-less" attitude regarding the 
local population and public goods. 
The dominant sense of insecurity in the Fourth Army was heightened by the Italian 
soldiers' low morale. The absence of any fighting spirit was probably a direct consequence 
the appalling Italian strategy in the whole war and its subsequent string of military defeats. 
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Italian army cadres knew too well that the invasion of France was not the fruit of an Italian 
brilliant military campaign, but more a gift from their senior German partner. The Italian 
army had been severely embarrassed in its confrontation with the French army in June 1940, 
and most soldiers felt that the French population's contempt stemmed not only from the coup 
de poignard dans le dos, but also from the Italian military debacle. Thus, the arrogance of the 
Fourth Army soldiers was not the conceited attitude of occupying troops acting as masters by 
the right of their military might, but arose from a sense of insecurity resulting from for a war 
which had gone wrong from the beginning. 
By the end of the year, Italian units had become more comfortable in their role and 
had settled in the region The French population had realized that the Italians were more 
interested in buttressing the coastline defense than annexing the occupied departments, and 
as a result, the conflict decreased. Moreover, the tension within the Italian army had eased 
considerably, even to the point of slackness. Both the mild weather and gorgeous landscape 
encouraged the soldiers to relax, as well as their distance from the battlefront. Italian soldiers 
were pleasantly surprised to find in the Côte d'Azur a region very similar both in landscape 
and in culture to their native land. This familiarity was however a mixed blessing. While 
sightseeing in southeastern France was certainly a welcome respite, especially for the units 
from the Eastern Front or from the Balkans, it also heightened the melancholy of soldiers 
who had not seen their families for months and, in some cases, for years. Most of the Italian 
soldiers, in fact, were not interested in politics and after years spent in the more difficult 
theaters of war, many simply  wanted to enjoy the French Riviera and ultimately to go home.  
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It is hardly surprising, then, that the commanders of the Fourth Army had a hard time 
enforcing discipline in southeastern France. Repeatedly, reports acknowledged the sense of 
impotence on the part of local commanders who had to fight against the boredom and laxity 
of the Italian army, even before they could think of countermeasures against an Allied 
landing. Demoralized soldiers, badly trained, poorly equipped, underfed, mentally and 
physically exhausted by a long war which had been nothing else than a continuous 
disappointment for Italy, were in no shape to enforce a harsh policy. On the contrary, Italian 
soldiers adapted very quickly to the situation they found in southeastern France, and in doing 
so, encouraged the emergence of an illegal economy in the Côte d'Azur. The volume of illicit 
trade increased dramatically with the arrival of the Italian army. The Italians bartered, sold 
and traded army goods for food in great quantities. Of course, this deregulated trade and the 
arrival of hundreds of thousands of underfed young men, poorly supplied by the Italian army 
services, pushed the French food distribution system to the edge of collapse.  
The negative economic impact of the Italian occupation however must be placed in 
the wider context of the wartime years. It is undeniable that black marketeering, house break-
ins and thefts significantly increased with the presence of an army in which discipline was 
slack and food services inadequate, contributing to the locals' distrust of the occupying 
forces. However, black marketeering and thefts did not start with the arrival of the Italians, 
but was a common feature of occupied France since 1940. Living in France during the 
Second World War, while not as harrowing as an experience as that of Eastern Europe, was a 
constant struggle to cope with heavy rationing, the impact of the harsh German occupation in 
the north, and Vichy's strict regulations. The surge in black market activity in southern 
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France, the poorest part of the occupied country, was only partially due to the Italian military 
occupation. Other factors such as the progressive deterioration of Vichy's food distribution, 
the increasing rapaciousness of German plundering, and the droughts in the summer of 1941 
and 1942 played a key role. In fact, Italian soldiers were quick to understand that good deals 
could be struck with local inhabitants, many of whom could communicate in Italian. The 
Italians never carried out a scorched earth policy, but always tried to barter, sell or buy goods 
from local food producers, shopowners or even private individuals. Of course, any business 
relation with the Italian army was strictly prohibited both by Vichy and by Italian army's 
laws, but the sheer number of trials for black-marketeering by the Italian military tribunal, 
which probably represented only the tip of an iceberg of illicit trade, shows that many were 
undaunted by the eventual punishment either because of greed or desperation. 
Black market activities were a successful way for the Italian soldiers to become 
integrated in the local society, but they were not the only one. Italian soldiers befriended an 
important segment of the local population, the Italians, owing to their common cultural roots, 
language, as well as the Regio Esercito's lack of discipline. Relations with the populace 
ranged from sentimental affairs to business partnerships, but it seems the Italian soldiers and 
officers were very eager to link up with the locals, notwithstanding the repeated warning of 
their commanders. Italian civilians seem to have been as keen to link up with the troops. The 
Italians' carefree attitude certainly won the hearts and souls of part of the population. This 
situation was very different from the other Italian occupations in the Mediterranean area. In 
the Balkans, one historian noted that "contacts were purely occasional' owing to cultural 
differences. An Italian fante had a hard time communicating with a Slovene or a Croat who 
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had few cultural ties to Italy and who did not speak a word of Italian, while, conversely, the 
Italians themselves did not speak any Slovenian or Croatian.
877
 Moreover, the harsher Italian 
policy in the Balkans stemmed from the supposedly racial superiority of the Italian Stirpe 
over the Slavs, an idea mirroring the Nazi contempt for the Slavic Untermenschen even if it 
never attained the latter's intensity. It was arguably far more difficult for Fascist propaganda 
to picture the occupation of France as a mission to civilize a primitive culture, given the fact 
that France was a richer country than Italy and millions of Italian emigrants had come to 
work in the previous centuries. Therefore, the laxity of discipline within the Italian army, 
along with the cultural similarities between the Italians and the local population, created ideal 
conditions for widespread informal relationships, and explained the relatively mild impact of 
the Italian occupation and the integration of the Italian soldiers into the French social fabric. 
Moreover, the paucity of the resources allocated to the French front demonstrated that the 
invasion of France was hardly a priority for the Italian General Staff. Understandably, in light 
of these structural factors, the Fourth Army command had no choice but to implement an 
occupation policy of moderation which would not aggravate the already delicate balance in 
southeastern France. 
  
                                                     




The Italian occupation policy in France: the repressive forbearance 
of the Italian army 
The relatively benign impact of the Italian occupation was due to more than just the 
pervasive laxity within the Fourth Army ranks, the cultural proximity between the army and 
the local populace or the strategic choices of the Italian General Staff. The temperance of the 
Italian army was part of a planned strategy to avoid escalating the confrontation with the 
local population. A key priority of the Italian army was to secure the coastline and shore up 
its fortification against an impending Allied invasion. Therefore, they wanted to avoid 
stirring up the local population with any irredentist discussion of an annexation of Provence 
to Italy. This policy, however, did not suit either the CIAF and the local irredentists, both of 
whom erroneously thought the occupation would immediately bring about the colonization of 
the region along the model of Menton.  
Yet, at the same time the Army still needed to guarantee the security of its troops, and 
so the Army requested the aid of other security agencies to help them root out any possible 
Resistance threat. Unfortunately, any historian studying the Italian security agencies is often 
confronted with the scarcity of documents, many of which had been destroyed in the first 
days after the September 1943 Armistice. Indeed, details on security agencies in the French 
occupation zone are fragmentary and not easily verifiable. Upon precipitously leaving the 
French territory on 8 September 1943, Italian security officials burned confidential 
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documents such as arrest reports and interrogation summaries.
878
 The official reason was the 
fear that the Gestapo and the Abwehr, the German military intelligence service, could use the 
security archives to track down Jews and other dissidents. However, it is plausible that the 
Italians also wanted to destroy any proof of their own misdeeds as the tide of war was 
turning. After all, having arrested resisters and anti-Axis partisans would have negatively 
affected any security agent investigated by purging committees in the aftermath of the 
conflict.  
At the head of the civilian security forces in the Italian occupation zone was Rosario 
Barranco, the controversial head of the Italian Political Police in the Alpes-Maritimes.
879
 
Barranco's early career was that of a brilliant civil servant who served the Fascist regime, but 
without really compromising himself or dabbling in politics. All seventeen service citations 
he received in the interwar years were obtained by excelling in thwarting non-political 
crimes, such as breaking a ring of cattle rustlers in Sicily in 1925-1926. His excellent record, 
along with his knowledge of the French language, eventually brought him to Nice in March 
1939 as police attaché to the Italian consulate there. After the Armistice, Barranco came back 
to Nice on 24 July 1940 to work as part of the local CIAF armistice commission. He was 
assisted in his task by a staff of functionaries, among them Luigi Civilotti, the former Fascio 
secretary in Cannes, and Osvaldo Angrisani, who was killed by resisters on the night of the 
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 While the Political Police office in Nice was certainly instrumental, in 
collaboration with the Vichy police, in the arrests of several fuoriusciti living in the Côte 
d'Azur, such as the future head of the Italian Communist Party, Luigi Longo (known in 
France by the pseudonym, Luigi Gallo), it appears that Barranco acted more out of a sense of 
duty than a staunch belief in Fascism.
881
 It is revealing that Barranco did not hesitate to arrest 
Sarni, the head of the Monaco Fascio, as well as a few other local Fascist dignitaries for 
minor offences.  
In addition to Barranco's office, other security agencies moved into the former Free 
Zone in the wake of the Italian occupation starting in November 1942. The SIM (Servizio 
Informazioni Militari, the Italian military intelligence service), sent two agents to Nice 
Carabinieri Major Valente, alias Salerno, and Carabinieri Captain Tisani, alias Pescara, 
Mario di Resta or Aresta both from the XV CA Carabinieri unit.
882
 Moreover, the army had 
its own counterintelligence agency, the Ufficio Informazioni (Ufficio "I,") operating at a 
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divisional level since the inception of the occupation.
883
 The first task of the Ufficio "I" was 
to keep an eye on Fourth Army troops, watching for any sign of defeatism.
884
 Every Ufficio 
Informazioni received a grant from the division to build up a network of informers, divided 
into two categories: permanent agents (agenti fissi) and occasional agents (agenti 
occasionali), all handpicked from among pro-Italian activists in the local population.
885
 Their 
informers' task was to provide information on anti-Italian organizations, either Resistance- or 
Vichy-based, and to update the army on the public opinion's views of the occupation army. 
Often, intelligence officers did not have to search far, as unscrupulous local individuals 
showed up at the Italian garrisons eager to be recruited, either moved by Fascist ideals or for 
more base reasons such as petty quarrels and greed. Informers were rewarded with not only 
money, but also cigarettes and food such as rice and meat.
886
  
A typical example of an informers' ring tied to a local Ufficio "I" was the one in 
Antibes started in December 1942. Three Italians, a couple owning a bar and a former Italian 
army veteran living in France, and two French, a civilian and a former French captain, 
spontaneously showed up, volunteering to become informants.
887
 The Ufficio "I" 
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immediately asked the Nice CIAF delegation for any background information on the 
prospective agents. A few weeks later, the CIAF delegation informed the Ufficio "I" that the 
Italian army veteran was in fact extremely unreliable. Information he had provided the CIAF 
before November 1942 turned out to have been distorted by his personal biases. As well, the 
French captain had apparently lied about his participation on the Eastern Front in the ranks of 
the Wehrmacht.
888
 In spite of the dubious reliability of the informers, the Italian army still 
made use of their information as they swept over Antibes on 4 January 1943 and arrested 
twenty persons. Soldiers were also encouraged to denounce any suspicious behavior on the 
part of local individuals, as Italian soldiers who denounced French civilians were 
automatically granted fifteen days of leave.
889
 Yet, Italian officers soon discovered that this 
policy backfired as unsurprisingly some soldiers denounced French citizens as having 




In fact, as the three Italian security agencies built their separate spy networks among 
the local population, this intricate web of espionage at times caused confusion within the 
Italian intelligence network. First, the three organizations were not always eager to share 
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their data. In addition, it was not rare for informants already on the payroll of one agency to 
be contacted by recruiters of other agencies who ignored the fact that the former individual 
was already working for the Italian cause.
891
 The issue of overlapping tasks and conflicting 
networks was in part clarified by the December 1942 tour in the occupation zone of the head 
of SIM, General Cesare Amè, and his talks with General Vercellino. It was agreed that police 
operations would be headed by both the Political Police and SIM, as confirmed by 
instructions give to various units before a January roundup of alleged anti-Italians.
892
 Fourth 
Army units were asked to provide logistical support by way of escorts for the arrested 
persons and trucks, while CIAF personnel were given the thankless task of warding off the 
expected complaints from French authorities.
893
 However, relationships between the different 
agencies still remained strained, even after the clarifications. In particular, Barranco and 
Vercellino could not stand each other.
894
 And it appears that the Army frequently had the last 
say in decisions. 
Notwithstanding these differences, all the Italian organizations operating in the newly 
occupied territory ultimately coalesced in the face of the ongoing menace of an internal 
French insurrection. To prevent this dreaded scenario, Italian authorities quickly enacted a 
strategy of massive arrests. However, the implementation of this policy waxed and waned 
over time, and the Italian army was always quick to tone down its implementation after a 
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scare. We have already seen that, from the beginning of the occupation of the Free Zone, the 
Italian army was willing to arrest individuals, most of it resulting from denunciations made 
by Italian informers. Due to the protest of French authorities, this strategy was called off on 
20 November 1942 by Vercellino, only to be reinstated by the Duce five days later. 
Following the late November crisis which ended with the seizure of Toulon and the 
subsequent disarming of the Armée d'Armistice, the Italian General Staff, fearing an uprising 
by the French population, gave permission to take hostages (Prendere ostaggi), from among 
either the local notables or anti-Italian activists. However, the order remained vague, as they 
did not specify what to do with the hostages, leaving the decision to the discretion of the 
local Army command.
895
 This order was soon succeeded on 12 January with another 
directive which stated that, in case of attacks, "[the local Italian units] should not detain 
hostages, but only arrest the individuals responsible for the offences."
896
     
That is not to say that the Italian army halted its repressive campaign. The 12 January 
document itself insisted that even "those who are suspected of complicity" could be arrested. 
Moreover, a 19 January report from the Legnano Division showed that some units still kept 
lists of local dissidents who were to be taken hostage in case of attacks, even though their use 
was limited by the fact that the detention of hostages was to be carried out only "in case of 
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urgent needs" (estreme necessità, underlined in original).
897
 On 28 January, a Fourth Army 
Command directive insisted on enforcing the "absolute protection by any means available of 
the physical and spiritual integrity of the Italian Armed Forces." Thus, Vercellino stated, if 
the perpetrators of the attacks on Italian troops could not be found, local commanders would 
have to resort to collective sanctions (sanzioni collettive), ranging from mild reprisals such as 
curfews and the temporary detention of suspects and witnesses to severe ones such as the 
deportation or internment of local French authorities. Yet, it is worth noting again the self-
limitation of the Italian army. The more severe sanctions could be ordered only by the higher 
echelons of the Fourth Army, such as division commanders or the Fourth Army commander. 
Moreover, Vercellino himself warned, "collective sanctions are a delicate weapon (arma 
delicata), abuse of which is very dangerous." Thus, he appealed to the sensibility and the tact 
of local commanders to select a sanction commensurate with the gravity of the offence and 
the local mood of the population. More pragmatically, the commanders were to gauge the 
"effectiveness that the sanctions will have [to better local conditions]."
898
 This rather down-
to-earth approach of the Italian army's upper echelons underscored the uncertainty of the 
Italian policy in the first months of the occupation, balancing a hardline stance intended to 
quash any sign of rebellious behavior against a softer policy favoring a modus vivendi with 
the population. On one hand, the Italians feared that French Resistance leaders, maybe united 
with officers of the Armée d'Armistice, would exploit the transitional phase of the Italian 
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deployment to launch an insurrection against the invading army. Therefore, they needed to 
show the populace that they were ready to crush any rebellion. On the other hand, they 
wanted to avoid indiscriminate retaliation which would transform the scorn of the local 
population into a tangible Resistance movement. 
Collective sanctions were, in fact, seldom implemented in the Italian occupation 
period. However, starting in December 1942, arrests rapidly escalated, changing from a 
pattern of individual arrests to raids leading to multiple arrests and finally, as of May 1943, to 
massive round-ups. Periodically, Italian troops, guided by local informers and headed by 
SIM and Italian police functionaries, stormed apartments and houses arresting individuals 
accused of being allegedly part of anti-Axis organizations or of having anti-Italian 
sentiments. The round-ups followed several criteria, such as, for instance, the nationality of 
the arrested. On 26 December 1942, a wave of arrests hit the Polish community in Nice. 
Apparently, the arrests were triggered by an incident involving a young Pole who had fired a 
shot at an Italian soldier, although another rumor suggested that a Pole had been using a radio 
transmitter to communicate with Allied secret services. Whatever the true reasons, more than 
twenty Poles, mostly journalists, officers of the former Polish army or civil servants of the 
defunct Polish state, were arrested.
899
 On 17 January 1943, the Italians went so far as to arrest 
the Polish consul in Monaco.
900
 Other citizens from Allied states were also targeted, such as 
British and Americans, as the Italians feared that every person was potentially a spy. Most of 
                                                     
899 ADAM 166 W 9, Rapport n°9512 "Incident du 26 Décembre, rue Châteauneuf," Inspecteur Wasilieff, 31 
December 1942; Rapport B.S.E. 291 E, Inspécteur Carrere, 12 January 1943. The Box 166 W 9 contains an 
exhaustive list, compiled by French postwar authorities, of persons arrested in the Italian occupation period in 
the Alpes-Maritimes, divided by nationality, as well as one complete list in alphabetical order. 
900
 ADAM 166 W 9, Rapport n°185 "Arrestation du Consul de Pologne à Monaco par les Autorités Militaires 
Italiennes," Commissariat de Beausoileil, 19 January 1943. 
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the British citizens were apprehended in three distinct sweeps; on 28 December 1942 in 
Monaco, in Nice on 9 January and in Cannes on 26 January.
901
 Arguably, though, the 
majority of arrested people were either Italians (roughly one hundred people in total) or 
French nationals (roughly seven hundred). Both communities suffered from waves and 
individual arrests throughout the Italian occupation. Nevertheless, the French bore the brunt 
of the repression disproportionately. The French numbered four times as many as the Italians 
in the general population, yet the numbers arrested were seven times that of Italians arrested.  
Some arrests were brutally done. Suspects were normally picked up in the evening or 
in the middle of the night. They were seldom given time to dress, as the Italians reassured 
them and their family that they were not being arrested and would come back in, at most, half 
an hour. The suspects were then driven to Villa Lynwood, a house requisitioned in Nice from 
an English citizen, where members of the SIM and Polizia Politica interrogated their 
prisoners, resorting in some cases to physical and psychological torture.
902
 One common 
technique described by Resisters in their memoirs was the Giro (Circle), a torture consisting 
of walking the detainee in chains for hours or even allegedly for days in a corridor until the 
unfortunate dropped exhausted or agreed to confess his misdeeds.
903
 In another example of 
physical and psychological abuse, one prisoner, accused by an Italian irredentist of having 
denounced him to the French authorities in June 1940, later complained of having been 
beaten by members of the Italian Political Police and by his neighbor. The Italians allegedly 
                                                     
901 ADAM 166 W 9, Rapport n°2651 "Arrestations effectuées en Principauté de Monaco et dans mon secteur 
par les Autorités Militaires Italiennes," Commissariat de Beausoleil, 28 December 1942.  In the 26 January 
sweep, ten Belgians were also arrested.  
902 ADAM 616 W 233, Rapport n°7008 "Personnalités fascistes, Commandant Valente, dit Salerno et Capitaine 
Tisani," 27 June 1945.  
903 Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, pp.231-232. 
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forced him to drink castor oil, and in the face of his refusal, beat him, causing him to faint. 
The suspect, however, was lucky. He was released shortly thereafter, not without having 
been first severely rebuked and warned to leave the Italian irredentist alone.
904
 Those who 
were deemed dangerous to Italian security were shipped to the various internment camps 
administered by the Regio Esercito.  
The Italians used a variety of camps to hold their prisoners, depending on the reason 
for their arrests. Those who were only suspected of being part of Resistance groups or having 
anti-Italian feelings, but had not committed any actual offence against the Italian army, were 
transferred to the internment camp in the village of Sospel, a village north of Menton, 
situated near the border between the 1940 June occupied zone and the former Free Zone.
905
 
At the end of May 1943, these prisoners were transferred to a new camp in Embrun (Basses-
Alpes), a former French penal colony.
906
 In response to the sheer number of arrests following 
the spring 1943 escalation of violence in the departments occupied by the Italians, the Italian 
army created an internment camp in Modane (Savoy), this one reserved for Communist and 
Gaullist militants.
907
 Living conditions in all the camps were harsh. A detainee complained to 
                                                     
904 ADAM 318 W 31, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Guillaume P., Procès-verbal n°2176, 
déclaration de Mr. Vaizman, 2 December 1942. 
905 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 265, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°1065 "I" di prot. "Repressione reati in danno delle truppe di occupazione," Comando Quarta 
Armata, Ufficio Informazioni, 30 January 1943; Rapporto n°1173/Inf. di prot. "Custodia di arrestati nel campo 
di Sospello," Comando I CA, Ufficio Informazioni, 13 February 1943. The orders were reteirated as, apparently, 
some prisoners with specific charges were still erroneously sent to the Sospel camp. See AUSSME, M3 476, 
Divisione Legnano (occupazione Francia), Rapporto n°1155/inf. "Custodia di arrestati nel campo di Sospello," 
Comando Divisione Legnano, Sezione Informazioni, 17 February 1943. 
906 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 265, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°4471/Inf. di prot. "Trasferimento campo di concentramento," Comando I CA, Ufficio Informazioni, 
30 May 1943. 
907 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 265, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°3925/Inf. di prot. "Internati civili," Comando I CA, Ufficio Informazioni, 14 May 1943. The camp 
also hosted some non-Communist resisters, such as one branch of the Alsace-Lorraine Resistance network 
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his daughter that the prisoners were given only two hundred grams of bread a day, with just a 
meager bowl of soup for lunch and dinner.
908
 That being said, families could visit their 
relatives in the camp, a privilege not many detainees in Axis prisons enjoyed. In particular, 
according to letters intercepted by Vichy's Contrôle Postal, it seems that British and 
American citizens were treated fairly well.
909
 It is unclear how sincere was the attitude of the 
Italian commanders. Some historians have argued that the far-seeing Italians were already 
"playing it safe" with Allied citizens, understanding that the tide of war had turned and it 
behooved them to ingratiate themselves with the possible victors. That said, it is important to 
note that the special commission consisting of the head of Fourth Army Carabinieri, 
members of the Ufficio "I," of SIM and of the Political Police, which met periodically to 
review the prisoners' dossiers, freed people of all nationalities for humanitarian reasons.
910
 
For instance, fourteen French prisoners were freed from the Modane camp in July 1943 for 
health problems, which had made further detention dangerous for them.
911
  
Sospel, Embrun and Modane, however, were reserved only for suspects who had not 
been arrested on specific charges. Those who had committed an actual offence against the 
Regio Esercito were referred to the military court of the Fourth Army, which operated in the 
small border village of Breil-sur-Roya. Given its exceptional nature, its sentences were never 
publicized and even its existence was unknown to all but the French intelligence service and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
captured in Cannes on 25 May 1943. See ADAM 616 W 182 Liste "État nominatif des personnes résident (sic) à 
Cannes internées à Modane pour le motif figurant en face de chaque nom."   
908 ADAM 104 W 4, O.D. n°517 "Doléances sur le sort des internés au camp de Sospel," 13 February 1943. 
909 ADAM 104 W 4, W.I. n°330 "Libération prochaine des internés civils de Sospel," 10 March 1943. 
910 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 265, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°6623 "I" di prot. "Internati civili ed assegnati a residenza forzata," Comando Quarta Armata, 28 
April 1943.  





 Those awaiting their trials were generally detained either in Breil, 
Menton or occasionally in Turin. As in the other detention centers, conditions for the 
prisoners were harsh, but seldom unbearable. Acts of kindness were not uncommon; one 
prisoner stated to the French police upon his release that the Italians had even transferred him 
to a hospital to cure a temporary illness.
913
 Some prisoners underlined the sympathetic 
attitude of the Italian gaolers who sometimes alleviated the imprisonment by giving them 
extra food and cigarettes.
914
 Sentences were rather mild, and acquittals and suspended 
sentences were not rare, especially for minor offences such as alleged insults to Italian 
troops.
915
 In fact, the Italian tribunal clearly understood that some of the accusations had been 
made in bad faith by individuals slandering their neighbors. General Trabucchi, the head of 
the Fourth Army Staff, warned the Italian commanders of the danger represented by 
members of the Azione Nizzarda who used the Italian soldiers to settle petty quarrels with 
neighbors.
916
 If anything, the people prosecuted were surprised that trials were held with 
equity and with a real defense provided by military attorneys, and most considered the 
verdicts considered to be fair.
917
 
However, these arrests were frowned upon by local French authorities, as they clearly 
undermined the sovereignty of the French state. Indeed, local army commanders preferred to 
avoid any friction with Vichy officials. They had left regular administration to local 
                                                     
912 A summarized history of the Tribunal from the French perspective can be found in ADAM 618 W 162, 
Rapport n°343 "A/S de M. Blanc René," 21 June 1956. 
913 ADAM 616 W 261, Note "Renseignements fournis par M. Jean," no date. 
914 Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, pp.224-225. 
915 ADAM 616 W 182 has a lot of individual records of arrests in the Italian occupation period.  
916 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 270, IT 3131, 
Rapporto n°1085 "I" di prot. "Rapporti dei militari con l'Azione Nizzarda," Comando Quarta Armata, Ufficio 
Informazioni, 29 January 1943. 
917 Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, p.226. 
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authorities, preferring to focus on strategic and security matters. However, sometimes, 
confrontation was unavoidable. The Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes, Marcel Ribière, 
repeatedly protested the campaign of wanton arrests carried out by the Italians.
918
 To add 
insult to injury, the Italians did not hesitate to arrest French civil servants. Ange B., a French 
citizen who, as a Monaco police auxiliary, participated in the arrests of Italian irredentists in 
June 1940 was himself arrested on 28 December 1942.
919
 On 24 January 1943, it was the turn 
of Jacques Galli, the Chef de division à la Préfecture, one of the closest collaborators of the 
Alpe-Maritimes prefect, who was taken into custody by Italian police officers, 
notwithstanding the prefect's formal protest.
920
 As was the case with the Menton mayor 
Durandy, the Italians hoped to catch "the big fish" by first getting the "small fry." As 
mentioned before, Prefect Ribière had been at loggerheads with local Italian authorities since 
1940 because of his hardline anti-Italian attitude. The occupation of November 1942 only 
worsened the conflict, as increased Italian infringements on Vichy's authority considerably 
hardened Ribière's stance. The Italian army's protection of the Jews in the department, in 
flagrant opposition to Vichy's Jewish policy in the German zone of herding French and 
foreign Jews into concentration camps, only worsened the institutional conflict in the Alpes-
Maritimes.
921
 Moreover, the Italians criticized the Préfecture for its ineptitude in thwarting 
                                                     
918 ADAM 616 W 242 Fichier 24 Arréstations civils français, Lettre au Commandant XVème Corps d'Armée 
Italienne, 11 December 1942; Panicacci, Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1939-1945, p.173. 
919 ADAM 616 W 242, Fichier 24 Arréstations civils français, Rapport n°96/4 de la Gendarmerie Nationale, 
Brigade de Beausoleil, 20 December 1942. 
920 ADAM 616 W 242, Fichier 18, Rapport n°193 du Commissaire Eveno, 26 January 1943. The folder does not 
contain Ribière's letter of protest, but does include the official, icy reply from Vercellino in response to the 
prefect's query about his subordinate. Lettre n°1174 S "Fonctionnaire de la Préfecture: M. Galli," 26 January 
1943. 
921




the wave of sabotages and attacks on the Italians. It was inevitable then that, pressured by the 
Italians, a frustrated Ribière submitted his resignation in late April 1943.
922
  
A few other Alpes-Maritimes notables also came under attack. The Mayor of Nice, 
Jean Médecin, had already been blacklisted by the CIAF in November 1941 for speeches 
filled with nationalistic undertones.
923
 In a scathing report, Mazzolini, the Nice CIAF 
delegate until May 1942, summed up the story of the Nice administration in the first half of 
the twentieth century, focusing on the Médecin family who had allegedly misappropriated 
municipal funds originally assigned to repair the city's infrastructure.
924
 As in the case of 
Ribière, tensions worsened with the military occupation of November 1942. Italian 
authorities were certainly not impressed by a May 1943 report from the Mayor of Nice which 
denounced the brutal and massive intrusion of the Italian police into the daily life of Nice's 
inhabitants. The confidential report, written after a massive round-up on 6 May 1943, and 
which was supposed to be seen only by Vichy authorities, was leaked to the Italians.
925
 
Médecin had done nothing to hide his contempt for the Italian's repressive policy and he 
expressed his solidarity with the arrested persons by greeting them, one by one, at the railway 
                                                     
922 Dossiers for Ribière and Chaigneau can be found in ADAM 86 W 7. In truth, one should also recognize that 
the Alpes-Maritimes prefect apparently enjoyed little popularity among the local French population, for he 
was accused of not being able to stop the black-marketeering. Thus, his departure may have been demanded 
by higher civil servants in Vichy. In fact, the new prefect, Jean Chaigneau, proved to be more flexible in his 
relations with Italian authorities and more successful in the administration of food distribution within the 
department. 
923 AUSSME, D7 18, Notiziario quindicinale n°24, 20 November 1941, p.24. 
924 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 42, Telespresso n°597 R. "Amministrazione di Nizza," 19 
March 1942. 
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 Significantly the document has been found in an Italian archive, ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, 
Box 68, Mairie de Nice, Cabinet du Maire, Rapport établi le 15 Mai 1943. 
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station before their departure for the Embrun internment camp.
926
 It is plausible then that the 
occupation authorities pressured the mayor to quit. The Nizzardo stepped up its campaign 
against the Nice municipal administration.
927
  On 27 July 1943, Jean Médecin stepped down 
and Nice remained without a mayor until its liberation in August 1944.
928
  
Yet, the Italians were not always successful in ousting hostile notables. For instance, 
Monseigneur Rémond, the nationalist Bishop of Nice, kept his position until the end of the 
war, to the dismay of local irredentists, who saw the unwillingness of Italian authorities to 
arrest him as a worrying sign of "weakness."
929
 In fact, rumors abounded that the cellar of his 
residence was stacked with weapons.
930
 It has to be noted that the new consul in Nice, 
Calisse, contrary to his predecessors, held the bishop in good esteem.
931
 However, more 
probably, the Italian Fourth Army command did not dare detain the bishop for fear of 
incurring the Vatican's ire and because of the likely backlash it would spark in an army 
whose rank-and-file were mostly of Catholic faith. Thus, the Italians bothered only minor 
clerical figures, such as a Nice abbot who had allegedly railed against the Italian occupation 
during a marriage celebration.
932
  
                                                     
926 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Notiziario n°30, Comando I CA, Ufficio "I," 6 June 1943. 
927 The newspaper's issue could not be found by the author, but the attack was so virulent that even the Italian 
consulate in Nice complained the article was untimely. ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 68, 
Telegramma n°20932 "Giornale il Nizzardo," Gino Augusto Spechel, 18 July 1943. 
928 Panicacci, Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1939-1945, p.178. 
929 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°2043/Inf. "Notiziario n°1," Comando I CA, Ufficio Informazioni, 18 March 1943. 
930 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°1047 di prot. sm/1 "Attività informativa," Comando EFTF, 8 February 1943. 
931 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 59, Telespresso n°2326 R "Monsignor Rémond, vescovo di 
Nizza," 16 October 1942. 
932
 ADAM 104 W 4, Rapport n°317 A.A. "s/s/ arrestations pratiquées à Cannes et région par les Autorités 
Italiennes," Intendance de Police de Nice, 10 February 1943. 
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On the other hand, if we are to believe a 1941 report from Consul Camerani, it 
appears that a fair share of the Côte d'Azur clergy was fiercely anti-Italian.
933
 In fact, the 
animosity towards the Italians was so intense than even Italian nuns had been allegedly 
ostracized by their French peers.
934
 This hostility towards the occupiers partially translated 
into organized opposition. The Resistance in the Côte d'Azur started in 1940 after the French 
defeat, but as everywhere else in France, its first steps were hesitant. The Resistance in the 
Alpes-Maritimes in the first months of the Vichy regime remained largely, in the words of 
the Alpes-Maritimes specialist, Jean-Louis Panicacci, “the deeds of a few individuals, ... their 
action often confined to debates, epistolary exchanges, listening to Radio-London.”
935
 The 
shock of the defeat along with the widespread popularity of the Maréchal were probably key 
factors in explaining the slow start of the French Resistance. The situation did not improve in 
1941-1942, notwithstanding the fact that Jean Moulin had gone underground at the beginning 
of 1941 following his sojourn in Nice. Initially, acts of resistance did not go beyond the 
occasional leaflets directed against Vichy and expressing fear of an Italian occupation, or 
school pupils’ slurs directed against Pétain, which were probably more a result of youth 
rebelliousness than a true Resistance consciousness.
936
     
If the French Resistance was reserved in its activities until the second half of 1942, 
the same could be said for Italian leftist expatriates. Southern France was known in the 
interwar years as a strong militant base for the fuoriusciti. In the Alpes-Maritimes alone, the 
                                                     
933 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 48, Rapporto n°1420 "Attegiamento del clero francese," 17 
March 1941. 
934 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 59, Rapporto n°654 R. "Religiosi italiani in case francesi," 
Consul Mazzolini, 22 March 1942. 
935 Panicacci, Les Alpes-Maritimes, 1939-1945, p.115. 
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 Some examples of Gaullist leaflets can be found in ADAM 159 W 43. Some examples of youth 
rebell  usness, su h as  he s ra  h ng  f P  a n’s p r ra  ,  an be f un   n ADAM 616 W 306. 
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Unione Popolare Italiana (UPI), a movement created in 1937 from the merging of all Italian 
antifascist organizations, could boast more than 5,000 militants.
937
  However, the UPI was 
fatally weakened by internal conflict between the two major political factions, the 
Communists and the Socialists. That rift widened dramatically after the German-Soviet Pact 
in August 1939. Socialists, who strongly opposed the pact, left the UPI along with some 
Communists. This secession could not have happened at a worst moment: first, the Third 
Republic, and then the regime of Vichy cracked down on the Italian leftist network in 
southern France. As mentioned earlier, a few hundred fuoriusciti were put in internment 
camps or under house arrest and Vichy shrewdly traded Italian leftist leaders, such as Luigi 
Longo, for French citizens who had been jailed in Italy at the beginning of the hostilities.   
If the Italian military occupation of the Côte d'Azur in November 1942 finally 
galvanized the local fuoriusciti and French Resistance, the local Resistance still needed a few 
months to become active. Jean Moulin succeeded in merging three of the most important 
Resistance groups (Combat, Libération-Sud, Franc-Tireur) into the MUR (Mouvement Unis 
de la Résistance). Its military branch, the Armée Secrète, was probably responsible for a 
wave of attacks meant to destabilize the Vichy regime. Several months before the Italian 
occupation, starting in the second half of 1942 and continuing in 1943, offices of 
collaborationist groups such as Jacques Doriot's Parti Populaire Français (PPF) and the 
Parti Franciste, and of Vichy organizations such as the Légion Française des Combattants 
(LFC), the Service D'Ordre Légionnaire (SOL) and the Légion des Volontaires Français 
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 Jean-L u s Pan  a   , “Les C mmun s es   al ens  ans les Alpes-Maritimes (1939-45),” Annali della 
Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, XXIV, Milano, 1985, pp.155-180. 
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contre le bolchevisme (LVF) were bombed or set alight.
938
 Sometimes, the Resistance 
targeted the shops of known French collaborationists.
939
 Other businesses that were working 
for the Axis powers were also attacked: a movie theater in Nice that showed German 
propaganda movies was set on fire in October 1942.
940
 A newsstand owner was threatened 
with having his business burned if he kept on selling collaborationist and pro-German 
newspapers and magazines.
941
 In May 1943, a bomb exploded in the Préfecture of the Alpes-
Maritimes, although it caused only minimal damage.
942
 
The Action Secrète strategy was concurrent to the campaign against the Italian 
occupation orchestrated by the Communist fuoriusciti, who were led by Emilio Sereni.
943
 
Anti-Italian resistance fell into three categories: efforts to undermine of the Italian soldiers' 
morale; the sabotage of infrastructure essential to the Italian army, especially the railway 
network and the telephone lines; and lastly, as the occupation continued, direct attacks on 
Italian soldiers. The Resistance, particularly the fuoriusciti, wanted to weaken the Italian 
army from within by infiltrating its ranks with spies and agents provocateurs. To this end, 
they tried to approach lone soldiers either in cafés or in bistros to persuade them to desert, 
playing on their desire to return home. Italian officers complained that soldiers were even 
                                                     
938 ADAM 166 W 1, Rapport n°130/4 du Capitaine André sur des incidents à caractère anti-nationaux, 8 
September 1942. 
939 ADAM 166 W 1, Rapport n°124/4 du Capitaine André sur un incident à caractère communiste, 3 September 
1942 
940 ADAM 166 W 1, Rapport n°153/4  de l'Adjudant-Chef Tourre sur des attentats commis à Nice, 12 October 
1942. 
941 ADAM 166 W 1, Rapport n°11.750/09 de l'Inspécteur Moschetti, 27 October 1942. 
942 ADAM 166 W 1, Rapport n°6.024/PS "Attentat par engin explosif à l'hôtel de la préfecture," Inspécteur de 
police Langlais, 5 May 1943.  
943 Sereni became a leading figure of the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano) in postwar Italy until his death in 
1977. He was arrested in June 1943 by the Italian police, see note 184, Chapter 7. "The Italian occupation 
policy in France: the repressive forbearance of the Italian army." 
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invited by fuoriusciti to their homes for a glass of wine or to wash their clothes, where the 
conversation would turn to the news from other fronts.
944
 The Italian military authorities took 
this menace very seriously. General Olmi of the Legnano Division insisted that soldiers 
should be encouraged with the reward of extra leaves and money to report suspicious 
attitudes among civilians. Conversely, failure to do so could not only lead to a soldier's 
indictment, but also to collective sanctions against the soldier's unit.
945
 In light of this 
decision, it is not surprising that soldiers denounced Resistance recruiters to their 
commanders. In some cases, the soldier feigned interest in the offer, only to lure the recruiter 
to a meeting that ended in arrest and a hefty twenty-year sentence.
946
 Therefore, the 
fuoriusciti also pursued other more indirect and less risky ways to spread their propaganda. 
They published a newspaper, called La Parola del Soldato (The Word of the Soldier), which 
was distributed by either dropping it furtively in front of Italian barracks during the night or 
simply leaving it on the sidewalk. The paper invited the Italian soldier to desert and join the 
ranks of the Resistance against the German army. By emphasizing the poor conditions of the 
average Italian rank-and-file, the paper not only endeavored to drive a wedge between the 
soldiers and their officers, but also between the Italians and the Germans. According to the 
newspaper, the Germans were sleeping in "cozy bunks" at first-class hotels that were heated 
                                                     
944 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°3786/Inf. "Propaganda comunista presso i militari a Nizza," Comando I CA, 8 May 1943. 
945 AUSSME, M3 476, Divisione Legnano (occupazione Francia), Rapporto n°1390/inf. di prot. "Contegno 
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by coal stoves while the Italians had to cope with beds made of "four wood boards on two 
rickety trestles" in shacks barely warmed by inadequate wood stoves.
947
  
Of course, the views in the Parola were biased and tended to exaggerate the divide 
between the two armies. Yet, as mentioned before with regard to wages and living 
conditions, it is likely that this particular indictment held a kernel of truth. Besides, the 
newspaper's editors seems to be well-informed on the whereabouts of the Fourth Army, as an 
article mentioned that leaves to Sicily, Sardinia and to southern Italy more generally had 
been cancelled. It is difficult to gauge the extent of the anti-Axis presence in the ranks of the 
Italian army. However, it is probably enlightening that in August 1943 Italian commanders 
complained that the Italian Communists were infiltrating the ranks of the Fourth Army.
948
 
Their worries were well-founded: in a trial of the Italian Communist organization in the 
Alpes-Maritimes in late August 1943, four of the thirty-four accused were soldiers from the 
Fourth Army.
949
 That a profound malaise permeated the army was clear when General 
Vercellino himself irately complained that soldiers were openly singing "rebellious songs" 
(inni sovversivi) in front of their officers.
950
 Of course, the fuoriusciti cleverly exploited the 
period of confusion following the ousting of the Duce in July 1943, but defeatist ideas 
apparently had seeped into the Italian army long before the fall of the Fascist regime.  
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In addition to fostering the seeds of defeatism within Italian ranks, the local resistance 
endeavored to discourage the local population from helping the occupation army. Thus, they 
also widened their attacks to include the shops and houses of notorious Italian irredentists. 
People who displayed openly their support for the Italian troops or who brazenly 
demonstrated a pro-Fascist attitude received death threats or got their shops bombed. On 8 
February 1943, in Antibes, several makeshift bombs were found in the premises of shops or 
houses of Italian Fascist militants who had been previously singled out as informers for the 
Italian army in a tract distributed in mailboxes throughout the city.
951
 However, reprisals for 
collaborating with the Italian occupation army could be even more ruthless. On 5 June 1943, 
two individuals entered a cobbler's shop in Nice and shot the owner, Giuseppe Moraglia, and 
his wife, Serafina. The two murderers, later arrested by French police officers while fleeing 
the crime scene, were two Italian fuoriusciti, former members of the Italian Communist Party 




Infiltrating army ranks and intimidating the irredentist minority in the Alpes-
Maritimes were only the first steps of a strategy to weaken the Italian war effort. The local 
Resistance also resorted to more direct means to oppose the Italian military occupation. No 
attacks were carried out by the Resistance until the end of 1942, as they were gauging the 
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size of the Italian army and its occupation policy.
953
 This wait-and-see strategy ended at the 
beginning of 1943. The wave of arrests awoke the local resisters from their torpor and forced 
them change their strategy. Their new strategy followed two directions. First, they targeted 
railway and telephone lines. Railway lines were crucial for moving troops and goods, and the 
local Resistance was aware that the line between Genova and Marseille, which ran parallel to 
the coastline, was key to feeding the Italian units deployed along the Mediterranean shore. 
Therefore, beginning in January 1943, they unleashed a series of attacks on the railway line: 
boulders were hurled on the tracks and explosive devices were planted, targeting tunnels and 
bridges especially.
954
 To stop the wave of sabotage, the Italian units, which were already 
short on men, requested the assistance of local authorities. French police officers, border 
guards and even members of the newborn French Milice were commandeered to patrol the 
railway lines.
955
  This measure did not, however, stop the wrecking of the railway lines, 
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At the same time, the local Resistance fighters decided to step up their struggle by 
taking direct aim at Italian soldiers. It is unclear if the first attacks attributed to the Resistance 
were truly the deeds of resisters or were the result of the deep sense of insecurity pervading 
the Italian army in France. For instance, on 4 January 1943 in Cagnes-sur-Mer, the exhaust 
roar of Italian military motorcycles was apparently mistaken as rifle shots.
957
 A few days 
later, one Italian sentry posted near railway tracks was shot in the leg, allegedly fired from a 
passing train. However, further investigation uncovered a somewhat confusing picture in 
which the evidence did not corroborate the soldier's account. In fact, the police and the 




If nothing else, these incidents demonstrated the edginess of the Italian soldiers. Yet, 
until February, direct strikes on Italian troops were rare and not very effective. A bomb 
hurled near Italian barracks in Nice detonated, without causing much damage.
959
 In fact, the 
same report mentioned that explosive devices that had been used by the Resistance so far 
were of poor quality and failed to explode most of the time. In his February report, the same 
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By March 1943, local resisters had grown bolder. A CIAF office (Border Control and 
Surveillance Delegation) in Cros-de-Cagnes had its telephone lines cut and was the target of 
a bomb.
961
 Four bombs were thrown into the courtyard of the Caserne Dugommier, former 
barracks of the French Army in Nice, now occupied by Italian units. Even though only one of 
the four bombs detonated and it caused only minimal damage, the French report noted that 
the devices had a more "destructive power" than the other ones previously used by the 
Resistance.
962
 This impression was confirmed on 10 April 1943, when a powerful detonation 
shook the night in Cannes. The door of a garage loaned to members of the local CIAF office 




The situation escalated at the end of April 1943. The Axis front on North Africa was 
collapsing as Allied troops advanced into Tunisia, the last African territory still in the hand of 
the Axis powers. With repeated acts of sabotage, the local Resistance was hoping to 
contribute to the prospective Allied invasion of the French Mediterranean shores by 
weakening the already shaky Italian distribution system. The Italian Army General Staff 
understandably was becoming increasingly worried that the internal situation was 
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de Nice, 7 March 1943. 
962 ADAM 166 W 11 Fichier Attentats contre les troupes italiennes, Rapport n°3029 "Explosion de bombe dans 
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radicalizing. North Africa, Italian military leaders feared, would be a stepping-stone for the 
possible invasion of the most exposed Italian territories in the Mediterranean area, the islands 
of Sicily and Sardinia. The Army General Staff warned local army commanders that there 
were serious risks "in the short term (brevissima scadenza) of enemy operation against our 
coastline."
964
 Thus, Italian military leaders feared a possible Allied invasion of France in 
spring 1943. At a local level, the Superesercito's stern warning trickled down to the units 
quartered in France. Army Corps commanders warned that the Anglo-American offensive 
strike in Tunisia might trigger "turmoil and hostile acts" (fermenti e atti ostili) in France.
965
 
In other words, the Italian's greatest fear of being caught between the hammer of an Anglo-
American landing and the anvil of a French insurrection, was taking shape.  
Units deployed on the coastline were reminded by a dispatch from the Italian General 
Staff that they should continue to strictly enforce the 10 January regulation which had 
divided Italian-occupied France into two zones, the Combat Zone (also named Zone A) and 
the Rear Zone (Zone B).
966
 It also ordered that a strict curfew from 11 p.m. to 4 a.m. be 
enforced in the Combat Zone starting from 27 April.
967
 The Fourth Army Command 
communicated the new regulation to the Prefectures of the coastline departments, the Alpes-
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Maritimes and the Var, which in turn relayed the information to all the major newspapers, 
and posters to that effect were placarded in every city and town.  
27 April 1943 would not be remembered in the story of the Italian occupation just as 
the beginning of the curfew. That evening, three officers of the local Italian garrison were 
gunned down while waiting for the trolley in the center of Nice. One of the officers, 
Lieutenant Junior Giorgio Tobino, died a few hours later from a severe hemorrhage, the first 
Italian soldier to die in France during the occupation.
968
 No suspect was found. The local 
Italian military commander immediately blamed the French police of "guilty negligence, if 
not of outright complicity." The commander warned that if the culprits were not found by 5 
May, the Italian army would ask for the dismissal of both the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes, 
Ribière, and the head of the Nice police, Duraffour.
969
 In the meantime, a longer curfew than 
originally planned was imposed in Nice, from 9 p.m. to 5 a.m., and all the theaters, cinemas 
and public halls were closed until further notice. Finally, the city of Nice was required to pay 
a hefty fine of three million francs by 29 April at noon.
970
 It is evident that the Italian military 
authorities were determined to punish the population as a whole. It is worth noting that no 
punishment was implemented by the Italians, even though wild rumors were spreading even 
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before the attack that the Italians would be handing over the occupation to the German army, 
or even worse, to local irredentists who would use it to pursue personal vendettas.
971
 On the 
contrary, the funeral of the Italian officer was uneventful in its somber ceremony and no 
major incident erupted in the following days.
972
 Local military authorities were probably 
keeping the irredentists at bay. At first then, the Italian army reacted surprisingly passively to 
the death of its first soldier of the occupation. In addition, the military took measures to 
reduce the troops' exposure. Italian commanders advised their officers to avoid settling in 
isolated apartments or villas where their security could not be assured.
973
 Soldiers going to 
the movies were required to return to their barracks before nightfall.
974
 Furthermore, officers 
who had to leave their barracks after curfew were instructed that they should always be 
armed and always with other soldiers.
975
  
The Fourth Army command was not idle, however. By 5 May, they were planning a 
major operation against the Resistance in Nice. On 1 May, the Fourth Army Command had 
issued a note to the entire coastline Army Corps detailing an upcoming round-up in Nice of 
"Communist" elements. The operation was to be headed by the highest officer of the Fourth 
Army military police, the Carabinieri. The local Italian garrison would be supported by a 
whole division, the EFTF, a reserve unit quartered further inland, along with a few hundred 
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Carabinieri from other units and even two regiments of the elite unit Legnano. Everything 
was prepared in minute detail: all the major routes leading to Nice were closed starting from 
10 p.m. on the 6 May. The arrests of suspects began shortly thereafter. The suspects were 
herded into the Nice racetrack where military doctors checked if the prisoner's health would 
be compatible with detention. Those who passed the physical were sent to the Modane 
internment camp. The operation took a full day, with the Italian army's supply services 
ordered to prepare more than one thousand meals for all the prisoners and their guards.
976
  
In spite of being the largest round-up to date, and the expectation that it would catch 
hundreds, the result was underwhelming. Vercellino's short telegram to Superesercito on 8 
May 1943 flatly stated that only 225 individuals had been arrested.
977
  Communist fuoriusciti 
in the Alpes-Maritimes, who had been responsible of several bombing attacks, including the 
one at the Caserne Dugommier, were only arrested a few months later, between June and 
July 1943.
978
 In fact, according to a French police report, most of those arrested were not 
even Communists, let alone fuoriusciti. Various notables, officials working in the Nice 
municipality, lawyers, engineers and a few retired policemen and army officers were among 
the victims of the raid.
979
 Some of the arrested had no links whatsoever with the Resistance, 
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 341 
but were only guilty of having quarreled with their neighbors.
980
 Indeed, the raid was flawed 
from the start because the Italians' intelligence was based on unreliable sources such as local 
irredentists. The local commander may in fact have been encouraged to use irredentist 
informants by an order from General Vercellino that directed the head of the Nice 
stronghold, the commander of the I CA division, to use the GAN to spread Italian 
propaganda.
981
 Something went wrong, as, according to a French informant who had leaked 
confidential information garnered at a GAN reunion a few days after the raid, the Italian 
authorities were furious with local informants who used the army to win petty rivalries with 
neighbors. In the future, they declared informants would be held responsible for their 




In light of the unreliable intelligence, a few prisoners were freed within days.
983
 The 
uneasiness in the Fourth Army high echelons over the faulty operation could explain the 
surprisingly lenient occupation policy of the Italian army in the following days. On 8 May, 
the Italian army relaxed its grip by reducing the curfew to 11 p.m. - 4 a.m. and theaters were 
again opened until 9 p.m. This decision would have been logical if the Italians had the feeling 
that the situation was calming down after the sweep of the Communist organizations. 
However, one day before the curfew was reduced, on 7 May, the Italian army was attacked 
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again. At noon, two men on bicycles threw two bombs inside the Hotel Francia, which had 
been requisitioned by the occupation army.
984
 The two bombs intended to inflict maximum 
damage as they were aimed at the officer's mess at a time where it would have been normally 
filled to its capacity. As fate would have it, lunch had been postponed that day and thus no 
one was injured. The attack also demonstrated the military's vulnerability. The mess not only 
was on the ground floor, but it also had two windows, both of which opened on a street.
985
 
The attack on the officers' mess was the first of a wave of strikes against the Italian 
army in May 1943. On 11 May, an Italian motorcycle patrol was ambushed in Trinité-Victor, 
a hilly suburb north of Nice. Four suffered minor injuries.
986
 The day after, a bomb was 
thrown into an Italian military gas depot.
987
 On 14 May, a bomb exploded on the windowsill 
of a school in Marseille which housed Italian units in transit. Seven soldiers were injured and 
one of them died a few days later.
988
 On 16 May, another bomb exploded in Cannes near the 
barracks of a Fascist milice unit, injuring one.
989
 After every incident, Italian local authorities 
enforced strict curfews and carried out round-ups of citizens, choosing their targets from 
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informers' lists and from among passersby, without much success in finding the real culprits. 
Many of those arrested were released very quickly.
990
  
June 1943 was less eventful compared to the previous months. Little sabotage was 
recorded and there were no direct attacks on Italian soldiers, apart from an officer in Nice 
who was found unconscious in an alley, having been beaten. However, the Italian army did 
not publicize to the incident, allegedly because the cause of the attack was a dispute over a 
woman.
991
 July was a different scenario. Bombs detonated in front of both French 
collaborationists and Italian irredentists' stores, or on the threshold of Vichy organizations 
such as the Légion.
992
 Sabotage of railway tracks were frequent even near Italian outposts.
993
 
In fact, the Italians were so exasperated by the recurrent destruction of their lines of 
communication that at least in one instance they held hostages, threatening to detain them 
indefinitely if the perpetrators were not found.
994
 However, the severity of this sabotage was 
nothing compared to the bombing attack on the Da Vico restaurant in Nice. On 20 July, a 
man entered the restaurant at lunchtime, which was packed with Italian soldiers, and threw a 
bomb. The explosion left five people on the ground, three of them in critical condition. One 
of the wounded, an Italian private, later died at the hospital. The other two who were severely 
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injured were Nino Lamboglia, a university professor who had openly espoused irredentist 
ideas, and his secretary, each of whom had one leg amputated by the blast.
995
 The true target 
of the attack had been the head of SIM in Nice, Major Valenti, who was having lunch with 
his collaborators.
996
 The attack was publicly rebuked by French local authorities. The Prefect 
released a statement which described the bombing attack as "loathsome and cowardly."
997
 
The Contrôle Postal revealed that even the local French population opposed the resisters, not 
out of sympathy for the Italian occupation army, but more out of fear of Italian reprisals. If 




In all these crises, one could not help noticing that local commanders, while 
responding to the threat with swift determination, seldom overreacted. The relative 
moderation of the Italian military occupation in France was reflected in the low numbers of 
casualties directly tied to the occupation. Of the roughly thousand individuals detained in 
Italian prisons in the ten months of the occupation, it seems that only two persons, a 56 year-
old American citizen, and the President of Nice Chamber of Commerce Francesco Becchi, 
died as a result of their detention.
999
 However, the two were not the only casualties tied to the 
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Italian occupation period. In particular, two cases made the headlines. On the night of 9-10 
January 1943, Giacomo D.C. of the Cadore Battalion escaped from his unit's prison, where 
he was being detained for having incited some comrades to desert, and fled in the night, 
taking with him a rifle and some hand grenades. His escape ended in tragedy a week later on 
the Savoy border. Driven by hunger, the soldier broke into a farm and killed its owner, a 
French border guard who had grown suspicious.
1000
 In another unfortunate instance, a 
gendarme in Digne was murdered by three Italian soldiers who had been caught poaching. 
The incident sparked widespread indignation in the small department of the Basses-Alpes. 
Local Italian authorities promptly reacted to defuse the crisis, a fact acknowledged in French 
reports. They immediately investigated and located the culprits, who were prosecuted in a 
military trial held in Digne and sentenced to twenty-two years each. The population was not 
entirely satisfied with the verdict, as they had demanded the death penalty. Yet the local 
command made the trial public and the judgment was passed quickly as a token of goodwill. 
Moreover, the Italian army donated an important sum of money to the gendarme's widow as 
compensation for the loss of her husband.
1001
 If in the instances of the two prisoners a fair 
                                                                                                                                                                  
round-up underlined that military doctors should check the health of the persons arrested to prevent anyone 
with a condition incompatible with incarceration from being detained. AUSSME, DS 1320, Rapporto n°6824/I 
di prot. "Epurazione della città di Nizza," Diario Storico Quarta Armata, Allegato 7. On the other hand, Becchi 
died shortly after being released from custody. ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 68, Telegramma 
n°239 R "Sig. Francesco Becchi: morte," Console italiano a Nizza Calisse, 19 March 1943. Calisse seemed to 
criticize the SIM in his report, as he underlined the fact that Becchi was 77 years old and his health might have 
been incompatible with detention. Jean-Louis Panicacci also cites the case of a fuoriuscito, Luigi Rosso, who 
had been tortured and killed in the Dugommier barracks. However, no archival document, either French or 
Italian, has been found to corroborate the alleged murder and Panicacci's assumption is solely based on the 
oral testimony of another Resister, Louis Pietri. Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, p.233.  
1000 AUSSME, Giustizia militare. Sentenze, carteggio, F19 82, n°3052 del processo, 13 February 1943. The 
culprit was sentenced to thirty years. He escaped the death penalty only because he had been previously 
decorated for heroic deeds. 
1001 Reports on the incident can be found in ADAHP, 42 W 82. 
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share of responsibility for the death lay with the Italian army for its detention of individuals 
in frail health, in the latter two murder cases, the responsibility of the Italian army was not so 
obvious. The murders in fact were carried out by Italian soldiers who were disobeying orders 
and thus did not commit their crimes as soldiers of the Fourth Army. These crimes cannot be 
ascribed to Italian occupation policy. In fact, local Italian commanders incessantly warned 
sentinels to use their weapons only at as a last resort, even against railway saboteurs.
1002
 Of 
course, the official reasons to avoid firing needlessly were very pragmatic because the 
commanders considered a resister much more useful taken alive, so as to be interrogated. 
Nevertheless, it is plausible to think that army commanders also wanted to avoid having 
nervous sentinels shoot innocent passersby.
1003
  
The above examples were reflective of the Italian commanders' desire to smooth the 
tensions between their soldiers and the local population. The biggest fear of the Fourth Army 
Command was to further destabilize a situation which was already partially compromised by 
the inherent weakness of the Italian army's deployment in southeastern France. For an army 
that was already overstretched and suffering poor morale, the defense of the Mediterranean 
coastline would have been a daunting task in itself, let alone if they also had to deal with 
internal rebellion. Thus, the Italian commanders had to implement security measures which 
would disrupt the daily life of the local population as little as possible. Moreover, any 
                                                     
1002 AUSSME, DS 1100, Rapporto n°1348/Inf. di prot. "Intempestività di sentinelle o vedette nel fare uso delle 
armi," Diario Storico Divisione Legnano, Allegato 68, 20 February 1943; ARC, Collection of Italian Military 
Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 269, IT 3105, Rapport n°640/Inf. "Sabotaggio linee 
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the night for a resister. See ADAM 166 W 10, Fichier Incidents provoqués par les troupes italiennes, 1942-
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political rhetoric had to be set aside, as any annexationist propaganda would probably be the 
best way to rally the whole population behind the banner of French revanchism.  
This relatively benign policy irritated local irredentists for they accused the army of 
being too soft with French nationalists, such as in the case of Monseigneur Rémond, who 
was never arrested despite his strong anti-Italian stance.
1004
 The local CIAF personnel, too, 
were unimpressed by the occupation policy of the Fourth Army. The CIAF, along with the 
Foreign Ministry, had a more political approach to the occupation and thus held different 
objectives than the military. Their long-term goal, reaffirmed incessantly in their reports, was 
the political, cultural and economic integration of the Provence into the Italian nation. As 
early as 1941, the Italian Finance Minister Thaon de Revel had commissioned a study to 
investigate how the Italians could penetrate the local economy by investing in crucial sectors 
such as tourism and the gaming industry (casinos).
1005
 Cultural integration was the task 
assigned to Nino Lamboglia, a university professor and curator of a local museum in 
Bordighera, an Italian village near Menton. Lamboglia, the author of several books 
underlining the Italian character of the County of Nice, had been watched carefully by the 
French police even before the occupation as he toured various Nice museums, taking pictures 
of documents and historic relics which could prove the Italian nature of the region.
1006
 For 
these activities, Lamboglia was expelled from France in April 1941. In the wake of the 
                                                     
1004 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 266, IT 3099, 
Rapporto n°2043/Inf. di prot. "Notiziario n°1," I CA Ufficio Informazioni, 18 March 1943. 
1005 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 55, "Studio preliminare per lo studio di un programma di 
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Lamboglia's mission was only one facet of a wider plan for cultural penetration 
espoused by the Italian Ministry of Culture, Giuseppe Bottai. A January 1943 memorandum 
from the Minister of Culture is especially revealing. The Minister approved a project 
proposed by Senator Mattia Moresco, the director of the Istituto di Studi Liguri, for the 
creation of a program of Provencal Studies.
1008
 The program would involve experts in 
different fields such as archeology and art history, linguistics and history, who would travel 
to France for research. The fact that the Istituto di Studi Liguri was a cultural institute known 
as a major cultural hub for irredentist scholars was a good hint at the overarching goal of the 
program. In fact, the memorandum explicitly underscored "the advisability that the military 
occupation of Nice and the Provence should be followed by an immediate cultural campaign 
which could be carried out by transferring some of the activities of the Institute to Nice, 
especially a few courses and conferences." This campaign, the memorandum continued, 
would stress that Provence, "as a Ligure, Roman and Mediterranean land whose history and 
tradition ... could be easily integrated into the Italian culture." It should be noted that the 
Italians were merely following the example of the Germans who, in the wake of the German 
occupation, had allegedly brought to France "some scholars whose role was to underscore all 
the traits and documentation of the Germanic influx in France throughout the centuries." The 
Culture Minister concluded his memorandum by underlining the importance of this cultural 
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1008
 The memorandum can be found in ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 80, Lettera n°40 Div. II 
"Istituti di Studi Liguri - Programma di studi provenzali," Ministero dell'Educazione Nazionale, 23 January 1943. 
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campaign, which could greatly benefit the activities of the Italian Foreign Ministry and 
reinforce Italy's future territorial claim. Thus, it is evident that civilian Italian authorities 
were already laying the groundwork for the political annexation of occupied France. In 
February, under the aegis of the Culture Ministry, Lamboglia published a book with the 
evocative title of Nizza nella Storia, (Nice in History), a monograph that explained the 
historical ties between Nice and Italy. Moreover, conferences were organized at the 
University of Nice to prove scientifically the cultural bonds between Provence and Italy.
1009
 
It was inevitable that these goals would clash with the moderate policies of the Italian 
army who had no immediate interest in annexing the newly occupied territory.  The growing 
battle between the two agencies was ultimately won by the army, when the reorganization of 
the CIAF in March 1943 subordinated it to the Fourth Army. On 10 March, the Italian 
Supreme Command ordered a major overhaul of the Italian political network in France. This 
overhaul, which became effective on 1 April, integrated the three CIAF military bureaus 
(Army, Navy, Airforce) into the Fourth Army's administration. More importantly, the 
General Affairs Bureau in Turin was reduced to a liaison office linked to the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry and was now headed by Bonarelli di Castelbompiano, the Foreign Ministry's liaison 




                                                     
1009 Rainero, La Commission italienne  ’armistice avec la France, p.336. See also the report of the conference 
"Il Trofeo della Turbia nella latinità" on the ramifications of the Roman Heritage in the Alpes-Maritimes 
organized by Lamboglia, Il Nizzardo, n°25, Year X, 27 June 1943, p.2. 
1010 For the official order of the restructuring, AUSSME, DS 4A, Telegramma n°11390/op., Diario Storico 
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Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 345, IT 4356, Telegramma 
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The official rationale behind these changes was to smooth the negotiation process 
between local Italian military and French authorities. Indeed, previously any communication 
between the local army commander and the French civil servants had to be channeled 
through both chains of command, via CIAF, the French liaison bureau attached in Turin, and 
finally to Vichy. Now the Italian local commanders could talk directly to local notables and 
needed to report only the results to Vercellino. However, the real reason behind this 
reorganization was the desire of the Italian army command to remove the CIAF from any 
matter that could impinge on the occupation. Local commanders seized control over a 
number of key responsibilities that had been assigned to the CIAF, such as the oversight of 
French army depots. The army also created Nuclei di Collegamento e Controllo (Control and 
Liaison Units) which were attached to the French prefectures without informing the CIAF 
presidency. These were expected to replace the CIAF delegations. According to the CIAF 
President Vacca Maggiolini, these units were incapable of controlling the French 
paramilitary organizations now that the CIAF informant network had been dismantled.
1011
 
 Indeed, one of the consequences of this reorganization was a severe disruption to the 
Italian informant network. Some officials who worked in France for CIAF undercommissions 
were dismissed from their jobs, causing a serious break in the stream of information.
1012
 
Thereafter, even the release of the CIAF fortnightly bulletin on the political and economic 
situation in the Italian occupation zone, which had been compiled by the various bureaus in 
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 Vacca Maggiolini lamented the fact that the Fourth Army 
Command refused to send a fortnight report, choosing instead to send a skimpy monthly 
report that left the CIAF in the dark as to what was happening in France. The CIAF had been 
reduced to a dry husk by the reorganization.
1014
 The true hub of power in the occupied zone 
had shifted to the headquarters of the Fourth Army in Menton.  
The brewing conflict between the CIAF, backed up by the Foreign Ministry, and the 
Fourth Army had ended in a clear victory for the military.  Fourth Army commands had 
complete control over policy in occupied France, while the CIAF's power now rapidly 
dwindled. The CIAF was increasingly attacked over both in terms its legitimacy and its 
efficiency. In a memorandum inssued on 16 July 1943, War Under-Secretary Antonio Sorice 
wrote to the head of the Army General Staff, General Ambrosio, openly accusing CIAF 
officials of holding their offices out of nepotism or favoritism (raccomandati). He also 
claimed that the CIAF personnel living in Turin was squandering the CIAF's budget on a life 
of luxury, inexcusable in a city which had repeatedly suffered from heavy Allied 
bombardments.
1015
 Sorice's indictment of CIAF officials echoed a deeper resentment on the 
part of the army quartered in France. According to an I CA report, the rank-and-file in the 
Fourth Army resented the special allowance given to CIAF members in France especially 
after March 1943, when they had far less duties and responsibilities.
1016
 CIAF personnel in 
                                                     
1013 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 345, IT 4356, 
Telegramma n°16367/I "Attivita' informativa," Vacca Maggiolini, Turin, 11 May 1943.  
1014 Rainero suggests that Vacca Maggiolini emerged from the duel with Vercellino victorious. Rainero, La 
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 Rainero, La Commission italienne  ’armistice avec la France, p.336. 
1016 AUSSME, DS 1100, Rapporto n°451/SA., Comando I CA, Diario Storico I CA, Allegato 51, 3 March 1943. 
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France were also suspected of using their office to pursue their own private interests, by 
using their travel privileges to establish black market networks.
1017
  
Apart from the loss of prestige, it was evident, that by the summer of 1943, the CIAF 
was outliving its purpose. Its president, Vacca Maggiolini, threatened to resign several times 
and was only stopped by General Ambrosio's persuaviness.
1018
 However, Ambrosio's 
soothing words could not hide the stark truth: CIAF had been reduced to a secondary role, far 
from any decision-making process and was often bypassed by Fourth Army commanders. As 
an example, an Italian army convoy arrived at the Vernet internment camp in June 1943 to 
transfer most of its Italian prisoners further east without even informing the Italian consul in 
Toulouse, who had been working incessantly for two years to speed up the liberation process 
of the internees. In fact, the bewildered Consul only found out about the operation by chance 
the day after, when the commander in charge of the operation asked the Consulate to send a 
telegram to warn the Fourth Army Services of the incoming convoy. The Consul was furious 




Not surprisingly, CIAF officials struck back, criticizing the Italian army's policy. The 
CIAF delegate in Nice, Speichel, attacked the Fourth Army Command after the attack at the 
Davico restaurant. Speichel, with the support of the Foreign Italian Ministry, severely 
                                                     
1017 For instance, three CIAF civilians were intercepted at the French-Italian border with wristwatches, jewelry 
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criticized the 9 p.m. - 5 a.m. curfew imposed after the attack questioning the usefulness of a 
nightly curfew, acidly noting that the bombing attack had happened in broad daylight in a 
public place "supposedly guarded by the Italian police and soldiers." The curfew would not 
only restrict civilians from having access to entertainment events in the evening, but would 
also force "the population to shut themselves away in insalubrious and overcrowded 
neighborhoods." In fact, the Consul argued that strict regulations such as these that impinged 
indiscriminately on everyone's life would drive a wedge between the Italian army and the 
local population, thus advancing the Resistance's goal of breeding a climate of suspicion in 
the Alpes-Maritimes.
1020
 The army's reply was venomous. General Vercellino belittled the 
CIAF delegate's argument as an example of "the simplistic mentality of an official, who, 
shortly after coming to Nice, already sees himself as the perfect judge of the situation." He 
went on to defend the Fourth Army's policy, affirming that the limited number of incidents 
was a clear demonstration that the Italian security policy was harsh enough to be a threat to 
possible resisters, but lenient enough not to stir a massive uprising.
1021
 
Speichel's concern appears less the result of a genuine concern for the wellbeing of 
the local Italian and French community than the desire not to alienate the population, in 
anticipation of the future annexation of the County of Nice. His criticism however, was 
unusual, as officials in the Foreign Ministry tended to complain more about the laxity of the 
Italian military policy in France. At the end of May 1943, Foreign Minister Bastianini sent a 
reproachful report, General Ambrosio, deploring the complacent attitude of the army 
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commanders, whose moderate and tolerant policy could be interpreted by the local 
Resistance as a sign of weakness. This situation was especially damaging to the Italian 
interests in regions targeted for future annexation, he thought. In fact, the Farnesina was 
explicit that the policy should ideally "protect and indirectly favor the local separatist and 
irredentist movements while preventing any opposition to the Italian political penetration 
from French authorities and police."
1022
 The Foreign Minister's doubts stemmed in fact from 
two venomous reports by the CIAF Delegate in Corsica Ugo Turcato on Italian military 
policy in Corsica. The Farnesina plenipotentiary made a jab at the local Italian commands by 
dismissing them as prone to "excessive tolerance and weakness" (eccessiva tolleranza e 
debolezza). He insisted that it would be necessary to shore up the Italian police, Blackshirts 
and military forces on the isle, while cracking down on any enemy radio propaganda. This 
hardline approach would require an "energetic and resolute Command." Moreover, the CIAF 
delegate had bitterly complained at being sidelined along with the irredentist movement in 
November 1942, while conversely Italian military commanders enjoyed a frank relationship 
with the Corsica Prefect Balley. The report concluded that a drastic change in occupation 
policy was necessary in light of the future annexation of the island.
1023
  
It is interesting to note that Turcato's harsh stance against Vichy authorities had not 
been always consistent. In June 1942, in another report to the Farnesina the Italian consul 
                                                     
1022 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 9, IT 19, 
Rapporto n°1/2893 "Appunto per l'Eccellenza il Generale Ambrosio," 28 May 1943. See also AUSSME, DS 1218, 
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openly criticized the irredentist movement in Corsica and their "bungled actions" (pasticci). 
This time, the Italian diplomat recommended a moderate tone to the propaganda which 
would "avoid directly bashing France, its institutions, especially its army," as many 
Corsicans considered themselves Frenchmen as much as Corsicans.
1024
 This surprising 
change of mind, which is akin to the evolution of the attitude towards the irredentist 
movement of the Nice CIAF delegation, can be indeed explained by the evolving political-
military situation in southeastern France. Before November 1942, CIAF delegates were wary 
not of openly displaying annexationist ideas or supporting irredentist groups as the very 
existence of the CIAF delegations was still uncertain and contested by Vichy. After the 
Italian invasion, Italian CIAF delegates along with irredentist movements became bolder in 
their demands, probably in part because they felt more secure. However, it is plausible to also 
see the CIAF officials' attacks on the occupation policy of the Fourth Army as a battle within 
the Fascist state between the Army and the Italian foreign Ministry. CIAF delegates who 
dreamt of being nominated civil commissars with the same prerogatives as the ones in the 
Italian occupied zone were outraged at being cast aside by local commanders, and lashed 
back, complaining to their superiors about the alleged ineffectiveness of Italian units 
quartered in France.  
Regardless of the motivations, Turcato's criticism was tersely rebuffed by the army. 
Ambrosio immediately replied to Bastianini, politely but firmly rejecting that the Italian 
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army's policy was softening, giving as an example the decisions recently taken in Nice.
1025
 
Army officials were less diplomatic regarding Turcato. The CIAF delegate's report was 
dismissed as a view "looking only at the dark side of things (a tinte esageratamente fosche)." 
Moreover, in a telltale sign of the problematic relations between army and CIAF officials in 
France, the General Staff icily pointed out that Turcato signed his reports as "R. Consolato - 
Bastia" (Royal Consulate Bastia), but he was in fact only an official  of the Delegazione 
assistenza e rimpatrio which was, in fact, completely subordinated to the local Command 
(the VII CA). The document insisted, that until the war was over, no consulates could exist in 
an enemy territory and thus "the only authority was the military."
1026
 Because the CIAF 
delegate was subordinated to the military chain of command, his report should have been 
sent to the local Army command, not to the Italian Foreign Ministry. In another slashing 
report on 5 July, the General Staff noted that Generale Magli, the military head of the 
Corsican army, had the full support of General Roatta, the head of the Army General Staff, 
who had just returned from an inspection tour on the island. The report subsequently 
lambasted Turcato who had failed his responsibilities both in form (no report to the VII CA 
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n°136, Comando Supremo a Bastianini, 6 June 1943. Here, Ambrosio is alluding to the massive round-up in 
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The friction between the Italian civilian and military authorities was not confined to 
Corsica. In an addendum written in the afternoon, the same 5 July document, was even more 
explicit as to who were the supreme authorities in France. In dismissing Turcato, the Regio 
Esercito would effectively demonstrate that "a beneficial example on the authority in charge 
in France and in Corsica was the military one." The report protested that the Fourth Army 
command was being deligitimized "by an analogous campaign, however more prudent in its 
form, from Minister Bonarelli and the other Delegates for the Assistance and Repatrations [in 
mainland France]."
1028
 A report by C. de Constantin, an Italian Farnesina official, written to 
Minister Guariglia, was especially damning of the military. The memorandum began by 
rehashing the arguments made by irredentist groups about the Italian character of the County 
of Nice. He denied any beneficial effect of a soft policy, which made the Italians appear as 
dupes (minchioni) whose gullibility (dabbenagine) was mocked by the local population. 
Instead, he advocated a policy of force (regime di forza) that would legitimize the 
prospective annexation of the County of Nice. In other words, Italians were to act as victors, 
because the French population was irremediably hostile to the Italian cause. The Prefect and 
the Mayor had to be ousted and replaced by an Italian Civil Commissar, and part of the 
population evacuated by force to make room for Italian colonists.
1029
 In his arguments, De 
Constantin was merely reiterating the opinions of the irredentist circles, who wanted to repeat 
the experiment of Menton in the County of Nice, notwithstanding its poor results. 
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De Constantin was also furious that Fourth Army commanders had not only 
frequently turned down offers of collaboration by GAN members, but also severely hindered 
their actions. It is undeniable that the Italian occupation army regarded the GAN with a 
mixture of skepticism and hostility.
1030
 In a controversial decision, the Italian commander of 
the Nice garrison, General Andreoli, had disarmed GAN members after the assassination of 
the irredentist informers, the Moraglia couple, in June 1943. This preventive measure had 
been further reinforced by increasing curfew hours, but only for GAN members. It is obvious 
that the Italian military commander feared that the GAN's desire for revenge would escalate 
the spiral of violence in the Alpes-Maritimes and full-fledged civil war was the last thing the 
Italian commanders wanted when they needed to concentrate their meager resources on 
repelling a forthcoming invasion.
1031
 On the other hand, local witnesses confirmed that it was 
local irredentists who had broken into the shops of Frenchmen imprisoned in the May round-
up, ransacking them, and they had also seen the same irredentists leaving the CIAF building. 
The link seemed to be clear.
1032
  
In light of the sympathy of the CIAF personnel for irredentist ideas, it is not 
surprising that many outspoken irredentists were frequent visitors to Italian delegations or 
Case d'Italia. In his trial, Jean C. admitted to having denounced Italian antifascists in 
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Beausoleil to the Italian consulate in Monaco.
1033
 Other irredentists who were habitués of the 
parties at the Consulate were identified as informers in the round-ups carried out by the 
Italian police.
1034
 Irredentists helped the CIAF delegations in other ways such as mounting 
guard over the CIAF delegation in Nice.
1035
 Two individuals accepted positions as ushers at 
the Italian consulate in Monaco, one of whom was nicknamed "the Death Messenger" 
(Messaggero della Morte) for his enthusiastic distribution of postcards calling on to young 
Italians in Monaco to enlist.
1036
 A few individuals were even more useful, such as the 
building contractor who agreed to repair the Casa d'Italia of Nice free of charge.
1037
 The 
close relations between the local irredentist movement and CIAF delegations should not 
imply that irredentists had no ties with members of the occupation army. One of the most 
rabid Fascists in Nice, Guillaume Paolini, was a regular guest at the CIAF Delegation, but 
also he had strong ties with the Fourth Army commanders because he rented his garage to 
Italian officers. That explains why Paolini, after being arrested by the French police for 
denouncing two neighbors, was released by an Italian military squad led by an angry officer 
who threatened to retaliate accordingly if the French police ever bothered Paolini again.
1038
  
It is important not to overestimate the importance of the irredentist movement. During 
the postwar trials, any individual who had had any relation whatsoever with either the CIAF 
or the Italian occupation army was indicted for intelligence avec l'ennemi, as both 
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organizations had been formally part of an enemy nation. However, the first thing that the 
French prosecutors tried to assess was whether the accused had subscribed to either the 
GAN, the Marcia Su Nizza (March on Nice) or the Italian Fascist Party. To help them in the 
matter, the French police had found a list of the GAN and PNF adherents carelessly left 
behind by hurried Italian officials when fleeing the Italian consulate of Nice in the summer of 
1944.
1039
 It would be tempting to view the members of the GAN and the PNF as part of the 
irredentist movement in toto. Nevertheless, considerable evidence proves this link simplistic. 
Almost all the accused admitted being part of the some Fascist organizations, but many 
argued that they had been forced, swindled or bribed to sign the paper. It also appears that 
irredentist recruiters inflated their numbers. One individual, whose name was found on the 
GAN member list, was in fact a French police informer who had been tricked into signing a 
donation for the poor children of Italian emigrants in Nice that in truth was a member form 
for the GAN.
1040
 Sometimes, an emigrant was forced to subscribe; one resident in Beausoleil 
joined to the PNF to spare his father, a well-known Communist in the region, any trouble 
with Italian authorities.
1041
 In other cases, the threat was more explicit: one irredentist 
recruiter warned a hesitant Italian that he could be shot and his parents living in Italy arrested 
if he did not embrace the irredentist cause.
1042
 Conversely, some Italian emigrants chose to 
ally with local Italian authorities because of the very tangible benefits that could come with 
it. One doctor joined the PNF as early as the 1930s in order to get a passport to facilitate 
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visits to Italy in order to look after his businesses there.
1043
 An Italian father registered his 
sons in the GILE, the Fascist youth group, so they could participate in holiday camps in 
Monaco.
1044




It is dubious whether we can include these cases as truly part of the irredentist 
movement inasmuch as their relationship with the CIAF was mostly motivated by non-
political reasons. Some individuals are even more problematic to place into the irredentist 
category.  The case of Joseph Caffiero is indeed emblematic. This sixty-eight-year-old 
Italian, sixty years of which had been spent in France, was an entrepreneur with an 
established business in typewriters and cinema projectors. Recipient of the Chevalier de la 
Legion d'Honneur, a honor recognizing his participation in the First World War as part of the 
famous Garibaldiens de l'Argonne, Caffiero was arrested in June 1940 and sent to an 
internment camp. The French accused him of having strong ties with the local Casa d'Italia 
even though it appears his trips were not politically motivated. He was a prominent 
fundraiser for the indigent in the Italian community. During his detention, Caffiero witnessed 
a Nice gendarme, Inspector Bagarre, brutally attack an Italian irredentist, Cardone. The 
victim later denounced Bagarre and Caffiero agreed to testify. Bagarre was ultimately 
sentenced to fifteen days in prison and was temporarily dismissed from his job. After the 
war, Bagarre, having been reinstated to his office, arrested Caffiero. Notwithstanding the fact 
that three of his sons were Resisters, and that several Jews testified in his favor, the Italian 
                                                     
1043 ADAM 318 W 51, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Joseph T. 
1044
 ADAM 318 W 86, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Cesare G.  
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entrepreneur was sentenced to two years for having had a business relationship with the 
CIAF and the Italian army. One could speculate as to how much Bagarre's influence, as well 
as the general climate of hatred of the Italians in postwar France, shaped on the judgment.
1046
 
In another controversial instance, an Italian entrepreneur who had business relations with the 
Italian army started receiving death threats in the form of small coffins sent in packages to 
his mailbox. The businessperson was so scared that he complained to Italian officers. Fearing 
for his life and expecting the Resisters to come to get him, he never mistook German and 
Italian police officers for the Resistance and shot them through the door, severely injuring 
one. The Italian was clearly on the brink of paranoia. Later, two Frenchmen who had 
allegedly sent the coffins were arrested by the Italians.
1047
 Given the fact that at least the 
anxious entrepreneur was right when he accused one of those arrested, who admitted in the 
entrepreneur's postwar trial of having sent the threats, one could wonder whether the Italian 
entrepreneur was really to blame. He was genuinely scared and probably did not fully 
acknowledge the gravity of denouncing neighbors to an occupation army that could imprison 
them in internment camps for months before getting a trial. 
Both men were sentenced for intelligence avec l'ennemi and were cast in French 
reports as "dangerous irredentists" who had striven to corrupt French society from within. In 
fact, their cases were not unusual. Postwar Nice courts acquitted several individuals who had 
been wrongly accused of misdeeds against the French nation by neighbors seeking revenge 
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or to personal vendettas. In some cases, it was evident that jealousy of a successful business 
could lead envious competitors to defame individuals.
1048
 French prosecutors ultimately 
decided that merely serving Italian soldiers as regular clients was not on its own sufficient to 
qualify as intelligence avec l'ennemi.
1049
 In some rare cases, the Tribunal de Grande Instance 
dismissed the charges, even if the accused had been found to have been an admirer of 
Mussolini until 1940, provided he could prove that he not supported the irredentist goal of 
the annexation of the County of Nice.
1050
 
Arguably, some testimonies can be dismissed as unreliable because it was in the 
interest of the accused to downplay their Fascist sentiments. However, even if the number of 
Italian persons indicted and sentenced by the new French Republic courts is counted, it is 
evident that the irredentist movement was very marginal even in the County of Nice, the 
territory which was at the heart of irredentist plans. An unofficial list compiled by the French 
police totalled 540 individuals in the Alpes-Maritimes, 330 of whom lived in Nice and had 
signed up for the March to Nice, acted as informers, or espoused annexationist ideas.
1051
 The 
list of Italian Fascists found in the Casa d'Italia had 1,200 names, but it included anyone who 
had been even remotely associated with the Italian state from as early as the 1920s.
1052
 Even 
if it is assumed that all the people in the list were irredentists, it is clear that the Fascist and 
                                                     
1048 That was the case, for instance, of several Italians who owned flower stalls in the Boulevard Thiers market, 
one of the most important in Nice. See ADAM 318 W 54, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Joseph 
F. and Dossier Lucie G. and ADAM 318 W 30, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Menardo/Barberis. 
1049 ADAM 318 W 24, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Jean G. 
1050 ADAM 318 W 39, Cours de Justice des Alpes-Maritimes, Dossier Edouard, Rose et Marie P. 
1051 The list can be found in ADAM 104 W 17. The other irredentist hubs apart from Nice were Monaco (50) 
and Antibes (28). 
1052 ADAM 618 W 165. The list is sorted by alphabetical order. Each entry was classified into different 
categories: 17/37 (old militants), MSVN (Fascist Milice), AN (GAN adherents), MN (March to Nice), FFR (Fascist 
Republican Party), W.SS (Waffen SS). The list is a catch-all in that it also included people who were later 
acquitted of any ties. 
 
 364 
irredentist organizations represented only a small minority of the 150,000 Italians living in 
the department of the Alpes-Maritimes. Of course, this minority was extremely vocal, 
especially after the invasion of November 1942, and this explains the fear on the part of the 
French population of an Italianization led by irredentist leaders, as well as the targeting of 
individual pro-Fascist individuals by Resisters. These irredentists, many of whom had 
emigrated in the 1930s and had integrated very poorly into the French social fabric, had been 
celebrating since June 1940 in anticipation of Nizza Italiana. "Nice is ours!" was the rallying 
cry in many irredentist circles. 
However, the irredentists who had been waving to Italian columns and hugging the 
marching soldiers in November 1942 did not understand that annexing the occupied 
territories was not an immediate priority for Italian military leaders. Fourth Army leaders 
were primarily interested in securing the shoreline in southeastern France from a possible 
Allied invasion while keeping a watchful eye for any local rebellion. In other words, Fourth 
Army commanders were ordered to crack down on any sign of an uprising or Resistance 
organizations, but without blindly retaliating against the whole population. They, of course, 
feared that a heavy-handed approach would only spark a full-fledged rebellion by a 
population who was already hostile. Moreover, Italian commanders were concerned by the 
poor quality of the Italian ranks, and recognized the fact that their soldiers would not be 
capable of handling an Allied invasion along with an internal uprising, especially if the 
population shared common cultural roots with them. This explains why the Fourth Army 
commanders espoused a policy of moderation throughout the occupation, and only took mild 
collective measures when forced to so. Their point in those instances was more to reaffirm 
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their authority than punish the population. Thus, they never went as far as the German 
commanders who, in Marseille in January, retaliated against a series of Resistance attacks 
against the local garrison by demolishing the neighborhood of the Vieux Port and arresting 
2,000 persons, most of them Jews, who were then sent to concentration camps.
1053
  
Of course, the fact that the irredentist movement was quite marginal even within the 
Italian community in France made it simpler for local commanders to keep these outcasts at 
arm's length. As early as June 1941, an army directive had barred Italian soldiers from 
belonging to the GAN organization, even though GAN members never really represented a 
serious threat to the Italian army due to their lack of political leverage.
1054
 The Italian army 
was also wary not to support any French collaborationist parties, even though it appears they 
occasionally used their informers.
1055
 In fact, both the PPF and the Parti Franciste vied for 
official endorsement as the Fascist party in France, but the Italians dismissed their claims, 
especially in light of their marked unpopularity among the French population.
1056
                     
In hindsight, the Italian occupation of France was tempered and its impact relatively 
light. Few casualties were directly the result of the occupation and neither massacres nor 
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executions were meted out. The Italian army suffered from only a few serious attacks, none 
of which seriously undermined their strategy. Sabotage was more a nuisance than a serious 
threat to their logistical network. This can be explained in part by the inchoate growth of the 
Resistance in southeastern France, whose organizations did not really take off before the end 
of 1943 after the Italian occupation ended.
1057
 Even in the Savoy region, where the Italians 
were confronted by groups of Maquis, the situation did not escalate tremendously.
1058
 Yet, 
the absence of a widespread internal front was also the consequence of Italian army's 
forbearance in France, and an occupation policy that was, most of the time, carefully 
calibrated to the gravity of the situation. Instead of embracing the irredentist discourse, the 
army favored a much more lenient approach, conscious that a hardline policy could easily 
provoke a violent confrontation with the local population. Therefore, army commanders were 
asked by the Italian General Staff to douse the fire of irredentism. Arguably, their task was 
made simpler not only by the marginality of the irredentist movement, but also the closed 
integration of the Italian community into the French social fabric. An Antibes police report in 
April 1943 emphasized that the absence of incidents in the town was due to the "great 
                                                     
1057 This was not lost on the Italian Commanders, who often argued in their reports that the sabotage was 
more than just individual acts by isolated persons, but was a concerted strategy by organization. See for 
instance, AUSSME, DS 1186, Rapporto n°3125/Op. "Situazione Mensile 21 Marzo - 20 Aprile," Comando I CA, 
Diario Storico I CA, Allegato 71, 24 April 1943. It is undeniable, though, that the Resistance still privileged  the 
more indirect approach of infiltrating army ranks to sap the morale with defeatist propaganda in the summer 
of 1943. See ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 
265, IT 3099, Rapporto n°4687/Inf. di prot. "Direttive delle forze sovversive in Francia," Comando I CA, 3 June 
1943. 
1058 Christian Villermet, A Noi Savoia, Histoire de l'occupation italienne en Savoie, novembre 1942 - septembre 
1943, Les Marches: La Fontaine de Siloé, 1991, see especially Part Three, "Les Réactions des Savoyards." The 
Savoy was the only  French region, aside from Corsica, where a resister, Henri Lanier, was executed for having 




number of Italian citizens or people with Italian heritage."
1059
 Yet, local irredentists were 
always eager to flex their muscles and to escalate confrontations with the French community 
and those Italians who were naturalized French, seen as traitors who had given up their 
Italian soul for a slice of bread. Thus, the army remained vigilant. 
The relative moderation of the Italian policy should not cause us forget that we are 
still talking of a military occupation of an enemy country. In the Second World War, military 
occupations by the Axis were always seen by the local populace as a traumatic intrusion in 
their everyday life and an attack on the nation's sovereignty. The intrusion was incessant as 
occupiers and occupied had to live side by side during a difficult period. The Italian 
occupation heavily impinged on everyday life with its curfews, evacuations and 
expropriations. The population was greatly angered by the wave of thefts committed by 
Italian soldiers at a time of great need. Waves of arrests which targeted people not tied to the 
Resistance were also a reminder that no one was safe.  
However, the situation never spiraled out of control due in part to the self-restraint of 
the occupation policy, in part to the disorganization in the French Resistance, and in part due 
to the cultural proximity of the Italian army with the local population. Yet, it should be 
emphasized that the primary motive underlying the Italian forbearance was pragmatic, for the 
Italian military leaders recognized it would have been unrealistic to try to both repel a 
prospective Allied invasion while also clamping down on an internal uprising of the 
population led by Resistance fighters using an army of demoralized, ill-equipped and ill-
trained soldiers who were only looking forward to returning home. The Fourth Army 
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command, helped by the Italian Political Police, seemed to be in control of the situation. The 
Italian policy was a conscious decision on the part of the command, not a mere expedient to 
counter a difficult strategic situation. In fact, Rainero's view that local Italian commanders 
were largely oblivious to the Resistance's whereabouts in France seems misplaced.
1060
 After 
all, the Italians had dismantled the two most important Resistance organizations in the Alpes-




Thus, for very calculated reasons, the Italian army refused to implement an 
Italianization policy such as the one carried out in Menton. No Italian civilian authority 
equivalent to the Civil Commissars was ever established in the former Free Zone, even 
though the Italians could have easily exploited the power vacuum after the dismissal of key 
Vichy officials, such as the mayor of Nice or the Prefect of the Alpes-Maritimes. They were 
not oblivious per se to Fascist imperialistic propaganda, as the army had fully supported 
Mussolini's dreams of conquest. However, they frowned upon any policy, be it Italianization, 
colonization or any other political disruptive policy, which could fuel the fire of French 
nationalism and thus lead to a showdown with the local population and Resistance. 
This pragmatic approach to the occupation did not please either the CIAF or the local 
irredentists. The CIAF had been planning for immediate annexation since its inception. In 
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1941, it had laid out a project for the final incorporation of Zone Libre in the Italian state, 
anticipating that an Italian military occupation would spark French military resistance or 
compel the government to flee abroad. Both conditions de facto would have broken the terms 
of the Armistice and thus legitimized the establishment of an Italian authority in France 
headed by the CIAF.
1062
 CIAF officials were thus probably disappointed that the invasion of 
November 1942 did not engender any widespread rebellion in France, as Vichy gave the 
order to its officials and to the French Armistice Army to remain passive. What is more, 
Italian army cadres incessantly stressed that the resulting Italian occupation was not political. 
Local French authorities were to remain in power, unless they hindered the Italian military 
policy. On 23 March 1943, the Army General Staff had issued a directive that ordered Fourth 
Army commanders to "safeguard in appearance (nella forma) the French sovereignty and the 
prestige of the legal government," "willing autolimitation" (underlined in original) as it was 
described.
1063
 The occupation was even more disappointing for local Fascists. Irredentists in 
Provence had greeted the army as their saviors, expecting in turn that the army would be their 
weapon against their hated French neighbors who had discriminated against them for years. 
Their leaders thought that they would be placed at the helm of a new Italian region, soon 
annexed to the realm of Italy. None of this happened.  
It is indeed ironic that, for years, Fascist propaganda had banged on the irredentist 
drum, especially with regards to the County of Nice, and now that the Italians had finally 
occupied the whole Côte d'Azur, they were not at all interested in annexing it. It would be too 
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simplistic to cast the army as a moderate faction within the Italian state and CIAF as the 
extremist one. Both organizations shared the same overarching goal, but they had different 
short-term objectives and both aimed to be in charge of the new province. As the Fourth 
Army command got the upper hand, it became evident that the Italian policy in southeastern 
France would be far more based on pragmatism and moderation than on Fascist ideals and an 
iron grip. Indeed, more than the structural problems of the Italian army, it was the careful 
planning of Fourth Army cadres that was the main reason why the tension never erupted into 





"You have to consider them as individuals living in concentration 
camps:" The Italian Jewish Policy 
If CIAF officials and Army commanders locked horns quite consistently in light of 
their different perspectives about the occupation, they agreed on at least one issue: the 
defense of the Jewish refugees in southern France. This aspect of the Italian occupation has 
been, without a doubt the most carefully examined by modern historiography since the end of 
the Second World War. As early as 1946, Léon Poliakov, one of the founders of the Centre 
de documentation juive contemporaine published a book, La condition des Juifs en France 
sous l'occupation italienne, which first delineated how astonishingly effectively Italian 
authorities in France had managed to shield the Jews in their occupation zone.
1064
 Later 
monographs later have reinforced this paradigm, although some works more recently had 
questioned the extent of the Italian rescue.
1065
 It is however important to examine the Jewish 
question again, as it sheds some light on the overall Italian occupation policy in southeastern 
France. The real debate in fact lies on understanding the reasons for this surprising and 
lenient attitude. Yet, only by setting the question in its historical context can one be able to 
fully understand the motivations of the Italians. 
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The Italian Jewish policy could not be studied without first focusing on Vichy's, as 
the former was a direct response to the latter. Arguably though, Vichy's virulent hatred for 
the Jews was not borne out of the blue. In fact, French anti-Semitism had deep roots, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century with a surge of radical nationalism and conservative 
Catholicism. The nationalists considered the Jews a foreign body, insisting on their potential 
harmful influence on French society. Extremists in the Catholic movement insisted on the 
deicide nature of the Jews and their inherently destructive behavior. Indeed, the downfall of a 
Catholic banking house, the Union Générale, was blamed on speculations by the Jewish 
finance. All the anti-Semitic factions coalesced in France in the infamous Dreyfus Affair at 
the end of the century. Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish artillery captain in the French army, was 
accused in 1894 of having smuggled military intelligence to the Germans. Subsequent trials 
revealed that many documents had been forged. However, the general consensus held that 
Dreyfus was guilty: eighty percent of the press in France condemned him. Even if Dreyfus 
was ultimately vindicated, the trial revealed the underlying anti-Semitism of the time. A 
product of this brooding sentiment, l'Action Française, a nationalist movement with staunch 
anti-Semitic undertones, was born shortly after the end of the trial.
1066
 The First World War 
coincided with an ebb of anti-Jewish hatred in France, as Jewish-French soldiers fought as 
valiantly as their non-Jewish fellows on the various fronts of the war. The economic crisis of 
the 1930s saw a resurgence of a rabid hatred of the Jews, a part of the wave of xenophobia 
spreading over Europe. The arrival in the 1930s of foreign Jews from all over Europe 
exacerbated this sentiment, to the point that even French Jews resented this intrusion, for fear 
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Indeed, indigenous anti-Semitism was heightened after June 1940 by the need to find 
scapegoats for one of the most egregious humiliations in the history of France. It is not much 
of a truism that Vichy's anti-semitic policy begun even before the Germans demanded the 
implementation of discriminatory measures. As a matter of fact, given the fact that most of 
the Vichy officials came from the conservative right, if not the extreme right, the Vichy 
regime from its inception begun its own programme of anti-Semitic discrimination, itself part 
of a wider xenophobic trend. Out of the 15,000 individuals who were stripped of their French 
nationality following the 22 July 1940 denaturalization law, more than 6,000 were Jews. 
Racist activists in the traditionalist right-wing groups such as L’Action Française of Charles 
Maurras and in pro-collaboration newspapers such as Je suis partout and Au pilori, were 
given free rein to spew their anti-Semitic rhetoric. Jews were unremittingly flagged as a 
foreign body in the fabric of French society. The 3 October 1940 Jewish Statute, which 
forbade Jews to hold high-ranking public offices or comparable positions in media or 
teaching, officially launched l’antisémitisme d’État.
1068
  
Vichy did not just content itself with ostracizing Jews from civilian society, it actively 
sought to expel them from the Free Zone. It has been widely demonstrated that Vichy was 
instrumental in the pursuit of the Jews. It is important to note here that Vichy's and the Nazi 
anti-semitic policies differed, at least at the beginning, in one important aspect. Whereas the 
Germans wanted to deport any Jew found in France regardless of the nationality, Vichy 
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sought at first to protect its nationals, both because of reasons of prestige and because there 
were veterans of the First World War among the French Jews. In a cynical example of 
Realpolitik, they bartered the lives of foreign Jews for the safety, albeit in the end only 
temporarily, of French Jews.   
On 4 July 1942, the head of the German police in France, SS Carl Oberg, and the 
Secretary-General in charge of the French police, René Bousquet, struck a deal to dispose of 
the foreign Jewish population on French soil.
1069
 In the infamous Rafle du Vel d’Hiver (Vel 
d’Hiver Round-Up) on 16 July 1942, thousands of French policemen rounded up more than 
12,000 Jews, who were later sent to extermination camps in Eastern Europe. Of course, not 
all Vichy officials were fiercely anti-Semitic. Prime Minister Pierre Laval, for instance, was 
not so much anti-Semitic as he was a pragmatist. He used the Jews, especially foreign ones, 
as a bargaining chip in his endless negotiations with the Germans. But many Vichy civil 
servants, such as the heads of the Vichy's Commissariat General aux Questions Juives 
(Office for Jewish Affairs or CGQJ), Xavier Vallat, and his successor, Louis Darquier de 
Pellepoix, never hid their fierce hatred of the Jews and, along with pro-Nazi collaborationists, 
were always eager to use them as scapegoats for the woes of France.  
This is nowhere as evident as in the Alpes-Maritimes. After the occupation of the 
northern half of France, Jews started flocking to the French Riviera in great numbers.
1070
 This 
concentration of Jews ignited anti-Semitic propaganda in the region, which blamed the “rich 
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Jews” for driving up food prices. The Nez Crochus (or Hooked Noses, as in anti-Semitic 
propaganda Jews were often portrayed as villainous individuals with hooked noses, full lips 
and frizzy hair) were often accused of running black market operations, either by buying or 
selling illicit goods.
1071
 Racial hatred directed against the Jews erupted in violence on 16 
June 1942 when PPF thugs pillaged the synagogue of Rue Deloye in Nice. The moment 
seemed ripe to tighten the noose around the Jews. The Bousquet-Oberg agreement paved the 
way for the round up of approximately 500 Jews in Nice on 26 August 1942, mainly 
expatriates from Eastern Europe, Germany, Austria and Russia, who were arrested and sent 
to the Drancy camp.
1072
 Prefect Ribière, who, along with the Nice Police Intendant 
Duraffour, supervised the round up, congratulated the police for “the way the [round-up] 
operations [of Jews] were carried out.”
1073
 However, the greater part of the Nice population 
disapproved of the operation, so much so that the objects of their earlier scorn were now 
looked upon with pity.
1074
 French Catholic prelates openly expressed their disapproval of 
Vichy’s policy for the first time.
1075
 The Bishop of Montauban (Tarn-et-Garonne) voiced his 
outrage in an open letter which was read in all the churches of his diocese during the 30 
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August mass. Without ambiguity, the letter declared that “the current anti-Semitic measures 
are disrespectful of human dignity; the violation of the most sacred rights of the individual 
and of the family.”
1076
 A few days later, one of the most prominent figures of French 
Catholicism, Cardinal Pierre-Marie Gerlier, echoed the Bishop of Montauban’s indignation 
in an open letter that stated that “we are witnessing a cruel scattering of families where 
nothing is spared, neither the aged, nor the frail or the ill.”
1077
  
This opposition did not stop the government from pursuing its Jewish policy. Prodded 
by the German administration in France which was already deporting Jews from the 
Occupied Zone to the East with the help of the French police, Vichy strove to send Jews from 
the Zone Libre to the Occupied one, starting with foreign Jews. Vichy police, helped by the 
Sections d'Enquête et Contrôle, the security force of the CGQJ, unwaveringly hunted down 
Jews. The situation radicalized with the occupation of southern France in November 1942. 
On 10 December 1942, orders issued from Berlin demanded the immediate arrest and 
deportation of all Jews in France. One day later, Laval signed a decree that required Jews to 
report to the nearest Gendarmerie to have the word "Jew" stamped on their identity and 
rations cards.
1078
 This discriminatory measure was issued along with two other measures: 
Jews aged eighteen to fifty-five of neutral or enemy nations were to be immediately 
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incorporated into the Groupements de Travailleurs Étrangers, while Jews in coastline 
departments were to be transferred inland in the departments of Drôme and Ardèche.
1079
  
These later decisions sparked a flurry of reactions from both civilian and military 
Italian authorities, who felt Vichy authorities were interfering with the Italian occupation. 
The Italian CIAF delegate in Nice, Calisse, immediately pointed out to the Prefect that Italian 
Jewish citizens were not subject to Vichy decrees.
1080
 The head of the Fourth Army General 
Staff, General Trabucchi, issued a directive to all commanders on 30 December expressly 
pointing out that no Jew in the Italian occupation zone should be interned by Vichy 
authorities.
1081
 The opposition to any French action against the Jews was further confirmed 
by Inspector Barranco, the head of the Political Police in Nice on 6 January 1943.
1082
 
Barranco in fact delineated the future Jewish policy of the Italian authorities in France. Jews 
were to be sent into forced residence in small villages in the Alpes-Maritimes and in the 
Basses-Alpes, preferably to hotels that could host the thousands of Jews of the Alpes-
Maritimes without splitting up the families. Small Regio Esercito units would supervise and 
guard these Jewish refugees. In the opinion of Barranco, this policy would "answer a 
standard of justice and humanity" (criterio di giustizia ed umanità).  
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Not surprisingly, rumors of the Italians' benign attitude in the Alpes-Maritimes were 
already spreading like wildfire throughout France. Jews flocked by the hundreds, if not 
thousands, to Nice, where they were received by a Jewish welfare organization, the Comité 
d'Aide aux Réfugiés (Refugees' Aid Committee, later known as the Comité Dubouchage, due 
to its location on Rue Dubouchage). The Committee was informally recognized by the Italian 
authorities and its importance should not be underestimated.
1083
 Aside from material aid, the 
Committee issued temporary "identity cards," an important tool regularizing the positions of 
persons permanently living on margin of society. These cards de facto shielded the Jewish 
refugees from wanton deportation by the French authorities, as these refugees were selected 
by the Italians to be sent to forced residences.
1084
  
The rescue operations were organized by Angelo Mordechai Donati, a well-to-do 
Italian Jewish banker who had acquired an important position in France during the interwar 
years as President of the Chambre de Commerce Italo-Française (Franco-Italian Chamber of 
Commerce). Donati had settled in Nice after the French military defeat in June 1940 and 
continued his banking activities there, helped by the fact that he was extremely influential in 
Italian political circles, especially in the Italian Foreign Ministry. If the first CIAF delegate in 
Nice Camerani in his visceral anti-Semitism despised Donati, his successors' attitude was the 
exact opposite.
1085
 Count Mazzolini was an old friend, and their relationship dated back to 
their frontline experiences in the First World War, and even his successor Consul Calisse 
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 It is still a debate in academic literature whether Donati really 
had enough influence to soften Italian policy.
1087
 One thing is certain: his whereabouts were 
carefully scrutinized by the French. A police report in April 1943 mentioned his involvement 
in the rescue operations of the Jews flocking in Nice.
1088
 Moreover, an anonymous anti-
Semitic report from June 1943, probably written by a militant member of a collaborationist 
group in Nice, denounced the nefarious influence of the "Jewish Pope" (Pape des Juifs) as 
the Côte d'Azur quickly became the "Jewish Paradise" (Paradis des Juifs). In fact, Donati 
was not only hated by French anti-Semitic militants, but also feared: he was allegedly an 
intimate friend of the Duce himself and that explained, from the twisted perspective of the 




In fact, the author of the virulent pamphlet was flabbergasted by the protection 
enjoyed by the Jewish community in southeastern France, a policy in glaring opposition not 
only to the German one, but also to Vichy's. For this reason, on 14 January 1943, Prime 
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Minister Laval complained to the Italian ambassador in Vichy Avarna di Gualtieri, that the 
Italians were not only protecting the Italian Jews, but also the foreign jews. As rightly 
asserted by Jonathan Steinberg, this later point was problematic for Vichy: the rescue of 
foreign Jews from deportation and even from French labor camps at a time when French 
Jews were being rounded up and sent to German extermination camps was badly damaging 
to Vichy's prestige.
1090
 Indeed, the Jewish issue needs to be placed in the wider context of 
relations between Vichy and the Axis nations. The French brought this problem to their talks 
with the Germans. In a January meeting with the commander of the SS police in France SS-
Brigadeführer Oberg, René Bousquet, the Secretary-General for the Police in the Vichy 
Ministry, bitterly complained about Italian CIAF authorities who were hindering the search 
for Jews in southeastern France.
1091
 Vichy authorities recognized that this was an issue they 
could use to drive a wedge between the two Axis partners while in the meantime showing the 
Germans that they were willing to fully collaborate with them in their racial policy. German 
officials in France, upon hearing about the situation in the Italian occupation zone, vented 
their frustration to Berlin. High-ranking Nazi officials approached their Italian counterparts 
in late January and early February to inquire as to the reasons for the Italian leniency. The 
German protestations eventually paid off. On 16 February, the Fourth Army command 
communicated to the Oberbefehlshaber West (German Army Command in the West) that 
"dangerous Jewish elements" would be forcibly concentrated in places far from the 
coastline.
1092
 The tone of this document was harsh enough to reassure the Germans of the 
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unity between Italian and German policy on this delicate aspect of the occupation. However, 
the directive of the General Staff delivered to Italian local commanders, which established 
the forced residence of Jews and citizens of enemy states took a much more neutral, if not 
actually sympathetic tone towards the Jews. Jews were given a reasonable amount of time 
(five days) to reach their destinations, and, both individuals older than sixty and women 
living alone were exempted from the directive.
1093
  
This directive appeased the Germans, but did little to reassure the French who were 
still dispossessed of their prerogatives in settling the Jewish question. It was only a matter of 
time before Italian Jewish policy would clash with Vichy's anti-Semitic campaign. At the end 
of February, the prefects of the Savoy departments, under precise directives from their 
government who was seeking to meet German quotas for deportees to the East, organized 
round-ups of foreign Jews. Italian military and CIAF authorities in the Savoy region instantly 
opposed, in many cases successfully, the deportations to the Occupied Zone. This position 
was confirmed in a telegram from the Italian General Staff to the Fourth Army Command on 
1 March, which reiterated that French prefects did not have authority over any Jews, 
regardless of the Jews' nationality. Therefore, local commanders were required to prevent any 
action of Vichy authorities, if necessary by resorting to the arrest of any prefect tampering 
with the Italian policy.
1094
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The Germans were certainly not impressed with the Italian army's opposition to the 
deportations. On 9 March, Von Ribbentrop wrote a memorandum to the German ambassador 
in Rome, Von Mackensen, asking him to raise with the Duce that it was his opinion that the 
task of rounding up Jews should be given either to the French police, to the SS, or to the 
Italian police, as Regio Esercito cadres had proven unreliable. In fact, the Germans openly 
favored the third solution as they thought the Polizia Politica would be as ruthless as the 
Gestapo in hunting down the Jews.
1095
 
At first, it seems indeed that the Italians would finally abide by the German Jewish 
policy of massive deportations to the East. The Fourth Army was told to refrain from 
intervening in the Jewish issue, and was furthermore instructed to hand over to Vichy or 
German authorities any Jew who had come to the Italian occupation zone after 26 March 
1943.
1096
 Mussolini personally handpicked Guido Lospinoso as the new General Police 
Inspector to resolve the Jewish issue. The fact that Lospinoso was a police official who had 
worked in the Italian Consulate in Nice in the 1930s tracking the fuoriusciti's activities in the 
Côte d'Azur was not reassuring to many Jews, who were worried that his nomination bore 
grim tidings. In fact, the Italians had no intention whatsoever in changing their Jewish policy. 
Lospinoso procrastinated, delaying his arrival in Nice until the beginning of May and 
refusing to meet with any German official for several weeks, sparking anger among SS clerks 
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in France, who accused the new Italian official of having fallen under Donati's influence.
1097
 
Indeed, in his recollections of the Nice period, Lospinoso mentions the crucial role of the 
omnipresent Jewish banker as the link between local Italian authorities and the Jewish 
community.
1098
 Moreover, Lospinoso, in a postwar interview to an Italian newspaper, 
boasted about his role in saving the Jews.
1099
 However, Italian Jewish policy in France seems 
to have been an admirable concerto orchestrated between different musicians, perhaps 
coordinated by Lospinoso as director, than the work of a soloist. Neither the Italian police, 
nor CIAF officials were willing to hand over the Jews to their German counterparts, and they 
both gladly supported the work of the Dubouchage Committee, which provided financial 
support for the rescue operation. The Italian army moreover provided the logistical support 
needed to move the thousands of Jews from the coastline to the inland villages and the 
personnel to guard the Jews once there. 
The "forced residences" were in fact a godsend for cornered refugees who had 
nowhere to go. The Italians were willing to let the Jews live as they saw fit, provided they 
stayed within the village and registered with the local Italian garrison twice a day. The 
Jewish refugees thus were able to recreate an authentic Jewish colony in the alpine villages. 
For instance, in Saint-Martin-Vésubie, a local committee, elected by the whole community, 
was implemented, to act as the vehicle for communicating any eventual issues or requests to 
the Italian military authorities, Jewish schools and synagogues were actually created, in what 
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was probably a unique situation in Axis-occupied Europe.
1100
 In the words of a German Jew, 
"I saw some scenes I had not seen in a long time: Jews calmly strolling through the streets or 
sitting at tables outside cafés, chatting in English, German, and some in Yiddish."
1101
 Vichy 
Contrôle Postal confirmed that the Jews were ecstatic in their new residences: Italian soldiers 
were "kind-hearted" (cœur d'or) and treated the Jews "in a very humane way." Indeed, the 
Jews were "extremely happy to be under the Italian army's protection."
1102
 In fact, the Italian 
army was not only permitting the refugees to live a normal life, barring the fact that they 
were forbidden to work, but were also shielding them from Vichy's eager grasp. For instance, 
on 6 April, French gendarmes tried to arrest two Jewish women who had escaped a Vichy 
forced labor camp. However, the women not only refused to leave the village but also went 
to complain to the local Italian commander. Shortly thereafter, the local Carabiniere 
commander chastised the two gendarmes by pointing out that the Jewish population in the 
village fell under Italian jurisdiction, and therefore, the French police were not allowed to 
have any contact with them. In fact, and it is impossible not to hear some irony in the Italian 
commander's words, "Notwithstanding the freedom they enjoy, you have to consider them as 
individuals living in a concentration camp surrounded by barbed wire, militarily guarded and 
which you should not come near."
1103
  
The Italians stayed true to their commitment to defend the Jews until the end of the 
occupation. Jews in increasinlgy great numbers flocked to the Italian occupation zone as 
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rumors spread that the Italian zone was a safe haven for the Jewish population.
1104
 In July, a 
Nice police report stressed the powerlessness of the French to stop the escape of Jews from 
Vichy labor camps to Italian army officials, who then redirected them to forced residence 
villages.
1105
 Following the ousting of Mussolini on 25 July 1943 and the subsequent rumors 
of an imminent disengagement of the Italian army from the French front, Jews protected by 
the Italians stormed the Italian consulate in Nice to plead with the Italian authorities to send 
them to Italy. Even a harsh life in Italian concentration camps, they desperately cried, was a 
more preferable fate than fall again into German clutches.
1106
 The urgency of the situation in 
occupied France was acknowledged by the Italian Foreign Ministry who authorized its 
officials in France to give safe-conduct to Italian Jews requesting repatriation, even without 
the previous screening of the Italian Interior Ministry usually required.
1107
 Moreover, up to 
the last days of August, when it was evident that the Italians would be leaving France soon, 
Italian authorities were still protecting the Jews from being drafted to the STO or to forced 
labor camps. This resolute stance triggered formal protests from Prime Minister Laval, who 
feared the prestige of the Vichy regime would be seriously compromised if the Jews were 




                                                     
1104 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 265, IT 3095, 
n°4276/Inf. "Afflusso ebrei," Comando I CA, 24 May 1943. 
1105 ADAM 616 W 51, Note de renseignements pour le rapport du 25 juillet 1943, Mesures administratives 
prises à l'encontre des français et étrangers. 
1106 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 80, Telegramma n°5000 R. "Communicazione per Ministro 
Vidau," Console italiano a Nizza Speichel, 31 July 1943. 
1107 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 80, Telegramma n°25012/P.R. from Vidau, 2 August 1943; 
Telegramma n°24335/C. from Vidau, 6 August 1943. 
1108
 ASMAE, Affari Politici 1931-1945, Francia, Box 80, Telegramma n°24348/P.R. "Ebrei nella zona di 
occupazione italiana: lavoro obbligatorio," Ambasciata Italiana a Parigi, 28 August 1943. 
 
 386 
The last days of the Italian occupation were even more frantic. In early September, 
the Italian army, under Lospinoso's directive, moved Jewish refugees who had been housed 
in inland villages closer to the Italian border, in anticipation of a precipitous flight across the 
border.
1109
 In fact, a few days before the 9 September Armistice, many Jews were transferred 
to Nice.
1110
 Donati was in fact working on persuading the Italian Navy to lend some of their 
ships so as to bring the Jews to Italy. The operation however fizzled due to the utter panic 
that followed the announcement of the Armistice, and Nice would in fact become a grim trap 
for thousands of foreign Jews, where the Germans could hunt them down easily.
1111
 If the 
Italian authorities failed to organize a comprehensive plan to move the Jews to Italy, some 
local commanders took the initiative to bring their protégés with them when they withdrew to 
Italy.
1112
 That was the case in the alpine village of Saint-Martin-Vésubie. The local 
commander, Lieutenant Strobino, upon hearing of the Armistice, immediately phoned the 
commander of the garrison of Cuneo, the city on the other side of the border to inquiry about 
a structure which could house hundreds of Jewish refugees. Upon receiving an affirmative 
response, with the help of local Jewish leaders, Strobino set in motion the evacuation of the 
Jews in the village. Long columns of Jews, escorted by Italian soldiers fled the village to 
cross the border through the Col des Fenêtres. The biblical exodus was a difficult trek, as the 
trail peaked at more than 2,000 meters and was more than fifteen kilometers long. This trip, 
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which would require quite an effort even for experienced hikers, was an excruciating 
experience for individuals heavily loaded with luggage, some of whom were either too young 
or too old to walk at more than a slow walking pace. The worst part, however, was probably 
the terror of the doom quickly approaching from behind, a nightmare cornered Jews knew 
well enough. However, it was not only this grave danger of being captured by the Germans 
which ultimately motivated frightened Jews to run for their life over a difficult mountain 
trail. In a generous gesture, Italian soldiers set up supply points in chalets along the trail to 
aid the Jews on the journey across the border. Hundreds of Jews made it to Italy, but 
unfortunately, the Germans, anticipating the flight across the Alps, had already occupied the 
Italian side and arrested most of the Jewish refugees, along with their Italian guides.
1113
 
The grim outcome of the Jewish odyssey does not belittle the significance of Italian 
soldiers risking their lives to save Jewish civilians at a time of stressful political turmoil on 
the Italian peninsula. The exodus of St-Martin-Vésubie was the logical culmination of the 
Italian's benign attitude in France. If the historians agree that the Italian Jewish policy in 
France was in flagrant opposition to those of Vichy and the Germans, the academic 
community is much more divided on the reasons behind this choice. Poliakov and Hannah 
Arendt argue that the traditional humanism of the Italian people explained their generosity 
towards the Jews.
1114
  This paradigm has been refined by modern authors. Jonathan 
Steinberg, for instance, contrasts the modern German nation, where anti-Semitism grassroots 
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was rampant, to the modern Italian nation, where Jews accounted for only a tiny part of the 
population and were well-integrated in the Italian social fabric. As a matter of fact, anti-
Semitism, especially in its biological form, was foreign to the Italian tradition. Moreover, 
while German officers were trapped in their tradition of blind obedience and martial efficacy, 
their Italian counterparts were more traditional in their beliefs, which emphasized both the 
Catholic piety and the enlightened values of the civiltà italiana.
1115
 Daniel Carpi on the other 
hand, emphasizes the absence of anti-Semitism in Italian army cadres and civil officials, and 
he attributes it to the failure of the Fascist regime to change the minds of its citizens.
1116
 
Steinberg and Carpi also stress that Italian humanism was not the only factor explaining the 
benevolent policy of the Italians in southeastern France. Political calculations were also 
involved in the Italian decision to save the Jews. Italian army leaders considered it their right 
to carry out any policy they deemed fit in southeastern France, while on the other hand, CIAF 
officials were also interested in delegitimizing the Vichy regime in order to prepare for the 
future incorporation of the irredentist lands into Italy. Therefore, their behavior was part of a 
strategy to assert Italy's sovereignty on the Free Zone. Moreover, the Italians endeavored to 
demarcate their policy from the German one, in order to stress the fact that they were capable 
of coming up with an indipendent policy, reinforcing their position that Italy should be 
treated on an equal footing with Vichy in the Axis negotiations.  
This pragmatist perspective on the Italian Jewish policy in southeastern France has 
been strongly argued by both Jean-Louis Panicacci and Davide Rodogno. Panicacci insists on 
the fact that Italian benevolence was also the product of their far-sightedness. Financial 
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holdings of the Italian royal family, Vatican prelates and even of Fascist high-ranking 
officials were deposited in American banks. Thus, the Italians did everything to endear the 
United States whose Congress allegedly had a powerful Jewish lobby, in order to avoid 
having their assets frozen.
1117
 Furthermore, both Panicacci and Rodogno note that the Jews 
were merely pawns in the complex relations between the Fascist, Nazi and Vichy regimes. In 
fact, the Jewish question was often used by local Italian authorities to challenge any 
interference from Vichy and the Germans in what Italians saw as their zone of influence. 
Rodogno, however, goes further, minimizing the Italian efforts, insisting that there was no 
overarching policy to save the Jewish refugees, but only localized cases of bribed soldiers, 
whose slackness allowed the escape of cornered Jews.
1118
  
While it is much of a truism that the lack of discipline in the Italy army and the Italian 
desire to affirm their sovereignty played a strong role in shaping the Italian policy, these two 
factors do not themselves explain the soft Italian policy with regards to the Jewish question 
in France. Indeed, if it was only a question of asserting one's authority in the newly occupied 
territory, the Italians could have herded the Jews in concentration camps, and then eventually 
dispatched them to the Germans without going through Vichy's security agents. In this case, 
they could have maintained their sovereignty in the newly occupied zone without annoying 
their senior partner. Rodogno rightly asserts that the Jews were never a high priority for 
Italian commanders, and indeed, it is odd then that they did not get rid of the Jewish refugees 
in the first months of the occupation. If nothing else, this cold pragmatic policy would have 
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had the double advantage of not having to use human and logistical resources to guard them 
later, while in the meantime discouraging any Jewish refugee living in the occupied zone to 
travel to the Italian one. Thus, it is difficult to dismiss the Italian approach as coldly 
pragmatic. In fact, the absence of anti-Semitism among both Italian army cadres and 
Farnesina officials is glaring and has been noted by all historians.
1119
 Italian officials were 
aware of the atrocities perpetrated by the Germans in eastern Europe and of the fate awaiting 
the Jewish population in Europe. The Italian ambassador in Berlin, Dino Alfieri, for instance, 
sent a poignant memorandum to the Farnesina, denouncing in shocking details the harrowing 
conditions of German concentration camps.
1120
 Other officials had been probably first-hand 
witnesses of German atrocities, like the Italian CIAF delegate in Nice, Calisse, who served as 
Italian Consul in Sarajevo during the war. Moreover, it is unthinkable that a Jewish man such 
as Donati, regardless of his real influence with Italian local and national authorities, could 
have otherwise enjoyed any leeway in the Nazi inner circles.  
The Italian policy of shielding Jews was effective until September 1943 because it 
was one of the only aspects of the Italian occupation on which army and CIAF officials 
wholeheartedly agreed. There is not hint to any dissension from Italian documents regarding 
this generous stance, and all Italian officials collaborated in it without exception. In fact, 
even the irredentist movement failed to show any anti-Semitic signs. Of course, that does not 
mean that anti-Semitic people did not exist in the Italian state, but at least in France they 
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were certainly kept at bay. The Jews were certainly favored by the fact that they did not 
represent a threat to the security of the Italian army or to the ambitions of Italian 
expansionists. In that regard, the Italian Jewish policy could be seen as a pragmatic one, 
careful enough not to stir up conflicts or create problems that were not directly tied to 
security matters. However, the Italians did not passively ignore the Jews, but actively assisted 
them and bettered their lives. Only the unfortunate events following the Armistice meant that 
fewer Jews could be saved. It was clear that, at least in the terms of the Jewish policy, the 





Easy Come Easy Go: the end of the Italian occupation 
The end of the Italian occupation of southeastern France was much more dramatic 
than its beginning. The disorganization of the Italian army, along with the sudden 
announcement of the Armistice, changed what should have been a gradual disengagement 
from southeastern France to a complete rout back into Italy. This dramatic collapse made 
manifest both the weaknesses of the Italian army in the frailty of its logistic network and the 
poor morale of its soldiers, but also its strengths, in the form of a moderate policy which was 
not seriously questioned even in the last frenetic moments of the occupation.  
The end of the Italian military occupation in France started with Duce's dismissal by 
the Italian King Vittorio Emanuele III on 25 July 1943 and his subsequent arrest by the 
Italian Carabinieri.  This decision was, first and foremost, a clear repudiation of the 
imperialist and aggressive policy of the Fascist regime. It was evident to many soldiers of the 
Fourth Army that the new government would soon order a withdrawal from the former Zone 
Libre. The news of the King's decision and the hope of rapid repatriation sparked scenes of 
euphoria in soldiers and officers alike. According to a report by the Prefect of the Hautes-
Alpes, later confirmed by postwar interviews with former soldiers of the Fourth Army, 
Italians troops cheered the news of Mussolini's demise to the point that officers "were 
celebrating with champagne" (sabler avec le champagne).
1121
 Italian commanders were 
certainly happy that the Duce had been replaced by Marshall Badoglio, a former Army 
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General who was loyal to the monarchy, but their joy was also tempered by the fear of a 
collapse of the already poor discipline in the Fourth Army. For this reason, on 27 July, 
Vercellino urgently sent a telegram to all units complaining about "the jubilation with 
debauchery and sustained squalls"(esultanza con gozzoviglie e schiamazzi prolungati) 
especially on the part of some Fourth Army officers. Vercellino tried to bolster morale by 
reminding the men that the waning of the Fascist regime was not the prelude to the end of the 
war and that the Allies were still fighting for "unconditional surrender" by Italy.
1122
 Another 
directive from him reminded soldiers and officers that the Allied airforce was "cynically 
destroying cities and tormenting populations [in Italy] with its terrorist bombings."
1123
 
Finally, another directive on 1 August urged the commanders to avoid using the word 
"peace" at all cost.
1124
 Concurrent with this campaign to shore up morale in the Italian army, 
the new government was trying to demarcate itself from the former regime. Italian soldiers 
were invited to refrain from any political activity or manifestation, and it was particularly 
meaningful that the order came from the new MSVN (Blackshirts) national commander, 
General Quirino Armellini.
1125
 Moreover, all outward Fascist symbols were being expunged. 
On 29 July, the Roman salute, along with Fascist symbols such as the Littorio as well as 
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Fascist mottos, were officially abolished.
1126
 Of course, asking soldiers who had been 
indoctrinated for years of Fascist propaganda to now instantly abandon the doctrine would 
have been, at minimum very upsetting for many soldiers. The younger generation of soldiers 
especially, who had been schooled in Fascist principles and rhetoric their entire lives, was 
completely at a loss, now that its absolute ruler had been removed like a common politician.   
In fact, notwithstanding the continuous calls to order by the Fourth Army command, 
evidence that the end of the war was approaching led to the disintegration of army morale 
and discipline. Endemic issues of the entire Italian occupation, such as soldiers and officers 
openly familiarizing with local girls became widespread, to the point that it happened even 
"in smaller villages and even in the countryside, at every hour during the day and night, even 
in spite of curfews."
1127
 In fact, Italian commanders noted alarmingly that security around 
Italian garrisons and barracks was inadequate as civilians, including women, wandered in and 
out unchecked by the sentinels.
1128
 Indeed, Vercellino insisted that the death of an Italian 
border guard gunned down on 2 August near the Swiss border was more the result of the 
poor enforcement of security measures than the partisans' prowess.
1129
 More importantly, 
                                                     
1126 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 338, IT 4296, 
n°9477/T. "Abolizione del saluto romano e cancellazione di emblemi," 29 July 1943. These changes were not 
limited to the Italian army, but also touched the other services. The air force, for instance, asked its officers to 
remove the Fascio on their uniforms. ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives 
Microfilm T-821, Roll 261, IT 3077, n°324/O "Variante al regolamento sull'Uniforme," 15 August 1943. 
1127 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 270, IT 3124, 
n°758/P.D. "Contegno dei militari in rapporto alle relazioni femminili," 12 August 1943, see also ARC, 
Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 261, IT 3077, 
n°E/53/R.P. "Contegno degli ufficiali in rapporto alle relazioni femminili,"Comando Aeronautica della 
Provenza, 6 September 1943. 
1128 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 267, IT 3100, 
n°5876/2 di prot. "Sorveglianza alle caserme ed agli accontonamenti," Comando I CA, 9 August 1943. 
1129
 ARC, Collection of Italian Military Records 1935-1943, National Archives Microfilm T-821, Roll 267, IT 3100, 
n°14068/Op. di prot. "Incapacità di comando," 8 August 1943. 
 
 395 
soldiers were found singing "subversive songs," probably Communist hymns such as 
Bandiera Rossa (Red Flag).
1130
 Yet, these songs were much more than just symptoms of a 
profound malaise within the Italian army. They were also evidence that the Resistance was 
actively recruiting, and with a certain degree of success. Indeed, the downfall of the Fascist 
regime had been a boon for the fuoriusciti recruiters. The Italian General Staff sent an 
alarming report to the Fourth Army Command that the fuoriusciti were intensifying their 
efforts to infiltrate the Fourth Army with propaganda and to expatriate in Italy, taking 
advantage of the confusion at the porous Italian-French border.
1131
  Moreover, in some 
regions such as the Savoy and Corsica, the Resistance radicalized, by killing and wounding 
Italian civilians and soldiers in ambushes and bombing attacks.
1132
  
Italian army cadres blamed these acts of violence on the French police's inability to 
thwart Resistance attacks, even accusing them of outright complicity with the Resisters. For 
this reason, the Fourth Army Command imposed draconian rules on the population.
1133
 The 
Bando Vercellino (Vercellino Proclamation), published by French newspapers in the Italian-
occupied zone on 17 August 1943, ordered the death penalty for a wide variety of crimes, 
ranging from the sabotage of military and communication infrastructure to armed 
insurrection to harming Italian soldiers and organizing into "subversive" groups. Even simply 
articulating Leftist ideas (defined as "forwarding the violent implementation of a dictatorship 
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of one social class, or the extermination of one social class, or the subversion of economical, 
political and social structures") could lead to a sentence of two to eight years in prison.
1134
 In 
reality, the punishments were seldom carried out, except in Corsica and Haute-Savoie, two 
regions which had been unruly since the beginning of the Italian occupation.
1135
 On the 
contrary, the Fourth Army Command asked local newspapers all over the occupied zone to 
publish a subsequent proclamation which granted amnesty to all those who chose, by the end 
of August, to surrender their weapons.1136 In all probability, this clemency was dictated by 
the fact that the Italians wanted to avoid an escalation of an internal rebellion they would 
have difficulty suppressing anyway and by their inability to enforce any oppressive 
regulation. This inherent weakness was evidenced by the fact that the Italian army was still 
unable to evacuate the coastline zone (Zona Combattimento) in mid August 1943, although it 
had been ordered as early as 22 April.
1137
 On the other hand, Italian commanders were 
ruthless with their own soldiers in an effort to curtail any slackness within the Fourth Army. 
For instance, four soldiers who had failed "to march in formation to reach the location 
assigned to their unit" got an exemplary sentence of twenty to twenty-two years.
1138
    
It is important to understand that the loss of discipline within the Italian army was the 
product of the widespread feeling that the war was drawing to an end. Indeed, starting late 
July 1943, the Italians set in motion their gradual disengagement from southeastern France. 
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The first to go was the flagship division of the Fourth Army, the Legnano Division, which 
left France at the beginning of August, followed in early September by the EFTF and part of 
the Lupi Division.
1139
 In fact, all units with the exception of the two Coastal Divisions (223° 
and 224°) were supposed to return to Italy by midnight of 9 September. Officially, the 
Italians were moving their troops from France in order to shore up Italy's defenses as they 
feared the Allies would soon attempt to invade the peninsula after their successful landing in 
Sicily in mid-July (Operation Husky). In hindsight, one could not help but think that the 
Italians were also moving their troops out of the various theaters of war in preparation for an 
incoming reversal of alliance. It appears that the Germans suspected this. The Germans had 
been already very suspicious of their erstwhile ally long before the ousting of Mussolini. 
Their masterplan to disarm and subdue Italian units in France, codenamed "Operation Alaric" 
had been drawn up as early as May 1943.
1140
 Undeniably, the General Staff's hurried decision 
to withdraw important units from Provence, starting with the elite Legnano, did little to quell 
German suspicion. CIAF officials noted that "German officials are still polite, but any 
sentiment of camaraderie has vanished from their side."
1141
 An Italian army report, based on 
CIAF information, underlined that in SS circles the disengagement from France "was seen as 
a betrayal, and further heightened the feeling of antipathy against Italy, which had lain 
dormant until now."
1142
 At a meeting in Casalecchio between Italian and German military 
leaders on 15 August 1943, General Jodl, the Chief of the Operations Staff of the German 
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Armed Forces High Command, ironically asked the head of the Italian Army's General Staff, 
General Roatta, if the units withdrawn from France "would be deployed in southern Italy or 
near the Resia and Brenner Pass [across the Italian-German border]."
1143
  
The Germans shrewdly played on the Italian need for extra units to bolster the 
peninsula's coastal defense to send some Wehrmacht units to Italy.
1144
 Of course, the real 
motivation behind the deployment of German units in Italy was to intimidate Italian local 
commanders and, if needed, to intervene in case of an Italian betrayal. More than anything, at 
the beginning, the movement of a substantial number of troops into the Italian occupation 
zone en route to the Italian territory unnerved the Italian soldiers. Friction between Italian 
and German soldiers became widespread. Local Italian commanders bitterly complained that 
these German soldiers and officers were arrogant and completely disregarded all Italian 
decrees, whether pertaining to traffic, the purchase of goods or even regulation of private 
property.
1145
 Wehrmacht personnel were especially inclined to break Italian curfews, giving 
false permits to French bistrot owners allowing them to keep their establishments open. 
Italian patrols were flabbergasted by the lack of discipline on the part of the noisy and 
boisterous Germans who kept reveling all night long. In a few cases, the officers offered the 
weak excuse that they did not know about the curfews, but in most cases, they simply offered 
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 More importantly, German units in transit settled near Italian quarters 
"behaving like masters of the house, carrying out artillery barrages, marches and drills with 
the intent to intimidate (a scopo intimidatorio)."
1147
 It was glaringly clear that the fall of the 
Fascist regime had definitely strained relations between the Axis partners at all levels. 
Germans and Italians warily watched each other, each expecting the other to make the fatal 
move that would shatter the coalition. 
The Forty-five days between the Duce's dismissal and the Armistice were tense in the 
Côte d'Azur, but did nothing to prepare for the massive drama that unfolded in 8 September 
1943, the date of the most terrible military disaster in the history of Italy. On 3 September 
1943, the Fourth Army Command received a directive called "Memoria 44" from the Italian 
General Staff Army which outlined to the Fourth Army the plan which should be carried out 
in the event of a German attack. Italian units in France were to be deployed to protect the 
main axes of communication and the passes at the border to counter any German invasion of 
Italy from France. In addition, the Italians were directed to attempt to outflank and attack any 
German troops either while on the move or while resting after marching. However, it is 
important to note that the directive gave absolutely no hint of the Italian-Allied negotiations 
which were ongoing at that time.
1148
 
In retrospect, this directive was no more than wishful thinking and for more than one 
reason. First of all, the Italian units were extremely demoralized, as most of the soldiers 
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could not wait to see the end of the war and to be repatriated. Their sense of loss was 
heightened by their poor armament, and the comparison with the highly efficient motorized 
German units replete with tanks and armored cars was unforgiving. The nail in the coffin of 
the Italian hopes to stop the German army was dealt by the 8 September Armistice. Much ink 
has been spilled on the Armistice between the Italians and the Allied powers.
1149
 All authors 
however agree on the fact the Italian army higher echelons were not left completely in the 
dark regarding the negotiations with the Allies, but that they were also not given any 
timetable for the imminent reversal of alliance. Of course, the confusion had originated from 
the botched negotiations between the two sides, which led to the Armistice being signed on 3 
September, but only announced by the Allies on 8 September 1943 at 6.30 p.m., and then, 
still only unilaterally. This in turn forced the Italian King, Vittorio Emanuele, and the head of 
the government, General Badoglio, to make the Armistice public on Italian radio one hour 
later. As incredible as it seems, the Armistice declaration caught the entire Italian army off 
guard, as no warnings had been previously sent to Army commands.  
This inexcusable mistake proved even graver for Italian units quartered outside the 
peninsula. Military leaders of the Fourth Army Command were shocked to hear of the 
Armistice. General Trabucchi, the head of the Fourth Army General Staff, immediately 
phoned the General Staff Army, only to be told that even General Roatta, the head of General 
Staff Army, had only found about the Armistice through the Allied radio broadcast and that 
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the Fourth Army Command was now on its own.
1150
 The appalling lack of directive from 
Rome doomed the Fourth Army. Each commander or soldier reacted with frantic panic in an 
atmosphere of "every man for himself." Soldiers were still scattered haphazardly all over the 
Mediterranean coastline, from Toulon to La Spezia, as some divisions were still in the 
process of transferring part of their units to Italy. This situation led to some grotesque scenes, 
such as in the case of the head of the Pusteria division, General Magliano, who was arrested, 
along with his General Staff, while dining with the commander of the local German 
garrison.
1151
 In most cases, due to the complete disarray of Italian troops who were left to 
fend for themselves, the Germans had little difficulty in disarming and arresting their former 
allies. German commanders surrounded the headquarters of the local Italian unit with tanks, 
artillery guns and heavy machineguns, ordering the Italians to surrender. Disoriented 
members of the Regio Esercito, who had been ordered up until a few days earlier, to 
fraternize with their Wehrmacht colleagues, surrendered en masse, feeling abandoned by 
Rome. Remarkably, in some cases, the Italians fought back tooth and nail. In Albertville, a 
city in Savoy, members of the Val Toce and Val d'Orco regiments fought through the night, 
cornered inside their barracks, killing four German soldiers and surrendering only at dawn. 
The city of Grenoble, the capital of the Isère department, saw a full-fledged confrontation 
which allegedly resulted in hundreds of casualties on both sides. In Nice, the small Italian 
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garrison in the Nice railway station refused to surrender and fought hand to hand with the 
Germans in a "last ditch-stand."
1152
  
In fact, when the Italians were well led by resolute officers and were not confronted 
with overwhelming odds, they managed to counterattack with surprising efficaciousness, 
given the circumstances. A few units managed to slow down the German advance by 
blowing up crucial bridges and tunnels leading to Italy.
1153
  In the end though, these barouds 
d'honneur did little to minimize the epic military disaster. Of course, the Italians had already 
lost when the government failed to inform the army of the armistice, and then fled from 
Rome, with the King, to southeastern Italy. Vercellino, who had managed to retreat with part 
of the Fourth Army Command to Cuneo, a city across the Italian border, was forced to sign a 
directive officially disbanding the Fourth Army on 12 September 1943.
1154
 Thus ended, 
rather disgracefully, the Italian occupation of France, three years of occupation of a foreign 
soil which had gained only minimal resources for the Italian war machine and less prestige 
for the Italian state in exchange for continuous political, strategic and military trouble.  
In fact, the end of the occupation eerily matched its beginning in June 1940 and 
September 1942, both in its strategic failure and its utter disorganization. The local 
population was extremely surprised to see the Italian troops pick up and leave so 
precipitously, in an incredible din which turned into a complete rout. A French truck driver in 
Saorge was forcefully recruited at gunpoint by an Italian officer to drive his vehicle instantly 
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ottobre 1943, pp.162-164. 
1153 See for instance ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 9 Capitulation Italienne, Rapport n°832/2, Gendarmerie 
Roquebrune/Cap-Martin sur les évènements consécutifs à l'occupation allemande, 12 September 1943. 
1154 The directive can be found in Torsiello, Le Operazioni delle unità italiane nel settembre-ottobre 1943, 
p.170. For having given the order to disband, Vercellino was prosecuted in the aftermath of the war for 
desertion, but was later acquitted. 
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loaded with Italian soldiers, to the Italian border.
1155
 In Breil, soldiers sold their remaining 
Italian military stocks of food to the local population.
1156
 In one instance, in compensation for 
the occupation, generous officers willingly left military materiel such as trucks and gas tanks 
for the use of the local population.
1157
 In most cases though, Italian troops hurriedly fled to 
the border, carrying with them a minimal amount of food or their personal weapons, while 
leaving behind their ammunition and food depots to be plundered by the local population.
1158
 
Soldiers threw away their weapons and ammunition in the bushes, unfortunately resulting in 




It is difficult to estimate how many soldiers of the Fourth Army were captured by the 
Germans in the days following the Armistice. Scholars seem to agree that at least 62,000 
soldiers of the Fourth Army, 37,000 of whom were formerly stationed in France, ended up in 
German prison camps.
1160
 In some cases, Wehrmacht commanders anticipated the moves of 
Italian units trying to escape their stranglehold in southeastern France. For instance, German 
soldiers intercepted an Italian truck convoy in Barcelonnette that had departed from Digne 
                                                     
1155 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 9 Capitulation Italienne, Rapport n°14/4, sur un incident crée par un Lieutenant 
des troupes italiennes de passage, Brigade de Saorge, 10 September 1943.  
1156 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 9 Capitulation Italienne, Rapport 29A, Gendarmerie de Breil-sur-Roya, 11 
September 1943. 
1157 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 6, Rapport n°472/2, sur un incident à l'occasion d'un enlèvement de matériel 
abandonné par les troupes italiennes à St-Vallier de Thiez, Gendarmerie de Grasse, 12 September 1943. 
1158 See for instance ADAM 616 W 114, Rapport Bureau de liaison 994, Gendarmerie de campagne, Lieutenant 
Commandant Scheieler, 16 October 1943. 
1159  ADAM 616 W 114, Rapport n°262/2 Brigade de Lantosque, 24 December 1943; ADAHP  42 W 82, Rapport 
n°6380 "Accident occasioné par l'éclatement de grenade," RG Basses-Alpes, 11 September 1943 and ADAM 
616 W 215 Fichier 6, Lettre du maire de Trinité-Victor au Préfet des Alpes-Maritimes "Explosion ayant entrainé 
blessures à des enfants," 25 September 1943. 
1160 For an overview of the data, Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, pp.306-307. 
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and was heading for the border.
1161
 Other Italian soldiers were even less lucky. An Italian 
soldier who, in an act of desperation, had clung to the back of a departing truck was mortally 
wounded by incoming German troops in Mont Agel.
1162
 Another one was found drowned in 
the river Tinée one week after the Armistice.
1163
 Not all the Italians were captured by the 
Germans, however. Some found refuge in the mountains or were hidden by the local 
population. The Germans of course tried to dissuade the population from assisting the 
fugitives, by posting bilingual posters which grimly reminded anyone that helping any Italian 
straggler or taking Italian weapons were considered crimes punishable by death.
1164
 Yet, part 
of the local population, even the French segment, was quite sympathetic to the Italian 
soldiers' pleas of being stranded in a hostile territory controlled by an army who regarded 
them as traitors. A report from the Var prefect made clear how "many people were moved by 
the [Italian soldiers'] condition, and in a surprising shift of opinion, the very persons who had 
railed against them before suddenly expressed sympathy for them."
1165
 Italian POWs in 
Toulon were helped by the local population, especially women, with food packages to 
ameliorate their meager rations in the German prison camps.
1166
 Especially in places where 
                                                     
1161 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 9 Capitulation Italienne, Rapport n°12011 CAB, Préfet des Basses-Alpes, 9 
September 1943.  
1162 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier 9 Capitulation Italienne, Procès-verbal n°152/4 sur la découverte d'un cadavre de 
militaire italien au Mont-Agel, Brigade de la Turbie, 10 September 1943.  
1163 ADAM 159 W 49, Procès-verbal n°4/74 Brigade de Isola, 15 September 1943. 
1164 ADAM 616 W 215 Fichier Nice Communications émanant du Commandement allemand, Verbindungsstab 
994 Abt. Ic, Az. 63 a, tgb 2317/43, Asile aux soldats italiens, 16 September 1943. 
1165 AN, F1, cIII 11194, rapport périodique du 1er octobre 1943, cited by Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, 
p.311. It is interesting to note that the report underlined that the sympathy was stronger "on the coastline, 
where the population was heavily mixed [between Italians and French]."  
1166 Emmanuel Volpi, L'Occupation italienne dans le département du Var (Novembre 1942 -Septembre 1943), 
Master 2 d'Histoire préparé sous la direction de Jean-Louis Panicacci, UFR LASH, Nice, 2007, pp.99-100, cited 
by Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, pp.312-313. 
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the Italians had fought back, such as Grenoble, the populace could not hide their admiration 
of their dogged resistance in the face of overwhelming odds.
1167
  
That is not to say that the French population was sad to see the Italian army leave. On 
the contrary, there were the scenes of jubilation across southeastern France, especially in the 
part of the zone which had been occupied by the Italian army since June 1940. If nothing 
else, the departure of Italian troops meant that the irredentist territories would not be annexed 
by the Fascist state. In Fontan, a French flag was hoisted on the roof of the Mairie and French 
inhabitants decorated the streets with flags.
1168
 The Prefect of the Alpes-Maritime, 
Chaigneau, mentioned in his monthly report that he had been greeted by an ecstatic throng 
during his visit to reinstate the French administration on 12 September 1943.
1169
 However, 
this joy did not last very long as the German occupation established itself. The German 
police carried out massive sweeps of Jews in Nice and these manhunts threw the whole 
department into an "atmosphere of true terror" (atmosphère de véritable terreur). In fact, the 
prefect's report for November-December 1943 emphasized that the situation in the Alpes-
Maritimes had considerably worsened because of the incessant waves of arrests by the 
Germans on one hand, and deadly Resistance attacks on both collaborationist organizations 
and the Germans on the other.
1170
 The former Italian occupied zone soon plummeted into 
violent confrontation. The Germans and their French allies did not hesitate to torture, execute 
or deport anyone opposing their policy, catching in their net a number of innocent victims. 
                                                     
1167 Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, p.312. 
1168 ADAM 169 W 7, réponse de la Ville de Fontan au quéstionnaire du CHOL sur l'occupation et la Libération, 
cited by Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, p.310. 
1169
 ADAM 616 W 97, Rapport d'information sur les mois de septembre et octobre 1943, pp.6bis-8. 
1170 ADAM 616 W 97, Rapport d'information sur les mois de novembre et décembre 1943, 10 January 1943. 
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Resistance fighters, emboldened by the Allied advance and the population's growing hostility 
towards both the Vichy regime and the occupation troops, ramped up their sabotage and the 






How can we explain and characterize the nature of the Italian occupation of France? 
Arguably, it is a difficult task for the historian to give definition to a military occupation in 
the Second World War, given the sheer variety of different perspectives and experiences it 
entailed. The easiest way to evaluate the Italian occupation is to compare it with the 
successive German one, as both occupations roughly lasted the same amount of time. A 
report filed by the Mairie of Nice in 1949 for the Comité d'Histoire de la Deuxième Guerre 
Mondiale made a point of the fact that the Germans had executed (fusillés) fifty people in the 
Commune of Nice and had deliberately pursued a scorched earth policy, while the Italians 
had not.
1171
 If one examines the raw statistics for the overall occupation of France, the 
differences become even more glaring. The Germans killed three times more people in the 
Alpes-Maritimes department alone than the Italians did in their entire occupation zone.
1172
 
Moreover, most of the casualties suffered by the civilian population under the Italian 
occupation happened in Corsica, where the local Resistance movement stepped up its 
opposition to the occupation in early 1943, ambushing and targeting Italian soldiers and 
policemen with surprising success.
1173
  
                                                     
1171 ADAM 169 W 3, "Occupation et Libération de la Commune de Nice, Guerre 1939-1945," Mairie de Nice, 7 
May 1949.  
1172 Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, p.327. The Italians in total killed 40 civilians, the Germans 159 only in the 
Alpes-Maritimes. In total, the Germans executed more than one thousand people in southeastern France, and 
deported 4,000 Resisters and more than 3,000 Jews, most of whom did not return alive. 
1173 For more on the liberation of Corsica, see Panicacci, L'Occupation Italienne, pp.314-323. It should be noted 
that the Germans did not occupy Corsica, as the island would be freed in September by a surprising alliance 
between Italian units quartered on the island and the local Resistance movement. The Italians lost more than 
600 men fighting the Germans.  
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It is true that the Germans occupied southeastern France at the end of 1943, at the 
moment when the conflict in France inexorably downgraded into a civil war without quarter 
between pro-Nazi collaborationist movements like the Milice Française and a more 
structured and efficient Resistance movement, whose ranks had swelled with réfractaires 
from the STO. But even if taking into account the brutalization of the Second World War in 
1944, one can not help but notice a qualitative difference between the Italian occupation and 
the German one which goes beyond the mere numbers of casualties. Unlike the Germans, 
who unremittingly crushed any form of opposition to their power, no matter how harmless, 
and deliberately targeted people who did not pose any threat to their occupation, such as the 
Jews, the Italians tried to balance carefully the need for tight security measures in a situation 
where they faced the real possibility of a joint effort between the local French Resistance and 
an Allied landing on the one hand, and the need for a temperate policy to placate the local 
population on the other. 
Comparing the Italian occupation of France and that of the Balkans is even more 
enlightening. The question is whether if the occupations of France and of the Balkans were 
two sides of the same coin, both reflecting the ambitions of the Italian Duce to create an 
Italian empire where the new Italian stirpe (noble lineage) will dominate. After all, the 
attitude of the occupiers was very different in the two regions. In the Balkans, the Italians 
behaved as colonizers, prone to wanton violence, including razing entire villages, executing 
bystanders and deporting even the most vulnerable such as children and women. In short, 
they committed war crimes. In France, none of this happened. The occupation was certainly 
 
 409 
not easy and seriously impacted on the population, but it never derailed into harsh repression 
or, worse, into a civil war.  
What can explain such different outcomes? For one, it is possible that the political 
chaos of former Yugoslavia amid widespread atrocities inured local Italian units to violence, 
enticing them to implement a ruthless policy.
1174
 It is a truism that the Balkans were ripe with 
atavistic ethnic conflicts which erupted in astonishing violence and widespread atrocities 
under the extraordinary circumstances of occupation during Second World War. No side is 
exempt from blame, as Serb Četniks, Croatian Ustaša, Communist partisans and Germans 
killed each other with a savagery rarely seen in the Second World War outside of the Eastern 
Front. The Italians, confronted with such deep ancestral hatreds and aggressive partisan 
actions retaliated, sometimes with brutality. The Italians' policy, seldom reached the same 
level of systematic ferocity as that of the occupiers or the Resistance, it is important to note, 
but it appears to have still employed a significant amount of violence. One thing is clear, the 
Italians acted more harshly in the Balkans than in France because they felt little sympathy for 
the Slavic populations. Unlike southeastern France, the Italian rank-and-file did not identify 
at all with the local populace, who they described in their memoirs as "feral beasts" whose 
lust for blood was as evident as their absence of hygiene. Not surprisingly, Italian 
commanders had fewer qualms in carrying out reprisals and inflicting a brutal occupation 
policy on individuals whom they considered "an inferior race."
1175
  
                                                     
1174 The similar process could have occurred on the Eastern Front with the Wehrmacht. Indeed, some 
historians posit that both the harsh environment of partisan attacks and peer pressure might explain how 
ordinary men became perpetrators of vicious atrocities, see Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve 
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, New York: HarperCollins, 1992. 
1175 Gobetti, L'occupazione allegra, pp.180-181. 
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On the contrary, in French territory, the situation was almost the opposite. It does not 
appear that the Italian soldiers were hated as much as they had anticipated. At first, the 
reaction of the population to the invasion was one of deep hostility, as everyone feared that 
the occupation would be a prelude to the annexation of the contested territories. However, 
after the dust had settled, it became evident not only that the Italian army had no interest in 
advancing an irredentist agenda, but that the Italian soldiers, in their shabby attire and with 
their weary expressions, deserved compassion more than scorn. Initially, then, the soldiers 
had been despised for what they represented − the Fascist annexationist propaganda so 
vitriolically spewed by their irredentists. However, soon as it became clear that they did not 
represent any danger to the integrity of French sovereignty, most of the population became 
neutral, if not actually helpful. Moved by pity, in the end, as the Germans moved into the 
territory, the locals helped the Italian soldiers escape, and in some cases, even gave them 
asylum in their houses, at a time when helping an Italian soldier did not bear any advantage, 
but in fact could get oneself in serious trouble with the German authorities. This was, 
perhaps, the most revealing insight into the true nature of the relationship between the Italian 
occupying forces and those living under the occupation. 
This entente was facilitated by the moderate occupation policy of the Fourth Army 
Command in the Italian-occupied zone. In order to pacify the region, Vercellino had two 
options: either to implement a harsh policy along the lines of the German occupation of 
northern France and the Italian occupation of the Balkans, or to try a more moderate one to 
ease the population into accepting their presence. CIAF officials, along with irredentist 
militants, pushed for the first option, as they were already looking ahead to the future 
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annexation of the Côte d'Azur to Italy. Their goals, both in the short term and in the longer 
period, were strictly political. While CIAF officials and the irredentists had a difficult start to 
their relationship, it seems that they reached an accommodation, tangibly demonstrated by 
the ease with which notorious separatists moved in and out of CIAF offices. CIAF officials, 
after the disappointment of being sidelined as early as November 1942 by commanders of 
Fourth Army units deployed to the former Zone Libre, understood that their only allies would 
be the local irredentist movement. They thus endeavored to carve out their own sphere of 
influence although without much success, as command units became the sole hubs of power 
in occupied France after the CIAF reorganization in March 1943 which wrested away most 
CIAF officials' prerogatives. Italian civilian functionaries understandably grew bitter and 
complained vociferously to their superiors in Rome, but these cahiers de doléances bore little 
result. 
Thus one of the major themes of the Italian occupation of southeastern France is 
certainly the internecine fight between Italian army commanders and CIAF functionaries. 
Interestingly the rivalry between civil bureaucrats and army officers was not specific to 
France. Luca Pietromarchi, the head of the GABAP (Gabinetto Armistizio Pace, a bureau in 
the Farnesina supervising the occupation in the Balkans), delivered a scathingly report on the 
Second Army in June 1943, accusing it of having “undermined the basis of our policy of 
alliance, collaboration, and guarantees with the Croatian state,” not only because of an 
alliance with the Serbs, but also because the Italians had put some Croatian Ustaša on trial 
and even executed a few.
1176
 The report, of course, glossed over the fact that the Croatians 
                                                     
1176 Pietromarchi Papers and Diary, Turin, 8 June 1943, cited by Burgwyn, Empire on the Adriatic, p.305. 
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condemned by the Italian military tribunals had probably committed atrocities against Serb 
civilians. Moreover, it appears that the weakening position of the Axis powers in Yugoslavia 
was as much of Italian commanders' responsibility the Croat nationalists', who refused to 
accept the incorporation of Greater Croatia into the Italian state. 
Thus, in both countries the military commanders Roatta and Vercellino were severely 
reprimanded by Fascist civil servants. However while Italian units in Yugoslavia ultimately 
had to withdraw as they had been unable to pacify the territory they had occupied in 1941, in 
France, Vercellino was able to keep CIAF officials and irredentists at arm's length with the 
success of his moderate policy and the relatively calm in the region. The Fourth Italian 
Army's command understood that harsh measures would only further alienate a population 
that was already bitter about the coup de poignard dans le dos. Italian military leaders were 
worried that the scorn felt by the French population towards an army which was occupying 
France, but which had not defeated the French army, could easily radicalize into a full-
fledged rebellion. Thus, their short-term goal of pacifying the region was considered more 
vital than the future annexation of southeastern France. Moreover, the Regio Esercito had 
abysmal morale owing due to the global failure of its war effort. It was dubious whether the 
demoralized and poorly trained soldiers could have enforced harsh regulations on a 
population with whom they could so easily relate. 
In fact, not only the rank-and-file's lack of combat spirit, but also the Italian 
commanders' choice to privilege pragmatism over ideology suggests that the Italian army, 
unlike its German counterpart, was far from being fascistized, even at the higher echelons. 
Hardline Fascists would have never allied with the Četnicks, a move that flagrantly 
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contradicted the directives of their supreme leader, the Duce. Moreover, few Fascists would 
have sealed pacts, however flimsy and temporary, with the Serbs, who ranked low in the 
Fascists' racial hierarchy.  An ideological army would have sought an alliance with the Italian 
irredentist movement in France, no matter the questionable reputation of its local members. 
However, the Fourth Army command believed, and rightly so, that sanctioning a separatist 
movement in Provence would only worsen the already precarious situation by stirring the ire 
of the local population, who driving them into the ranks of the French Resistance, and this 
without really gaining any tactical advantage. On the other hand, Četnicks may have been 
racially inferior and not fully honest in their intentions, but they had two big advantages: they 
were as desperate for help as were the local Italian units and secondly, they also had military 
training and a degree of discipline, as opposed to the Italian irredentists who lacked both. 
Yet, the Italian occupation policy in France there was more than mere pragmatism or, 
as some authors have asserted, expediency in a difficult situation. Neither explanation fully 
explains why the Italians helped the Jews, regardless of their nationality. Sheer pragmatism 
would have suggested getting rid of them as expeditiously as possible, by rounding the Jews 
up and handing them directly to German authorities. This process would have enabled the 
Italians to solve the Jewish issue simply, while depriving Vichy's administration of its 
prerogatives. There would not have been the hassle of creating Jewish colonies in Alpine 
resorts, nor of posting units to guard them at a time where every single soldier was dearly 
needed to guard the under-manned bunkers of the Mediterranean coastline. Rodogno insists 
that handing over the Jews damaged the prestige of the Italian army in the eyes of the local 
population. While this may have been the result in the Balkans where many of the Jews were 
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indigenous, it is dubious that the French population would have opposed the arrest of foreign 
Jews, who had been scapegoats since the beginning of their arrival in the Côte d'Azur, 
blamed for the endemic plague of black-marketeering and illicit profiteering. Thus, the 
Italians' benevolent policy appears not to have originated solely from strategic constraints or 
a vested interest in asserting its sovereignty in the new occupied zone, but also from a 
different approach to the occupation of enemy countries in the Second World War. The two 
Axis partners did not have just parallel strategies of war, they operated in parallel moral 
universes. Atrocities which were acceptable to the racist Nazi mindset, such as the 
extermination of Jews and the deportations of entire populations, were alien to the Italian 
strategy of war. To be sure, the Italians established concentration camps and the Italian 
occupation occasionally degraded into massacres in the Balkans; but the Italian army did not 
engage in mass extermination or mass deportations. While the Germans sought to deport 
huge numbers of the conquered population to make room for German colonists while, in the 
meantime, milking as efficiently as possible the conquered territories for their resources, the 
Italians endeavored to colonize through the Italianization of the local population, using both 
force and persuasion to enlist the newly conquered population into the service of the future 
master race. This paternalistic attitude was nowhere so evident as in southeastern France, 
owing to the strong Italian minority of the region and the resulting cultural affinity. In 
Menton, for instance, the Italians wanted to bring in Italian colonists, but they were just as 
keen to have the city's French citizens return to the Cité des Citrons.   
Therefore, we can safely assert that the Italian occupation of France was not in the 
German style, only lower key and less efficient. The Italians had their own independent 
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policy. The peculiarity of its Jewish policy perhaps best exemplifies the difference between 
the two, notwithstanding the pragmatism and reasons of prestige underlying it. Even the 
repression, if compared to the other Italian and German occupations in Europe, was less 
brutal and was generally commensurate with the true gravity of the threat.
1177
 And it appears, 
at least as far as France goes, that the measures implemented by local commanders were not 
simply a practical expedient to compensate for the Italian army's inherent weaknesses, but 
part of a comprehensive strategy to avoid an all-out violent confrontation with the local 
population. To this end, the Fourth Army command not only found itself on a collision 
course with its German counterparts and Vichy officials, but also battling the political 
ambitions of CIAF officials and local irredentists.   
Hopefully, this study has shed some light on Italian occupation, but there is much 
more to explore. While the reasons behind the different Axis polices in France had been 
examined, the comparison of the occupations in France and in the Balkans (an exercise 
beyond the scope of this work) would be revealing. The difference in policy may have been 
attributable to the ruggedness of the Yugoslav partisans, against whom Italian commanders 
adopted a scorched earth policy, compared with the aloofness of the French Resistance in the 
Italian zone. Or perhaps a certain inferiority complex or sense of fraternity stopped the 
Italians from implementing a ruthless policy in France, whereas in the Balkans, as in Africa, 
                                                     
1177 In his chapter on the repression carried out by the Italian army in the occupied territories in Europe, 
Rodogno writes little about the French occupation, only mentioning the 6 May sweep in Nice. He fails to 
realize that this sweep was an exceptional event, never repeated. The author however admits he lacks the 
documentation to further analyze the repressive policy in France, as he did not consult the local archives. 
Rodogno, Fascism's European Empire, p.347.  
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they had fewer qualms about ruling with an iron fist. This study may take us some ways 
towards an understanding of this, by fleshing out the French story.   
I have scarcely touched on the occupation of Corsica, which deserves a study of its 
own, because of the island's peculiar history and its strong separatist movement. The story of 
the Savoy region, where the occupation was harsher due to a more organized Maquis 
movement hiding in the mountains, deserves exploration. Moreover, some archives, such as 
the proceedings of the Fourth Army military tribunal, war crimes dossiers and the censored 
letters from the soldiers, are still unavailable to the scholar, either due to archival regulations 
or to the lack of cataloguing.
1178
 Nevertheless, my dissertation intends to be a point of 
departure in the examination of the Italian occupation of France, on the life of the Italian 
soldiers in World War Two and on the power struggles between the civilian and military 
authorities with regards to the occupation policy in France. The latter point in particular 
seemed to nuance significantly the idea that the Fascist regime was monolithic, as it has been 
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